Human Nature, Universal Rule

Philosophy Forums Philosophy
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When I ask people, why do you do this, why do that? I often get the answer, “It is human nature.” I ask, what is “human nature?” My proposition is this, we all start off with a blank slate. As time goes on, we become psychologically conditioned through our interactions with the world. We have the capabilities to do many things, but does the fact that we can do things make the act itself natural?

How to change ourselves

I read this in a Marxist book and it had a most profound influence over my thinking. The author said something like. “Humans are conditioned by the environment, but they react upon it, changing it, and in the process they changed themselves.” This is a materialist view, in that our change in ideas stem from our reaction to the material world. Ideas themselves do not change us, but our environment does. (ignore religion for the time being). I regard myself as an idealist (not in the Marxist sense) for I believe all we have is awarenss, and what is important is how we React to our awareness. Am I being pragmatic here?

Can a rule be ever universal?

The answer is no. A rule in itself imposes a guide line, a limitation on particular circumstances. Even the widely regarded Golden Rule, “do onto others as you would do onto yourself” is limited in that it does not apply to other animals beside humans.
A problem with the golden rule is this,

replace others with yourself
“do onto (yourself) as you would do onto yourself”
makes sense

Let, others = yourself

then

“do onto others as you would do onto yourself”

makes sense.

But others /= yourself
so the rule is inapplicable in this world!

May God grant us the wisdom to solve this dilemma. Amen.

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Hi Pinnacle.

These rules may “make sense” but that doesn’t, by itself, make them worth following. That would be a very low standard. In any event, when people say “It’s human nature” they are really saying “Because I want to”.

The context in which you are speaking is a moral one. Most of the time, when you question someone’s morals, they will tell you to buzz off. “It’s human nature” is a nice way of doing that. And it seems to work on you. It’s got you off on the chase for this “human nature”, hasn’t it? But it is a statement devoid of content otherwise. They might as well say “I dunno”. It would be more honest in many cases.

So, I ask, what dilemma? An argument can make sense and still be devoid of any true statements. “Making sense” is not much. This is not a dilemma. A dillemma occurs when two contradictory statements appear to be true. What is true about these?

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I find the phrase “it’s human nature” to be very trite. It seems like this is easily applied to far too many cases, for it to actually be considered a legitimate argument.

Obviously, it is a term that contradicts itself. If it was “human nature” (in the sense that no human would astain from it,) then the action would never need to be questioned, and the inquiry would never have taken place. So obviously, any questionable action, cannot be regarded as the nature of the species, because that implies a sort of universal connotation.

I find that when most people say “it’s human nature, there is nothing wrong it it” they are in fact saying ‘it’s my individual nature to be susceptible to outside influences, and if there is something wrong with it, I am ignorant to this fact, for I percieve my actions as universally acceptable.’ I’ll contend that it cannot usually be simplified to that extent, but often “human nature” is nothing more than ill-fitted generalizations based on the individuals perceptions. This is why ethics is such a complex subject, because there are no moral absolutes which can be used to measure one’s actions with.

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Pinnacle,
Surely the rule ‘Do unto others as you would unto yourself’ ought to be applicable because it implies ‘if you were in their position’.
For example, if you see an old lady drop her bag and she can’t bend down to pick it up, you would presumably help her because if your positions were reversed that is what you would want her to do for you.
This highlights another refinement that perhaps needs to be made to the rule: 'do unto others as you would have them do unto you (if your positions were reversed). In this way perhaps the rule can extend to animals. If you were suddenly in the chicken’s position, perhaps you wouldn’t want the farmer to shoot you after all? This is however a very controversial suggestion because we cannot know whether a chicken would indeed feel this way at all.
Don’t get me wrong, I think there’s some truth in what you say when you suggest that a rule can never be universal. I just don’t think we should give up on this particular rule so easily - especially where humans are concerned.

