Hello all, I have started another tread in the recent past regarding this issue, and I am planning on writing a 7-9 pg paper for my theory of knowledge class. I was looking at combining a coherentist and foundationalist model and present it as a working model for the justification of beliefs.
The seemingly accepted problem with foundationalism is that no belief can be non-inferentially justified because of bonjour’s epistemic assent argument. The Givenist would claim that non-inferentially justified beliefs are justified by intuitions. One objection to this has been that if intuitions are of a cognitive nature, they must be justified, which would require another intuition, etc and would not solve the foundationalist’s problem. If intuitions are not of a cognitive nature, they can’t have a truth value and can’t be used to justify a belief. I would like to present a model where intuitions are cognitive, and they form a coherent structure, and i would like to call this coherent structure “consciousness.” These intuitions would form a coherent structure that are justified because they are consistent, and mutually explanatory.
Then I would adopt a foundationalist model where the epistemic regress argument is satisfied, and this coherent structure of consciousness is the non-inferential justification for all of one’s inferential beliefs. This is not to say that I believe intuitions are non-inferentially justified but rather that they form a coherent set that does not require further justification outside of the set. What I am looking for is any glaring objections that may arise to this model of belief justification, and any reading materials that would be of assistance to me in writing this essay. Thanks in advance for all your help.
I just wrote a paper on this. Devitt vs. BonJour Round 2.
Anywho, the issue one will find when dealing with anything lacking a priori justification (or intuition) comes from several places.
How do you know how to test your system? If you do not intuit what kind of system your testing comes from then where does it come from?
Also, where do you obtain the connections by which you link information? How do you get from your neighbor is not home to he has gone to the store or is on vacation?
Then where do instincts come from (see Naturalism) but other than that you seem to be on a good start.
Also, address the obscurity of intuition to help solidify its meaning.
I chose to argue for your stance on intuition being true. Silly Devitt.
Where could I find Devitt’s position on this? I do not believe there are any works of his in our course textbook. I was also told to look at Susan Haack’s Foundherentist theory.
also, how might experience factor into this model? i’m thinking that experience may be the coherent structure, as it would be seemingly impossible to have inconsistent and non-mutually explanatory experiences. would it be easier to explain intuitions as being the most basic inferential beliefs that stem from this coherent set? i’m not positive what the definition of intuitions i’m looking for is. it seems to make the most sense to say one forms intuitions as a result of one’s experiences. maybe experiences could be the links between the intuitions in the coherent set previously mentioned? i’m inclined to say that experiences can justify intuitions and these intuitions can justify beliefs. i’m worried im getting further from where i need to be rather than closer. can anyone give me any input on this?
I would say that if a belief is valid, it still may not be justified. This is because it could be valid based on wildly false premises, thus arriving at a false conclusion. If we were pretty sure that it was false, how could we be justified in believing said conclusion? Maybe if the belief was valid, and we had no worthwhile evidence to the contrary, then it could still be justified even if the premises and conclusion were false. However, because we are speaking of validity, it seems this can only apply to inferential beliefs.
A belief is something you’re sure of but you have no right to be so. If you did, it would be knowledge, not merely a belief. Belief is an intellectually filthy business and is never justifiable.
Please give me a break impious… u act like knowledge is so easy to obtain. Beliefs have reasons behind them and those reasons can surely make one justified or not. Why don’t we all just go off the deep end with you and say further that sensory experiences are all willy-nilly?
Examination belief is justified (by that is meant, guiltless, or has reason for existing) because it inspires reasonable inspection that can later become a theory, and later a finding.
Spiritual belief is justified (same meaning) because, well hell, I’m getting sick of typing it, so here: click this and read
So how is one made better off by holding a skeptical viewpoint? Enlighten me about the benefits of holding the “brain in a vat” or the evil genious theory, Impious.
Impious, I’m glad that you’ve developed such an inclination for philosophy, such that everyone must hold the same virtues as you. To make things worse, if they don’t, then they’re sick according to your philosophical brilliance. Tell me, did Socrates think Skepsis was a virtue? Sure, he said, “All I know is that I don’t know,” but that’s hardly skeptical because he’s still asserting knowledge in that statement. If you honestly think that you don’t know whether or not there’s a car driving in front of you as you’re waiting to cross the sidewalk, I advise you to step out in front of it and see then if you know. We may not always know that we know, but how can one deny that someone can know without knowing that they know?
I’m not denying the appeal of skepticism, but to me it seems to be taking the easy way out. “Hey lets study epistemology. Today we’ll talk about skepticism. None of us know anything. Study is over, everyone go home.” If that is one of your virtues, then maybe you’re the one who is sick, or maybe you should give up on epistemology altogether.
I think the most important kind of skepticism is the will to question religious beliefs. For example, that there is an all-knowing, all-powerful God or that there’s a cool afterlife for those who follow Jesus. I’m not concerned with debating what can can know as you’ve suggested- by skepsis I don’t mean ‘Philosophic doubt as to the objective reality of phenomena’ but rather ‘a skeptical outlook or attitude’. (Miriam-Webster Dictionary) Personally, I’m concerned with deposing ‘truths’ that aren’t true- and to work out what the truth really is requires precisely that: a skeptical attitude.
I don’t see how skeptical is equal to brain in a vat.
The former is natural extension of the brain input, and the latter is a hyper extension.
The brain automatically accepts all information as true.
It then double checks the information to see if it should remain true or be classed as False.
If you look at yourself in the mirror and say, “I am a floor cabinet”, then you will have just lied to yourself.
In part you will have said, “True” right away, and then “False” because the truth version will meet your associated information.
This basic principle is extended out into skepticism in a near domino fashion of checks.
It more or less means that as soon as you find “unknown” in your databank, you class it as “false” until proven.
Not being skeptical means that as soon as you find “unknown” in your databank, you class it as “true” until proven.
It should be apparent why it would be dangerous to walk around with the last option as your only funciton when being interested in learning philosophical concepts.
Conversely, the isolated brain complex is regarding the idea that regardless if you hold something as true or false, all may be false.
Impious and Stumps, I’m definitely with you when we’re going down that alley. But in terms of skepticism in epistemology (Keith Lehrer for example), that is the theory I reject. I agree we must be skeptical and not take everything as a truth, otherwise we’d all be fools. I was thinking that you were talking specifically about being a “skeptic” when it comes to epistemology.
