justifying moral realism

kyle2000 · October 14, 2011, 9:35am

Proving Moral Realism

My goal is to prove that it is true that value judgments are not mere matters of opinion, or to refute the common position that can be reduced to the phrase "anything goes", or the position that one is free to say that they are good in their own eyes and still be right.  In order to prove this we need to know just what kind of truth we are talking about.  I will spend five pages analyzing truth, nine pages describing the foundation of morality and the final six pages will apply my moral theory to four specific cases.   
We will analyze truth using Aristotle's subject/predicate approach, that is, we will first analyze what truth is, then what can be predicated of it.  There are three basic approaches to truth, one, the correspondence theory, two, the epistemic theory which is subdivided into many other theories, and, three, the deflationary theory of truth.  The correspondence theory is the view that the man on the street holds and the one that the majority of philosophers accepted until the 20th century.  Currently only 25% of philosophers fully accept the correspondence theory, whereas another 20% merely lean toward it.  21% accept or lean toward the deflationary theory and 14% accept or lean toward one of the epistemic theories.   Surprisingly, more philosophers believe in moral realism than they do in the correspondence theory of truth.  Given space constraints, we do not have time to consider the deflationary or epistemic approaches but will instead briefly defend the correspondence theory.

The correspondence theory of truth

In order for humans or any complex species to survive it must successfully understand the external world and be able to make predictions regarding the future.  If we fail in our predictions we can literally die.  It is therefore necessary that we develop some language that describe our beliefs about the external world.  These beliefs are either true or false.  If we see a cliff with jagged rocks below we must develope a belief regarding what will happen if we jump off of it.  If we decide, based on observing the result of others jumping off, that we would die if we were to take the plunge, then we have formed a true belief that corresponds to reality.  Let's now prove the correspondence theory of truth employing the reductio ad absurdum.  Just imagine if there was no system for assigning truth or falsity to our beliefs regarding the external world.  We humans would have no means of obtaining our daily necessities.  Say, we felt hungry, however, if truth or falsity did not correspond to the real world, I would then have no means of determining whether or not eating an apple would satisfy my hunger.  Or say for example that someone were to ask me: "If I eat this apple, what will happen to me?"  How would I answer them other than by making statements regarding what I believe would correspond to the result of eating the apple?  Further, after the apple is eaten and the person did in fact continue to live, how would we describe that result other than by saying that our belief was true?  This seems incredibly obvious yet I am forced to spend at least some time on it, since so few philosophers fully accept this account. 
More important for our present purposes than what truth is, however, is what can be predicated of truth.  This is a much more difficult problem.  Typically, people want to know if value judgments are objective or subjective.  This dichotomy doesn't fit the existing categories.  If we are going to say that it is true that value judgments are true, obligatory, real, then we need to specify what kind of truth we are talking about.

Problem: what kinds of truth are there

Truth and Obligation

Before we lay out the different kinds of truth a word must be said regarding truth and obligation.  Obligation may not be the best word here, but certainly some truths are true regardless of what humans believe, that is to say, these truths are obligatory, we humans have to believe them, if we want to call ourselves intelligent.  For example, 2 + 2 = 4 is an obligatory truth, no matter what we believe that truth will remain the same, it is obligatory.

Objective Truth

Objective truths are true irregardless of what any subject/living being thinks.  Objective truths are true even if all subject were to disappear tomorrow or if there were no subjects to think of them.  Such truths would include the distance of the Earth from the Sun, the number of stars in our galaxy, and the temperature at which water boils.  Objective truths, moreover, do not change or if they do change it is not the result of human/subjective decision.

The Subjective Truths

Categorical Intersubjective Truths

These truths only apply to ALL living beings.  (I will discuss what constitutes a living being later).  Such truths would include, a species cannot persist if it did not reproduce, a species could not exist if it could not metabolize energy, a species could not exist if it had no instinct for survival, or there is a threshold of harm to the body beyond which an individual can no longer function.  There are very few categorical intersubjective truths.

Rational Truths

If we wanted we could discuss intersubjective truths that apply to all living beings including bacteria, plants, viruses, or metazoa, but for the purposes of this paper we are only worried about truths that apply to all rational beings.  (A more detailed account of what is rational will be given later).  One categorical rational truth is simply true by definition, for instance, all rational beings do not harm themselves for no reason, or when given a choice between two identical products, the rational being will purchase the one for less money.  That is the very definition of what rationality is.  The second key rational truth is a tautology but one that few people are aware of and one that truth nihilists deny:

one must know how to survive in order to survive

Notice that the above tautology is something that is impossible to deny.  Try as hard as one might, there is nothing they can do that will make this truth nonexistent.  This truth is obligatory, but not obligatory in the sense of the speed limit, rather obligatory in the speed of light sense, in that it is physically impossible to avoid it.  The only loophole in the above truth hinges on the word "know".  When does ignorance become knowledge?  This cannot be clearly demarcated.  However, it is a fallacy to say:

The distinction cannot be clearly demarcated
Therefore, there is no distinction

As we will soon see, all moral values derive from this key tautology.