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Im of the belief that all human action is human nature… Whatever we do, its in our nature to do. Though I am a determinist…

“Surely the rule ‘Do unto others as you would unto yourself’ ought to be applicable because it implies ‘if you were in their position’.
For example, if you see an old lady drop her bag and she can’t bend down to pick it up, you would presumably help her because if your positions were reversed that is what you would want her to do for you.”

This is not a rational rule in my opinion. It requires a big IF for it to be logical. IF, doing unto others results in them doing unto you the same, than it would make sense to treat others as you would treat yourself. But this is not at all the case. I could go around helping old ladys pick up their bags all my life, and then one day when im old and gray, and I drop my wallet, the young punk 2 feet away from me wont move a muscle. In some cases, when you have determined that the IF is a reality, in that you believe that doing something for a person will result in them doing something back in kind, than your best bet would be to do something they like, because they will do something you like.

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“But this is not at all the case. I could go around helping old ladys pick up their bags all my life, and then one day when im old and gray, and I drop my wallet, the young punk 2 feet away from me wont move a muscle. In some cases, when you have determined that the IF is a reality, in that you believe that doing something for a person will result in them doing something back in kind, than your best bet would be to do something they like, because they will do something you like.”

But this is morallity based on the desire for a reward.

What if by spending your entire life helping old ladies pick up their purses, you inspire several other people to do the same. You succeed in accomplishing, a good act upon mankind. Saying it is pointless because chances are no one will return the favour 20 years down the road suggests that your morallity is based on personal gain, as opposed to “universal good.”

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"your morallity is based on personal gain, as opposed to “universal good.”

Ofcourse it is. What reason is there to persue the good of anyone else but me?

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“Ofcourse it is. What reason is there to persue the good of anyone else but me?”

Because, even if you don’t benefit from your good actions, perhaps someone close to you will.

For example (using your old lady scenario again): Say some young man watches you helping old ladies picking up their purses, and then by chance he sees an old lady who has dropped her purse 2 days later. Now lets say this old lady the young man sees is your 96 year old great grandmother. Your good actions may not benefit you, but they have inspired this young man to help your grandmother; your good actions have came to benifit someone you presumably care about.

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“Because, even if you don’t benefit from your good actions, perhaps someone close to you will.”

And why should I persue the benefit of someone close to me that I care about? What does “caring” about someone mean to me, the individual.

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R.T.,

“And why should I persue the benefit of someone close to me that I care about? What does “caring” about someone mean to me, the individual.”

Consider Spinoza, who shares your feeling that there is no transcendent reason why we should care for others, and that at the center of all action is a desire to conserve and empower the self. He though realizes that the drive to power requires an understanding of the limitations of one’s own power, and a knowledge that multiple bodies in concert are more powerful than a single one. He begins by pointing out that the body itself relies on the multiple bodies that feed and nourish it, a dependence that defines inherently what is “good”.

“The human body needs many other bodies for its preservation. But that which constitutes the specific reality (forma) of a human body is, that is its parts communicate their several motions one to another in a certain fixed proportion. Therefore, whatsoever brings about the preservation of the proportion between motion and rest, which the parts of the human body mutually possess, preserves the specific reality of the human body, and consequently renders the human body capable of being affected in many ways and affecting external bodies in many ways; consequently it is good.” EIV, prop 39, proof

Upon this physical dependency he then he points to the necessary effects that others have upon us, effects that when in concert bring us to greater power.

“if two individuals of completely the same nature are combined, they compose an individual twice as powerful as each singly” EIV prop. 18

“It is impossible, that man should not be a part of nature, or that he should not follow her general order; but if he live among individuals whose nature agrees with his own, by that fact, the man’s power to act will be aided and encouraged…” EIV, app 7

“The individual who seeks to increase his power to think and act will seek to combine with other individuals to compose an individual proportionately more powerful than each one alone.” EIV prop. 18 note

“because no one is solitude has the strength to defend himself and to obtain what is necessary to life, it follows that men naturally desire a civil state, and that they can never completely dissolve it”. TP 6:par 1

Because there is an inherent limit to your power, given your desire to strengthen yourself you are determined to ally yourself with that which is greater than your solitude. We do this all the time, whether it is simply by sharing a language, or sharing unwritten codes of conduct. It is the forming of assemblages that grant greater efficacy to the self, not its limitation. For Spinoza it is actually Reason that allows us to identify the sightlines of these streams of power and to take advantage of them. But the angry rebel and the equanimitous and charitable sage are motivated by the same thing, the desire and will to persist. One just does it more efficiently and with greater understanding. Of course if you imagine yourself more powerful by not caring for anybody [in the active sense], Spinoza would suggest, by all means don’t care for anybody. Only one’s impotence will convince one otherwise.

