First, my position on the matter is that we do not have free will. Secondly, there are so many people that believe in free will, and don’t have a good reason other than “it feels like I have free will!” Hopefully we can spread the truth about this matter.
I decided to write a short article on the matter. It is fairly technical, so its not much fun to read. (I also posted this essay on the philosophy wiki where fellow philosophers can add/edit their own philosophical content: sophiasdialectic.com/dokuwiki/doku.php )
Freedom and Moral Responsibility
There are few topics in philosophy, which are as controversial as the perennial problem of freedom. My concern is not with various theories of freedom, but with the plausibility of moral responsibility in the context of determinism, compatabilism or libertarianism. Can we really consider agents free enough to choose, and be punished for bad choices? Even if we accept libertarianism or soft determinism and their respective arguments, still, it seems, we have only hit upon entirely determined acts, or uncaused, random acts, neither of which we can be morally responsible for. In arguing that nothing entails absolute freedom, I maintain a sort of modified determinism—where an agent is considered “trivially free†(as opposed to compelled, or under the influence drugs) but not morally responsible. According to modified determinism, freedom is impossible, both in practice and concept.
In an everyday sense, when we speak of acting freely we often mean ‘doing what we want’ or acting without coercion. In other contexts, we may mean that a person is in full possession of normal adult capacities for decision making—that he or she is not under the influence of alcohol or drugs, is mentally competent, and so on. However, this is as far as the concept of freedom extends; it is merely a linguistic distinction between acting in accordance with our own desires, or being forced to conform to another’s desires. Unlike the soft determinists, however, we can still act “trivially free†without implying moral responsibility.
If we are ever to understand the complex problem of freedom and its counterpart, moral responsibility, we must begin with how it is defined in the context of these different theories. Libertarianism and determinism hold that in order for an act to be free, no amount of antecedent conditions are sufficient to guarantee a particular outcome. Libertarians also maintain that when an agent acts freely he is not acting without reasons or influences, but merely that these reasons are not wholly responsible for the action. The soft determinist position asserts that a free act is one that flows from the desires of the individual, even if the very ambitions and personality of the agent are wholly determined.
The libertarian conception of freedom has two distinct branches. The first holds that if actions are insufficiently caused, then the remaining element of a decision, which tips the outcome one way or another, is experienced as an impulse. In this context, it is plausible that multiple outcomes are possible from one set of antecedent conditions.
The second branch maintains that although an agent’s choice is caused and predictable, the will or character from which these decisions flow is uncaused and the agent is still considered free in performing the action. The main distinction is between uncaused actions, and uncaused will. Nonetheless, both of these interpretations of libertarian freedom, however plausible they may be, only allow for a kind of trivial freedom, not freedom in the sense that entails moral responsibility. For example, if I am choosing between eating a snickers bar and drinking coca-cola, multiple factors will influence my final decision. Perhaps I love the way the Carmel and chocolate mingle in my mouth as in the case of a snickers bar, but I am thirsty, so I turn to the coca-cola, and almost take a sip. But suddenly I have a craving for chocolate, and eat the snickers.
If we reversed time and allowed the process of deliberation to occur again, and the second time I decided to drink coca-cola, we could call the choice free (according to the first libertarian definition, where actions are uncaused), in virtue of the fact that the antecedent conditions did not necessarily bring about a certain conclusion. The original craving, which inspired me to eat snickers in the first place, is completely uncaused, or else it would have predisposed me to snickers again the second time. Although the inclination towards chocolate is only of partial value in my process of deliberation, the entire choice can be considered uncaused, because the impulse for chocolate was the deciding factor—without it, I would have acted differently. Subsequently, impulses or actions, which are uncontrolled and occur for no reason whatsoever, are random. Robert Kane best explains how random acts are no freer than determined ones.
An event which is undermined might occur or might not occur, given the entire past. (A determined event must occur, given the entire past.) Thus, whether or not an undetermined event actually occurs, given its past, is a matter of chance. But chance events occur spontaneously and are not under the control of anything, hence not under the control of agents. How then could they be free actions? If, for example, a choice occurred by virtue of a quantum jump or other undetermined event in one’s brain, it would seem a fluke or accident rather than a responsible choice. Undetermined events in the brain or body it seem would inhibit or interfere with out freedom, occurring spontaneously and not under our control. They would turn out to be a nuisance—or perhaps a curse, like epilepsy—rather than an enhancement of our freedom.
The second interpretation of radical freedom, by which actions are generally predictable, but the will inspiring them is uncaused, still does not imply freedom. The libertarians accept that genetics, social conditioning, and upbringing all greatly influence the will, but claim that these influences are not sufficient to guarantee a certain character. This would be comparable to rewinding life and allowing everything to unfold precisely as it had before, only to find oneself an entirely different person. Even if this version of radical freedom is plausible, we still cannot be considered free if some components of our identity are partially uncaused. If our character is arbitrary we cannot contract praise or blame for anything—after all, we never decided to act in a certain way, our character happened to us.
There is another, obscure view in libertarianism, by which the decision making process occurs in a vacuum, completely exempt from the natural laws of causation. According to this perspective, every aspect of deliberation is uncaused: when we decide, we take no considerations and have no reasons for making a particular choice. If I were deciding whether to get a GMC truck or a Toyota hybrid, and I was an environmental activist, it would seem obvious that I would prefer the Toyota hybrid. However, under this view of radical freedom, I could choose the truck, because no considerations enter into my process at all, including my environmental preference. If we were able to make decisions in this miraculous way, it would hinder our freedom, not enhance it. I could hardly think of myself as acting freely if I had no reasons for choosing one way or another.
It seems as though no conception of libertarian freedom, either imagined or real, entails freedom. However, the proponents of compatabilism have a compelling (no pun intended) argument for freedom in conjunction with determinism. To reiterate, their central claim is that an act can be considered free if it originates only from within (verses without, which is compulsion), and is consistent with the desires of the agent. This theory seems to better describe than hard determinism, what we experience as freedom, and makes a valuable distinction. However, regardless of its truth, does it really give moral responsibility a place next to freedom?
The soft determinists agree that we are entirely a product of our upbringing, cultural background, heredity etc, and that if we knew precisely all of these factors, we could predict an agents personality and desires with certainty, while still calling him free and morally responsible. I contest this—if my choices flow from a determined character, I cannot possibly be considered free. Imagine a wolf, nearly starving in the snowy Canadian tundra. He is entirely the product of instinctual predisposition, and past experiences will determine his outlook, (just as dog becomes fearful of humans after years of abuse). In the same way that the wolf is determined, so are we fixed in our volitions.
The wolf is prowling among the trees when he encounters an unsuspecting rabbit. His desire for food is strong (i.e. the conditions are right), and so he pounces, killing the rabbit. If we are soft determinists, we must hold the wolf morally responsible—for he fulfilled the compatabilist criteria—he acted according to his own desires and without coercion. Similarly, we must hold a meteorite, which crashes into Indonesia and instantly obliteration millions, responsible for genocide, just as Hitler is responsible for the destruction of six million Jews.
It is apparent that compatabilism, as well as libertarianism and determinism offer no plausible explanation of freedom. However, we cannot deny our experience of freedom, and our natural tendency to praise or blame others is inherent in human nature. There is an inexorable contradiction between the concept of causation in modern science, and our everyday perception, which undoubtedly points to freedom. Although it is of no consolation, I maintain that we are completely determined. However, I am no hard determinist—I assert that absolute freedom—the kind that entails moral responsibility, is inconceivable.
