Is knowledge also a belief?

The question remains, how are we certain, and do we know we are certain.

For all we know, we could be in a science lab injected false memories that don’t exist outside of the injection. Therefore, we can only know things exist in the past and in the present, but we can only be 99.9999999999 percent sure that the same patterns will repeat in the future.
For instance, we’ve seen gravity happen 999999999 times, so we believe that gravity will still occur 100 years from now, provided two conditions are met - We have our eyes open, and 2. We are not dead by then.

Yes what standard indeed. So as I understand the fields of epistemology that you provided, rationalism, empiricism, etc - they all provide narrower, specific standards for what constitutes knowledge as opposed to something as broad as JTB.
Correct me if I’m wrong? If not, please note that I am in turn (at least beginning, or attempting) on providing a standard for knowledge as broad as JTB. As such, I don’t see any other broad standards other than JTB. As my response, it seems there needs to be a broad standard to replace JTB. Please note that I never said there wasn’t standards in epistemology, but I don’t know of any that address knowledge in the manner that JTB does and that includes rationalism, foundationlism, and empiricism. Please correct me if I am wrong there.

In any case, I am not asking for your to summarize the entire field of epistemology, unless there is only the entire field of epistemology to rely on in determining a standard for knowledge. Is that what you are implying? Because I am looking for a more simplistic and think I have and can provide a more simplistic nature of knowledge - that rivals the simplicity of Plato’s JTB however with more efficacy. Of course, I don’t mine is so simple, but I think mine would be broader, yet simple enough compared to the entire field of epistemology.

Gettier showed that JTB is not sufficient for knowledge yes, but in turn Getter showed that some JTB is knowledge, correct? Certainly not all.

Now you state an attitude of certainty is not what makes belief a component of knowledge, well then I ask, what does? I agree that a proposition that we think is true can be a belief unless it can be justified as knowledge. The standard of justification however - I have yet to lay out. But nor did Plato really. There are justifications in rationalism, empiricism, but they don’t encompass knowledge in general. The encompasses how to know specific things, not everything that is knowable.

I would think my standards do fit in the field of epistemology - except for those standards take into account JTB and as such knoweldge as a belief. I understand the knowledge not always being true seems to be a belief - however it does come down to what the word knowledge means then in that case. Is it knowledge is “familiarity, awareness or understanding of someone or something, such as facts, information, descriptions, or skills, which is acquired through experience or education by perceiving, discovering, or learning.” or is it knowledge that is “familiarity, awareness or understanding of someone or something, such as facts, information, descriptions, or skills, which is acquired through experience or education by perceiving, discovering, or learning that are true”.

Not the qualifier of true being the only difference, in which I added on my own, not from any source of what the definition of knowledge is. Being that it may be, justification based on reason, logic, understanding means a state of knowing is not a state of believing - it is a different state of mind. They are subtly different, but also very meaningfully different. That is my contention and I see no reason why it couldn’t be so aside from subjectively grouping knowledge as also a belief and missing out on this subtle difference in attitude of knowledge in our state of mind that is brought about by justification through reason, logic and understanding. Belief is not a calm state of mind, knowing is. There are differences that I contend qualify knowledge to be seen not as belief in any way shape or form, as alluded to earlier. This difference in belief and knowledge, I contend, doesn’t matter if knowledge is true or not. It is not the same state of mind~

Interesting, so relevant to what?

Very good then - so there is no real basis you claim other than a subjective definition?

I contend my framework is superior in that it notes a difference that leads to a more coherent state of mind for all.

No. And I was not talking about a “subjective definition”. Your Interpretation is false. Read my posts again. Perhaps you can come to the right interpretation. Good luck!

Ok, so then I ask what are these definitions of belief and knowledge that they must begin with?

No, things like empiricism, rationalism and so on seek to flesh out the details of what the ‘J’ in JTB+ stands for. They aren’t in any sort of opposition to it. Empiricism and Rationalism are types of justification, they don’t disagree that JTB or JTB+ = knowledge.

Only if there is something inherently flawed with JTB+, which I don’t think you’ve shown.

As far as I recall, Gettier would say that all knowledge is JTB, but not all JTB is knowledge- there is an additional something which must be added to JTB to qualify it as knowledge.

A belief is a component in knowledge because a belief is the thing that can be justified and true, in the same way that ‘animal’ is a component to ‘being a fish’, because animals are the things that have spines, breathe with gills, and etc.

The state of thinking a proposition is true is always a belief. That is a simple definition of the term. That’s why knowledge is also a belief- because knowledge is a particular sort of ‘thinking a proposition is true’. I still haven’t seen a non-semantic disagreement with this from you.