Dunamis

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Exactly the point I was trying to make Dunamis, that caring about others I do only for my own benefit. Literally, when I say I care about another, it means that the person I care about has an effect on me, the individual. So Aluscardum was right to bring up that reason for the golden rule, that it might effect someone I care about, I just wanted him to realize that me caring about them implies my… egoism, or selfishness in the matter. Though just because following that rule might lead to my benefit from the benefit of those I care about is no good reason to act by that rule. Playing the lottery might lead to me winning 1,000,000 dollars, this is no good reason to play. But if I determine that I will gain from following the golden rule, than i’ve got a reason to act in that manner. Like I said, the golden rule will not always yield individual returns.

I completely agree with Spinoza’s arguments except for: “the center of all action is a desire to conserve and empower the self.” I would say that the center of all action is the persuit of pleasure, all desire in general. Wheather that be desire for individual power or desire for altruism, the pleasure obtained is what drives man. But his arguments apply just as well to my belief. Generally, the persuit of pleasure is much more successfull when persued in numbers, and as Spinoza says: "it follows that men naturally desire a civil state, and that they can never completely dissolve it”.

I should read up on Spinoza, I have found that we share a few beliefs. Thus far I would think I most closely resemble his philosophy, I may be able to say I am a Spinozist…

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R.T.,

“I would say that the center of all action is the persuit of pleasure, all desire in general. Wheather that be desire for individual power or desire for altruism, the pleasure obtained is what drives man.”

Spinoza ostensibly defines joy as that which one experiences as empowerment, and sadness as that which one experiences as disempowerment. The empowerment in each case is real and on the physical level. So he would agree with your focus on pleasure, only he reconnects pleasure to a larger thought of the fundamental desire to persist. What is interesting about Spinoza is that the pleasure of the altruist and hedonist is exactly the same, the experience of empowerment in one mode or another. Adjunct to this thought is that certain types of pleasure, certain attempts to empower oneself are misguided or confused, and inevitably lead to more impotence and sadness. What reason -and the principle of empowerment- allows is for one to see through the illusion of pleasure, and understand the mechanism that brings pleasure forth. Reason allows one to pursue more complete pleasures, pleasures that do not disempowered, pleasures that allow us to move from more passive states (the ignorance of the causes that determine us) to more active states (knowing the causes that determine us, and so to effect those causes if possible).

Dunamis

13

“Spinoza ostensibly defines joy as that which one experiences as empowerment, and sadness as that which one experiences as disempowerment.”

I wonder though about this definition, did he mean that everything that brings pleasure is empowerment, or that empowerment brings pleasure. I wonder what he would say to the practice of fetish sex acts such as bondage and domination, where one would obtain pleasure from being treated in a manner that would probably be best ascociated with disempowerment. If empowerment was everything that brought pleasure, than this would be a slight corruption of the intended meaning of the word I presume. If he believes acts of empowerment bring pleasure while acts of disempowerment should bring pain, or saddness, than he would have to address the above issue. I believe that he would call these acts empowerment as well though.

“only he reconnects pleasure to a larger thought of the fundamental desire to persist.”

I would not make this connection… I do not believe that such a desire is “fundamental” in that it is inherintly valuable. In my opinion, to persist is only an obvious means to the end of prolonging pleasure. Suicide exemplifies this idea. When persistance loses its pleasure value, when life is not worth living anymore or when it is too painfull to go on, than suicide becomes a reasonable alternative. Maybe we have a natural instinct to survive, but I would say that the concious mind has no fundamental desire to persist, only to persue pleasure. So I would not call the desire to persist the larger thought as you say, but the smaller, that reconnects, as all human thoughts, to the larger thought of the fundamental persuit of pleasure.

