Is Christianity so weird that it must be true?

Philosophy Forums Religion and Spirituality
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“Corrupt” in what sense? In that you or I would judge it to be no proper authority? Or in that it has operated outside the restraints the law applies to authority?

If the U.S. government does that to citizens, then it is corrupt in both senses. But the government of Nazi Germany did it, and was corrupt only in the first sense. We would judge its actions in, for example, persecution of political dissidents, to be wrong, but they were not outside the lawful authority of the state in that country under that regime.

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No. I think violence by authority can be justified on whatever basis society determines, not just restraining violence itself. Do you think it’s justified for a parent to smack a 10 year old boy if he tells a elderly neighbor to “fuck off and die”? Do you think it’s justified for the cops to show up at my house and take my kick-ass stereo away if I keep playing it loudly at 3am? Do you think it’s right to incarcerate an Enron executive who shuffled money around or lied to the FBI about it? In all these cases the authority would never have to justify their use of violence based on restraining other violence (although this may indeed be a side benefit). The violence is justified simply because society has determined that these behaviors deem the perpetrator worthy of violence. I don’t see this as a religious issue at all unless society chooses to impose violence on a particular religious group, but I don’t see that happening in the US any time soon.

Suffering is such a difficult concept to define and can be very subjective. Plus, I don’t think suffering is a bad thing necessarily. Many religious traditions accept suffering and even see it as a means to a greater end.

I’d go with “person” over “force of nature”.

Ok except with the “and so may be held accountable” part…

Ok, but all you are saying that accountability for actions is an essential element of human morality, and therefore can be used to define a human being. Then you propose that if God is not accountable in the same way as a human being then he is actually not a human being. But whether he is much less than a human being (force of nature) or something much more than a human being (God) would still seem to be open for discussion.

I don’t agree with the “net good” argument at all. I agree that God is a person, and I agree that one member of the trinity is a human being. But divine violence is justifiable simply because it is divine, not because it is in some complicated way “not violence”. God could decide to torture me for eternity and I would still say that he was comletely justified in doing so. Whenever he chooses not to inflict violence on human beings is evidence of his inherent goodness and grace. But I think we’ve been over this ground before.

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In the sense that society is physically capable of doing so, obviously you are correct; however, we are still left with authority having to meet whatever standard of good and bad society applies, and employ its violence so as to enhance the good, so that it ceases to be a net evil. It isn’t simply a matter of authority being justified in being violent solely because it is an authority.

Depends on what you mean by “religious issue.” It is certainly a moral issue, and it has a bearing on how we think of divine authority.

Well, there we’re getting into what’s good for whom and why. Suffering can be a path to enlightenment, if it’s handled properly, and if it’s within the capacity of a person to be handled. Or, in a more mundane context, the suffering that comes from exercise can result in a healthier body and greater enjoyment of life. But in both those cases, it’s a matter of resultant joy or pleasure outweighing the suffering, resulting in a net good.

Figured you would. :sunglasses:

Not human, but PERSONAL morality, and therefore can be used to define a person. The same consideration would apply to an artificial intelligence, an extraterrestrial, or even an animal intelligent enough to understand right and wrong (which means more species than people generally understand, although certainly not all animal species).

Not human being. Person. Incidentally, I wouldn’t say that a force of nature is less than a human being, just different, and the difference is such that moral judgments upon its behavior make no sense.

However, a superior person is still a person, not intrinsically different in this way. And while it may be argued that a human being lacks the full knowledge and capacity to judge the actions of God, it does not, in my opinion, make any sense to say that the actions of God are somehow immune to ANY judgment of whether they are good or evil simply because He/She/It is God. As long as God has free will, and so is capable of taking action that results in net good or net harm, then God is a person and so capable of morally meaningful good or evil acts.

This relates back to your statement about whether violence is good or evil depending on whether one is authorized to do them. But there must be a basis for authorization, and if the basis is simply “'Cause I’m da boss,” then you have a thuggery, not anything morally meaningful.

If the statement, “God is good,” is to have any meaning at all, it cannot be perfectly synonymous with “God is God.” Otherwise, all you’re saying is “'Cause He’s da boss.”

And this is what I cannot agree with. You are saying that God is good merely because He is God, not because He is good. You are positing a divine thuggery. I think that is nonsense.

Unless, of course, God isn’t a person, but is a force of nature instead. In that case, to ask whether He/She/It is good or not is a meaningless question.

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Way to play to the Confucian crowd (of one).

I do agree, in one sense, that an unjust government has voided its authority because it has violated that basic morality that we have spoken about on other occasions. Indeed, that is the entire basis behind the Mencian “right to revolution” (anachronistically recognized, but still a valid concept) as well as the guiding principle of Confucian politics, the Will of Heaven.

