Making Lemonade out of L.E.J. Brouwer

Im lurking here, and learning.

One note so far:
Apparently, and reasonably, Peirce held the progression of real numbers as a peudo-continuum.

And indeed it appears that numerical division absolutely precludes continuum.

Distinction of one existent from another itself is a refutation of continuum. Thus, one might say that logic itself precludes continuum.

Logic requires division of empirical reality into ultimately arbitrary abstractions, which lose part of their arbitrariness by being coherent with each other - but this does not make them pertinent beyond the method they allow for.

Thus “A” only equals “A” if we already agree that reality is divided into blocks that can be compared and identified in terms of each other by equation and contradiction.

Hence “A”><“A” is more accurate, in that “A” is greater than “nothing” by the same measure that “A” is greater than “nothing”: neither “A” actually has a direct equal though.

Thats how logic comes to the (unwelcome) aid of mathematics.

Universite´ de Montre´al, C.P. 6128, succursale Centre-ille, Montre´al, Que´bec H3C 3J7, Canada
Neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behaviour generally posits that brain mechanisms
will ultimately suffice to explain all psychologically described phenomena. This assumption stems
from the idea that the brain is made up entirely of material particles and fields, and that all causal
mechanisms relevant to neuroscience can therefore be formulated solely in terms of properties of
these elements. Thus, terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (e.g. ‘feeling’,
‘knowing’ and ‘effort’) are not included as primary causal factors. This theoretical restriction is
motivated primarily by ideas about the natural world that have been known to be fundamentally
incorrect for more than three-quarters of a century. Contemporary basic physical theory differs
profoundly from classic physics on the important matter of how the consciousness of human agents
enters into the structure of empirical phenomena. The new principles contradict the older idea that
local mechanical processes alone can account for the structure of all observed empirical data.
Contemporary physical theory brings directly and irreducibly into the overall causal structure certain
psychologically described choices made by human agents about how they will act. This key
development in basic physical theory is applicable to neuroscience, and it provides neuroscientists
and psychologists with an alternative conceptual framework for describing neural processes. Indeed,
owing to certain structural features of ion channels critical to synaptic function, contemporary
physical theory must in principle be used when analysing human brain dynamics. The new
framework, unlike its classic-physics-based predecessor, is erected directly upon, and is compatible
with, the prevailing principles of physics. It is able to represent more adequately than classic concepts
the neuroplastic mechanisms relevant to the growing number of empirical studies of the capacity of
directed attention and mental effort to systematically alter brain function.

what von Neumann calls his ‘abstract ego’.

Review

Quantum physics in neuroscience and psychology:

a neurophysical model of mind–brain interaction

Friday, December 28, 2012
what von Neumann calls his ‘abstract ego’.
what von Neumann calls his ‘abstract ego’.

www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/PTRS.pdf

Review

Quantum physics in neuroscience and psychology:

a neurophysical model of mind–brain interaction

Jeffrey M. Schwartz

1, Henry P. Stapp2 and Mario Beauregard3,4,5,*

1

UCLA Neuropsychiatric Institute, 760 Westwood Plaza, NPI Los Angeles, CA 90024-1759, USA

2

Theoretical Physics Mailstop 5104/50A Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, University of California,

Berkeley, CA 94720-8162, USA

3

De´partement de Psychologie, Centre de Recherche en Neuropsychologie Expe´rimentale et Cognition

(CERNEC),

4De´partement de Radiologie, and 5Centre de Recherche en Sciences Neurologiques (CRSN),

Universite´ de Montre´al, C.P. 6128, succursale Centre-ille, Montre´al, Que´bec H3C 3J7, Canada

Neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behaviour generally posits that brain mechanisms

will ultimately suffice to explain all psychologically described phenomena. This assumption stems

from the idea that the brain is made up entirely of material particles and fields, and that all causal

mechanisms relevant to neuroscience can therefore be formulated solely in terms of properties of

these elements. Thus, terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (e.g. ‘feeling’,

‘knowing’ and ‘effort’) are not included as primary causal factors. This theoretical restriction is

motivated primarily by ideas about the natural world that have been known to be fundamentally

incorrect for more than three-quarters of a century. Contemporary basic physical theory differs

profoundly from classic physics on the important matter of how the consciousness of human agents

enters into the structure of empirical phenomena. The new principles contradict the older idea that

local mechanical processes alone can account for the structure of all observed empirical data.

Contemporary physical theory brings directly and irreducibly into the overall causal structure certain

psychologically described choices made by human agents about how they will act. This key

development in basic physical theory is applicable to neuroscience, and it provides neuroscientists

and psychologists with an alternative conceptual framework for describing neural processes. Indeed,

owing to certain structural features of ion channels critical to synaptic function, contemporary

physical theory must in principle be used when analysing human brain dynamics. The new

framework, unlike its classic-physics-based predecessor, is erected directly upon, and is compatible

with, the prevailing principles of physics. It is able to represent more adequately than classic concepts

the neuroplastic mechanisms relevant to the growing number of empirical studies of the capacity of

directed attention and mental effort to systematically alter brain function.

The rest pd the article can be downloaded here:

phymath999.blogspot.com/2012/12/ … o.html?m=1

And finally,

Neumann and Breuwer

math.ucr.edu/home/baez/games/games_20.html

pin.it/x3k5ohv2wazjmk

In the works, ongoing …

Thanks for bumping this thread. Once in a while a fella needs to be reminded of how dumb he is, and threads like this do the trick for me. Takes me back to those days when I chose to huff butane with ty and matt down by the creek rather than go to math class. And I’m glad I did, because if I knew all this shit, I couldn’t experience the joy of being humbled.

I’m gonna agree with wtf… I think.