“What is interesting about Spinoza is that the pleasure of the altruist and hedonist is exactly the same”

I am alike in this, I have gone so far as to call myself the most tolerant person possible. You can see how this follows from accepting all human action as the persuit of the same pleasure, just diffirent methods of achieving it.

“Adjunct to this thought is that certain types of pleasure, certain attempts to empower oneself are misguided or confused, and inevitably lead to more impotence and sadness. What reason -and the principle of empowerment- allows is for one to see through the illusion of pleasure, and understand the mechanism that brings pleasure forth. Reason allows one to pursue more complete pleasures, pleasures that do not disempowered, pleasures that allow us to move from more passive states (the ignorance of the causes that determine us) to more active states (knowing the causes that determine us, and so to effect those causes if possible).”

Ah, maybe this answers my first question. I would now think Spinoza would answer my first question by saying bondage and domination acts are merely misguided persuits of pleasure. I might be able to agree with that. This is indeed my argument against religion, that though it is pleasurable for the religious, there are more succesfull methods of the persuit that do not disempower in the way religion might, such as prohibiting pre-marital sex, or prohibiting any possibility of action in general. More than this, I would go further by saying that empowerment means the expanding of possibility of action, and that this leads to a greater potential for pleasure, simply by allowing more choices and opertunities. I would go even further to say that encouraging inately pleasurable acts such as sex and eating is the most effective means of maximizing potential pleasure, though within reason, and considering the consequences of these actions, such as STD’s and pregnancy, and obesity. This would also be my argument for encouraging permissive trends in society, as it would lead to further possibility of action and consequently empowerment, and consequently a higher potential for pleasure.

Im sure youve heard all of that before though… :unamused:

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R.T.,

I wonder though about this definition, did he mean that everything that brings pleasure is empowerment, or that empowerment brings pleasure. I wonder what he would say to the practice of fetish sex acts such as bondage and domination, where one would obtain pleasure from being treated in a manner that would probably be best ascociated with disempowerment.

It is that all pleasure brings empowerment. In the example of masochism, the empowerment that is experienced comes on many levels. One is the alignment with the will of the torturer, forming a pleasure assemblage wherein you take your place as the object of pleasure for another. Lacan I believe also theorized about how the masochist disempowers the sadist by forcing him into the split state of subjectivity. In this way the masochist takes control of the situation through his submission. This is the reason that a masochist and a sadist are not compatible. The masochist is also empowered through aligning himself with larger narratives of purging and renewal, that by suffering one becomes purified and proven, passing through disempowerment so as to be empowered. There are innumerable ways in which the masochist experiences empowerment. Spinoza is quite clear that the experience of disempowerment comes from the perspective one takes. The very same acts in the hands of political torture that might lead to a feeling of impotence, would lead to empowerment in the mind of a sexual masochist if within his sexualized scenario.

I would not make this connection… I do not believe that such a desire is “fundamental” in that it is inherintly valuable. In my opinion, to persist is only an obvious means to the end of prolonging pleasure. Suicide exemplifies this idea.

Spinoza would only say that you do not understand the mechanism behind pleasure. He would also suggest that most circumstances of suicide are the result of confused thinking, the imagining –admitted or not- that you will persist after that moment of death. James Hillman, a renown psychologist, wrote a famous book on suicide, that suggested that it is “the attempted hastening of a too long delayed transformation”. Key to Spinoza’s understanding is that clarity of thought dispels many of the misguided attempts at empowerment. Outside of Hillman’s definition, suicide woud by Spinoza be seen as a confused state.

So I would not call the desire to persist the larger thought as you say, but the smaller, that reconnects, as all human thoughts, to the larger thought of the fundamental persuit of pleasure.