Intersubjective Tendencies

Rarely does a truth apply to ALL living beings.  Instead what we find is facts applying to a limited class of living beings a substantial majority of the time.  For example, roughly one in a million times a human will survive a fall of more than 10,000 feet, or survive the consumption of one liter of pure grain alcohol in one hour.  Like rational truths, intersubjective tendencies are obligatory, mere thinking does nothing to change them, yet unlike rational truths they do not always apply, but when they do apply our thoughts do not influence this application.

Conventional truths

These truths are true by agreement and can be changed provided that people agree to change them.  The border between Canada and the US is a convention, it can change provided those two countries agree to it.  It has no objective existence and if all humans were to disappear tomorrow there would be no border between Canada and the US.  The fact that Prince William of England is royal is also a convention.  There is nothing about the molecular composition of his body, or the substance of his mind that makes him royal, rather it is simply a convention that English people agree to live by.  If Prince William by some quirk of fate were to land in Papua New Guinea where no one knows who he is, he would cease to be royal since the natives do not live under this convention.  The same applied to King Louis XVI and the French decided during their revolution to abandon this convention which resulted in King Louis' execution. What words mean and refer to are also conventional truths and these truths change all the time.  It is also important to point out that like rational truths, one is obligated to abide by these conventions, provided they are intelligent, but unlike rational truths, these truths can change.  The obligation is not as exactly concrete as rational truths, for it has the disclaimer that one must be intelligent in order to sense their obligation.  For example, one can choose to be irrational and use the word red when everyone else means blue, one is free to do this, yet they will no longer be rational since, by using words incorrectly, they will not able to obtain the goals necessary for surival.

(Inter)subjective Illusions

It can be true that a person or a group's belief is false.  That is an intersubjective illusion.  A good example would be that many Americans believed on the eve of the Iraq War that Saddam Hussein would attack them.  This was a false belief, but it was true that many Americans believed this.  Racism is another intersubjective illusion.  Many races believe that other races are inherently inferior.  This is a false belief, yet it is true that certain races believe this.  As we will soon see, just because a broad class of people believe something, does not make these beliefs true.  The prefix inter has been placed in parentheses since just as this truth can apply to a class of people, so too can it apply to a single person.

(Inter)subjective Opinion

These truths stand in contrast to rational truths.  Rational truths are obligatory, intersubjective opinions are not obligatory.  Such intersubjective truths would include whether or not Coke tastes better than Pepsi, whether merlot tastes better than chardonnay.  These truths also contrast with conventional truths, in that rational beings are not obligated to believe them, yet like conventional truths these truths change.  Intersubjective truths are different from rational truths since they do not directly touch on survival.  A good way to think of this is to keep in mind:

what is dangerous is not a matter of an opinion.

If one sees a cougar charging at them, then it does not matter what the person thinks, more than likely it will kill them. To further drive home the distinction between rational truths and intersubjective opinions recall that two people can be equally knowledgeable regarding how to survive and one can prefer Coke and the other can prefer Pepsi.

Artistic Truths

A note must be said regarding artistic truths, such as whether or not that the music of Shostakovich is better than the Beatles is a rational truth, or whether the art of Picasso is better than a standard commissioned portrait, or whether or not Tolstoy's War and Peace is better than a book by John Grisham.  I tend to believe that to a certain extent it is binding on all rational agents that Shostakovich is better than the Beatles, however, such a statement is simply too difficult to prove and consequently goes beyond the scope of this paper.

The following table sums up the key differences of the seven truths.

changes?	obligatory?	true?

objective no yes yes
categorical intersubjective no yes yes
rational no yes yes
(inter)subjective tendencies yes yes yes
conventions yes yes yes
(inter)subjective illusions yes yes no
(inter)subjective opinion yes no yes

the moral realist versus anti-realist debate

The realist deeply want moral truths to be objective, since objective truths are more "real" than subjective truths.  (What is real goes beyond the scope of this paper, for our present purposes, it is recognized that it is a difficult question.  Here we simply mean anything existing outside of the mind).  The realists point to the fact that morals are not matters of opinion, that they are obligatory, therefore, they are objective.  The anti-realists point to the fact that a subject must exist, if morals are to exist, therefore they are subjective.  In order to resolve this dispute all that is needed is new terminology.

Problem: what type of truths are value/moral judgments

Now that we have identified what kinds of truths exist, we can determine what kind of truth describes value judgments and moral judgments.  A helpful hint might be to think about what beings have value and which do not, then find out what is the difference between them.  It is generally agreed among atheists and theists, monists and dualists, that only living things value, whereas a universe in which there was nothing living at all, value would not exist.

