Locke, Berkeley, Hume

Tell me what you think.

[size=120]On The Possibility of There Being Causal Laws[/size]

In this paper I will talk about the transition in thought between the three so-called empiricist, John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume on whether there can be such a thing as causal laws of nature between sensible corporeal things. Each of the three philosophers have their own ideas on the matter, but they could not each be fully understood without the others, since for example Berkeley’s ideas on causation are by and large a reaction to Locke’s, and David Hume’s ideas on causation are a reaction to Berkeley and Locke’s ideas. I will start with the earliest of the three, John Locke, and then move on to Berkeley and his rather odd conception of the world, and what role the laws of causation play within his conception of the world, and how it relates to Locke, and then finally I will move on to David Hume, his ideas on causation and how they relate to his two predecessors.

For John Locke, to say that event A causes event B, is to say that event A originated, or produced, event B. In other words, event B had it’s start in event B; it began to be because of, or through, A. But for an effect to have it’s beginning in a cause, that means that in the cause there must exist the power to produce the effect. And Locke does claim this, and this notion of power or of necessary connection is central to his conception of causation. Powers for him are simple ideas of relation that arrive in the mind through reflection. For example, through reflection, ie thinking of the things that occur within our own mind and bodies, we can observe that our Will gives rise to motion in the body which was before at rest. He says that we can find in ourselves the power to begin, continue, or end several actions in our mind, and motion in our bodies (ibid, §4). It is also in reflection of his experiences of change in objects, that Locke comes to conclude that there exists in objects a power that produces the changes.

Later on in the essay, in book IV where Locke talks about the conclusions that the worldview he espouses in the previous three books warrants in terms of knowledge and the sciences, he states that there can be no science of bodies, and there can thus be no causal laws descriptive of sensible things. His reasons for this conclusion have to do with the strict criteria that he places on science. For Locke, a proposition is scientific if it is general, instructive, and unquestionable, and being that we determine cause and effect only in the particular instances in which we sense or reflect upon our experiences of bodies or of our own selves, we have no way by which to make general claims regarding necessary connections between those simple or complex ideas we regard as cause and those simple or complex ideas we regard as effect. And so Locke’s humble epistemic position is that there can be no knowable causal laws among corporeal substances.

In Berkeley we find that while the description of causality and the answer to whether there can be causal laws between sensible things is similar to Locke’s, the reasons why differ greatly. Berkeley’s account of causation is this: for someone to claim that A caused B, A would have to have been the agency, or the power or necessary connection, by which B is brought into being. However Berkeley, in contrast to Locke, holds the position that there aren’t any instances wherein we can say one corporeal thing caused another, because in his philosophy there are no such things as independent sensible corporeal things capable of persisting without a mind perceiving them. Sensible things are for him combinations of sensible qualities. Sensible qualities are in turn identical with sensations, or mental states or ideas. When this is coupled with the fact that Berkeley states that “all our ideas, sensations, or the things which we perceive, are visibly inactive,” which is to say that they are inert,(§25, pg34) it becomes clear that for him there can be no such thing as a causal relationship between one corporeal thing and another. For example, given an instance in which we see a rock at midnight that is cool to the touch, and again the same rock in the middle of a hot summers day but which is now hot to the touch, Berkeley would claim that it wasn’t the sun that caused the rock to become hot, because the sun is for him void of agency, and is only a mental state, an idea, and thus it is not a candidate for being the cause of anything. What caused us to think that the rock was hot is an active mind, presumably God. And so in Berkeley we find that the immediate and sole cause of the things we see in nature is not due to a power that exists in the cause or a necessary connection that exists between sensible things. The immediate and sole cause of things is but “a volition of the Supreme Being,” as Hume puts it. Thus, for Berkeley there can be no causal laws for sensible things. In his philosophy there do however exist non-causal laws of nature, which are better described as forecasts for what ideas we can expect to sense when in the present of another, based on enumerative induction, or other wise put, based on the consistency in which see the ideas together. He states that through experience, the mind becomes aware of the regularity in which some ideas “are attended with such and such other ideas, in the ordinary course of things” (§30, pg36). It is through this regularity that we can act in a way that might procure in us pleasure, or alleviate pain.

