Mucius
I have been studying “Philosophy in the Flesh†by Lakoff and Johnson. This contains a theory that is grounded in what is called conceptual metaphors.
What the author is saying is that the experience of perceiving consists of the actions of categorizing, inferring, and conceptualizing. When a woman sees a tree these processes make up the experience of perceiving. Perceiving and/or moving through space are actions that require categorizing, conceptualizing, and inferring.
Likewise when a tadpole sees something swimming by the tadpole has a similar type action within its neural network. I say this to accent the theory that these actions, generally considered to be mental functions disconnected from bodily functions, are not disconnected plus the fact that the reason we humans have this capacity is because our non human ancestors also have this capacity.
In a nutshell this theory that I call metaphor theory states that the motor and sensory neural system does reasoning type functions. This metaphor theory also says that we have experiences that are called primary metaphors wherein the neural network contained in the mental space for this primary experience can and is mapped into another mental space and there it becomes part of another concrete or abstract concept.
A metaphor is not just a manner of speaking but this book builds a complete new and revolutionary idea that says that metaphors are the contents of mental spaces and these contents can and are mapped unconsciously to form the foundation of another experience that might be a concrete experience or an abstract experience.
Note regarding conceptualization and imagination.
The authors speak of the centrality to conceptualization and reason of imaginative process such as metaphor, imagery, metonymy prototypes, frames, mental spaces, and radial categories.
It appears to me that the authors are saying that imagination sets the stage for conceptualization by constructing several of necessary structures and that these structures become part of the concept.
“Reason is imaginative in that bodily inference forms are mapped onto abstract modes of inference by metaphor.†All of these bodily induced structures remain part of the “DNA†of all concepts both concrete and abstract. It is these constant structures that ground all of our concepts to our bodily modes of behaving.