Problem: what is the difference between life and non-life

[note to reader: this might be a long-winded description of something that can be stated in a few words. let me know if you think it should be cut]

Since we intuitively sense that life values and non-life does not, let's try to figure out the difference between the two and perhaps there we will find the answer to value.  Before we do that, however, we need to put the different forms of life into different categories since there is a huge difference among living things.

nonlife viruses bacteria plants metazoa
ignorant intelligent ignorant ignorant intelligent
determined choice random determined choice
independent dependent independent independent independent
no metabolism no metabolism metabolism metabolism metabolism
no reproduction multiplication reproduction reproduction reproduction

I have divided life into four distinct categories, each depending on five key traits. Let’s start with the least controversial and end with the most controversial.

Metabolism. Life must take in elements from the exterior and convert that into energy so as to execute certain cellular processes, chief among them movement and cell division. Viruses do not have this quality.
Reproduction. Life must be able reproduce.
Independence. This trait is necessary so as to distinguish the three from viruses. Viruses require a host in order to exist and cannot survive independently.

The last two traits are controversial, and difficult to understand. A living being’s movement can be either random, determined, or the result of conscious, deliberate choice. A living being can have knowledge about the real world, or it can be completely ignorant. Bacteria seem to be completely ignorant of the real world, yet their movements are not determined by any physical law. Movement without intelligent planning is random. Whether or not bacteria have knowledge of the real world is a good question. When seen swimming in a petri dish it clearly appears that they are moving around without any clear goal, they’re just moving. Other bacteria break nitrogen down from N2 where it is triple bonded and consequently extremely hard to break and fix it into ammonia so that plants and animals can use it for energy. Perhaps this can all be done without conscious knowledge, as if bacteria were machines or perhaps bacteria really do need to be conscious, but without eyes, it is very difficult to imagine how they would acquire data regarding the world. For our present purposes it is not necessary to give a completely perfect demarcation of life and non-life, we are merely trying to establish what life is, so that we can answer what value is.
Plants seem to be just organic machines whose purpose, among other things, is mainly to convert carbon into oxygen. They do not appear to exhibit much choice. Their growth is probably not strictly determined by their genome, there might be some randomness involved, but by and large, they do not move much and their movement could be explained by algorithmic processes.
Viruses, on the other hand, are much more puzzling. Viruses wear a protein coat to fool their hosts into thinking that they are not foreign invaders, thus the immune system is not activated. Wearing a very specific protein coat so as to fool another organism is not something chance can accomplish. This clearly requires knowledge. The virus then finds the nucleus of the cell, sneaks in through its pores, then finds the exact DNA it needs, takes over the organisms DNA and uses it to make copies of itself. And all of this is done without eyes and a very small number of genes. This whole process seems to require knowledge and choice. Again, for our present purposes it is not necessary to state exactly whether or not viruses are life, rather we are only interested in them, insofar as they inform us of what value is.
We now come to animals or metazoa. Here is where we will at last pin the definition of value down. In elementary school we are all taught what the requirements for life are. One requirement that is not mentioned is that all animals must have a minimal concept of value.

Digression: the metaphysical method called discovering logical impossibility

[note to reader: this might be a long-winded version of stating the obvious, let me know if you think it should be cut]

I will now use what I call the method for discovering logical impossibility to determine what value is.  Here's how the method works.  We collect facts about the world.  We then try to pinpoint what things must exist if these other clearly obvious things are to exist, stated another way, we observe things that clearly exist and try to find out what they depend on.  Now this method does come with its pitfalls.  For example, it is not always easy to reason from effects to causes.  This is called the fallacy of affirming the consequent.  Say, for example that if you jump off a 500 foot cliff, (J), which as a cause, then you will die (D), which is an effect.

J ⊃ D
D
∴J

With this reasoning whenever we see a dead person, we conclude that they jumped off a 500 foot cliff which is obviously false. We must develop a method for avoiding this fallacy. We start with the following axiom which can be formulated in three different ways:

nothing can exist unless other things exist, except for the first thing that ever existed.
everything’s existence depends on something else.
for every thing that exists, E, there is something, S, which can be removed which would make E’s existence impossible.

We have now come up with a way for formulating a valid deductive argument using Modus Ponens:

if something exists, (E), then there is something, (S), which can be removed which will make E’s existence impossible.
Something exists
Therefore, there is something which can be removed which will make E’s existence impossible.
E ⊃ S
E
∴ S

The next step is we think of everything that exists in the universe that we are familiar with. For some reason, our mind is able to efficiently cut through the chaff and narrow down the possibilities rather quickly. We then try to think of something that if it did not exist, the other facts that clearly exist, would not exist, in other words, it would be logically impossible for the facts to exist, if the other entity did not exist. When we have found that something, we give it a name, and, where possible, we use a word that already exists which is most like that thing which we are trying to describe.
Like all philosophical methods it has many problems. For example, what is responsible for gravity’s existence? The atheists will say that it just popped into existence 10-16 seconds after the Big Bang. The theists will say that its existence was fine-tuned by God so as to make life possible. The mind is another problem. On whose existence does it depend? The eliminavists will say that it does not exist, the dualists will say that it exists but its existence does not depend on anything else.

