"Liber. A supra-political movement."

One of the high points of my life was on and around June 9th, 2010, which was the day of the national elections. Little over a month later, I wrote a piece about that high point that I have hereby translated:

I did not vote. For me that was the best choice, as it gave me the highest feeling of happiness, the highest feeling of freedom, the highest feeling of power (feeling of happiness is feeling of power; freedom is power). The political stage is set with people that have their interests, i.e., their power-wills (cf. “longing”)¹, at heart. Whether it is conscious and direct self-interest or not, politicians always take certain matters seriously. Thus they are not free from those matters, they are “engaged”. Yea, even when they are concerned with freedom, they are still engaged, not free. The only people that can fully enjoy that freedom are those that enjoy that freedom without standing in its service. Whoever stands in service is a servant, a slave; not a freeman. A freeman rejoices in his freedom while others mourn the potential or actual threats to it.

A philosopher is a human being that has the peace and freedom to contemplate [beschouwen] the world; and a Nietzschean philosopher is a philosopher that regards [beschouwt] the world as what it most probably is, will to power and nothing besides, and regards the world as will to power as something ravishing. The political stage, too, he watches, when he watches it, with joy: he is a spectator that can immensely enjoy the spectacle. To see all those wills to power battle down there! All the deception and self-deception! A spectacle for godmen, but why should he himself enter the stage? Why should he lower himself to seriousness? To the level of people that consider certain matters “weighty”? That get “furious” when their interests are not taken seriously? If he enters that battle-stage, it certainly isn’t as a grim military man advancing on his enemies. No, his march is a victory march: the battle has already been decided in his favour, for he has attained the height from which he can look down upon the whole human stage. He has attained superhumanness, in the Nietzschean sense—that is to say a godliness that often enough seems inhuman. If he visits the “city”, the polis, he comes, to speak with one of Nietzsche’s so-called “letters of insanity”, “as the victorious Dionysus, who wants to turn the earth into a festival.” He celebrates the will to power, he exuberantly proclaims his will to the eternal return: with songs of praise to everything from the Occupation to the Liberation,² from the Holocaust to the Nuremberg Trials, from the cutting of rain forest and the clubbing to death of baby seals to ecoterrorism; all expressions of the will to power does he applaud, the formidable one!

¹ “Interest” is belang in Dutch, which originally meant, and is a cognate of, verlangen, “longing”.
² The Netherlands’ occupation by, and liberation from, Nazi Germany.

To be honest, although I am not unfamiliar with this problem and solution, it is frightening.

“Who is the shepherd into whose throat the serpent thus crawled? Who is the man into whose throat all the heaviest and blackest will thus crawl?”

I compare your self-liberation to biting off the serpents head. I wonder, did you laugh? Was such laughter (as no one before has laughed) necessary to make this step?

Servitude is not synonymous with slavery, especially when it is a chosen Duty.

I did not laugh, I just exulted. And at any rate, in TSZ the laughter only comes after the biting-off and spitting-out.

The root of all words beginning with “serv-” in English is the Latin servus, which in the first place meant “slave”. To be sure, that does not make servitude synonymous with slavery. But a “chosen duty” is an oxymoron.

You sound like a Buddhist.
Pretending not be a part of it (or above it), while elevating own dissociation with the world to the status of divinity is a just a clever defense mechanism.

Not with the world in general; only with the world of politics. But as I wrote as an addendum to my original piece, little over two months later:

I wrote this piece when I did not yet have insight into the necessary connection between the philosophy of the eternal return and the political philosophy of the Übermensch. That connection was the philosophical problem (one may easily say puzzle!) with which I subsequently occupied myself for quite some time. And I think I’ve solved it. And for the Übermenschen that the future will possibly, and hopefully, bring, the rain forest (and perhaps also the existence of seals) is certainly of importance. I therefore would probably vote now, and then for the party whose influence in my view probably most favourably affects the possibility of the sprouting and flourishing of Übermenschen.