Which is why JTB is broad and doesn’t specify the details of the ‘J’, and doesn’t have to in order for it to be true.

Eh, I don’t really care. It’s looking more and more like you’re making a semantic point and not a philosophical one. Pick the dictionary definition you like best and promote it I guess.

Again with this? Being true isn’t from any source of what the definition of knowledge is? What about the “Justified TRUE belief” definition we’ve been discussing for two days? Jesus Christ.

That’s your argument? You don’t see why it couldn’t be so? You’re right because you don’t see why you’re wrong? I’ve already given you an explicit argument for why you’re wrong twice, and again you’ve ignored it. Let me do it…again. Even simpler this time.

Propostions are the only things that can be true or false.
A belief is ‘a state of mind concerning the truth or falsehood of a proposition’.
Knowledge is also a state of mind concerning the truth or falsehood of proposition.
That’s why knowledge is a type of belief.

So far all you’ve given me is “Yeah but knowledge and belief feel different in my head”. Yeah, no shit. But so what? Nobody defines ‘belief’ according to a specific way it feels in your head. Thinking dogs have four legs, thinking the sun is shining, and thinking you have cancer all feel very different from each other too, and yet nobody tries to argue that some of these things aren’t belief on the basis of that.

There’s nothing subjective about it. They are both states of mind concerning the truth or falsehood of propositions.

Knowing that you are on fire is not a calm state of mind. Look, why would you even WANT to define ‘belief’ and ‘knowledge’ according to how you imagine they feel in other people’s heads? You already conceded to Arminius that how knowledge feels to you might be completely different from how it feels to him, so doesn’t that render it useless as a definition when we already have a perfectly good one?

It is not so difficult to say. So just make some suggestions.

To really narrow this discussion down to the crux of the matter, I’m going to only respond to this:

“A belief is a component in knowledge because a belief is the thing that can be justified and true, in the same way that ‘animal’ is a component to ‘being a fish’, because animals are the things that have spines, breathe with gills, and etc.”

Now you state a belief is a component in knowledge because a belief is the thing that can be justified and true"…

Please note you state belief can be justified and true. Of course, we don’t agree there. But you are stating also that “Belief is a component in knowledge” - note that you didn’t state “the component in knowledge” which would carry more weight.

Belief’s can become justified as knowledge, as I stated in my OP. However, my contention here is that belief is not needed for knowledge, rather a state of knowing is all that is needed and that state is state is different from belief. i state it is possible to bypass belief altogether to obtain knowledge.

So your response isn’t really a direct answer to the question I pose.

Do you understand this?

Relevant to the scope of topic concerns. For example, I define all existence in terms of affect because without it affecting anything, it is not relevant to my ontological concerns and if it does affect anything, I need to include it in the scope of an ontology. Or to say that you “know how to repair a short-block chevy”, whatever you are referring to as “knowing” needs to include the actual issue of repairing and specifically all of the details a chevy short-block within the scope of your intent - “relevant to your intent”.

You don’t think beliefs can be justified?

Or true?

Do you know that, or just believe it?

Oh wait, you DO think beliefs can become justified. You just prefer not to call them beliefs anymore when they are justified. Your preference is not an argument for anything. It certainly doesn’t change the fact that when a belief becomes ‘justified as knowledge’ it remains a person’s cognizance as to whether or not a proposition is true, and thus remains a type of belief, according to how epistemology defines ‘belief’.

I understand that you decided to ignore 95% of what I wrote to you, including all the detailed arguments against your positions and the information you asked for.

Correct, beliefs can become justified to become knowledge , just as easy as they can be destroyed to not be even considered anymore.

Its not a belief when its knowledge, so somewhat correct. I just laid out why this “preference” as you so nicely put it (as is the epistemic classification that knowledge is a belief is also a preference), is an argument for noting the difference between knowledge and belief in a more coherent manner that includes the state of mind we know as knowing, that provides a different attitude than just merely thinking something is true without justification. There is a difference and it ought to be recognized for good reason, to downplay belief due to its problematic nature. I contend belief is less intelligent. Knowledge is a different state of mind that is not a state of belief, it is a state of understanding. To consider belief and understanding as a similar category as you would with other epistemologists is not correct. So what is the reason for this assertion? Sure both a state of mindful understanding leads one to think their understanding is true, but so does a mere belief.

