You present false dilemmas. You either think that all of my actions are caused by physical events, or that they are all totally random, and then you try to stick “free-will” into one of these pigeon-holes.
This view does not take into account the complexities of the mind/body problem. Dualist interactionism presumes that the mind has some element of control over the body - it doesn’t argue that actions are all “random”. Dualist interactionism is neither determinism or indeterminism as you have described it.
I am not saying that dualist interactionism is true - I am just trying to show you that you present a simplistic analysis of the problem that you are trying to solve.
I personally think that the free-will/determinism problem is meaningless without a corresponding metaphysical theory about the mind.
Hi. I think the notion of morality is meaningless without at least the assumption of free will, whether we can determine it or not. The examples usually given of the possibility of some powerful being/s controlling our will just begs the question. Do those beings themselves have free will? Are we not really asking “Is there the possibility of free will anywhere in the universe, rather than just for us?” Could there be anyone controlling those beings who are controlling us and do ‘they’ have free-will?
For me, free-will is an unprovable ideal assumption but it is a feature which I believe must be assumed. Further to that point, I believe both determinism and free-will are unprovable. Freedom is that sense we perceive when we assess, through our judgements, the various conditions in our minds presented to us prior to making a willed-decision. When we finally complete our assessments, a summation occurs and that summation is itself the ‘will.’ We either will to ‘believe’ or to ‘act/not act.’ The willing of belief or action gives us the sense of a boundary between what has gone before and what passes subsequently. The will, as ‘boundary feature’ gives us that sense of freedom. Ultimately however, that freedom cannot be proven.
Cheers, MRJ
Its not a false dilemma until you prove it so. If it is, how do you account for metaphysical free will without being random when your actions are causeless?
Obviously it doesnt argue that actions are random, or I wouldnt have felt compelled to point it out, instead it tries to reconcile it. Now, whats the reconcilition?
Im familiar with quite a few responses, but I cant argue against yours until i know what it is.
I present a simplistic argument, its now your job to show how these complexities refute it and by doing so I will gain an understanding of you position. From then I will probably counter by disputing those complexities or bring in some of my own. Thus, barring misinterpretation of intent, we will successfully have an argument.
If thats what you think is the root of my misunderstanding then show me how. You must show me a reason for agreeing with you.
All I’m asking for is the reasons why you take your position. Just because we are talking metaphysics rather than hard science doesnt mean all positions are equally valid and equally unsupported.
All that I was saying that you give me two metaphysical options, universal causation or complete randomness.
I say that the problem of free-will is that of a self that is neither just a random event nor just part of an endless chain of causes.
Because it is metaphysical, I just cannot tell you how this is “justified”. The problem here is that, just like the belief in the external world, I believe that I have control of my own actions, and I see other human beings doing creative things, making pieces of art, inventing scientific theories, playing sports, writing literature and poetry, and playing musical instruments.
Now, none of this “justifies” my conception of free-will, it is only a mild argument for it. And it seems radically different to the view that the whole universe is deterministic, so every piece of art and every scientific theory was bound to occur by the laws of nature, or that a piece of art or a scientific theory is the result of a “chance” event.
But I suspect that you still want to keep the false dilemma and try to “dissolve” the free-will problem by denying its metaphysical difficulties.