The association with Buddhism is an apt one, by the way (see http://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopic.php?p=2163641#p2163641). But why do I seem to have come full circle?..

This was the first question that arose reading the OP - as a Nietzschean, would you celebrate the victory of ressentiment that an old-fashioned socialist majority would represent?

The second, specific to Dutch politics, is who on earth do you vote for to represent aristocratic interests, especially if you were to want to avoid Christian parties?

One can take a duty upon oneself - “I consider it my duty to look after my brother” where no such duty is expected or formalised.

Yes, Chosen Duty is not an oxymoron.

Chosen Obligation perhaps is.

Yes, though that’s not the whole story. There are lesser and greater goods. Ressentiment represents a lower form of eros (Plato’s equivalent of the will to power) than affirmation: see http://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopic.php?p=2238720#p2238720, final paragraph, and compare this passage I wrote on Facebook:

Nietzsche’s Superman is the man who loves love/desire [i.e., eros] so much as to desire its eternal recurrence. But his love/desire is the highest manifestation of love/desire, as it desires the infinite multiplication, without any addition or subtraction, of the greatest beloved, the All. Therefore, it is the manifestation he loves best.

In the provincial elections, which were held well after the national ones, I voted for GroenLinks—not inasmuch as they’re Green and Left, but inasmuch as they’re Green and Progressive: see http://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopic.php?p=2260924#p2260924, toward the end, and note:

'The Will to Power: Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values’—in this formulation a countermovement finds expression, regarding both principle and task; a movement that in some future will take the place of this perfect nihilism—but presupposes it, logically and psychologically, and certainly can come only after and out of it. For why has the advent of nihilism become necessary? Because the values we have had hitherto thus draw their final consequence; because nihilism represents the ultimate logical conclusion of our great values and ideals—because we must experience nihilism before we can find out what value these ‘values’ really had.” (Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Preface.)

Compare my Nietzsche contra Wilders.

I didn’t say it had to be expected or formalised. One cannot choose what one considers something—what one thinks or feels about it.

Why not will to the world, for and of the world, rather than against it or at its expense?

Where did you get the notion of willing against or at the expense of the world?

To will from an implicit separateness and position of observationality is to abandon the world for some sort of ideality, as if the world were one’s object alone and not also precisely and indeed firstly also one’s own conditions and conditionality, as well as representational of one’s own highest possibilities as such.

Such as, “A philosopher is a human being that has the peace and freedom to contemplate [beschouwen] the world;” …or, “and a Nietzschean philosopher is a philosopher that regards [beschouwt] the world as what it most probably is, will to power and nothing besides, and regards the world as will to power as something ravishing. The political stage, too, he watches, when he watches it, with joy: he is a spectator that can immensely enjoy the spectacle” begs the question as to what extent you view yourself as a conditional part of this world/s which you seem to believe yourself capable of simply “observing” from a distance?

What, to you, does “supra-political” mean? Does “not voting” encapsulate or touch upon this will, for you? Or do you feel moved in the sense of a full conscience and passionate awareness that you are both a certain condition of “the world” as well as a certain condition FOR it? What could subordinate “contemplation” of “the spectacle” more than a fully willed participation in the influencing and creating of a/the condition/s for the possibilities of and for this “spectacle” itself?

Willing always occurs from “an implicit separateness and position of observationality”. But it would only be what you say it is if the will to power view were not a view from the inside (BGE 36). To regard the world as will to power and nothing besides is to view the rest of the world from the outside as if from the inside. And as for the political stage: though it does influence everyone on it and off it, it is highly improbable that it will take my peace and freedom.

It means to not be concerned with what happens on the political stage; to enjoy what happens there in any case.

Psychologically, very much, yes. Logically, only slightly, as it’s only one vote.

No, no conscience: I’m neither a condition of nor for the essence of the world.

I suppose this is a rhetorical question. If so, what’s your point?

