Is all knowledge empirically verifiable?

Philosophy Forums Philosophy
1

greetings all. i’m new on this forum and since I’m starting a topic, I might as well say something about myself.
ahem
well, I’m a proud Roman Catholic with the highest respect for science, as well as the disciplines of history, literature and philosophy and also am a professional student. And just in case anyone wonders, my participation here is not as the caped crusader of the pope, but just as a learner who likes discussing ideas.

anyway, I have a question I would like to discuss. in contemporary society, we currently have a mixture of what is termed “Modernism” as well as “Post-Modernism.” the latter is essentially a critique of the former.

anyway, one modernistic assumption that remains in contemporary thinking is: all knowledge available to the human intellect, must be empirically testable. based upon this assumption, it is sometimes claimed that if one cannot measure or observe something as a quality, quantity or rate, that something does not exist.

Question: How do we verify or falsify the claim: All knowledge is empirically verifiable.

It appears to me, that this claim is internally problematic:

According to the claim itself, knowledge (including of the truth of the claim itself) can only be had empirically, but I can think of no set of empirical experiments that would verify or falsify this claim of human knowledge. Can anyone else?

Second, one might resort to ulterior arguments that are dialectical in nature, rather than simply empirical, to support the idea that all knowledge is empirical, but in so doing, one contradicts the claim one is trying to support (for the simple fact that one is gaining knowledge for that claim by non-empirical methods).

If this is truly the case, it appears to this one, that we have the choice either to assert the claim (i.e. All knowledge is empirically verifiable.) dogmatically despite lack of rational support, OR to reject this claim as fallacious and be open to logical philosophical argument which is not directly empirically verifiable.

2

that depends on how you define knowledge…

knowledge is most commonly defined in philosophic circles as justified true belief…

justified via logic, true via empirical evidence, and it must be believed to be known…

knowledge is problematic for a variety of reasons…

-Imp

3

right.
frankly, i’m most interested in questioning that assumption that all knowledge must include empirical verifiability. for example, it seems part of mathematical theory can be proven logically, but not empirically.

4

Perhaps it shouldn’t be understood as a general claim, but as a specific definition of the word “knowledge”. And definitions are of course more or less arbitrary.

5

I think we need to break ‘knowledge’ down into grades of purity. Take history for example – the Minoans are by-and-large a silent civilization. We just don’t have enough information from them to really say much with certainty or authority. So, should we then abandon the study of the Minoans?

I think the answer is, “Of course not!” But at the same time, we have to carefully consider what (limited) information that we do have about the Minoans and build our framework of ‘what we know’ off of that, rather than just inventing things willy-nilly.

We can tell by their archetecture and painting that they were basically an extension of what was going on in terms of Near Eastern cultures at that time, and they clearly were maritime traders based various materials found in Knossos not native to the area. Couple that with the knowledge that whenever the Greeks talk about the Minoans in their myths, they talk about them having an incredibly powerful Navy (King Minos built the first great fleet, ect). Next, we have the fact that there were no walls at Knossos and the knowledge that women are pacifists and that if they ran things there would be no war and everything would be happy-smiley-fun, so clearly (because of the no-walls), the Minoan civilization was a totally pacifistic mother-earth worshiping matriarchy.

One of those things is not like the other . . . but not all these forms of knowledge (even those I consider to be reliable) are equal. Now, if a less useful (less reliable) form of knowledge conflicts with a more useful one, then I would say we ought reject the less useful one and try and re-formulate our understanding.

6

Del said

far from “of course,” this claim is simply an assertion and requires support and argument. i think i’ll wait for forthcoming argument rather than give counter-arguments at this time.
however, in your argument, i would like an explanation why two people, when in disagreement about the definition of a certain word (say “coxcomb”) both will go to the dictionary (as an accepted authority) for adjudication. and how, when one of them, seeing the dictionary’s definition matches his own, will say “ha! i told you so” and such. if definitions were arbitrary, would not people simply say, “ah well, we disagree of course, because there is NO SUCH THING as a definition that does not depend upon one’s own arbitrary opinion.”
(does that make sense? i hope thats clear.)

[EDIT: my bad. on rereading your post, i think i misplaced the emphasis of what you were trying to say. but you seem to want to define “knowledge” to include the idea of “empirical” necessarily. but the point of my argument is that cannot be support. you can dogmatically claim it, but then, one is being as dogmatic as the fideists who dogmatically claim the existence of God without support or argument.]