Main thread resumed

Now let's employ this method to determine more precisely what value is.  Metazoa exist, there is no doubt about it.  If metazoa are to exist, what else must exist?  We already have the obvious answers of reproduction and metabolism.  Is there anything else?  Clearly there is.  If a species is going to persist at all, it must at the bare minimum be able to distinguish actions which cause its death from actions that allow it survive.  Stated another way, the metazoan must be able to predict the immediate future to a sufficient degree.  Just imagine a species that often swallowed poison, thinking it was food, or ones that attacked predators that are obviously too strong to be overcome, or ones that did not even run from predators, or ones that simply refused to feed themselves, or ones that did not even know how to engage in sexual intercourse even though they had the necessary organs.  Such a species could never last for longer than a generation, indeed, it is difficult to imagine how such a species could even come into existence.  We need to name this phenomenon that enables the metazoan to distinguish between good and bad actions, I call it reason, judgment, intelligence, or rationality.  These are the nouns, their verbs are: distinguish, determine, differentiate, or care about.  The objects of their verbs are: valuable/invaluable, good/bad, proper/improper, appropriate/inappropriate.   Other synonyms for invaluable objects which do not seem to have a positive counterpart are: errors and mistakes, for example, reason avoids errors.  Thus when we answer what is value, what is intelligence, they both refer to the same thing:

Definition of Reason: that phenomena that organizes the being’s choices so that it can increase its probability of survival

Notice that the above can be reformulated as the tautology that I mentioned earlier: one must know how to survive in order to survive.  Thus denying the above truth becomes very difficult.  A tautology is the purest form of truth, its crime is that it rarely tells us anything useful, not that it is false.  In this case, however, only 28% of philosophers fully accept that morals are real, whereas another 23% merely lean toward it, which is to say, that they are either not aware of the above tautology, deny it, or do not think it proves moral realism.   Let us now check once again to see if this thing really exists, employing my method of discovering logical impossibility.  I argue that if metazoa exist, then value must exist.  We ask ourselves is it logically impossible for a species of metazoa to exist and value not exist.  (one or two metazoa can exist without value, but not an entire species).  We prove this by reducing the contrary to the absurd.  Can a species not know how to survive, and still survive?  Of course not.

The following chart should help:

NOUNS VERBS OBJECTS INDIRECT OBJECT
reason differentiates valuable/worthless for a purpose
intelligence determines good/bad for a reason
rationality distinguishes (im)proper for an end
judgment desires (in)appropriate for a goal
cares about positive/negative for an objective
right/wrong
evil/sacred

All of the words refer to the same thing.  Further, to merely define one of the words using other words would be circular reasoning.  We cannot say that reason is simply that which determines the good, for then we have to know what good is.  Using my above definition of reason/good, e.g., that phenomena that organizes the being's choices so that it can increase its probability of survival, we have avoided the fallacy of circular reasoning. Using the chart we can construct a few sentences, two examples:
1. Reason determines what is good and bad
2. Intelligence distinguishes between valuable and invaluable
We have now refuted G.E. Moore's assertion that the good cannot be defined.  We have avoided the naturalistic fallacy which forbids us from defining the good using mere synonyms.

Problem: what is the difference between moral judgments and value judgments

In order to understand morality we must understand value.  We have dealt with value in detail and for the remainder of this essay we will only concern ourselves with a subset of value: morality.  The chief difference between moral judgments and value judgments in general is that moral judgments directly touch on survival, value judgments do not.  However, some value judgment do touch on survival yet one would not consider them moral, for example, decided that eating food is good.  That is a value judgment, but it does not sound like a moral decision.  A second condition of a moral judgment, therefore,

has already been pointed out by Kant, in that only when “the action [is done] without any inclination, simply from duty; then the action first has its genuine moral worth.”

