Is utilitarianism an acceptable ethic for animals?

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Is utilitarianism an acceptable ethic for animals?

Before this question can be answered it will be important to define a few things. What do we mean by utilitarianism and what does it mean to say it is, or isn’t an acceptable ethic for animals ? On what criteria is ‘acceptable’ being judged? I shall leave the former definition for the opening part of this essay and deal now with the latter. I shall understand the phrase “an acceptable ethic for animals” as an ethic which can realistically be applied to animals and one which is practical when applied to the real world. These are the criteria by which I shall judge the success or failure of utilitarianism. Utilitarianism, as an all-encompassing ethical theory has many proponents and opponents but this essay will only deal with its application to animals and the arguments surrounding it.

In this essay I will first describe the type of utilitarianism which is to be defended, namely preference utilitarianism as supported by animal rights philosopher and activist, Peter Singer. Where there is a significant differing implication between the preference type and other forms of utilitarianism, I shall make note of it. The remainder of the essay will focus on the objections to the utilitarian view, both those that believe it goes too far in defending animals and those, such as Tom Regan, who believe it does not go far enough. An analysis of the theory itself and its criticisms will enable us to conclude whether or not it is an acceptable ethic for animals.

Preference utilitarianism

Preference utilitarianism is a particular type of utilitarianism which defines the good to be maximized as the fulfilment of persons’ preferences. Like any utilitarian theory, preference utilitarianism claims that the right thing to do is that which produces the best consequences; when defined in terms of preference satisfaction, the best consequences can include things other than pure hedonism, like reputation or rationality. So how does this apply to animals? The contractarian view of morality is that only those who have the capacity to enter into a contract can enter into the moral sphere. Since animals do not have this capacity they cannot be considered moral beings. As such, the only morally relevant issues surrounding animals are ones which indirectly affect humans or the animals as property. Singer rejects this view citing the principle of equal consideration of interests.

If a being suffers there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration (Singer 1975). In his Animal Liberation, Singer quotes Jeremy Bentham, one of the founders of the utilitarian school of thought, who says, ‘The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?’

The morally significant attribute that all animals, including humans, share is they have the capacity for suffering and enjoyment or happiness. It is just as arbitrary (and in fact what Singer calls speciesist) to draw the line of equality between different species as it is between different races and sexes or between those with differing intelligence or cognitive capacities. What’s more, Bentham also says “Each to count for one and none for more than one” which includes animals as well as humans.

Singer sums it up saying that ‘the essence of the principle of equal consideration of interests is that we give equal weight in our moral deliberations to the like interests of all those affected by our actions’. Since animals have preferences and can be affected by our actions, those preferences must be given equal weight to that of humans on an individual basis. In this way, preference utilitarianism is an acceptable ethic for animals because, by virtue of the principle of equality of consideration, it, unlike contractarian ethics, can be applied to them.

Preference utilitarianism in practice

There are three main areas in which preference utilitarianism has practical implications on animal welfare; the meat industry, animal experimentation and animal sports. In ‘Animal Liberation’ Singer dedicates a chapter on the first two and in other publications, talks about the third. In each case he gives examples of the status quo and the considerable amount of suffering that animals go through, unnecessarily, all over the world. Using preference utilitarianism, he describes what he believes should change in each case. With regards to the meat industry, he argues that we should all become vegetarians since the pleasure we may get from eating meat does not justify the suffering that animals go through in factory farms. He says that the majority of animal experimentation should stop since in most cases it does not directly save human life and therefore cannot be considered worthwhile. And finally, he says that the enjoyment that people may get out of taking part in hunts or watching bullfights, does not outweigh the suffering of the animals. These are all simplified but the point is to show that preference utilitarianism has real and significant practical implications for our society and the way we treat animals. As such, this is evidence that the theory can be put into practice with real results which minimise the suffering of animals.

Is it an acceptable ethic for animals?