Xunzian concluded:

i think that makes very good sense. i am very nervous about the word “useful” (useful to whose or what purposes?). but i basically agree, no knowledge can ultimately contradict other knowledge, so if two sources conflict, check both, and probably go with the most likely or reliable.

but is that principle - which we have just agreed upon - itself empirically verifiable? i can’t think of how.

are we agreed then, that we must heavily rely upon empirically verifiable data (demand it in every appropriate situation etc.) but that we should not dogmatically disallow use of philosophical argument (logically and dialectically testable) but not empirically verifiable?

(btw, i’m using “dialectic” here to mean basically, the process of logical argument, rebuttal and response which necessitates a sort of survival of the fittest for arguments in that one is forced to improve their arguments in competition with contrary arguments, and the best argument comes out on top. its basically rational discourse and what we are here to do.)

7

I generally place empirically obtained evidence at the top of the ladder, if that makes sense.

To continue with the history example, we have to trust archeological evidence over pretty much every other type.

For example, the first Emperor of China was long thought to have been a radical Legalist, to the point of renouncing all other philosophical schools as well as silly superstitions that would have been present in China at the time. But the archeological evidence suggests that he was far more moderate than the written records would suggest. That isn’t to say that he wasn’t a Legalist, and the Great Burning definately occured where non-legalist texts were destroyed . . . but there is also evidence of him performing non-Legalist, Shamanistic ceremonies.

Of course, this assumes that the empirical evidence has been interpreted correctly . . . but I would trust the interpretations of modern (fairly neutral) experts over the authors of what amounts to state-sponsored propoganda from the next dynasty (where most of our primary-source literature comes from).

8

once again, i think your post makes sense.

but let me qualify: we expect and employ different sources of knowledge for different areas of exploration. in history we definitely need to keep a close close watch on archaeological evidence. however, i’m not sure archaeological evidence is “empirical.” archaeological evidence requires much interpretation (as you allude to) but empirical evidence comes from the application of the scientific method (problem, hypotheses, test, observe, etc.). “empirical” is closely related to “experimental” (which is interpreted, but in a different way.)
perhaps, archaeological evidence is partially empirical, but not purely.

either way, the one point i am trying to make still stands: we cannot simply demarcate knowledge as empirical without being dogmatic, and but we cannot support the claim (i.e. All knowledge is empirically verifiable.) consistently (for the reasons mentioned above: no empirical tests could do it, and other non-empirically verifiable methods would be inconsistent with the claim itself).
in the end, we acknowledge that we need both, empirical and philosophical support.

9

Well, I used history as an example because it is my hunch you want to relate this back to the existence of God.

Clearly, there are assays that are better than others, but yes, we do need to place these things within a framework.

It is worth noting that the effects of antibiotics had been observed well before Flemming put two and two together. But, he was in such as place as his observations had an applicable meaning. The philosophical support (the context, really) is very important to the interpretation of the empirical data.

10

Xunzian said:

Yes, exactly. it appears that even to do science, one needs a hefty philosophical basis (one that historically took a long time to craft). So there is more necessary then simply empiricism.

Also,

well, i wouldn’t be a very good catholic if i didn’t believe in God. but a claim of that sort would need its own support and argumentation. i think that such is available. (i’m not going to trying and sneak it in while no one is looking.) but really, here i am just interested in pounding out this point about knowledge against an apparently common fallacy. i think this is a necessary starting point, right?

11

I think this is the same route that Logical Positivism started to take, and is why people today irrationally dismiss the movement in its entirety.

To me it seems clear that NOT all knowledge is empirically verifiable. First, as has been stated, there are numerous facts of mathematics that have no physical analogue in our universe. Second, there seems to be an elementary proof of this fact.

Either the statement “all knowledge is empirically verifiable” is true, or it is false. Assume it is true. Then “all knowledge is empirically verifiable” is empirically verifiable. But it seems clearly impossible to ever empirically verify the single idea that ALL knowledge is empirically verifiable. If you accept this, then assigning a truth value of “True” to that statement results in a contradiction - thus, the statement must be false.

