It all makes sense in a way, but I get fuzzy with the “Good, we can say, is the quintessential character of pleasure in any form (physical, emotional, intellectual, etc.)” portion. To me, it seems, emotions take root in the intellect where pleasurable carnal desires can extend into protracted abuse of the physical body by extending the satisfaction of sensations way beyond natural durations. The physical body is saying that’s enough for now but the intellect wants more and more. That doesn’t come off as being good. I know this way off topic, but posting it gives me a little intellectual pleasure nonetheless.
No surprise here. You reply to my use of “simple” by ignoring the context that specifies its meaning (synonymous to ignorant, naive), leaving it as nothing but a polar opposite of “complex”, and then rendering my point to nothing but a complaint that your descriptions lacked the ostentatious decorations necessary for me to play “intellectual-dress up”.
Talk about the tea calling the kettle black. My use of “simple” (to mean "lacking knowledge/naive/not sophisticated in the area) was a criticism of the (lack of) content/substance/clarity of your post, not the style. Instead of even considering I might be making a valid criticism of your post, you immediately assume I have a problem with simplicity in general. Because of that, you fail to see my carefully-constructed criticisms as pertaining to the meaning/substance of your post, and instead say that I am the one who is judging one’s words/writing outside of the substance they are meant to describe.
I wrote very clearly that the criticism of “simple” was made in the context of your post lacking any clearly described point. If what you wrote showed a knowledge of the topic, and a thoughtful read of the OP, and it had a clear meaning with words used in such a way they could be discussed, I wouldn’t have criticized it being “simple”.
You have a lot to learn about reading and writing for the purpose of communicating a clear message.
My post covered this. “The existence of morality and ethics” is, at best, a strawman. You saw “morality and ethics” and your boy scout nihilist brain jumped to “Unsubstantiated opinions!” The above quote itself assumes certain standards of ethics. It is only your use of “morality and ethics” that necessarily makes them contradictions.
I know you’re not sure how. You’re also not sure how to use the word “thus”. I’m sure writing it made you feel intelligent, though.
Oh. Well you see what I wrote there was in the context of my explaining why nobody responded to your post, so you should have been reading it in that light. If you were, it would’ve been very clear my point had not been finalized at this point. If you look back, you’ll see a space, and then the capital letter of the next sentence, where I continue.
Sorry, I didn’t think to preface my post to help guide beginners. I just presumed everyone here has had sufficient training in reading comprehension. You know, essays and books, things like that where it takes at least several sentences to make a point. I guess it’s sorta hard, at first.
Yeah I figured you’d need some extra help to get this one, so I continued:
…Still didn’t get it huh? 
Covered in my post.
And nothing. That’s why nobody responded to your post.
Again, no clear debatable points.
After a comma this time?
You miss the point, yet again.
lol
You fail, you grocery store embarrassment.
So now maybe you see why no-one else bothered responding. Sheesh.
Right, here are some working definitions:
subjective — pertaining to mental states (beliefs, desires, emotions, etc.)
objective — pertaining to something, but not subjective
relative — pertaining to some, but not all, individuals
absolute — pertaining to something, but not relative
relational — pertaining to a relation between one or more individuals
monadic? intrinsic? internal? non-relational? — pertaining to something, but not relational
necessary — obtaining in all possible worlds
contingent — obtaining in some possible worlds, but not necessary
Feel free to comment.
Sorry, dude, I’ve only just spotted this.
I suppose relativity and absoluteness are always in respect of something. So the truth that size 10 shoes are too small for my feet is relative in respect of whose feet size 10 shoes are too small for, and the truth that size 100 shoes are too big for everyone’s feet is absolute in respect of whose feet size 100 shoes are too big for.
Hey, it happens. Get used to it.
This is why we need definitions. ‘Absolute’ can mean what you said, in which case there really isn’t a difference between an absolutist and a relativist except that the absolutist would, for some reason, believe that everyone at all times believes in the same moral principles (which is just weird). Typically, though, this is not what is implied by the term ‘absolute’ when it comes to moral theories - a moral absolutist typically believes that moral truths are unwaveringly and unconditionally true independently of what anyone (or everyone) thinks.
The difference being?
Please do. I’m interested to hear your conclusions.
That’s a very tortured description, but it sounds like you’re saying that too much pursuit of physical pleasure can’t be good because of how unnatural it tends to become. Personally, I don’t think how “natural” an act, desire, or propensity is should figure into its moral standing at all (in a utilitarian context) unless it is meant to insinuate that one will ultimately suffer in the long-run, but that is already presupposed in utilitarianism.
Okay, so let’s consider what follows from the so-called objectivist-relativist position. As a moral objectivist, one would believe that moral principles pertain to something other than people’s mental states, and as a relativist, he would also believe that moral principles pertain to some but not all individuals. Now at first blush this might sound inconsistent, what with morals pertaining to no individual (i.e. no person’s mental state) and some individuals at the same time, but I can grant that there’s a difference in meaning being employed by the word ‘pertain’ here. I’m thinking that, in the one case (objectivism), you mean to talk about a basis for morality, whereas in the other (relativism) you mean to talk about who such a morality applies to. I expanded on this point in another thread; please read it and let me know if this resolves the aparent inconsistency.