So we’ve seen that utilitarianism and specifically preference utilitarianism can in theory be applied to animals, but does it go far enough? Proponents of animal rights, such as Tom Regan, don’t believe it does. Regan claims that animals, as what he calls ‘subjects-of-a-life’, are bearers of rights like humans, although not necessarily of the same degree. This means that animals in this class have “inherent value” as individuals, and cannot merely be considered as the means to an end. (Regan 1985) This is different to the utilitarian view which does not consider animals as having inherent moral value over and above its capacity to suffer or be happy. So where is the tension?

Consider an example where performing fatal experiments on 10 rats, which would cause them extreme pain and suffering, could save the life of a human. The utilitarian would weigh up the expected outcomes and most likely decide that it was right for the experiments to go ahead. The rights theorist like Regan, who adopts a strict Kantian idea that animals should never be used as a means to an end, by contrast would say that experimentation on animals was always wrong. The utilitarian ethic, according to Regan, does not go far enough in protecting animals and as such is not an acceptable ethic to apply. I do not accept this criticism since I would agree with Singer and the utilitarians that human life is of greater worth than animal life due to our ability to be self-ware, capable of abstract thought, of planning for the future etc. As such, I would accept that there could be a justification for animal experimentation if there was no other alternative, the suffering of the animals being experimented on was minimised and the saving of a human life was guaranteed. All of these restrictions are compatible with a utilitarian perspective and take into consideration the welfare of animals.

One of the criticisms of people who believe that animals have rights is that rights can only be given to beings that can make moral judgements. Carl Cohen, writing in a medical journal said:

“The holders of rights must have the capacity to comprehend rules of duty governing all, including themselves. In applying such rules, the holders of rights must recognize possible conflicts between what is in their own interest and what is just. Only in a community of beings capable of self-restricting moral judgments can the concept of a right be correctly invoked." (Cohen, 1986)

Clearly animals do not have this capacity and therefore cannot have rights. This is a criticism that proponents of animal rights such as Tom Regan have to deal with. However, preference utilitarianism dodges this criticism because it does not claim that animals have rights but that we should given consideration to animal welfare. It puts more emphasis on our duty towards animals rather than affirming rights for animals themselves. This makes preference utilitarianism a more widely acceptable ethic than ones which demand animal rights.

Is there anything about the ethic of utilitarianism that would make in unacceptable when applied to animals? One concern is that of demandingness. The ethic requires us to minimize the suffering of animals whenever possible. At present, billions of animals suffer every year due to the factory farm industry, animal experimentation and animal sports. On top of that animals are suffering due to environmental issues e.g. 99% mortality rate in sewer rats due to lack of food. This would suggest there is an international emergency in terms of animal welfare. As a result, minimising the suffering of such a large amount of animals seems extremely demanding and in some cases impractical. Devoting our resources to minimising animal suffering could have undesirable consequences in other areas of life. However, I do not accept this as an argument against preference utilitarianism as an ethic. It is not an ethic which requires a binary state. Any amount of minimising suffering is better than none and although the process may be gradual, it can be conceived as a ladder to climb.

Another objection to utilitarianism, one which is broader than the issues of animal welfare, is that it’s sometimes impossible to know what will maximise happiness in the long run. As a consequentialist ethical theory, utilitarianism relies on expected outcomes of a situation. The outcome that maximises happiness and minimises suffering in the short terms is often relatively easy. However, is it possible that what we think is the best outcome now, may not be the best in the long run? In his essay ‘Why I am only a Demi-Vegetarian’, Richard Hare (perhaps unknowingly) provides us with an example of this. Preference utilitarians such as Singer argue that we should all become vegetarians and stop eating meat because by not buying meat, the meat industry will eventually collapse as an economic inevitability. However, Hare argues that this not necessarily the correct outcome. (Hare 1993)

Suppose that a large proportion of people became vegetarians and stopped buying meat. The meat industry as a whole would be forced to cut its prices and as a result only the most efficient producers would be able to stay in the market. Usually, the most efficient producers, i.e. the ones which can charge the least for its produce, are the least ethical. Factory farms which can produce much larger amounts of meat in a shorter amount of time will often keep animals in very small cages to maximise space, causing them a lot of suffering. More ethical farmers, who allow their animals to have free-reign and are raised and killed ethically, will be forced out of the market because their produce will almost always be more expensive. The answer then says Hare, is to become what he calls a demi-vegetarian; someone who eats mostly vegetables but supplements their diet with a bit of meat which is ethically sourced. By doing so, the demi-vegetarian is able to buy meat produced by the ethical farmers, thus keeping them in business, while also causing the meat industry as a whole to become much less intensive. This is clearly an example of how utilitarianism can provide ‘right’ answers in the short term which end up causing more suffering in the long term. Perhaps what is even more damning is that although Hare is a self-style Kantian utilitarian, his views are very similar to Singer and yet they still come to different conclusions.