That said, I think it is worth drawing a line between the concept of ‘authority’ and the concept of ‘good authority’. Naturally, for you, if we are to talk about ‘authority’ in a nebulous manner, then it become divine authority and so everything you have said is consistent. For me, when one talks of ‘authority’ in a nebulous sense, it is not anything resembling perfect authority but rather the sort of authority we encounter on a day-to-day basis and as such, it is fair to assume is already corrupt at some level. Indeed, this corruption is so much of an assumed (because according to my cosmology – I respect that your’s is different, a perfect being does not exist) that to call it ‘corrupt’ is to miss the point because everything is ‘corrupt’ at some level, so in order for corruption to be a meaningful notion, it ought be reserved for extreme cases.

But, as per usual, I think we are disagree more in degree than in kind.

25

Ned,

As a side-note, if you don’t mind mixing your religious leanings with your lab-life (and I would COMPLETELY understand you wanting to keep them seperate) try talking to some of the FOBs in your department about Confucianism or Buddhism. Especially the Christian Koreans (there should be plenty of them).

I think you’d find that plenty of other traditions get their fair share of shit – especially Confucianism from the Koreans, when their version of Christianity is a strange child of both Confucianism and Christianity (so they ought know better).

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Hi Ned. Thank you for the comments. You said; ”I think the history of Christianity provoking violence is a mixed one. While I agree that Christian theology itself doesn’t promote violence many convinced and committed Christians have been violent or supported violence.

Christian support of violence is an oxymoron. It’s been my observation that many who identify themselves as Christians are really Kantians. They embrace a universal moral code, couched within a political or quasi-political ideology, where each individual strives to become a member of a Kantian like earthly “kingdom of ends” rather than a member of Christ’s Christian heavenly kingdom. Quasi-Christians can very well be: noble men, sincere men, absolutely moral men, well-meaning men; exactly as rational thinking true Kantians are. Yet, such things are not the conditions of being a Christian man as they are conditions of being a Kantian.

Meanwhile, real Christians know there will always be wars and rumors of wars throughout time (Matt. 24:6) because wars are empirical. But Christians are not troubled nor focused on wars because wars are things “in-itself,” merely a side-bar within world history. War ideology therefore is not likely to be embraced by Christians. It will only be observed as the natural unfolding of history (Matt. 24).

You said; ”Forget the crusades, what about the support for the Iraqi war by modern evangelical Christians. What do you make of that?”

Real evangelical Christians center their attention on heavenly kingdom building rather than earthy empire building. Wars are always connected to “empire building” which is an earthly pursuit. Christians are in the world but they are not of it (John 17:16, 15:19). Therefore, worldly things should not hold too much sway for the true Christian (2 Tim. chapter 4, verse eighteen). Christ’s kingdom is a heavenly one exclusively (John 18:36). Christians operate within the world as instruments displaying the gospel light of: love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and self-control (Gal. 5:22-23). Christianity and pure evangelism are not of a political nature as wars are. So war preaching evangelists are by nature a red flag. Passion

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I know plenty of Koreans but I’ve never got into any religious discussions with them. Maybe I’ll ask a few questions and see what I can find out about their version of Christianity.

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This is a variant of a common position in Christianity. If encountered with any bad deeds done by a group in the name of Christ then we simply claim that they are “not true Christians” by whatever definition we choose. While I admit this may be true, I do not think it is helpful to go down this path. First, it starts from a presumption that Christians are not capable of incredibly evil deeds and I find this a rather arogant position and one that is not supported in fact. I think it is much more “Christ-like” to admit our weaknesses and try to understand the source of these problems, whether personal or institutional. Second, I think it creates and un-necessary confusion for non-christians who may not be familiar with the hair-splitting theological differences that we base our definitions on. I don’t see any downside to using the non-Christian definition of what a Christian is, and then admitting that Christians have faults. The alternative of creating a new definition of what comprises a Christian solely so that we can exclude those who do things we don’t agree with seems too much like passing the buck.

the problem with this position is that “war ideology” has been embraced by Christians throughout history.

I think this a “head-in-the-cloud” attitude. Evangelical Christians are obviously heavily politicised in the US and clearly support a republican agenda. I don’t think any non-Christian would associate the word “evangelical Christian” with “heavenly kingdom building”. I think they associate the words “evangelical Christian” with some very earthly issues like abortion, gay rights, gun control, and the war in Iraq.

I understand what you are saying and admire your focus on the important things. I agree with your approach. However, it is not the approach taken by the majority of evangelical Christians in the US. If you don’t believe me, just wait a few months till the election machine gets into full gear. You’ll find evangelical Christians all over the place talking about very, very, earthly issues, including the war in Iraq.

29

Did Chesterton consider Christianity to be a philosophy?