Let’s also consider what follows from the so-called subjectivist-absolutist position. As a moral subjectivist, one would believe that moral principles pertain to people’s mental states, and as an absolutist, he would also believe that moral principles pertain to something other than only a handful (or subset) of people (i.e. all-or-nothing). So a moral subjectivist-absolutist would believe that a moral proposition is true if and only if it pertained to everyone universally (again with some ambiguity over the word ‘pertain’), but this echoes the same difficulties/oddities I pointed out in my last post - namely, the strangeness of absolutely everyone agreeing to the same moral principles. Such a moral position, I would have to say, is bankrupt of even a single moral truth, for what moral claim is there that absolutely everyone agrees to?
Now the importance of this was to distinguish between it and ‘relativism’, and it would seem the difference now turns on the scope of these terms. Whereas a relative statement must “pertain to some, but not all, individuals” a relational statement must “pertain to a relation between one or more individuals” which puts its scope far beyond that of relativism (i.e. a relational statement could pertain to all individuals). In that case, my example of an objecting weighing 10 lbs could be read as a relational statement (since it would be 10lbs in relation to all people) but not a relative statement (since relative statement only hold for some people).
But, of course, that example was meant as one of an absolute statement. But it must now be noted that, en lieu of the definition you have given above for ‘absolute’, my example of the 10lb object is a good example of an absolute statement since it pertains to something but isn’t relative, but nevertheless could still pertain to all people (which was in contrast to my intention of showing how it pertains to something independent of people).
This then boils down to semantics. I don’t really care what definitions we use as long as those definitions are understood by all parties and they are being used consistently. The only thing I press you for at this point is to address my comments above (about the objectivist-relativist and the subjectivist-absolutist).
Does the intellect, with its instantaneously being knowledgeable of past pleasurable experiences, produce propensities and penchants that want to be satisfied frequently? Or do these inherent desires provoke the intellect to concoct a future that provides the circumstances for them to be fulfilled? Whatever the case may be, a future action is desired to be repeated in order to experience pleasure again. Considering the actions of a utilitarian, that wishes to utilize something to experience the goodness of pleasure, shouldn’t there be an element of weighing or questioning the action as to its decency before it is done? Is that not a moral consideration?
Even the utilitarian may not want to do what is considered indecent, but this in no way refutes his position. It’s still a desire (i.e. a pleasure) to do what’s decent and to refrain from doing what’s indecent.
Does desire position him or decency?
I’m not sure I agree with you about what’s ‘typically’ the case, but there’s a good point here: relativity and non-relativity can be to things other than individuals (e.g. times and places). I’ve overlooked this so far. (By the way, I’d say that independence of what anyone thinks is a mark of objectivity, not of absoluteness.)
As to your more recent post, give me day or two to think about it.
Need they be mutually exclusive? Could the utilitarian not desire decency? Could he not abhor indecency?
It can be both.
Of course it can if you use ‘absolute’ in such a way that it is. But I can’t see any value in doing so when we already have a word for the same thing, namely ‘objective’.
I should have made a similar remark in response to your claim that ‘a moral absolutist typically believes that moral truths are … unconditionally true’. There’s already a word for the opposite of ‘conditional’, namely ‘categorical’.
I haven’t forgotten that I still owe you a reply to your earlier post …
Yep, this is right on the mark. I believe the usual terms are ‘appraiser relativism’ (basis for morality) and ‘agent relativism’ (who morality applies to). I too found myself making this distinction in another thread (starting at ‘However, I’m not sure … ’), though I couldn’t remember the exact terms at the time. And I agree that the objectivist-relativist position is incoherent if we’re talking about appraiser relativism, since no appraisers feature in an objectivist analysis.
First, I agree that if there are no moral standards that everyone shares, then there are no subjective-(appraiser-)absolute moral truths. However, this won’t be a problem with the coherence of subjectivist-absolutism. Rather, it’ll be a problem with its plausibility. In other words, subjectivist-absolutism may be a bit far-fetched, but it’s not self-contradictory.
Secondly, there are those who think that a sufficiently sophisticated version of subjectivist-(appraiser-)absolutism isn’t so far-fetched after all. I’m thinking in particular of those who favour what I’ll lump together for convenience under the label ‘ideal observer theories’. An example is one of the analyses I discussed in the thread mentioned above, according to which to say that action X is morally right is to say that it satisfies the moral requirements that everyone would have after full deliberation (if everyone were to deliberate fully). I’ve no intention of defending this analysis here, but I just wanted to note that it trumps simpler versions of subjectivist-absolutism in point of plausibility.
Then we’re on the same page. The example you give is indeed an absolute statement on my definitions, whereas, as I mentioned in my last-but-one post, what you’re after is an objective statement (on my definitions). As I said in my last post, I can’t see any value in having an overlap between ‘objective’ and ‘absolute’, unless perhaps you want to use ‘absolute’ as a blanket term to mean ‘objective, universal, eternal, categorical and necessary’.
Well, okay, I have not much else to say then. Working within the scope of your definitions, I can’t really disagree with what you say.