So what is the conclusion? It seems true to say that preference utilitarianism, based on the principle of equal consideration of interest, provides a possible ethic for animals inasmuch that it is not nonsensical to consider animals as morally relevant due to the fact that drawing the moral line at the species level seems arbitrary. The utilitarian view seeks to provide for the welfare of animals and minimise suffering but manages to dodge the objections raised against animal rights theorists by not claiming that animals have rights. This renders it more acceptable as an ethical theory. There is no doubt that when applied, utilitarianism does indeed provide better welfare for animals and that the outcome of better welfare for animals is an ethic which can be universally applied. However, there is a worry that it is not always possible to tell what is the best action to take in order to achieve that outcome. The issue of animal welfare is connected not only with the moral issues that surround it, but also with the economic and environmental spheres which could be impacted by a utilitarian ethic. In essence I think it is fair to say that utilitarianism is an acceptable ethic for animals. The main difficulty, facing the whole spectrum of animal rights activists, is getting people to agree and act on it.

Bibliography

HARE, R. M. Why I am only a Demi-Vegetarian in Essays on Bioethics, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1993.
REGAN, T. The Case for Animal Rights, University of California Press, California 1985.
SINGER, P. Animal Liberation, Thorsons Publishers Limited, Wellingborough, Northamptonshire 1975.
SINGER, P. Practical Ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1979.

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edited

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Hey W.J.

Thanks for the reply, the quote you have given is actually in the essay although only the end part of it. I cut down the first bit because I felt it would’ve been quoting too much from one source in one go.

cheers

  • ben
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I’ve read Singer’s argument in his book The History of Western Ethics and believe that it is seriously malformed.

The problem has to do with the anthropomorphized concept of suffering and preferences as they relate to animals.

Definition:
Suffer
v. suf·fered, suf·fer·ing, suf·fers
v. intr.

  1. To feel pain or distress; sustain loss, injury, harm, or punishment.
  2. To tolerate or endure evil, injury, pain, or death. See Synonyms at bear1.
  3. To appear at a disadvantage: “He suffers by comparison with his greater contemporary” (Albert C. Baugh).

v. tr.

  1. To undergo or sustain (something painful, injurious, or unpleasant): “Ordinary men have always had to suffer the history their leaders were making” (Herbert J. Muller).
  2. To experience; undergo: suffer a change in staff.
  3. To endure or bear; stand: would not suffer fools.
  4. To permit; allow: “They were not suffered to aspire to so exalted a position as that of streetcar conductor” (Edmund S. Morgan).

[Middle English suffren, from Old French sufrir, from Vulgar Latin *sufferre, from Latin sufferre : sub-, sub- + ferre, to carry; see bher-1 in Indo-European Roots.]

At its root we find that suffer can mean to feel pain and certainly we know that animals can feel pain. However, the origin of the word means “to carry” and several of the other definitions imply a carrying around of pain. This “carrying of pain” implies a psychological component that adds to physical pain, may continue after physical pain has gone, or may create pain when no physical trauma has occurred. From this I conclude that only humans can suffer true depth of pain as theirs tends to be a pain that isn’t transient in nature.

There’s no evidence to say that the sheep suffers to any degree at all from farmer Brown’s “raping” it the field. It has no clue what is going on and if there is any discomfort, then I would bet that all memory of that event would be gone in a matter of days. So, based on that silly example, and I’m sure hundreds of serious ones, I conclude that animals do not suffer in the full sense of the word. So, their suffering is trivial.

