For some reason i’m biased towards the Husserlian project of world constitution (over Heidegger’s). This reason, I suppose, is that I believe Heidegger’s notion of world to be completely dependent on the work done by Husserl. That is, Husserl’s answer to the transcendental question of old (episteme, kant, descartes, etc).
Heidegger does deepen “world” in many respects. however, i feel as if Heidegger’s personality is somewhat fused into Being and Time. as if Heidegger had this ultimate freedom of taking the Husserlian project and molding it into whatever he wanted. Granted, Heidegger was brilliant and contributed a lot to philosophy. but, in terms of his notion of WORLD, is it radically different from Husserl’s? or just a modification?
I lean towards the latter, but I’m hoping for some imput here.
THANKS
come on, some one knows something about this! right?
that all depends on how you define world…
being-in-the-world, acting in the world, or the world in and of itself as an ontological matter…
some parts could be considered radically different, but that’s a different question of perspective…
-Imp
I am slightly confused as to what you mean by “world”, too. Then again, I may not have read about the very concept you are referring to here.
Nevertheless, I will have a stab at your question.
Heidegger’s philosophy differs from Husserl’s in that he immersed the subject right into the thick of the zeitgeist in which a person inhabits. Human beings are totally wrapped up in all the social and political forces that pervades one’s time. Heidegger seems to have made almost no distinction between the subject and object worlds. The subject was totally imersed in the object world, they were inseperable. Whereas Husserl seemed to have a more independent view of the subject. The subject seemed to possess more of a free will where each persons individual consciousness could determine epistemological truths for themselves.
I am not sure if this helps you, Alex.
Fent, that does help, but i disagree about the husserl part of what you said. i don’t see husserl’s transcendental subject as being more free than heidegger.
or, wait, in a way i do. i find that freedom in heidegger is a real problem of sorts. we are free for death (freedom-towards-death) and we are free to choose our fate (inauthenticity vs. authenticity), but i feel that these freedoms are not really freedoms at all. chosing fate or not chosing fate is somewhat…circular. isn’t your fate what you chose?
husserl doesn’t not have this sort of dilemma, but freedom is restricted in the sense that what is inside (as well as in heidegger) is the same stuff that is outside. as much as it is that we cannot control the outside, we cannot the inside and vice versa.
we are an epistemological truth in an existential way, but i don’t think the subjectivity that husserl has in mind is all that subjective. why? because the subjective in husserl is the a prior subjective, the categorical subjective, the (if you will) objective subjective. thus, the truly relative parts of our lives are less relative.
thanks
So with Husserl, you believe that the subject isn’t really free at all, it is molded totally by the object world? This is what I think you are saying.
I agree that our cogito constantly interacts with the external world, thus the object world is forming our consciousness. But, I believe that with Husserl’s philosophy he left room for individual decision making. Our cogito is free to the extent that it can choose how to interpret objects in the external world.
no, i didn’t mean that at all with husserl. i think husserl is existential and does believe in freedom. i don’t think that husserl thinks that truth is so subjective that we can make it up.
no, i didn’t mean that at all with husserl. i think husserl is existential and does believe in freedom. i don’t think that husserl thinks that truth is so subjective that we can make it up.
Yes, Husserl dissmises any type of causality within the conscience, due to his phenomenologic approach to conscience, which he finds to be intentional. Husserl is against that side of psychology that attempts to explain conscience through exterior causes, or introspective psychology, that tries to reduce conscience to its own interior causes.
On a larger scale, Husserl is rather ambiguous. He recognizes the outside world only through decomposing it in an infinit number of successive aspects, in a way that he is forced to reconstruct it every time with his iner imperative. This construction of phaenomena by the intentional conscience is closely linked with perceptions, although experience doesn’t exhaust the being of that thing.
I reckon that where Heidegger’s being is deeply immersed in the world, in history, in existence, Husserl’s doctrine of an intentional conscience is somehow in danger of slipping towards solipsism. However, I can’t help thinking of Heidegger’s use of the term existence, as existere, ek-sistere, to go beyond something, wrenching it out of the relation of utility…
Well, I guess the main difference between Heidegger and Husserl’s world is that in Heidegger’s world, the being, as being in strict concordance with the actual historical context, may take away his teacher’s right to use the university library where he is rector, as a result of political exigencies.
through what faculty do we discern ? senses?
how does awareness manifest? application of reason?
i think our experiance provokes opinion.