I wrote most of this last night but didn’t want to consider it ‘done’ when I was tired, so waited to post it until today. Glad I did.
Okay. I’m going to keep things in the same order and only go on tangents if essential. Still haven’t heard back from Ierrellus, fuse, Chester, or fixed cross, so I’m reposting my questions to them into this reply.
Only Humean: True distinction, but…
Questions: Are you now voting false distinction/dichotomy (implied when you said “What if you can get an ought from is, and someone else can get an opposite ought from is? That seems to be the common state of affairs”—but perhaps…probably…you were just pointing out what people ‘think’ they are doing)? You and Russian Tank seem to agree in that you use the terms ‘aim’ and ‘ends’ (skeptical/suspicious of ‘offered’ objective ones), and he uses the term ‘particular goal’. Questions for both: do either of you rule out the possibility of an objective aim/end/goal (if so, why? If not, can we justify a goal by pointing back to the way things are?)?
Film Snob: False dichotomy.
Questions: If you are following a true ought, are you obeying something objective? Do you rule out the possibility of an objective moral law?
Everyone offering a genealogy: So there is a history of man’s understanding of Ethics (it is up for debate whose history is more accurate). There is also a history of man’s understanding of Physics (several cosmologies up for debate). How does there being a history of how our understanding develops…rule out the possibility of objective truth in either field? We have made leaps and bounds of progress in Physics because the truths and errors are real, rather than constructs—why can’t we make progress in Ethics (or, rather, make ‘changes’ in Ethics…since progress doesn’t happen unless there is a true ought to which we are progressing) without folks assuming its because the oughts and errors are constructs? And this doesn’t even touch on the is-ought. If you apply the is-ought to Physics, it means we don’t say “My theory corresponds to reality—therefore, you ought to believe my theory,” or, to reverse it, “You ought to believe my theory—therefore, my theory corresponds to reality.” The is-ought applies in both Ethics and Physics. Only anti-realist folks who think truth can be fiction, who completely disregard the fact that scientific progress makes no sense unless we are really wrong about our errors and really right about at least ‘some’ of our new understandings, would dismiss the is-ought as a false dichotomy. Talking about how we came to understand the earth orbits the sun does nothing to answer whether we think we’re collectively/individually constructing/justifying its correspondence (committing the ought-is fallacy of anti-realism) or whether we think it corresponds or not despite our (lack of) justifications of it (committing no fallacy). If we tried to say, “The earth orbits the sun, therefore we have good reasons for believing it orbits the sun,” we would be committing the is-ought fallacy. And talking about how we came to understand the Golden Rule does nothing to answer whether we think we’re collectively/individually constructing/justifying its correspondence (committing the ought-is fallacy) or whether we think it corresponds or not despite our justifications of it (committing no fallacy). If we tried to say, “The Golden Rule corresponds to, or describes, God (God exists, so the Golden Rule exists), therefore we have good reason to follow the Golden Rule” we would be committing the is-ought fallacy. That we must ‘learn’ that the earth orbits the sun, or that (arguably) the Golden Rule is true and should be followed…does not imply our learning actually constructs those truths. Truth cannot be made up.
Ierrellus: False dichotomy. Oughts come from somewhere (ises).
Granted: In order to be true, a belief/ought must correspond to reality (to an “is”)…but…
Questions: True or false: Whether or not an “ought”, or any other belief, is true (corresponds ontologically to an “is”) has no bearing on whether it is justified (epistemologically with evidence and/or reasoning), and whether or not it (ought/belief) is justified (epistemologically with evidence and/or reasoning) has no bearing on whether or not it is true (corresponds ontologically to an “is”). If this is true, can’t a belief/ought “come from somewhere” without violating the is-ought (ontology-epistemology) distinction? Also see my questions to Chester.
Buffalo: False dichotomy (“is-ought distinction trick of language”).
Answers you are free to challenge: You ask how we get oughts. How we justify them is with reasoning and evidence. How we ground them is, of course, in an Is (actually…’we’ don’t ground anything…reality does that for us). As with everything else, we must evaluate the reasoning and evidence and go with the strongest theory. The Euthyphro Dilemma is a false dilemma resolved by the reality (if true) that God’s commands are in accordance with his nature and so do not create anything arbitrary or separate from himself. If his nature is “that to which a true ought corresponds” or “that which a true ought describes” it would mean the ought to which his commands correspond is not “above” him—it “is” him. I mentioned a link to some Euthyphro articles earlier in the discussion. All of that only touches the issue of ontology, or grounding. If you want to talk evidence and reasoning, start with an Ethics course. The most interesting thing I found out from my course was … the Golden Rule comes up when discussing every theory, but … it is not given its own chapter. My work in progress corrects that error.
fuse: True distinction. Don’t blow it off too easily.