Significant to Spinoza, a gift of his thought is that his modular definitions allow understanding at levels other than the human individual. All life for instance would share this fundamental desire to persist, without our having to presuppose the capacity or experience of pleasure per se. In addition, human beings are also able to form complex assemblages with other bodies, which in turn are treated as individuals themselves; these meta-bodies also are motivated by the desire to persist. In this way, nations, friendships, momentary groupings come into existence and the actions of which can be understood via the desire to persist. You of course can project and say that a family does “x” or “y” is pursuit of pleasure, or a nation does “a” or “b” in pursuit of pleasure, but clearly this does not hit the mark. Rather, Spinoza comes upon a supple description that can said to rule the actions of an ameba on a microscope slide, to a tree growing in rocky soil, to a 75 year old prisoner, to a floundering political party. Fundamentally, his reduction of pleasure to power proves more revealing, I would suggest.

Dunamis

15

Agreed on the masochism.

“He would also suggest that most circumstances of suicide are the result of confused thinking, the imagining –admitted or not- that you will persist after that moment of death.”

This seems to always be the explenation for suicide, and yet I wholly disagree. I am sure there are such cases, that suicide is commited out of confused thinking, maybe even the majority. But I can easily imagine circumstances in which I could rationally choose to end my own life. For example, criminals that take a big risk, but end up getting cought, often times end their own lives. And this seems totally rational to me. It seems perfectly rational to end my own life if I predict that the rest of my life will be much more pain than pleasure, since the avoidance of pain is the same driving force as persuit of pleasure in my opinion. Maximizing pleasure value is the drive, and pain can be considered negative pleasure value. So it would seem rational to end ones own life. And I think I understand the mechanism behind pleasure very well. It was indeed designed by evolution, as all evolutionary designs, to encourage persistance. It could only have evolved if it persisted. But I believe that once we had mastered our survival to a certain level, that our conciousness, which was designed to get us to persue pleasure, and pleasure is designed in a way that promotes persistence, our conciousness was able to expand its forms of desire. A simple example is that back when humanity was still strugeling to survive, when nature still pressured us to be a certain way in order to survive, developing an interest in cuting oneself would be extremely detrimental to survival. The cuts would get infected and so on, such that this desire would be extremely uncommon, and the desires throughout humanity would be pressured by nature to direct humanity towards persistence. But today, the desire of cuting oneself, though still uncommon, is no longer anywhere as significant a detriment to survival. We have bandages, and ointments to disinfect, we have mastered the art of survival, to a point. And so, this desire can exist, and our increasing skill in survival allows for even more forms of desire to exist, which allows for more possibility of action, which empowers us. It can be said that conciousness has broken free of the desire to persist, which it was pressured into by natural selection.

“All life for instance would share this fundamental desire to persist, without our having to presuppose the capacity or experience of pleasure per se.”

Though the definitions are strange, I would agree with this. Isn’t this elementary evolutionary theory? My ideas do not interfere with this understanding.

“You of course can project and say that a family does “x” or “y” is pursuit of pleasure, or a nation does “a” or “b” in pursuit of pleasure, but clearly this does not hit the mark.”

Well why not? I think it hits the mark perfectly. I cannot say that “a family” acts in persuit of pleasure, but surely the actions of the individuals involved that result in the persistence of the miniature society can be explained easily in terms of pleasure. And this also very effectivly explains the results of when the individuals seek pleasure opposed to the persistence of the society. This is how most societies fall is it not?

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R.T.,

And this seems totally rational to me. It seems perfectly rational to end my own life if I predict that the rest of my life will be much more pain than pleasure, since the avoidance of pain is the same driving force as persuit of pleasure in my opinion.

It really would be impossible to understand the state of mind, that is the nature of the beliefs of such a person – intention is referentially opaque. They might very well also be under the impression of a lasting existence, beyond the moment of their death. For instance, even if there is no propositional belief in immortality, the fantasy of one’s own funeral often plays a part in suicides. Also included in your pleasure model is the unfortunate problem of some kind of instantaneous calculation, where the person is perfectly willing to inflict very real pain upon himself, after having calculated the amount of imagined pain he was going to otherwise receive. I suggest that this seems highly unrealistic. Rather there to me is a conception of the self that goes beyond the moment of death that allows suicide to seem a reasonable option. There really is no way to settle this because as I said there is no way to know what is in someone’s mind, as much as you imagine that you can.