Preference:
1.
1. The selecting of someone or something over another or others.
2. The right or chance to so choose.
3. Someone or something so chosen. See Synonyms at choice.
2. The state of being preferred.
3. Law.
1. A priority of payment given to one or more creditors by an insolvent debtor.
2. The right of a creditor to priority of payment.
4. The granting of precedence or advantage to one country or group of countries in levying duties or in other matters of international trade.

The second point has to do with preference, and much like the concept of suffering, I don’t think that animals have the necessary cognitive abilities to choose what they like or enjoy. The idea of “preferring” something implies a thought process and a belief system. A flower will tract the sun as it moves through the sky. It does not prefer the sun, but rather it reacts to the sun. Just like a flower, no animals has ever expressed a reason why it likes one thing over another, but it’s clear that they do react to things in an either positive or negative manner. These responses can be explained by either our knowledge of instinct or through classical conditioning. So, I conclude that animals do not prefer things.

In total, I’m not impressed with Singer on this one, and even believe that he’s attempting to foist a little something on the public.

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“What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month old”

This is more problematic reasoning, that I think smells, as it is hardly fair to compare an as of yet unfinished product with one that is.

At one time the Mona Lisa was a wooden plank and how does that compare to the art of a Pepsi Bottle? That statement rings of stupidity.

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Hey Adlerian,

Singer is a philosopher and not a scientist although I’m sure he’s studied the science surrounding animal suffering. The point you raise is a valid one but I’m not sure I agree with your arguments or conclusions. Obviously one thing that we have to establish before we can apply the utilitarian view is whether animals can feel pain and there’s been a lot of study on it as I’m sure you are aware.

Marian Stamp Dawkins (Richard’s wife) wrote an essay titled “The Scientific Basis for Assessing Suffering in Animals”. In it she describes the fours ways in which we can assess their suffering: Physical Health, physiological evidence, behaviour of the animal and “asking” the animal. I’m happy to go through each of the arguments if you’d like, but her most convincing argument is such:

“Here is the key to discovering the circumstances in which an animal finds things so unpleasant that we want to say that it is suffering. If it will work hard to obtain or to escape from something - as hard as or harder that it will work to obtain food, which most people would agree is an essential to health and welfare - then we can being to compile a list of situations which cause suffering and, indeed, can arrive at a tentative further definition of suffering itself: animals suffer if kept in conditions in which they are without something that they will work hard to obtain, given the opportunity, or in conditions that they will work hard to get away from, also given the opportunity. We then have the animal’s view of the environment.”

She gives the example of chickens who were given the choice to stay in their cage and roam free outside. Almost all chose to be outside the first time and in subsequent trials all the hens chose to be outside instead of the cage. This is the most convincing evidence because it is a choice made by the animal itself and is not based on us equivocating human suffering with animal suffering. I agree with you that their suffering is different to ours because a lot of suffering is related to the complex cognitive capabilities that only humans have, however, animals still suffer in a real way.

In addition, it is this choice behaviour which shows that animals do have preferences and will go to some length to get them (e.g. Dawkins gives the example of cockerels who will work a lot harder for food than for the chance to see a rival cockerel). It is a more rudimentary form of preference but I think it is more than the biological ‘preference’ of the sunflower to move towards the sun. A chimpanzee, our closest relative, will definitely show signs of preference.

In response to your views on Singer, I disagree that he’s doing this for any other reason than because he believes in what he’s saying. He himself says that he has no particular love for animals but is motivated by his belief that it is morally correct.

Cheers for your comments,

Ben

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Ben,

I think that if those people invent their own concepts and definitions then they are very hard to argue with. However, if we take into account the full meaning of suffering as having a lot more to do with the psychological aspect of life that just physical response then the defense of animals fails in my opinion.

I’m sure that you could crush the heads of a dog’s puppies under your boot and within an hour the incident would be forgotten. Meanwhile a human mother that had this happen to her might kill herself and the incident might be remembered by the community for years to come.

I just don’t think that pain and suffering are quite the same thing. In fact, pain related psychotherapy focuses on the thoughts the person thinks that intensify the pain. A person with a bad back my say to themselves all day long, “I can’t stand this,” or “I’m not a complete man anymore,” and these thoughts will increase the suffering of the person, but not the pain.