Questions: (Ones you ask.) What are objectified morals? How does one know they are true oughts (both corresponding ontologically, and justified epistemologically)? (Excellent questions.) Edit: I forgot to clarify that an “epistemology” is how we justify what we think we know…what we think corresponds, or has genuine “ontology” (exists, is metaphysically true/real)…this applies equally to what we think is truly moral. My questions to Ierrellus and Chester may make things even more clear. I explain the epistemology thing further to James below. Also see my answer to Buffalo directly above.
Chester: True distinction. The is-ought is only a problem if there is no (later: personal) God. To conclude there are true oughts (“objectified morals”), and a God (whose nature and/or commands) to which they correspond, is a faith-wager, as is its alternative (neither alternative can be known with certainty). Objectified morals are not dependent on us and are part of the substance of the world.
Questions: Do you think true oughts are ‘true’ because they correspond to a personal God? If yes, do you know why this does not violate the is-ought distinction? Do you think true oughts are ‘justified’ because they correspond to a personal God? If yes, how does this not violate the is-ought distinction (see questions to Ierrellus)? Do you believe divine command theory? If so, see questions to Buffalo and Film Snob (from my last long post) regarding orders.
Iambiguous: False dichotomy.
Questions: When you say “true for you” you don’t mean “true TO you”, so to what being is it true? Note that saying “is/ought” is not the same as saying “true ought” (I agree it is possible for the latter to be grounded in God, though, due to the is-ought fallacy, not justified by his existence). If dasein is always subject to change, how can it ever really be “that to which a true ought corresponds” or “that which the true ought always describes”?
James S Saint: True distinction (though not a contradiction–agreed).
Questions: I’m going on this tangent cuz discourse is impossible if we don’t get this squared first. What difference does it make if you choose between 2 or 20? In the end, the one(s) you select is/are “true” and the one(s) you reject is/are “false” (at least in your mind) – so regardless of the number of options, picking an answer demonstrates the true-false distinction (2 options right there—but, really…only ONE of them will abide…).
Now for something practical…what do I do with a poll like this:
A) NEVER only two possible answers (you would pick this one)
B) Sometimes only two possible answers (I would pick this one)
–which one, between the two, is right—is there a middle way? “I don’t know” is not a middle way.
Or how about this poll:
A) Is-ought is true (not false) distinction (we would pick this one)
B) Is-ought is a false (not true) distinction (some others in this thread would pick this one)
–which one, between the two, is right—is there a middle way? “I don’t know” is not a middle way.
Regarding logic, I begin to get the feeling you are joking the whole time. A=A…law of identity. Just the beginning.
My point with the credit thing is that giving credit where it is due (as far as one is aware) does not automatically equate to worship or lack of proper critique.
On the epistemology misunderstanding (fuse had it, too)… Dictionaries can’t tell you everything, so here’s the short and skinny: The is-ought distinction says that whether or not a belief/ought is true (has ontology) says nothing about whether or not it is justified (epistemologically) [we can believe (morally) true things for the wrong reasons], and, reversing it, whether or not a belief/ought is justified (epistemologically) says nothing about whether or not it is true (has ontology) [we can have great reasons for (moral) beliefs that correspond to nothing]. Justified = ought. True = is. Plato was the first to point out that our beliefs need to be “both” justified “and” true—to be one is not to be the other, they are not the same. Hume apparently agrees regarding ought-beliefs.
“One can rightly reject the false dichotomy without rejecting the is-ought distinction.”
The reason for this thread: Yes. There are those who dismiss the is-ought as a false dichotomy because they believe some values (oughts) are true (ises) and that the is-ought distinction undermines this. I do not think the is-ought distinction necessarily keeps values (oughts) outside the realm of truth (ises). It allows for true oughts. What it does not allow for, is justifying those oughts by mere ontology or status quo, or (in reverse) establishing ontology by their justification. Good reasons and evidence are required for justification, and justification does not produce correspondence to reality. We must have both.
Russian Tank: Still not sure what you vote.
Questions: Can we justify a goal by pointing back to the way things are (if you say ‘no’ then you vote ‘for’ Hume’s is-ought distinction and agree the is-ought fallacy is a real fallacy)? Do you rule out the possibility of an objective/universal goal/aim/end (if so, why?) (also asked of Only Humean, who uses the terms ‘aim’ and ‘ends’ (and is skeptical/suspicious of ‘offered’ objective ones))?
Fixed Cross…still waiting for you to weigh in.
True Distinction: Only Humean, fuse, Chester, James S Saint
False Distinction/Dichotomy: Film Snob, Ierrellus, Buffalo, Iambiguous
No vote yet: Russian Tank, Fixed Cross
So far, it’s 4-4.
Lastly…the most important questions for those who vote false distinction (so far Film Snob, Ierrellus, Buffalo, Iambiguous)… If you are one who believes some oughts are true, is that why you dismiss the is-ought as a false dichotomy and do not consider the is-ought fallacy a true fallacy? If so, see “The reason for this thread” in my reply to James. If you are one who does not think some oughts are true, why do you dismiss the is-ought distinction, considering the “is” part is about truth?
Let me know if you change your vote. The poll does allow for that.