I wanted to try this again. Unfortunately last time a couple of people trod all over the thread and we had some issues with understanding what speciesism actually is. It might be worth reading that thread (from page 3 on) if you’re new to the debate.
The view that belonging to a certain species of creature is a reason for treating certain beings as having more moral value than others is often assumed but not often explicitly defended. It would be interesting if those who have recently defended this view (if only implicity) could expand on their thoughts in this thread as to this particular issue, or indeed show how such speciesism is not necessarily a implicit part of the arguments against vegetarianism, or animal testing, or hunting…etc.
Please, this is not a thread about vegetarianism, animal testing or hunting. I’m not looking for your thoughts on those topics here.
Speciesism is essentially to argue that there are morally relevant differences between us and other animals that in turn give us ‘rights’ to put our own interests as paramount to the interests of other animals.
Speciesism in the news: Dennet and Owen Flanagan were two philosophers on a panel of 22 experts, some primatologists, some lawyers, some stem cell researchers, in which the potential consequences of stem cell research were debated.
The panel concluded that ‘to implant human stem cells into the brains of non-human primates can unintentionally change their moral status’.
The panel reportedly tried to deal with the question of ‘if there are cognitive or emotional capacities that are unique to humans in ways that make us worthy of higher moral status’.
The stem cell biologists and neurologists were apparantly unable to specify limits on what an implanted stem cell might change or effect. Apparantly the panel met with no philosophical agreement on the moral significance of changes in abilities in primates undergoing stem cell research, if they could detect any.
So the first question is if speciesism can be defended. Only after that can we look at what makes us different to non human animals and in turn look into if those differences are morally relevant. For example, that many humans have the capability for ‘abstract reasoning through the process of time-binding’ is not necessarily a morally significant difference, unless we are also to hold that humans without these capacities (of which there are many) be assigned such moral status as non human animals of similar cognitive ability.