Isn’t this elementary evolutionary theory? My ideas do not interfere with this understanding.

The problem is Spinoza invented it 150 years before Darwin. The difficulty with your term pleasure is that it seems too narrow to apply to all situations, and neglects the possibility of the drive passing beyond the common associations of pleasure itself. What begins as pleasure as in appetite can pass into joy, a joy that carries associations beyond those implied by pleasure. But because Spinoza’s term in each case would be companied by a kind of pleasure, it doesn’t really matter, does it. He theorizes the pleasure, only he refines it just one more level down.

I cannot say that “a family” acts in persuit of pleasure, but surely the actions of the individuals involved that result in the persistence of the miniature society can be explained easily in terms of pleasure.

It reduces your ability to understand the functioning of meta-bodily composed “individuals”, because the actions of particular individuals is not understandable strictly in terms of personal pleasure pursuit, without considering the drive of the composite. If you would like to project your pleasure terminology onto trees and antfarms and political parties, you are free to do so, but in the end you will be operating from a definitional deficit, projecting anthropomorphized intention into non-human assemblages. The problem is that your term has specific connotations that limit it’s applicability. But no doubt you are attached to it, so stick with it.

And this also very effectivly explains the results of when the individuals seek pleasure opposed to the persistence of the society. This is how most societies fall is it not?

You are locked into a Hobbesian view, wherein a society can only be conceived of as a warring set of individuals who fail or succeed in giving up their pleasures. What Spinoza allows in the understanding that sub-groups within a society and society itself have wills to persist, which subsume the individual behaviors of single human beings, integrating their will to persist into a larger order. Families, nations, gangs, all become living things.

Dunamis

17

“The difficulty with your term pleasure is that it seems too narrow to apply to all situations”

All human situations. Ofcourse it wont apply to living beings without a nervous system…

“because the actions of particular individuals is not understandable strictly in terms of personal pleasure pursuit, without considering the drive of the composite.”

With human composites, I think the actions of the individuals are best understood strictly in terms of personal pleasure persuit. I do not see how the composite has its own drive… The composite is merely the combined actions of the individuals, and thus it presents the illusion of acting as a singular being, but I think that considering a society a living being is abstracting it too much.

“If you would like to project your pleasure terminology onto trees and antfarms and political parties, you are free to do so, but in the end you will be operating from a definitional deficit, projecting anthropomorphized intention into non-human assemblages. The problem is that your term has specific connotations that limit it’s applicability.”

I would not like to project my pleasure terminology onto trees and antfarms, nor society’s. I only project the terminology onto that for which the terminology applies. You are right, it has a specific connotation, it is indeed only appliable to humans (and alot of animals) I would think I apply the same terminology on non-sentient life forms as does Spinoza, the desire (not truly applicable, but the idea gets across) to persist, as per evelutionary theory and natural selection. As for meta-bodies, again, I think that is abstracting it too much by saying:

“society itself have wills to persist, which subsume the individual behaviors of single human beings, integrating their will to persist into a larger order. Families, nations, gangs, all become living things.”

I cannot agree with this. They create the illusion of living things, which is just testiment to our social capacity, to act in concert to the level of creating an illusion of a whole new being. Its like the story of the school of fish, I dont know if youve heard it… A school of fish gets attacked by a shark, so they all bunch up together, and allign themselves in the form of a larger shark. To the attacking shark, they create the illusion of a larger shark. I think it is abstracting it far too much to say that the illusion of the shark created is now its own living entity. Its not… it just looks and acts like one.