Good we agree. But I contend that belief isn’t required for knowledge; rather belief can be bypassed through understanding. In fact I would make the claim that belief should be bypassed until understanding occurs. Doubt, doubt, doubt, until comprehension and clarity are present. Certainly this leads one to a more logical method of gaining knowledge; to think something is true without the requirements of knowledge isn’t logical; that being there is no logical necessitate that it is true, but the mind thinks it anyway. With a state of knowing, belief is irrelevant.

The field of epistemology has come to an agreement of knowledge being a type of belief because philosophy often does build on itself in academia. This began with Plato and went on from there. But the field is problematic on knowledge and belief. Gettier already disproved JTB It seems as if you are attempting to appeal to authority as if why knowledge must remain a type of belief based on a very trivial matter that both contain one aspect in a greater state of mind that doesn’t just include that aspect. It’s also very subjective as its categorizations. Remember this is philosophy after all, this is not science. To thumb your nose at anything that flies against the past 2000 years of epistemology might seem the reasonable thing to do but it is reeks of elitism and a rather mindful appeal to authority, regardless of it being hidden from discussion.

We as humans attempt to categorize things just to try to make sense of them, but they are usually approximations - just as math i can be an approximation physically, but conceptually it is not. I have yet to see one justifiable necessity why knowledge must be classified as belief, other than what you state, that’s what epistemology states. I have yet to see a reason why knowledge must be considered a belief other than it shares one trait - thinking something is true. But lots of things share one trait in this world, we don’t categorize them in a group because they share one subjective trait that may or may not have any bearing on the nature of our mind due to its complexities.

I did not ignore, I decided to narrow the conversation for clarity on the crux of the matter. Once that is resolved (if you choose to), or at least for the sake of argument, then I think it would be best to get into other issues as a result of considering knowledge as not a category of belief.

What does it mean, when someone says “they know” or they “fail to know”? Is there a limit to one’s capacity to know? Or are there some things that are actually unknowable?

If we are honest with ourselves, we have to admit we are all sometimes mistaken in our beliefs, which means some of them are true, whilst others are false. There are times where we construct beliefs to create a positive state of mind or conversely to hoodwink ourselves and what becomes apparent from this is that some of these beliefs do not relay the way things actually are.

Is there an unerring way of arriving at beliefs?

Is all knowledge built on instinctive beliefs?

Plato believed in the pre-existence of the soul, which tied in with his innatism. He thought that we are born with knowledge from a previous life that is subdued at birth and must be relearned. He saw all attainment of knowledge not as acquiring new information, but as remembering previously known information. Before we were born, we existed in a perfect world where we knew everything.

I don’t know why there’s still so much issue with this!!!

A belief is something thought to be true.

Knowledge is something thought to be true.

However, belief is used as a form of probability, whereas knowledge is that actual doing of.

“I believe it’s 10th street”

“I know it’s 10th street!!”

Both people can be wrong when giving directions, the believer could be right and the knower could be confused.

It may seem like I’m overthinking this, but actually, I think you have been the over thinkers …

They are mostly synonyms. People who “know” can be mistaken… When they are mistaken, we get angrier, because knowledge is implied as zero error, whilst believing is considered probabilistic …

But, and this is important, for every knowledge, it is also believed …

Everybody notes the difference between knowledge and belief. If they weren’t different, there wouldn’t be two different words for them. Knowledge is a special type of belief, it differs in multiple criteria, including perhaps the attitude through which it is apprehended. That doesn’t mean it isn’t a belief. According to any common philosophical definition of ‘belief’, it absolutely is one.

All this shit has been pointed out to you when you made the exact same argument on reddit, and it was downvoted to oblivion there. You should have listened. “Belief” means something in philosophy, and if you undersatnd that meaning, it’s obvious that “knowledge” is a sort of belief. If you dispute that, especially as you have done without any argument or any demonstrable knowledge of the relevant field of philosophy, you are simply talking about concepts other than what the rest of us mean when we say ‘belief’ or ‘knowledge’.

The question isn’t so much whether this fucked up thing (which includes neither belief, nor truth) that you are calling ‘knowledge’ for some reason should be understood to be ‘knowledge’ by anybody else. It seems the more reasonable angle is for us to simply conclude that WW III Angry is a strange man who uses words in strange ways that don’t make sense.

“Thinking something is true without justification” is not what a belief is. Beliefs can be justified- at least to every other epistemologist on earth. You’ve merely declared, for no reason, that once something has justification it doesn’t get to be called ‘belief’ anymore.

It is recognized. That’s why we have the word ‘knowledge’ and don’t just call everything ‘beliefs’. Just because lakes and oceans are very different, doesn’t mean we have to stop calling one of them a ‘body of water’ in order for the difference to be recognized.

