Metaphysical restrictions = Bad math

I came upon this notion just recently while developing my new big TOE. I’ve come to realize that pretty much every intitial metaphysical restriction – such as a “closed system” – that a theoretical physicist uses as an assumption will necessarily eventually lead to “misbehaving” mathematics. Particularly, I’ve been doing some pretty heavy duty research about the history of this thing called “Quantum Mechanics.”

Very briefly, modern quantum theory found its footing in the mid-19th century when two independent areas of research – thermodynamics and electromagnetism – were being simultaneously developed in many major European centers, such as Berlin. The “ontologies” of these two fields were entirely different. Thermodynamics was based upon something called “gas theory,” which treated matter as point-masses that are all interacting in a very Newtonian, cause-and-effect manner. Guys like Carnot and Clausis were heavily involved in the development of this field.

However, Maxwell’s electrodynamics was not at all based upon “point masses,” but on continuous fields. It did not seem as seem as though the two could be unified into a common theory.

Enter the late 19th century. There are starting to become hints, through various experiments, that the concepts of “heat” and “radiation” are highly correlated. It is at this point where the theorists try to start constructing conceptual bridges between the two.

The second law of thermodynamics simply states that heat will always move from hotter to colder bodies, and never the other way around. This idea was formalized under the auspices of a fairly strange value known as: entropy. It was this value that was to serve as intermediary between the equations of gas theory and those of radiant phenomena.

But there is a problem. The idea of entropy depends crucially upon the idea of a “closed system.” This is an arbitrary metaphysical restriction that cannot possibly have any foundation in empirical reality. And it is precisely because this restriction was assumed way back in the late 1800’s that certain terribly misbehaving, insensible mathematical devices were developed by various German theorists in the 1920’s. The interpretations of the meanings of these formulations are what has given rise to much of the perfect philosophical insanity that is passed off as being “scientifically supported.”

The problem with all of this is that the language of theoretical physics is a highly rigorous formalism that takes many years of study to master. So, when average, sensible philosophers attempt to confront the physicists about their obvious nonsense, all the physicists have to do is point to their equations and say, “Don’t blame me… it’s all in the math.” But symbolic mathematics is a series of logical propositions just like any other human language. There would be no progress in theoretical physics if the practitioners only made analytic judgements. They must also make synthetic claims that are not always “copasetic.” They can, for instance, highjack their own “pet projects” onto the backs of empirically verified equations, as long as they do the necessary accounting with their constants and choice of units. In short, these people can be just as cunning as anybody else when in comes to matters of securing their professional reputations.

This is the situation that we found ourselves in, at the turn of the 20th century. There was a hell of a lot at stake when it came to developing unified theories. We in 2008 find ourselves entangled in a “gordian knot” that we have unwittingly inhereted. The only way to possibly develop a fully coherent system of physical thought is to go back in history and see what kind of utter philosophical garbage was being put forth for the sake of a “good career move.” But the current “modern” physicists are woefully ill-prepared for the kind of intellectual discomfort that this will cause them. Their psyches are very fragile and it is only the thin verneer of “mystical symbolism” that masquerades under the aegis of mathematics that is protecting them.

So, I want to show the world what a little bit of philosophical “elbow-grease” can do when it comes to developing a well-grounded physical system that consists of zero arbitrary metaphysical restrictions, and can therefore be done in a way that is profoundly sensible.

All very noble. But what exactly would such a thing consist in?

Also - we don’t need to take these kinds of restrictions as ‘metaphysical’. You’re example is the assumption of a closed system. This doesn’t need to be an assumption we make about reality, rather in formulating our theory and our mathematics we just need to recognise that the mathematical model that we produce has this limitation, that it only applies to closed systems. As such, we know our model isn’t ‘the world’ but only, well, a model of it. This brings in a more important point: how can we produce models without any of these kinds of restrictions, which you label metaphysical but need not be taken as so?