I’m listening to a lecture series on the philosophy of language by John Searle from Berkeley University (I seriously recommend them–Searle is incredibly entertaining and funny–anyone who finds philosophy dry won’t after listening to his free iTunes-downloadable pod casts). He talks about Friedrich Frege, the father of modern language philosophy, and he says that the philosophy of language grew out of Frege’s attempt to equate mathematics with logic.
Now this thread is not about the philosophy of language, so I won’t go into the details of how the philosophy of language grew out of this, but I will briefly explain (assuming I understand Searle (and assuming Searle understands Frege)) how Frege thought mathematics relates to logic, and also why it failed spectacularly.
It starts with what Frege thought was a “scandle”–no one knows what a number is–“Quick–” Searle says, “gun to your head–what’s the number 2?” So Frege tried to define it. The number 1 is the set of all sets containing 1 member, the number 2 is the set of all sets containing 2 members, the number 3 is the set of all sets containing 3 members. To put it more simply, the number 1 is all singular things, the number 2 is all couples, the number 3 is all triplettes, etc. This brings mathematics into the sphere of set theory, and set theory is an outgrowth of logic–voila!
Why it failed? Russle’s paradox. If you can have sets of sets, you can talk about the set of all sets that don’t contain themselves. Does that set contain itself? I’ll leave it to you to wrap your head around that question. It also failed because of Godel’s incompleteness theorem. I’ll admit that I don’t understand why Godel’s incompleteness theorem disproves Frege’s definition of numbers (on which his equating math with logic rests), but Searle says so, and whatever Searle says is right.
Anyway, now to the point of the thread: why is this holy grail of mathematicians and logicians so ellusive? Why can’t we equate mathematics with logic? My own thoughts on the matter lead me to the following (which I don’t consider a full equating of math and logic, but I do think it’s a reasonable start):
Logic is a just a set of rules for thinking properly–modus ponens, Demorgan’s law, disquotation, the law of excluded middle–all these logical rules are just the rules that thought develops for itself as it perfects its function of getting its analysis of facts and propositions and arguments right.
But so are the rules of mathematics. With math, however, it’s a set of rules for how to think properly about numbers. That is to say, it’s the same activity of thought–figuring out the rules for getting things right–only applied to something much more specific: quantities.
But why does mathematics seem like a much more vast and elaborated system than logic? That’s a question I have no good answer for. I would propose that maybe it might have something to do with the happenstance stultifying influence that the middle ages had on Arostotelian (and basically all of classic intellectual) thought. Aristotle’s logic, which is very basic by our modern standards, was thought to be a done deal for the longest time (even a philosopher as recent as Kant said so) and the dominant methodology for studying the classics at the time (i.e. scholasticism) really avoided innovation (I don’t know if they actually forbidded it–but I know their religious views at the time did). Meanwhile–literally during those same middle ages–mathematics made some incredible strides, particularly in the department of algebra.
Why? I don’t know. Maybe it was because they couldn’t trace mathematics to any one particular sage or historical figure (Euclids maybe, but I believe he was famous for intruducing geometry, not so much mathematics, but I could be wrong). Maybe this made it seem like they weren’t blaspheming against anyone for changing or adding to the system. Maybe it was because mathematics is just so invaluable for so many applications in a way that logic isn’t–it does wonders for accounting, for war, for construction and engineering, for science, etc.–and so development and innovation was that much more needed in mathematics than in logic. But why is this? I’ve always wondered why logic, even with its modern mathematical-style notation (which Frege invented, BTW), doesn’t seem nearly applicable to anything as mathematics seems. Maybe we can touch on this somewhere in the course of this thread (if it goes anywhere at all ;P).