It seems clear to me that knowledge must either be empirically verifiable, or else justified logically. This statement doesn’t admit disproof as its predecessor did, and seems intuitively to match up to how all of science and math works.

Of course, if you’re going to use this to talk about the existence of god, it means you either have to give empirical evidence of god, or else a logical argument for the existence of god - both of which seem pretty impossible.

12

Twiffy,
i wanna say Hallelujah, praise the LARD (as is said in missoura). you’re right, i am thinking of logical positivism. i bring it up because it seems many people are closet logical positivists these days.
the only place i’d differ is your opinion that:

i happen to think that some such arguments are sound. hopefully we can get to those sometime.

13

reaaaaaallly. which ones? for some reason i find discussing these arguments fun, even though i’ve never found any one of them convincing…

14

Hmmmm, it would seem as though my posts are getting deleted today.

15

Yeah, logical positivism is an interesting topic. I consider myself an out-of-the-closet Logical Positivist - not that I believe all knowledge to be empirically verifiable, but that I believe all knowledge to be either empirically or logically verifiable, which is a very natural extension of LP. Once you make this adjustment, LP is no longer inconsistent, and the “meaninglessness” criteria can apply consistently and intuitively in full force.

I would be interested to hear which arguments you think are sound! I’ve thought a good bit about most of Anselm’s arguments, and the first mover argument, and haven’t found anything I can respect in them. Maybe in a new thread?

16

If there is unclarity in a given vocabulary, if people give differing meanings to certain words, then we can only achieve clarity if each one of us gives a DEFINITION of what he or she means with a given word or concept. If you give a certain definition, it may not seem arbitrary to you but it will be so to me if my definition is different. If a hundred people give a hundred different definitions, isn’t each definition arbitrary? Or how would you go about deciding which one of them is “correct”?

Well, the problem with philosophy is that dictionaries can not be accepted as authorities. Language is always arbitrary, dictionaries are useful tools for defining standardized meanings for everyday usage but you cannot tell me that you have learned your language skills purely from studying a dictionary? Or that the meaning ALL persons give to a certain word is exhaustively covered by a dictionary? Of course not, every person’s language has been accumulating gradually throughout life, and the way we structure our thoughts is fundamentally affected by our personal histories. A good part of 20th century philosophy has dealt with linguistics. There’s a reason for that. Language is not a neat, standardized system in which everyone always knows precisely what the other person means. You may not notice this in everyday life, but if you get involved in a philosophical debate about “knowledge”, you should notice it pretty quickly.

I didn’t say it was my definition. On the contrary, I said it was a more or less arbitrary definition, so clearly I am willing to accept other definitions also.

17

I think you can falsify this claim by the fact that alot of things are to complex to verify empirically.

The weather for instance. It is impossible to predict the weather by calculating it with all the factors that are an influence. Because of that, the weather condition is never the same. Still, a metreology is very much a sience. They are able, at least one or two days in advance, to make predictions that are accurate to a point that they are useful (I mean, obviously it is not exact, but exact enough to serve mankind), by using combinations of mathematics and experiences from the past. So you can say that it is possible to have knowledge without being able to verify it empirically.

Another example is snooker. For a snooker player it is impossible to calculate all the angles and hit the ball as the math tells him to. He simply doesnt have the time and equpment to do so during a match. Also, the balls are never in exactly the same spot, so he cannot simply practice every possible shot untill he knows how to play it. Still, some snooker players can play some shots with 99.99% accuracy. So you can say he has the knowledge how to play , without being able to verify it empirically.

It just seems that the human brain is capable of things, having or creating knowledge if you like, that is simply isnt verifiable. Maybe that is the part of us humans that sets us apart from lets say… computers?

18

JTB isn’t a popular analysis these days. Edmund Gettier attacked it in his famous paper Is Knowledge Justified True Belief?. I recommend you read it if you can find it.

19

How is the proposition “knowledge must either be empirically verifiable, or else justified logically” either empirically verifiable or justified logically (it doesn’t appear self-evident to me, nor does willing its negation imply a contradiction)?

I don’t see how.

20

JTB is the best definition epistemologists have going at the moment… the fact that justification is tenative is simply a symptom of the disease… btw, I wrote an extensive paper on the gettier problem years ago… it is posted on symposia…

journal.ilovephilosophy.com/Arti … Problem/32

gettier’s problem is not a problem…

-Imp