But maybe I can bring this back full circle and comment on the implications this has on my being a relativist and objectivist at the same time. What I said about being a relativist certainly seems to square fairly well with how you defined relativism - pertaining to some but not all individuals - but now being an objectivist - pertaining to something but not subjective (i.e. pertaining to mental states) seems a little quirky. I mean, utilitarian objectivism, insofar as it defines ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in terms of pleasure and pain, certainly seems to appeal to subjective states of mind, but my point was that in defining good and bad in such a way, it by no means follows that such definitions are subject to change (either over time or across individuals). For this brand of utilitarianism, in other words, there will be no point when one experiences pain as good nor will there be one individual, in contrast to another, who experiences pain as such (some might debate this point - vis-a-vis the psychology of the massochist - but that’s a matter for separate strain of argument).
So it leads me to wonder how you would respond to my self-labelling as an objectivist; is what I call ‘objectivism’ just what you’d call ‘absolutism’ (i.e. given that pain and pleasure are experienced the same way universally)? But if so, that would seem (I would think) an even stronger contradiction in terms given that ‘absolutism’ is usually taken to be (and as it would seem, by your definitions as well) two mutually exclusive ends of a dichotomy.
On the other hand, another very central point I was making was that these two positions, whether in direct opposition to each other or not, might actually work together so long as they are answers to two different moral question - namely, the question of how to define ‘good’ and ‘bad’, and the question of what things are good an bad. This, I believe, can resolve the aparent conflicts between the two positions I claim to hold however you define them.
Your thoughts?
As you may be aware, in academic philosophy your utilitarianism would be called your position in ‘meta-ethics’, while your relativism would be called your position in ‘normative ethics’. The distinction is standard. Whether it resolves the conflict (if there is one) remains to be seen.
I’d certainly say that any definitions containing the words ‘pleasurable’ and ‘painful’ were subjectivist. But let me clarify something. Are you defining ‘good’ as
- ‘pleasurable for everyone’,
- ‘pleasurable for someone/me/us’, or
- ‘pleasurable’?
I’ll come to the alleged conflict once you’ve replied.
Addendum
I’d meant to comment further on this in my last post:
This seems a bit muddled to me. To say that the definition of a word is relativist isn’t to say that the definition is subject to change over time or across individuals. Rather, it’s to say that the extension of the word is, by definition, subject to change over time or across individuals. So ‘pleasurable for me’ would count as a relativist definition of ‘good’ even if everyone used the word ‘good’ in this way. Conversely, if some people used ‘good’ to mean ‘pleasurable for everyone’ and others used it to mean ‘approved of by everyone’, these would still count as absolutist definitions.
I mean to define ‘good’ as pleasure in-and-of-itself (so #3 in the options you listed). What I mean to say in claiming that good/pleasure is not subject to change across time or people is simply that if one experienced pleasure at one time (in response to some stimulus) and then at a later time experienced some different sensation (in response to the same stimulus), I would hardly say that pleasure (or good) for him was one thing at first and then became something different later on, but rather that he ceased to experience pleasure (or good). So pleasure (and therefore good) is always and forever one thing - it may come in and out of one’s experience, and be replaced by differing experiences - but it doesn’t become something different itself in virtue of that.
The best analogy I can image is to liken it to color. We define red as the color of this text, but if for some reason the color of the latter text changed (say because of some error in the screen settings of your monitor), we wouldn’t say that ‘red’ now refers to a different hue; we would say that the color of the text changed to some other color, something not red.
On the question of what might be pleasurable to one person but not to another, that too is answered with all the foregoing. Since I am defining ‘good’ on pleasure in-and-of-itself - I am, in other words, abstracting pleasure out of that which might make one feel pleasure (a desired object, a situation, a person, etc.) - I am treating it as a pure state of mind through-and-through, divorced from any worldly object one might draw it from. Thus the question of what might be pleasurable to one person but not to another is moot - or rather it is a question on which I bring my relativism to bear. My utilitarianism I reserve for that state of mind in-and-of-itself that we call pleasure (and I call ‘good’) regardless of what in the world invokes it, and therefore the question is not what thing (in the world) is pleasurable for one person but not for another, but what pleasure as a state of mind is - and that I don’t think is relativistic.
I’m happy with your choice of option 3. I’d say this definition is neither relativist nor absolutist but non-committal or neutral. And it’s consistent with a relativist (or an absolutist) position in normative ethics, which is the result you wanted to achieve.
Okay, that’s clearer. But it doesn’t make you an objectivist or an absolutist, at least not in any sense in which those words are ordinarily used in meta-ethics. It simply means that you hold ‘good’ to be a rigid designator for the tendency to produce a certain quality of experience — as distinct from the cause of the experience or the subject of the experience.
The body, with its response, has no independent existence, as it is not separate from what one calls pleasure or pain. The vibrations may be different. The intensity of each vibration may be different. When one demands a particular sensation he divides them – good and bad. The function of the body to respond is mutual to all.
Could you say, since the body’s response is not separate from the pleasure or pain, that this is an objectivity – and that when one prefers a specific sensation and proceeds to label them (good/bad) that this also is an objectivity?