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In his essay on “why I believe in Christianity” he says…

“Nevertheless it falls to us to make some attempt to explain this religious philosophy which was, and will be again, the study of the highest intellects and the foundation of the strongest nations, but which our little civilisation has for a while forgotten, just as it has forgotten how to dance and how to dress itself decently. I will try and - explain why I think a religious philosophy necessary and why I think Christianity the best religious philosophy.”

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If you remove the “global” from “global warming”, what remains is altogether different in meaning. In fact, it’s kind a comforting-sounding word, like how it feels to drink cocoa on a chilly day.

Religious philosophy is reasoning with a supernatural underpinning. To engage in it during one’s existential musings is like using the literary technique of exposition. This key part of the plot’s already been determined before the curtain goes up, it only waits to be revealed as the dialogue proceeds. Not that there’s anything wrong with that. But you either accept the made-up part (on faith), or you’ll likely find it not that entertaining. Better to see what else is playing.

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I can’t agree with what you’ve said here, Ingenium. In fact, I think you’re guilty of the very same thing you’ve accused Ned of.
The only purpose I can see to relying on the term supernatural is to create a emotional notion of ‘fancifulness’ or falsehood before the investigation begins. Especially in the case of metaphysics, the subject of which is to discuss what sorts of things ultimately make up reality. For something to be ‘supernatural’ is only interesting, only a bad thing, if one pre-supposes materialism. If one has to pre-suppose materialism in order to do metaphysics (whic his how I’m reading ‘existential musings’ when you say it), then one is already finished, as you say, the plot has been determined before the curtain goes up. Without a bias towards materialism, supposing the existence of God is no different than supposing the existence of matter, or numbers, or universals.

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Then allow me to share with you another purpose: the use of terms as they’re defined in dictionaries.

From Miriam Webster’s site:

supernatural - 1: of or relating to an order of existence beyond the visible observable universe; especially : of or relating to God or a god, demigod, spirit, or devil.

The quote I was addressing contained the phrase “religious philosophy,” which implies that there is a slant to the inquiry. This isn’t about just exploring questions regarding ethics, logic, wisdom or morality. It’s an exploration (or ‘musing’) regarding the existence of something that is, as you said, metaphysical. Other types of philosophical inquiry don’t pre-suppose either metaphysical or material, because that’s not the thrust of the inquiry. So this type is “special.”

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Yes, well, when I say ‘metaphysics’, I mean it in the sense of ontology, that is to say, that most foundational branch of philosophy*- dualism vs monism, the existence and nature of material reality, that kind of stuff. I was certainly not using it in the “embarrasing section of the bookstore” sense of the term. Since when doing metaphysics, the very existence and essence of nature is the matter at hand, nothing can by default be called supernatural. Or, if you prefer, it all can, since metaphysics deals pretty much exclusively with that ‘which is beyond the visible and observable’. That’s why it’s not empiricism.

Now, to return to your point now that we’ve both defined a term or two:

Yes, religious philosophy is by definition a philosophy that has supernatural underpinnings, or at the very least procedes from a background that does.  I'm not totally sure yet what an 'existential musing' is, but assuming it has to do with pondering the nature of what exists (i.e., ontology, otherwise known as metaphysics), then assuming or ruling out the 'supernatural' is putting the cart before the horse. 
And, of course, philosophy is not just about beginning. A person can develop or adopt a core philosophy, supernatural or otherwise, and reason perfectly well [i]from there[/i] about matters such as, as you say, ethics, logic, wisdom or morality. A particular inquiry may need to rely on the (super)natural underpinnings for it's ideas, or it may not, all depending.  A theistic or otherwise supernatural system is special precisely the same way that a feminist, communist, or nominalist system is- only in that it is defined.
  • Unless you think it’s epistemology, as some do.
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I do better treating it as a verb. :slight_smile:

On this end, I’m not able to reach a satisfying understanding of ‘ontological metaphysics’. It seems to turn on itself, somehow.

In the example we’ve been discussing, I didn’t see any ‘ruling out’ going on. It seems like expending time and energy reasoning one’s way (or convincing oneself that this is what’s going on, lol) to an ontology that includes both God and everything except for God…but wouldn’t it be easier to just start with God (or ‘first cause’) up front and move along to how he may directing the show and where “I” fit into that?

Again, this started with a quote about religious philosophy, which implies seeking a rationale for faith rather than being more open-ended about it. What Chesterton seemed to be announcing was that he’d found the best belief, that Christianity made the strongest case in his estimation. As I said, nothing wrong with that, as long as one understands that’s what it is. (Now whether or how God’s ‘knowable’, I’d call epistemological, or maybe theological, or some combination, who knows?) It’s just that ‘doing metaphysics’ this way prevents one from exploring any other reality than God as reality or vice versa. I find it constraining, others probably find it liberating.

Yes, but then the work changes in scope to application.