Problem: are moral judgments rational truths

If moral judgments are rational truths then they are obligatory, that is to say, one is not free to have any morality they want and also call themselves rational.  If one denies a moral judgment, then they are no longer rational.  Let us attempt to prove that.  The foundation of morality rests on three rational truths:

A being must know how to survive in order to survive
If one wants A
and if B leads to ~A
then one cannot do B,
or one cannot want both A do ~A
By definition, a rational being desires life, that it to say, they desire A in statement two.
Life expectancy increases if living beings cooperate

statement one, the tautology of knowledge

One might wonder why statement one is even relevant to the discussion.  The reason why it is relevant is because if knowledge exists, then mistakes exist.  What I am proposing is that in a moral debate there is a clear right and wrong. The person making the mistake is wrong and their moral judgments do not correspond to reality, that is to say, as will be demonstrated later, they are proposing actions which will not even achieve the goals they set for themselves.

statement two, the mistake clause

Statement two shows that there really is such a thing as a mistake.  If one desires to hit a bull's eye and one does something which makes that impossible, such as breaking their bow, then they have made a mistake.  All mistakes share this basic structure, one does something which makes the obtainment of their goals impossible.  As we will soon see there are certain mistakes that apply to all rational beings, because there are certain actions which make life impossible.  For this idea I am primarily indebted to John Deigh's interpretation of Kant's ethics.

statement three, the definition of rationality

Many attempt to doubt premise three, but their position is refuted simply by virtue of their being alive.  First, we have a name for one who does not desire life, or is contemplating suicide, namely, irrational.  Second, those who claim that they do not desire life and are not suicidal, betray the falsity of this belief with every action they make.  In order to not kill one's self, one must desire life.  Those who deny premise three refute themselves simply in virtue of the fact that at every moment they strive to avoid death, thus proving that they desire life.  When this is pointed out the skeptic then try to imagine someone who is alive but does not truly want to be alive.  It is true that one can wrestle with suicidal thoughts but ultimately if one wrestles with suicide and is still alive their desire for life is stronger than their desire for death.

statement four, life expectancy increases if living beings cooperate

No man is an island, one needs others in order to survive.  One cannot subsist completely alone and if they do their powers are seriously limited.

Cooperation (A) in general is cooperation (B) that increases one’s life expectancy
Increasing one’s life expectancy (B) is good (C)
Therefore, cooperation in general is good
A = B
B = C
∴ A = C

Problem: can one be rational and immoral at the same time

My personal favorite moral philosopher, Bernard Gert, believes one can be rational and immoral at the same time:

Starting at least as far back as Plato, philosophers have tried to reconcile morality and self-interest or to show that when morality conflicts with self-interest, rationality requires acting morally. However, morality does sometimes conflict with self-interest and when this happens rationality does not require acting morally. Rationality does not even always require acting morally when morality and self-interest require doing the same action. … Furthermore, such actions are usually rationally allowed. It is also rationally allowed to suffer some harm to avoid greater harm for others for whom one is concerned even when these actions are immoral.

Gert and I are in agreement.  The problem here depends on how many irrational acts must one commit before they become irrational.  I, for example, do irrational things all the time, it doesn't make me irrational.  If, one the other hand, I were to believe I was the messiah but were also capable of a number of rational acts such as feeding myself, I think it would be fair to call me irrational.  It is true that a rational person can be immoral but what they are not entitled to say is that there assertions about what is moral do not violate the rational truths listed above, stated another way, if I say that it is profitable to day trade the stock market based on mere chart patterns, that is clearly wrong, and it violates a rational truth, since past chart movements in no way predict future chart movements, that does not make me an irrational person, that just means that I am basically a rational person with a few irrational ideas.  Similarly, it is a rational truth that if you want A and B leads to ~A, then you cannot do B.  All rational beings want A, which is to say A.  So if a rational being asserts that B is good and does not know that it leads to ~A, then he is violating a rational truth, whether this one mistake makes him irrational is a different question.  To give a contemporary example, Bashar Assad right now is using violence to suppress a popular rebellion.  He thinks that this act leads to life, but it clearly leads to death and could well lead to his own death.  Whether or not he is acting irrationally is difficult to say, but he is clearly violating a rational truth.

a detailed definition of the good

I have stated that morality is founded on three rational truths, one of them being all rational beings desire the persistence of their own life.  Given that truth, can we then describe certain general actions that are consistent with this truth, so as to make our discussion of morality more clear?  In other words, is there a criterion by which we can determine whether or not an action leads to life, that is to say, is morally good?  I have below a list of four actions where if all of them are fulfilled then the action must be good, or if all of them are violated then the action must be bad.  Unfortunately, it is almost always the case that some of the criteria are violated and some aren't, making it difficult to determine if the act is good or bad:

does it increase life expectancy of this generation
does it increase life expectancy of future generations
does it increase well-being or decrease pain
does it not violate anyone’s right to be free from harm to a significant degree

Let’s now see why to violate any one of the four criteria would violate the three axioms on which morality rests. We will prove all four criteria using the reductio ad absurdum. (Note: the English word pleasure has fallen on hard times recently and has become so deeply associated with irresponsible sensual pleasure, that the more positive word well-being will be used instead.)

