the assertion is actually that it is irrational and unjustified to reject someone or some work based on anything other than a sufficient understanding of that person or work itself. which is still an assertion im sure you reject.
yes, it is irrational for you to reject someone’s writings just because they were a member of the Nazi party. that is exactly right. im glad you agree.
We also have to consider what the writings contain and they mean. If Heidegger were, say, a rocket scientist what you say has a lot of merit.
However, if they view philosophy as a historical process that ultimately ought deal with living in the world, then we can and should look at how he experienced the world. If his experiences lead him to become a Nazi, that does say a great deal. None of it good.
If he were aligned with the analytics, I think a case could be made that he was more like a rocket scientist so his experiences oughtn’t have any bearing on his philosophy. However, for an existentialist to do that sort of thing is problematic in the extreme.
A Nietzsche for all occasions.
From Beyond Good And Evil, On The Prejudices of Philosophers
6.
It has gradually become clear to me what every great
philosophy up till now has consisted of–namely, the confession
of its originator, and a species of involuntary and unconscious
auto-biography; and moreover that the moral (or immoral) purpose
in every philosophy has constituted the true vital germ out of
which the entire plant has always grown. Indeed, to understand
how the abstrusest metaphysical assertions of a philosopher have
been arrived at, it is always well (and wise) to first ask
oneself: “What morality do they (or does he) aim at?”
Accordingly, I do not believe that an “impulse to knowledge” is
the father of philosophy; but that another impulse, here as
elsewhere, has only made use of knowledge (and mistaken
knowledge!) as an instrument. But whoever considers the
fundamental impulses of man with a view to determining how far
they may have here acted as INSPIRING GENII (or as demons and
cobolds), will find that they have all practiced philosophy at
one time or another, and that each one of them would have been
only too glad to look upon itself as the ultimate end of
existence and the legitimate LORD over all the other impulses.
For every impulse is imperious, and as SUCH, attempts to
philosophize. To be sure, in the case of scholars, in the case of
really scientific men, it may be otherwise–“better,” if you
will; there there may really be such a thing as an “impulse to
knowledge,” some kind of small, independent clock-work, which,
when well wound up, works away industriously to that end, WITHOUT
the rest of the scholarly impulses taking any material part
therein. The actual “interests” of the scholar, therefore, are
generally in quite another direction–in the family, perhaps, or
in money-making, or in politics; it is, in fact, almost
indifferent at what point of research his little machine is
placed, and whether the hopeful young worker becomes a good
philologist, a mushroom specialist, or a chemist; he is not
CHARACTERISED by becoming this or that. In the philosopher, on
the contrary, there is absolutely nothing impersonal; and above
all, his morality furnishes a decided and decisive testimony as
to WHO HE IS,–that is to say, in what order the deepest impulses
of his nature stand to each other.
premise: X was a Nazi
premise: Nazis are bad
premise: X wrote some stuff
conclusion: the stuff X wrote is bad
is faulty reasoning. the “bad” is first of all unjustified and is taken as an assumption which is not necessarily true (for example, there is evidence that Heidegger was not a real Nazi and was only “playing along” so as not to be killed); and aside from that, the “bad” even if it exists does not apply to the writings of X, only to X itself. there is a disconnect, a lack of causality in the argument.
inserting a premise that says “a bad person will only produce bad writings” would solve the problem. however, no one is making that claim, and if they were to, it is also unjustified, not the least of which is because “bad” is insufficiently vague and undefined and thus is inapplicable to any “writings” in question, unless we can make a connection between the reasons why this “badness” obtains for X to the content of the writings themselves. without such a connection, and without justification for the “badness” itself, to say that “you should reject someone’s writings just because they were a member of the Nazi party” is false.
Premise 3 needs to be expanded, something I addressed above.
A) Not if the writings deal with experiencing life as well as the history of human thought. Nazism is rightfully a deal-breaker when it comes to those things. Like I said above, that argument works for a scientist. It may even work for an analytic philosopher. But it sure doesn’t work with an existentialist.
B) Looks at how Dasein relates to tradition and authentic choice. His being a Nazi makes that element a deal-breaker.
do you have a point, or are you just trying to shift the focus of the conversation because you cant come up with any criticism or fault in my reasoning?
as i said, you are priceless. keep up the good work. its those like you who make ILP so much fun.
Haven’t you realized(?), the only valid argument is a link to a credible, “scientific” source (apparently those journals don’t just discuss experimental findings, they provide “factual” qualitative interpretations, as well!).
3xs is playing with himself, “source” and “criticism” is defined as that which “proves” his views.
No matter what you say against him, you’re the top hat (dumbshit, there’s no selective pressure for that) and he’s the battleship (and everything on the board is water).
P.S. This doesn’t mean I agree with what you’ve said in this thread, I just find 3x more ridiculous than you.