In the same vein, I could go on and on about preferences, but will keep it brief. I know that preferences for people are usually, but not always, tied to complex reasoning and have never seen that in animals, but I said that.

As a former vegetarian I can smell the misanthropy in Singer that I have found amongst the animal rights people that I have known and I’m suspicious. That being said, I am still about 90% vegetarian and have a huge love of animals, but recognize that human needs are the only needs that count. Desiring to see animals as beings deserving or rights is sometimes a human need.

So, any human can say with great conviction that THEY believe that it is wrong for HUMANS to engage in behavior that degrades HUMANS. No that’s an argument that I can’t or would not be able to counter.

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Hey Ad,

I guess there is little I can do to convince you (not that I’m particularly trying to!) since whether you believe animals suffer or not will be based on a) what your definition of suffering is, and I think yours and mine (and Singer’s) differ and b) whether you accept the scientific evidence.

What I would say is that Singer doesn’t try to defend rights for animals he just says we should consider them equally to humans with regards to suffering. Regan and others defend animal rights and this I do not agree with.

I became a vegetarian almost a year ago, partly to see if I could and partly because I wanted to explore the lifestyle and ethics surrounding it. I promised myself I would do it for a year and that year is soon up and I will have to make a decision. I was impressed by Hare’s essay on why he is a Demi-Vegetarian which is what it seems you are and it is possible that I will end up being one myself. I do believe that there needs to be a radical assessment of the way we treat animals in our world, not to the point that they have the same rights as humans but that their welfare is taken into consideration a lot more than we do currently.

  • ben
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Yes, I must say that I got into that lifestyle out of a sense of ethics and then it changed as I became more aware of human suffering, and my own need for protein.

Anyway, the topic is really ripe for discussion because mass animal farming does strike one as macabre at best and the quality of animal/human experiences is certainly debatable. In fact, I’m sure that I could do a pretty good job taking the stance that animals and humans are no different.

So, have at it everyone.

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I once had a very prolonged discussion on this forum about the ability of animals to suffer. What does it mean for lower animals to feel pain, I think was the main issue.

Do you think there is a disconnect between the way lower animals feel pain, and the way a human animal feels pain. If yes, then how can we be proponents of this ethical system when we don’t know the full range of it’s implications…Causing harm to humans(economic/time) to help animals that may or may not fit a set criterion.

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Nihilistic,

I’m not sure what you mean by ‘lower’ animals. The genetic difference between humans (who are also animals) and their closest relatives the apes is 1%. The difference between an ape and an oyster say is, by comparison, a lot larger. So I don’t think you can categorise everything that is not human as a lower animal.

I think there is enough scientific evidence to suggest that animals feel pain in a way that is significant and therefore they can suffer if enough pain is inflicted on them. There are ways of discovering what constitutes suffering for different types of animals such as those provided by Dawkins in her article.

There is no harm caused to humans by adopting a vegetarian diet. In fact, there is a lot of evidence to suggest that a low meat diet is in fact healthier than a high meat diet. So I don’t accept your argument that considering animal welfare causes harm to humans. I do not accept “losing jobs” or “not enjoying the taste of meat” as a sufficient harm.

Cheers for your comments,

Ben

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Hey Nihilistic,

Here is the article, it’s fairly short: articles.animalconcerns.org/ar-v … ssess.html

If animals are not sentient and they cannot feel pain or suffer then I don’t believe they enter into the moral sphere. It does matter if a child kicks a stone because the stone has no interest in not being kicked. A dog in contrast will yelp if it is kicked and behave in a way that implies it is in pain because it has an interest in not being kicked.

In the article Dawkins mentions the fact that a common objection given is that we can’t know if animals are really feeling pain because we are not them. In a similar vein she says, we can never really know that other humans feel pain in the same way that we do. We can only know our pain and assume based on evidence that other humans who behave in the same when hurt and experience the same physical reactions are also feeling pain in the same way. This is exactly the same with animals.