statement one, the good increases life expectancy for this generation

Just imagine if every action decreased the life expectancy of this generation.  Imagine if you had two choices, either do A or not do A and it turned out that A increased this generation's life expectancy by one year whereas ~A decreased this generation's life expectancy by one year.  If one were to always choose ~A in this situation, or even if they simply chose it more often than A, it is clear that the affected species would soon become extinct.

statement two, the good increases the life expectancy of future generations

It is with much sadness that I report that a substantial majority of Americans do not believe statement two.  Right now, many believe that it is more important to build up our economy than it is to fight global warming, which would increase the life expectancy of future generations.  I realize it is more complicated than that, for many believe that Global Warming is a hoax, or that we can ultimately adapt, yet it is also true that you hear quite a few people denying any interest in the welfare of future generations.  Revolutionary warfare is another instance of an act which includes the present generation undergoing hardship and death for the sake of future generations' higher life expectancy and increased well-being.  
So as to prove statement two, we simply apply the same reasoning that we used in statement one: if one were to always choose to decrease the life expectancy of future generations, then such an act would lead to the extinction of the species.  If however it were the case that a species could increase its own life expectancy by three years while decreasing a future generation's by two years, then such a species could persist, yet such an act would violate statement three and four.

statement three, the good increases well-being and decreases pain

A species must be constructed in such a way that in general those acts which give it well-being also increase its life expectancy.  We can prove this by reducing the contrary to the absurd.  Imagine if a species derived well-being from acts that lead to its destruction.  Such would cause it to become extinct.  Of course for us humans there are quite a lot of acts which give us well-being and also lead to our destruction, drugs being the best example.  The point of statement three is that IN GENERAL those acts which give us well-being must also be consonant with an increase in life expectancy.  A species can experience numerous exceptions to this rule and still survive and continue to survive for a number of generations, the fact remains however, that there is point when a species experiences too much well-being from destructive acts that it cannot survive. 
It is important to keep in mind just how much well-being literally keeps us alive.  Doing things that make us feel good, such as going to concerts, spending time with our friends, learning new things, reading good books, healthy parties, all of these, when done in moderation, not only make us more attached to life, they also make us fight harder for our lives when we are under attack.  Imagine, for example, two people whose lives are both in danger.  One has been consistently struggling with depression, is divorced, has few friends, the other is a success, has a great job, a great family and is highly respected.  Which of the two is more likely to give up fighting and allow themselves to be killed when their life is in danger?  Obviously the more successful one.

statement four: the good does not violate anyone’s right to not be harmed

Everyone has a right to be reasonably free from harm.  This truth is not so easy to prove as the other three.  For example, it is perfectly possible to harm a small minority of people so as to increase the life expectancy of this generation and future generations and the species not become extinct.  I have tried very hard to find a proof that would justify that every individual has a right to be reasonably free from harm, but I must confess that I cannot find one.  It is better to admit that one cannot find a proof than make a bald assertion and fool the reader into thinking I have proven something that I haven't.  However, most people accept the truth of the claim uncritically so for our present purposes we will take it as true.

Problem: whether morality will never be put on a rigorous basis

I will soon apply this theory of morality to particular cases, but first I want to show that although it can be proven that morals are rational truths which are obligatory and do not change, for a tiny 1% of the time moral decisions can never be known with certainty.  The reason why moral truths are so difficult to determine is because we really do need a time machine.  If someone proposes a certain action, the only way to determine if it truly is right and good is to do the action, use a time machine, fast forward to the future, note down the amount of life and death it caused, as well as other facts that measure well-being.  However, even that is not sufficient.  We also need a reset button.  After we've fast-forwaded to the future, we need to hit the reset button, rewind to the present, then hit the fast-forward button again and calculate how much death resulted again, because a sample of one could result in some extraneous state of affairs.  We then need to use the inexact science of statistical data analysis to determine whether or not an act seriously affected the future.   
There is a second reason why morals cannot be put on a rigorous basis.  I said earlier that one has a right to be reasonably free from harm.  Well, what constitutes a reasonable amount?  Take, for example, imminent domain, where one must undergo the pain of being uprooted from their home for the sake of more efficient traffic flow which would ultimately benefit the economy.  How does one determine the reasonable amount of pain one must feel in such a situation?  Indeed, how does one even know how much pain another feels?  If we have a choice between uprooting about a 100 from their homes and improving traffic, the economy and consequently the material prosperity of a whole city it is impossible to measure the trade-off between the well-being of the city and the pain of those uprooted from their homes.  Does this mean that morals are not real, or that anything goes, or that we are free to call ourselves good and do whatever we want?  Absolutely not.  It is a fallacy to say:

X cannot be measured
Therefore X is whatever we say it is

Take for example the surface temperature of the star Sirius. Right now it cannot be measured, it does not follow therefore that the temperature is whatever we say it is.

what I am not trying to prove

I want to be perfectly clear what I am trying to prove.  I am not trying to prove that we are forced to be moral, or that we will be punished if we're not moral.  Rather, I am trying to prove that if one wants to call themselves rational or good, then they must abide by the rules I have laid out.  Imagine the following dialogue:

Me: You shouldn’t steal.
the Knave: Why?
Me: if you do then you’re not a good person.
the Knave: Why?
Me: because stealing harms others.
the Knave: So what.
Me: If you don’t care about harming others then you’re not a good person.
the Knave: I don’t care.

