It is maybe useful to say a few things to explain my approach. Shortly, I consider that Utilitarianism is a doctrine that in fact cannot be applied. (Actually there’s a lot more reasons why I can’t side with Utilitarianism, but it’s pointless to dwell on them; I could even add that I simply do not believe in Ethics).
So, I have no specific intent to say anything in defense of Utilitarianism, quite the opposite.
Nevertheless, as for your questions, I guess that it would be possible for the utilitarian to consider that act moral and remain consistent. And I just mean that, I do not imply that I am the herald of the orthodox utilitarian view.
It seems that this is what everybody understands of Utilitarianism, but, sorry, I don’t get it.
What does it mean that «that’s a utilitarian thing to do»? OK, I understand it fits pretty well the utilitarian’s scheme. But only the utilitarian’s? I guess that it’s not the case. Other ‘creeds’ may assess it as good, maybe on condition that the act is moved by some ‘causes’. But, well, it seems that is no hindrance for the Roman Catholic Church in ordert to get a procedure of beatification started.
(Actually, if you ask me, I’d rather say that that was a Catholic thing to do). Now Catholicism may not necessarily conflict with Utilitarianism, yet it’s not exactly the same thing.
Then I think that Utilitarianism is definitely concerned with what should move to action. It seems to me that excluding altogether motives is an exaggeration of the doctrine of Bentham, and notably overstressing his seemingly staunch belief in psychological egoism. As prominent a utilitarian Bentham may have been, he is not the sole utilitarian. Besides, I won’t pretend to know more than I do on this subject, but if you check the article “History of Utilitarianism” on the Stanford Encyclopedia, you shall see that even in Bentham’s doctrine this psychological egoism is at odds with other tenets of his.
Bentham advocates actions to be guided by a ‘principle of utility’, Sidgwick writes «we must still arrive finally, if it is to be practically useful, at some determination of precepts or directive rules of conduct», Stuart Mill seems to imply that this principle is the only true motive for a truly moral action, being the existence of a moral faculty doubtful and being other motives the consequence of conditioning (such as education or customs).
This principle is stated by Stuart Mill as:
This happiness is far to be oneself’s only. The expression ‘to promote happiness’ hints to that, and Stuart Mill undergoes a long discussion in order to assert that there is more pleasure in promoting a general happiness (and that selfish happiness is vulgar). It is not clear, to me, what this happiness is supposed to be in the end. Pleasure is a sensation or a state of mind, if it is all about pleasure meant in this way, then we may infer that making dope free would be the most moral action. Hence, unlike others, in order to defuse the allegation of ‘swine morality’, Stuart Mill posits that some pleasures are vulgar while others are noble (and they could conflict with each other), that some natures cannot be contented with vulgar and temporary pleasure, and he presents a view that I find not dissimilar from Aristotle, that the noblest pleasure and political virtues overlap.
If, as I maintain against Bentham, there is no effective way to compute the increase in general happiness caused by an action, it seems to me that what is left of Utilitarianism is this ‘principle of utility’ guiding conduct.
However, let’s assume that it all boils down to a calculation of how beneficial are the consequences. Salvo definitely did something that can be approved by the Utilitarian, regardless how he got inspired. That said it was some borderline case too. If Salvo had ever had any utilitarian concern, he put himself in a condition where the supposed greater good was opposed to his own. But that could be deemed irrelevant because the aim is this ‘general happiness’. But even so, it remains to be seen if that was really the case. In fact Partisans (the Italian guerilleros during WWII) always left Germans carry on their reprisals on civilian, also because they saw it as instrumental in order to foster rebellion and uprisings, as indeed it happened. That was in the end a good strategy, it helped to put a strain on German occupation that made the war shorter, which means that probably it saved more lives than those saved by Salvo D’Acquisto.
Of course this is speculation, one sees the direct effect of Salvo’s act and can maintain that there is no proof of the alternative. Moreover the supposed positive effects of the alternative would be very diluted, one could not establish a sure correlation between the execution of the villagers and a shorter war. Very true, but the utilitarian can hardly argue on the basis of a lack of proof and of indirectedness. This proof in fact he never has. He may only have the more or less reasonable presumption of having effectively contributed to the general well-being, and the more the scope is large, the more is ‘general’, the more is maximised, then the more it is close to a mere guesswork.
There’s this so called thought experiment of the student who, being utilitarian, should decide whether studying or going out with friends. As going out is more pleasurable and as friends would enjoy his/her company, while they would not if the s-he opts for studying, the moral action would be going out. Stuart Mill would oppose that the pleasure of studying is of a superior kind compared to partying with friends and that the there’s a greater contribution to general happinness by successfully achieving studies. Yet neither the successful achievement nor this future utility can be guaranteed, they are merely presumed, hoped.
Just to be clear, I am not maintaining that Salvo was wrong, I am objecting to the utilitarian thing to do, I have deliberately developed a paradox to show that there is (or that I guess there is) an inner weakness in Utilitarianism that, against its claim, makes (at least some) moral actions undecidable, mostly if one does not want to focus on motives. Anyway, all this has not much to do with the questions you raised.
This is subjective and beyond contention. Personally I never saw it as a moral thing. Inspiring but not moral, not in the sense of something done for others.
However, I believe there may be an ‘utilitarian way’ to consider it moral.
The utilitarian could see that action as still guided by the ‘principle of utility’ (because of the presumed possible future effects), so he could still judge it as a moral. However, if we are really to assume that they could not count in any possible future consequence (which, honestly, I think it’s absurd), consider at least what Stuart Mill wrote (Utilitarianism, ch. 2):