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R.T.,

The composite is merely the combined actions of the individuals

One then of course can say, as some people do, it is meaningless to ascribe the pursuits of human beings to anything other than the combined actions of the individual cells that make up a human being. This of course may be true, but when a will is ascribed to the whole -as you regularly do by making pleasure the sole pursuit-, the individual part takes on greater context. There comes a point when “combined actions” begin to operate, or are effectively describable as, having a will. Such is the case in considering meta-bodied entities formed from many human beings, and even things other than human beings.

I think it is abstracting it far too much to say that the illusion of the shark created is now its own living entity.

I find this short sighted of you, but this is only because I do not take a “person” to be a narrowly defined consolidated entity, but rather a confluence of many bodies, many “minds”. The single “mind” that you seem to privilege itself does not exist per se, but is only the hypothesis that makes sense of behaviors. So too with other meta-bodied entities. The advantage to this kind of thinking is that it includes your own position, but contextualizes and explains it, making it applicable to many more things in the world, incorperating human behavior into a much larger phenomena.

Dunamis

19

I have to go shopping right now, so I cant write much. But the diffirence between combined actions of the cells in a human being and the actions of a human being is the conciousness. The self-awareness of the entity. When two humans get together and form a group, a new conciousness is not created, or at least we are not aware of any new form of awareness. And the same goes to when I lose some of my cells, when I get cut for instance, no sense of self awareness is lost. It seems that this level of abstraction that is a concious living being is the only unique one. Everything else must thus be referanced to this one unique aspect. Gota go, ile have more to say later probably, but feel free to give me your opinions of what ive written thus far…

20

R.T.,

“But the diffirence between combined actions of the cells in a human being and the actions of a human being is the conciousness.”

This is a very slippery slope. There are varying degrees of (self) “consciousness”, auto-immune, socialogical, varying physiological body maps, etc. There is not “one” person, but a confluence of “persons” overlaid upon the site of the “body”, some of them narrower than the bounds of the flesh, some of the broader. You reduce a rather complex mechanism, or series of mechanisms into a single word -consciousness-, just as I think you do with the word “pleasure”. The consciousness you presume, simply is not locatable.

“When two humans get together and form a group, a new conciousness is not created, or at least we are not aware of any new form of awareness.”

This really is untrue. Marriages and friendships take on the characteristics of independent entities, explainable as a functioning whole. The individuals may or may not be aware of this independent, synergetic functioning, which does not mean that it is not describable as such. The awareness of the part the part is playing has little bearing on the operational “awareness” of the whole. Individual circuits in the computer have no idea the function they are playing in the calculation of the whole. Human beings (often) have no idea of the function they are playing in the whole of a nation, or a neighborhood. Ants (apparently) have no idea of the place they are taking in the manifest will of the colony, which certainly operates as if it had a “mind”.

Fundamental to your position is the idea that the Self is not a constructed thing, a thing that is only operationally regarded as a Self for the benefits of communication and coordination of that “whole” with other “wholes”. In fact the “Self”, the “consciousness” you presume actually reveals the social and linguistic whole of which it is only a part. There is no “consciousness” per se, but only behaviors which can at some times be regarded as conscious, and at other times not, whether we are speaking of human beings or of other things. It is a running hypothesis, not a locatable state.

This seems be what is missing from your analysis:

This is not a rational rule in my opinion. It requires a big IF for it to be logical. IF, doing unto others results in them doing unto you the same, than it would make sense to treat others as you would treat yourself.

The principle is not of reciprocity, but of fabric making. The version of the maxim: [Agapeseis ton plesion sou hos seauton.] as found in Romans is literally: Thou shalt love your nearer one as if [loving] thyself. It is an act of consolidation. There is no qualification of an “if” this, then that. It is a maxim that attempts to foster a larger body, a meta-body, wherein each part is treated as an aspect of the Self. It is the acknowledgement of interdependence which fashions a whole larger than the two “I scratch your back”, “You scratch my back” negotiations, a living entity beyond the comprehension of the part, but whose “good” serves the “good” of the part. What Spinoza would suggest is that the clear understanding of that harmony, a harmony upon which one depends, is what produces the deepest pleasure. Power is the ability to be affected.

Dunamis