At that point the dialogue stops.  The knave and I are in agreement.  If however the knave were to insist that in spite of their theft they are still good people then they would have to justify that claim.  It is that claim, that one can steal and be good or stealing is neither good nor bad, that I am trying to refute.

Problem: how does one prove theft wrong

We will now try to use this theory of morality to prove certain particular cases right or wrong, starting with the least controversial cases.  I want to state clearly however that just as some charlatan preachers twist the words of the Bible to prove virtually anything they want, so too is my moral system is not immune from being twisted to justify evil acts.  Let's start with theft.  In order to prove to the thief that they are bad people, we must first prove three things: one, whether law is better than anarchy, two, whether some private property is better than none, three, whether some cooperation is better than none.
When I say anarchy, I mean the type a city experiences after a hurricane and no police are on the scene, not the type of anarchy which Bukanin imagines where people peacefully agree to resolve their disputes without resort to government.  The enforcement of law causes an overwhelming reduction of harm.  It is quite easy to see how much harm proliferates when the police are not available.  Mass looting begins, muggings rise, fires break out, the destruction of property abounds.  
Let's now ask whether private property is better than the lack of it.  I know Bukanin wrote a book called Property is Theft.  But I seriously doubt very few people would prefer to have their own laptop borrowed without warning at a moment's notice.  Having private property enables us to plan for the future which is the very bedrock of the reduction of harm, we cannot decrease pain unless we can plan for the future.  
Thieves are a living contradiction.  They want the goods that society makes possible.  They enjoy the fruits of everyone's mutual cooperation.  They profit off of the rule of law and the existence of private property.  The thief, just like everyone, wants life, the decrease of harm and the increase of well-being, yet their actions make these desires unrealizable.  Ironically, if you were to ask most thieves if they would prefer that theft became widespread, they would say no.  They understand that only a very tiny minority can be thieves in order for theft to be profitable.  Further, if you were to ask a thief, if they are good people, most would also admit that they are not good people.  However, for some thieves, this question never even enters into their minds and they just steal with no thought as to their actions' larger implications.  In short:

thieves want increase in life expectancy (L), an increase in well-being (W) and a decrease in pain (P)
if the rule (R) of law and the enforcement (E) of private property exist, then life (L) expectancy increases, well-being (W) increases and pain (P) decreases
if theft (T) occurs, then the rule of law and the enforcement of private property decreases
if the rule of law and the enforcement of private property decreases, then life expectancy decreases, well-being decrease and pain increases
L ⋅ W ⋅ P
R ⋅ E ⊃ L ⋅ W ⋅ P
T ⊃ ~(R ⋅ E)
~(R ⋅ E) ⊃ ~(L ⋅ W ⋅ P)

As you can see the above proof has the exact same structure as the mistake clause outlined earlier. Thieves cannot justify his actions even according to their own standard. The thief wants L, W and P yet their actions makes L, W and P impossible.

Problem: whether there is a such thing as justifiable theft, whether Robin Hood is a good person

One cannot cooperate with people who desire your harm or your death.  Cooperation is only good if it leads to the four goods described above, increase in life expectancy, increase in life expectancy for future generations, increase in well-being and decrease in pain, while not violating another's right to be free from a reasonable amount of harm.  To cooperate with an evil person would be a mistake as can be shown with the following proof:

I desire increase in life expectancy, increase in well-being and a decrease in pain
If I cooperate with person X, then my life expectancy will decrease, my well-beings will decrease and my pains with increase
therefore, I cannot cooperate with person X
L ⋅ Pl ⋅ P
C ⋅ X ⊃ ~(L ⋅ Pl ⋅ P)
~(C ⋅ X)

It is a fact of life that there are some people who merely pretend to be cooperative but secretly they are willing to harm us for their own gain, or they have us cornered such that we are compelled to slave away for their sake. It has come down to us through legend that that was the case Robin Hood was in, whether or not it was true, need not concern us here. There came a point when the aristocracy of England lost an interest in the cooperative enterprise and decided instead to bleed the poor as dry as possible without killing them, for the obvious reason that one cannot profit off the labor of a dead person. As rational people we are compelled to avoid those who would destroy us and, if we cannot avoid them, we must destroy them first. I understand that this sounds harsh. Those who criticize this usually do not want to admit that there exist irrational people that have no interest in cooperation. On the other hard, acknowledging that they have a point, it is rarely the case that people have zero interest in cooperation and therefore we must always err on the side of caution before making the extremely risky assumption that a group of people has no interest in cooperation.
Let me now try to prove more formally that it is irrational to cooperate with people who desire us harm:
we do not desire to harm ourselves
group X desires to harm us
if we cooperate with group X, then it will be easier for them to harm us
therefore, we cannot cooperate with group X

When it becomes we have sufficient proof that another group’s only intention is to harm us for their own gain, it becomes justified to steal from them. This moral dilemma is very similar to the doctrine of just war.

