Good is good and bad is bad (yes morality is really that easy)

[Zeroeth_Nature (Self-Lightening, ΑΘΕΛΗΜΑ,)]

@HumAnIze

The example is to illustrate the obvious difference between pleasure and suffering. Eating a cupcake is a nice experience.

To some. Not everyone likes cupcakes. But sure, it’s just an example.

@HumAnIze

A nail being shoved into your eye is not a nice experience. Anyone can understand immediately and clearly the OBJECTIVE difference between these two experiences. One involved pleasure, the other involves suffering. Categorically different.

Well, are pleasure and suffering really all that different? May there not be a very thin line between the two? Still, I agree that there’s indeed a line between them.

@HumAnIze

Good and bad involve not only conditions of existence such as needing to eat to survive, but also involve motivational feelings and reward-mechanisms including pleasure and suffering. Subjective experience is also an objective fact and arises from objective facts.

Yes, that’s kind of what I meant by that parenthesis about mental health. Mental well-being, motivation, etc.

@HumAnIze

Causing suffering and torture is bad.

No, this is nonsense and doesn’t follow from the aforesaid. Causing suffering to another need not cause suffering to oneself and may even give pleasure to oneself.

@HumAnIze

Maybe in some cases it leads to good results, but that is deflecting from the real issue of the act itself.

Only sociopaths or libtards cannot grasp the intrinsic badness of inflicting torture on someone. To everyone else, who has a healthy and properly functioning mentality, suffering is understood as obviously bad.

That’s at best intersubjective, not objective. Is sociopathy bad, mentally unhealthy, or dysfunctional? Not objectively. It’s funny that you are kind of the “libtard” here, asserting things like this. Also, like your “categorical difference” between pleasure and suffering, it’s quite superficial.

@Sauwelios

They are [possibly] values that are instinctively shared by all healthy human beings. There must then, however, still be a culture that decides that such instinctively shared values are the highest values. We can imagine the following dialogue:

A: “Why should we value X and Y the most highly?”
B: “Because all healthy human beings instinctively value them.”
A: “But why should we value this fact so much?”

Methinks B at this point has only two options:

1. B: “Because all healthy human beings instinctively value it.”

With this we arrive at an infinite regress.

2. B: “Because we have good reasons for doing so, to wit […]”

Instinct is irrational. We can therefore also have good reasons for acting against our instincts. This undermines B’s first answer, “Because all healthy human beings instinctively value them.”