Let me know what you think of her article…

  • ben
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Another good argument in in favor of the pro-animal stance is no matter what the effect on the animal, humans suffer from knowing that they are the cause of animal deaths, that sometimes result from horrible techniques. We know this because humans report that they are suffering.

This is similar to my stance on the death penalty. I don’t care about the criminal as much as I care about the affect on the innocent people doing the killing and the feeling spread to the general population.

So, it could be said that the improved treatment of animals would result in a general increase is human happiness. Of course this would have to be weighed against the resulting problems in diet and so forth.

I think this argument is well outside of what Singer is proposing though.

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I’d be interesting in reading how you manoeuvered from that first sentence to the second.

Not really, since there are none. It’s basic nutrition. And as an example for you - I’m fifth generation vegetarian - no health problems in my family line.

But I don’t mean to shift focus from Ben’s essay, which I think is well written and entirely cogent. I’d only suggest involving more of speciesism, but it hardly needs it considering the form of the essay.

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“I’d be interesting in reading how you manoeuvered from that first sentence to the second. “

I’m not sure what you mean here.

“Not really, since there are none. It’s basic nutrition. And as an example for you - I’m fifth generation vegetarian - no health problems in my family line.”

I would like to see you naked! From your photo you look to be very thin and have an elfin frailty. Billions of Asians fit into this category and then move to America and produce 6’2” children. Just because you appear healthy does not mean that you are as health as you could potentially be.

We did have this discussion before, if you remember.

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I mean that I think you’re using bad logic but I’m giving you a chance to explain it incase I missed something.

Get in line big boy! No no. Well I weigh 15.5 stone…photos can be manipulative. I’m 6’2/3" (basically six foot three inches) so if I go hiking or something and lose my muscle/fat (4 months in Laos prior to that particular photo, lol), I look thin just thanks to being tall.

Ah yes, thanks for reminding me! p.s. I am glad you find factory farming macabre - I fully agree.

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So, you really find my reasoning about suffering to be based on bad logic? I thought that it was pretty well worked out. I like the concept that “suffer” means “to carry” and that only a thinking being could carry the burden of pain and it’s implications, thus only a human can truely suffer.

I like that one.

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en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropomorphism

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pathetic_fallacy

-Imp

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Vegetarianism is a great thing. God knows the western world is filled with human vegetables who have a diet that can onyl be described as ‘pig swill’.
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Quite simply: Animals should be treated with dignity in the Slaughterhouse (an irony perhaps). But, as the human reacel ooks set to continue to eat meat, we should maske sure it is done in a humane, manner, with greater consideration for the ‘quality’ of the animal before death…which will inevitably effect the quality of the meat on the shelf.
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‘Everyday for many animals is like the Holocaust’ - I can’t recall who said this. but if animals could attack, I thinkwe humans would be in for quite a war.
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I am curious to know the ‘meat’ ‘veg’ ratio of the average western plate. I imagine, from my own experience, that the meat far out weighs the vegetable. This is ridiculous. Vegetables and fruits are perhaps the life blood of the human stomach and soul - the fact that a majority of people refuse to eat them highlights just how degenerate many of our eating habits are.
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I am all for re-establishing fruit and veg as the centre of any good meal. Meat alone will not save us! And surely there is a connection between ‘depression’ and a lack of fruit and veg. i.e. vitamins and minerals. a lack of fruit and veg = bad balance.
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At a practical level - perhaps even an econimic one - Slaughtehouse utilitarianism is probably the best policy.

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[edit]Anthropomorphism is not relevent to ben’s essay. Utilitarianism sidesteps the issue of innate animal ‘rights’ and recognises suffering as a-thing-in-itself outside of human characteristics. Adlerian is on the right track with regards to a refutation of the importance of animal suffering.[/edit]

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speciesism

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Racism

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logic

I also like the idea that true suffering is a burden to ‘carry’ and associations implicited might very well be true. However my question was regarding your logical leap from ‘Animals do not suffer in the [sic] true sense’ to ‘Therefore their suffering is trivial’.

If their suffering really is trivial then that would suggest utilitarianism was not a suitable ethic for animals.