Problem: whether music piracy is justified theft

Let's now try a more difficult example.  I remember quite clearly purchasing a CD with 14 songs for $20 and liking only three of the songs.  This was clearly a system that did not reflect the "real" value of the music.  Today I can buy those songs legally for three dollars, thanks to internet software.  To answer this question we have to discuss a phenomenon known as overpricing.  Overpricing involves charging exorbitant rates.  Some rock concerts are $100.  Is this overpricing?  When the object in question concerns life's necessities things are different.  It was once very common (today less so) for stores in poor neighborhoods to charge their customers higher prices since the poor could not afford to travel to a variety of markets.  This is not a just practice.  Clearly merchants need to make a living and their labor needs to be rewarded, but to reward someone for their labor, while making another's life impossible, is not what cooperation is about.  If you want the benefit that comes with cooperation, then you cannot cause another pain which overpricing clearly does.
Whether or not the overpricing of CDs was justified is a different question since it did not involve life's necessities.  No one would scarcely call the overpricing of yachts unjust since it targets a segment of the population that has plenty of money to burn.  CDs however targeted mostly teenagers who did not have a lot of money and music is such a powerful and tremendous force, especially to young people, that it almost takes on the form of a necessity.  Nevertheless, even if a system were not set up where one could buy single songs for a dollar, it would still be wrong to illegally download songs for free and here is why.  The act leads to a contradiction.

We want music (M)
If illegal (I) downloading occurs, then musicians will be paid less (L)
If musicians are paid less, then there will be less music
Illegal downloading occurs
Therefore, there is less music
M
I ⊃ L
L ⊃ ~M
I
~M

As you can see, we started off wanting to enjoy music and we did something which lead to our being unable to enjoy music.

Problem: whether the illegal downloading of books is immoral

This is an even more difficult question, since it is one that I personally was once engaged in.  Now that I have a homemade book scanner I no longer have to worry about it, but I know that if I could not get legal access to a book but could get illegal access to it, I would steal it.  We here run into the problem of cognitive dissonance.

We see ourselves as good people
Those who steal are not good
Therefore, we invent some rational to turn theft into borrowing
Therefore, we can now view ourselves as good people

I’m afraid I cannot approach this question in an unbiased manner, nevertheless I want to try. We first have to distinguish between different books. New books that are hot off the press and from which the authors are attempting to make a living, should not be stolen or downloaded from the internet for free. These authors deserve the fruits of their labor. Thankfully I don’t do such things. Let us now consider the essential function of libraries. Libraries were set up because scholars were already employed as tutors by a university. Libraries enabled scholars and students to get access to a wide range of books and the users of the libraries simply paid a fee to the libraries to use all the books, or the taxpayers picked up the tab. A similar system is already set up with classical music where for $15 a month one can listen to a huge range of music. It is very likely that a similar system will soon be set up with books where for a monthly fee one can download any book that is not a bestseller. Of course there is a lot of sentimental attachment wrapped up in libraries and many will resist seeing them go, but the fact of the matter is, they are simply no longer the most efficient system. So until the new system is set up what should one do in the meantime? Let’s see if illegally downloading books violates any of the four rational truths listed above. I want books. Is it true that my illegally downloading books, if generalized, would lead to my not being able to read books or being able to read less books? The principle is the same with music piracy.
I want books
If illegal downloading occurs, then professors will be paid less
If professors are paid less, then there will be less books
Illegal downloading occurs
Therefore, there is less books

Admittedly the scholarly book industry contributes perhaps less than 1% to the income universities receive. It might even be the case that the publication of all scholarly books results in a net loss. Nevertheless, the principle remains that illegally downloading books does in a small way contribute to less books being written. If the more efficient system were set up where one could pay $15 a month for access to all non bestsellers that would be great, yet it is still a fallacy to say:
If a more efficient system existed, then I would not steal
The current system is cumbersome
∴ stealing from the current system is justified

So I’m going to take the position here that illegal downloading of books that only about a thousand people read anyway is still immoral, though only to a small degree. I personally continue to do it, yet I refuse to justify the act. I would rather admit the wrongness of the act than succumb to cognitive dissonance and justify acts which should not be justified.