Can the ontological argument as presented by Anselm and Scotus be defended against the objections of Aquinas and Ockham?
I shall merge the arguments of Anselm and Scotus together as it shall benefit the conclusion that we have looked at the arguments themselves in their best possible light rather than as pieces drawn from separate individuals. It is my thesis that the ontological argument in question cannot be defended against the objections raised.
Pro et Contra
Part I.
That it can be defended
[Arg. I] That the definition ‘that being than which no greater can be conceived without contradiction’ fits the Christian God exactly and is the correct definition because God is all-knowing, all-powerful, all-good and unchanging.
[Arg. II] To understand the phrase ‘most perfect being’ is to already have conceived of it. This a priori proof equates the phrase ‘most perfect’ with ‘most real’, a Platonic influence. Upon conceiving of the most perfect being, it cannot exist solely within the subjects head for then it would have something more perfect than it. Therefore, this perfect being must exist.
[Arg. III] That God is infinite because a finite being would not be the most perfect being conceivable without contradiction, therefore God must be infinite.
[Arg. IV] It is possible that a being than which no greater can be conceived without contradiction can exist and that if possible, the existence of God is actual. Since positing the possible existence of God in the intellect only would be a contradiction, we should conclude that God has actual existence also.
To the contrary
[Arg. I] Anselm presents his definition as the crux of his argument for the existence of the Christian God. However it is impossible to conceive of a ‘being than which none greater can be conceived’. To undertake such a conceiving would be a task that took an indefinite period of time.
[Arg. II] Existence should not be used as a defining tool for concepts such as this, as existence is not a property of a thing. The process of definition is one that separates the particular thing from all other particular things by identifying the unique or specific characteristics of the particular thing. That something exists or not is not a defining characteristic – it tells us nothing more about the nature of the thing.
[Arg. III] The proposed transition from conceptual existence to actual existence is not a satisfactory one. The move from conceptual to actual existence via possibility is equally invalid as this allows any perfect thing in concept to exist in reality also.
[Arg IV] One cannot define something into existence – definitions serve only to provide us with the specifics of what to them observe in the actual world to see if the concept refers accurately to anything in existence.
[Arg. V] The proposing of an infinite being that is intensively infinite such as the all-powerful infinite God proposed by Anselm and Scotus leads to a contradiction.
Body of the Question
[Method of Procedure.] The method used to establish the thesis is to consider three separate propositions, the analysis of which shall lead to the required proof that the thesis is correct. [1] That an intensively infinite being could create motion in an immediate instant and in doing so create a contradiction; [2] that the proposition [Arg. I] in Pro (‘that it can be defended’) for the definition of God is an impossible one; and to cement the understanding reached by Scotus that [3] existence is not a property and [4] that our definitions do not necessitate reality.
Anselm’s argument requires that even the fool can reason the existence of God, although for him it does not particularly matter who is doing the reasoning. For Anselm the most perfect being conceivable is the Christian God, and He is all-knowing, all-good, all-powerful, eternal and unchanging. The question is if this concept of a perfect being exists only in his head or also in reality. If the former, this being is hardly the most perfect imaginable, as existence is a perfection greater than the opposite.
The important concern for Scotus is that God be intensively infinite (all-powerful etc), as this is a requirement of the scriptures these scholastics were so keen to unify with reason. There is no theoretical need for this postulation however, as all that needs to be explained can be explained with a finite God. As Ockham demonstrates, ‘plurality is not to be posited without necessity’. By this standard, the ontological analysis of particular situation should make reference to existing things only when the features of the question cannot be explained in any other way. Opinions may differ about whether or not the postulation of a new kind of beings is really necessary in certain situations, but general acceptance of Ockham’s Razor places the burden of proof firmly on the side of those proponents of a more complex view of the world.
Turning to proposition [1], we see that a being infinite in power and knowledge could produce motion in an immediate instant. If such a being undergoes a motion, or some other type of change then it must either gain a property it formerly lacked or alternatively lose a property it otherwise had. The third and only alternative is that the being both loses and gains properties or parts of properties. The contradiction arises when we consider the time within which the change occurs; that God might create motion in one instant (an individual moment in time that is undivided) and have property X at that time and also lose property X at the same time. In this situation God has both property X and lacks property X at the same moment in time; a contradiction.
There are two problems caused by the definition of God required by the ontological argument [2]. As Gaunilo stipulates, it is impossible to conceive of a being than which none greater can be conceived. The Great Chain of Being provides a framework within which to do so but the problems arise from the nature of conceptualising infinity and perfection; these are terms that cannot be properly understood and certainly not used in a definition that requires certain parameters and borders. One cannot conceive of an infinite thing because things are defined by their finite nature; a rock is a rock due to its strict borders and an infinite rock is no rock at all, merely a shapeless mass. To even begin to conceive of a being than which none greater can be conceived is to start on a task that cannot end by definition. The second problem and the second reason why the definition fails is that the consequences of such a position entail a logical acceptance of the existence of any perfect thing. A perfect twig is not considered to exist in reality by virtue of being conceived in the mind. A possible counter-concern is that of there being an ultimate perfection or extent of all things but this does not come about until the early modern period and as such is of no relevance to this analysis of the medieval objections.
That existence is not a property [3] deals with Anselm’s initial appeal to the idea that God necessarily exists due to how God is defined. The process of defining an object is one where the particular or special qualities and attributes of an object are identified so that we can separate it from other objects that have different or similar attributes. It is these distinguishing features that can legitimately be used for defining the object in question. By saying that God exists we are not saying anything of importance, in defining terms, about the object ‘God’. Anything that can be referred to exists in one way or another, be it conceptually or actually. With this in mind we cannot include the notion of existence in the definition of ‘God’, a realisation that is ultimately damaging for the ontological argument.
To be certain of the problems that exist with the argument we can allow the notion of existence to be used in the definition and defining of ‘God’ while still finding a major fault with the argument [4]. Even with the acceptance of the definition of God as including the notion of existence it would not logically follow that God as defined does exist. This is simply down to the fact that we cannot define something into existence. We can concoct concepts that define in many ways but nothing will guarantee that the thing referred to by the concept a priori actually exists in the actual world (or any actual world!). It is this gap between the concept and the actual that caused Anselm his gravest problem, and one that Scotus was not blind to in his use of Plantinga’s shift to cross the void between concept and actuality by means of possibility. However the transition can only be achieved via observation, so Scotus is forced to accept the argument as only persuasive at best.
[Conclusion] It would seem that Anselm borrowed from Plato without making proper sense of Plato. He effectively asserts that the more perfect something is (the higher its place in the chain of being) then the more actual and real it is. By definition God would be the most real entity in the world. What is unclear at this point is what Anselm means by perfect. He certainly intends for it to mean the same as it did for Plato, but this is entirely indefensible when used as a foundation for an a priori proof. We are not born with an innate sense of what perfection is, and hence we cannot know, a priori, what perfection means. It becomes steadily clear that Anselm has joined separate concepts into causal relationships that independently have unsatisfactory definitions. As Anselm can create a definition for a perfect and necessary being and label it as ‘God’ then it is fair to presume that his logic is valid for me if I create a definition for a necessary perfect pebble and label it as ‘the perfect pebble’. If Anselm’s proof was to be defended against the objections of Aquinas and Ockham then any deity in any faith could become actual simply by conceiving of it. I can hardly imagine this as being Anselm’s intended consequence (far from it).
Effectively what Anselm and later Scotus are attempting to do is will God into existence. No matter how much mental energy I put into the task, my perfect pebble will still not appear. Should you be unsure of the ontological argument’s failure then simply find my pebble; therein lies the answer.