In David Hume’s philosophy of causation, we see a sort of amalgamation of Locke’s position regarding corporeal things, in that they exist independently of being perceived, and we learn of them through sensation and reflection, and Berkeley’s Laws of Nature. Firstly, Hume does take it as a given that corporeal things exist as our simple or complex ideas represent corporeal things to be. Secondly, before giving an analysis of causality and his position on whether there can be causal laws, he discusses whether causation, as had been previously interpreted by Locke and Berkeley, via as a necessary connection, power or agency, between A and B, has any significance. A term or idea, for Hume, is significant if and only if there is an impression or sentiment from which that term or idea is derived. With this criteria for significance he goes on to analyze the terms power, force, force, necessary connection in an effort to discover if indeed they do hold significance, or not. Hume, in contrast to Locke, states that when we see an act follow another, we don’t sense in the first a power or a necessary connection that links it with the second. Our senses, on the whole, he says, give witness only to the one thing actually following the other (Pg41). Or as he puts it on page 42, “the scenes of the universe are continually shifting, and one object follows another in an uninterrupted succession; but the power which actuates the whole machine never discovers itself in any of the sensible qualities of body.” To support the claim that we do not sense any power or necessary connection in the cause of a thing, Hume states that if we did we could foretell what effect would result without ever having witnessed the effect before.

Further on in the Enquiry, Hume tackles even Locke’s other claim that we sense power through reflecting upon our own self, as when we Will in the mind to move a limb previously at rest. He states that in these occasions we don’t sense or understandpower in ourselves, since were we to sense this power we would know it’s connection with the effect, ie the limbs, and there would be no ignorance of the connection between mind and body. But there is ignorance, and so we are not conscious of the power of our own will. Secondly, if we sensed and knew power we would be able to know why the mind has power over some parts of the body, such as the hands, feet, fingers, etc, and not others, such as the heart, lungs, liver. Again, we have no knowledge of this, as we ought to have if we did in fact sense and knew of this power that exists in our mind. It is through experience, Hume states, that we learn of the influence of our will. Thirdly, Hume states that were we to feel the power in our mind to move our limbs, we would know the intricate motions that are activated first, such as the blood vessels, the nerves, the muscles before the end result which is the movement of a limb. But we don’t know this. We only perceive that we have a will to move a limb in one instance, and that limb moving in the other, without really sensing the nerves or blood vessels going to work. On the whole, Hume rejects Locke’s claims and states that we do not find in ourselves any creative power, which arises from nothing a new idea, and “imitates” the omnipotence of its maker. (pg45)

In lieu of this, it would seem that the conclusion warranted is that the terms commonly associated with causation by Locke and Berkeley, viz energy, force, power, necessary connection, are insignificant, and Hume says exactly this - that they seem so, even though he later goes on to salvage the significance of these terms by stating that through witnessing the same event following the other in every instance, the mind does indeed feel the connection in the imagination, but this connection for Hume is not, as it was for his predecessors, something real in the corporeal objects. Hume’s account of causation depends on enumerative deduction. For him, someone who, through a fair sample of times, witnesses event B follow event A, may draw the conclusion that there is a causal connection between A and B, and that had A not occurred, B wouldn’t have either. Or, in other words, for B to occur, A would have had to occur.

[conclusion…uninteresting]

I don’t think there are many people who have actually read Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human Understanding”, at least not on the ILP forum. Here’s my recommendation, or at least how I read it: start with the last few chapters titled “Faith and Reason”, “Reason”, “Enthusiasm”, and “Wrong Assent or Error”. Concentrate on those chapters at the end of Book 4. Then go back and read chapter 10 in Book 3 titled “Abuse of Words”. Skip around in Books 3 and 4, but read those last few chapters in Book 4 first.

Those last few chapters titled “Faith and Reason”, “Enthusiasm”, and “Wrong Assent or Error” lay out his thoughts on religion which are at the core of Locke’s philosophy. Also, Locke was not an Atheist or even a Deist. The Essay was published 1689-1690. His “Reasonableness of Christianity” was published five years after the “Essay Concerning Human Understanding”.

Overall, Locke’s Essay is not easy reading and seems uninteresting. However, if one reads and rereads those last few chapters I think one might then find other sections in the Essay a bit more interesting. At least that’s how it was for me. It might also depend on the religious views of the reader.

Thanks for the recommendations. I’ll look them over again one of these days.

I agree with you. If my memory serves me right, God’s existence was for Locke demonstratively known, and so was morality.