I like it! Those who claim to affirm the eternal return but show practically no knowledge from history are “Buddhist-Nietzscheans”! :laughing:

Sauwelios is the green leftist and sees ressentiment as a form of eros. :slight_smile:

So far I haven’t seen him affirming anything past, non-democratic, non-socialistic.

Perhaps he wants make us believing that Nietzsche did his part of the job.

I disagree, rather willing is the result of sufficiency of interaction, mutual conditionality between that which wills and that which is willed, or willed to/upon/with respect to. Separateness is the case, of course, in the sense that all “objects”, all “things” are “separate” objects and things, attaining to differentiations. Yet this is not the substance of willing, far from it, since to will means to interact, contact and connect, to encompass and enclose and orient toward. Willing itself then being the sufficient ground of difference-separateness, then - where this not the case, in no way might we be able to say that differences have attained. The intent/capacity to relate toward stands at the root of willing, indeed even at the root of difference “itself”. That is, unless you are positing a metaphysical “pure objectivity” of “aether” in which all differentiation is situated and by which it is always, ultimately, conditioned in its difference.

Perhaps Nietzsche’s will to power serves you as this sort of aetheric principle?

How do you come to the conclusion of this improbability? Is the fact of this improbability the reason why you feel justified in dismissing the political process as something with which you must engage? You view yourself as essentially unconditioned by politics, then? It is in this sense that I critique your “abandonment of the world for some sort of ideality”.

What is the source of this enjoyment, for you? Simply observing the various machinations of the will to power, merely “for its own sake”? Do you yourself not WILL something HIGHER than this mere self-pleasurability, something nobler the contemplation of (for the possibilities for and against) which would certainly cause concern to arise within you?

Psychologically then, your will in part arises from the pleasure you get from not voting, from saying “No” to the political system. How then would you respond to the critique that this pre-scriptive “No” of yours reflects an impotency for willing and conceiving of necessities for and possibilities of political influencing? Certainly your belief that you are insulated from the more ‘essential’ effects of political activity - that you are unconditioned by it - could quite easily be construed as a defense mechanism employed to sustain your above-mentioned “impotency for willing and conceiving” which lies at the root of your pre-scriptive “No”.

What is the essence of the world? You do not see yourself as capable of influencing this essence? Why not?

That willed involvement, activity, conception and creation - a willing of a power of influence - are superior to an isolated “contemplation” which lacks these.

I disagree: willing is interaction; it’s not a “result”.

And where did I claim that it was? Following yourself, I said that willing occurs from an implicit separateness and position of observationality, not that that is its “substance”.

I have no idea what you’re talking about. “Aether”??

It seems that you fail to distinguish between the past and the present. I am of course essentially conditioned by the politics of the past. I am not—yet—by the politics of the present. And to worry about conserving the conditions of my freedom and peace would be at odds with the justification of my freedom and peace: my affirmation of the whole past and present. But unconcern with my future freedom and peace is not the main reason why I feel justified in dismissing the political process etc. After all, the future is much more comprehensive than only the part of it in which I will still be alive.

There is nothing nobler or higher than “self-pleasurability”. So the question is rather: Do I not find greater pleasure in a certain concern than in utter unconcern? And the answer is: I do. In fact, the fact that I do is the reason for my translating and posting my piece here.

Where did you get a prescriptive no? Also, I wouldn’t say that my will arises from the pleasure of not voting, but rather that the pleasure of not voting is the pleasure of my willing.

I don’t, because to me the essence of the world is will to power, and to influence that would itself be a will to power, which would corroborate it instead of change it.

Well, I think the will to the eternal recurrence is in effect an Aufhebung of the will to power: it is essentially a will to power over the world as will to power, meaning that the will to power functions as its own antithesis and thereby effects a synthesis in which the will to power over the world is cancelled and the world as will to power preserved: in Heidegger’s language, one becomes being’s shepherd instead of its master.

I think you find pleasure in imitating Nietzsche. :wink:

So far you have no own contributions to:

  1. Proving Nietzsche
  2. Showing his sources

What’s that saying about the pot and the kettle…?