There is nothing ‘problematic’ about belief. A belief is simply thinking a proposition is true or false. It’s only problematic because YOU DEFINED IT IN A PROBLEMATIC WAY. If this troubles you, then obviously you should stop it, and define belief the way the rest of the field does.

Of course it is, for you, because YOU chose for no reason to declare that beliefs with justification don’t count as beliefs anymore. The only thing you allow to be called a ‘belief’ by your asinine definition are things that aren’t very rational. So no fucking wonder you find them not to be rational.

Why ask? I explained it to you three times already and you fucking ignored me. Well, here it is again:

A belief is no more or less than thinking a proposition is true or false. Knowledge is also the state of thinking a proposition is true or false, plus some added criteria. By basic logic then, knowledge is a belief, and not all beliefs are knowledge. That’s the reason for the assertion. Feel free to ignore me again and go on pretending as if this is mysterious.

Well then you don’t fully comprehend what those words mean, or else you’re using them in a magical way that nobody but you uses them.

This is literally nonsense to anybody with a basic understanding of epistemology.

Doubting something is a belief of the form “I believe X is unlikely”. You really need to understand some basic epistemology. If you think belief and doubt are opposed to each other, then you’re probably mistaking New Atheist propaganda for epistemology. I understand that there are YouTube videos that use ‘belief’ to mean a bad thing that mature people don’t have, but they are making you look stupid when you bring that sentiment and attempt to work serious philosophy with it.

This is very important; I’m on to you, just as any epistemologist would be on to you. You have non-philosophical reasons for wanting to co-opt the term ‘belief’ as a term of denigration to apply to people who have convictions and opinions for what you consider to be the wrong reasons. I’m sure that’s how you’re used to using it, and how you’re used to seeing it used in the circles you run in. The fact that you think knowledge and doubt aren’t types of beliefs makes it obvious.

But you aren’t right, and you don’t have an argument, and as long as you keep pushing this bad idea without an actual understanding of epistemology to back it, you’re going to continue getting the bad reception you’ve gotten, and it doesn’t matter how many communities you peddle it to. Well, you can probably get some 14 year olds in the comment section of a Richard Dawkins youtube video to agree with you.

This is plainly false with standard definitions of terms, though God only knows how you define the ‘requirements of knowledge’. Or ‘logical’ for that matter. When you make up the meanings of words as you go, anything you say quickly becomes irrelevant.

Not in the way you think. I’ve already explained this to you 3 fucking times. Stop telling me what Gettier did and didn’t do, when it is obvious to both of us that you’ve never read him.
Gettier showed that something IN ADDITION to JTB are required for knowledge, not that JTB are not criteria for knowledge. How many times must I say it?

Yes, semantics is that way, and that’s all you have- a desire to use words in a way most people aren’t using them. You aren’t making any arguments, you’re just stubbornly insisting that everybody should change the way they use basic philosophical vocabulary.

You haven’t actually said anything at all about the nature of knowledge.

I don’t care if pointing out basic facts seems elitist to you.

OK, this is crucial, engage your brain here: ‘thinking something is true’ is not ‘one trait’ of a belief. It is the only trait. It is the sum total definition of what a belief is. Anything that is ‘a state of thinking something is true [or false]’ is a belief. Anything that is a belief is 'a state of thinking something is true [or false]. There are not dozens of traits of beliefs, of which I am singling out but one. Knowledge is a belief in the same way that a spoon is a utensil.

We do if it’s the only trait definitive of one of the two things we’re comparing. Water is H2O. Is ice water? Why yes it is. We don’t say “Clearly Ice isn’t water just because it shares one arbitrary trait (being H2O) with water!”

That’s exactly what you’re doing here.

You ignored me just like you ignored all those poor people on Reddit that tried to explain these same basic things to you.

We could have some fun here Uccisore !!!

If a belief cannot be knowledge, then you cannot know a belief can’t be knowledge!


Uccisore is wise and knowledgeable and his arguments very logical

One of the words for the definitions of “belief” and “knowledge” that they must begin with as one original phenomenon is the word “information” in a very primitive sense which means, for example, without lie, fraud, corruption, cynism … and so on.

Information is useless without understanding though. All of us are inundated with so much information every day we can’t possibly process it all. We process what is reasonable to process. Even an amoeba receives information, but does that mean it knows anything?

Not all information conveys meaning however. So information which does is a sub set of all information
It is important not to confuse it with knowledge which does convey meaning. The two are not the same