You often hear the phrase “might does not make right”, but I would argue that it does, albeit in subtle forms.
It’s a view I’ve been inclined to take for year or so now. Moralities, religions, and teleologies are merely outcomes of power structures enforced by violence, the threat of violence, shame, guilt, constructs of justice, peer pressure, and traditions. It is merely might making right.
Are there any idealists - those that believe there is a correct human teleology - that want to contest my Weltanschauung?
Not as an idealist, but I think the power of this theory is limited. Ultimately, you can explain anything in terms of “that was successful, so that method is a method of power struggle” - not just the French revolution, but peaceful protests for civil rights. Not just violent coups but democratic consensus. It’s an explicatory lens through which to build a narrative, rather than a working model. Of course what is ‘right’ is defined by society, and so in some sense can be seen as an expression of ‘might’ if you include consensus as a slave-morality powerplay - equally, everything can be seen as an expression of ‘consensus’, if you include coercion as a form of consensus-building.
I don’t think it’s wrong, but I don’t think it’s as complete a story as it appears - but formulated so, it can lead to a skewed world view if it’s taken as a truth rather than a tool.
It seems to mean that everyone is “right” until someone with a bigger gun comes along.
I don’t think there are any ideals in the natural arrangement of things. I do sense a component of cooperation in the laws of nature, though. As a people living together, we often cleverly put notions in a certain fashion and call that being optimistic, claiming that optimism will carry us through. Yet, there is little room for optimism when we discern the reality you describe in the OP.
OH made a good comment about the way society has an imposing, coercive purpose in telling us what we must do. The values that a particular formed group upholds is for the desired effects of that group’s relationships only. The attempt to make life conform to anything that is an ideal may very well be an unnatural act especially when we cannot detect any model or limiting factor in nature aside from conservation laws.
A problem arises when we try to apply truth to justice – two big buzz words. Whether you use your gut feelings or a principle as truth, if you feel you are being treated unjustly, I’m sure you would feel justified and right to resist even with violence.
You’re right … and I’m not admitting that because I think you can out smart me. 
Seems to be so.
What is “right” is subjective, or, lies in the interests of those who the rules favour.
If there is any ultimate “right”, then it would have to be innate; competetion for “the good” wouldn’t exist, discussions on “the good” wouldn’t exist, and moreover it wouldn’t have to be protected by guns etc.
Why was slavery abolished in the UK?
Not to serve vested interests, for sure, and not because slaves had bigger guns. It seems to be an example of a group with a predefined ‘given’ right, religious theory, exerting political pressure. As far as they were concerned, abolitionists viewed “right” as objective, as prior.
Clearly it turns out that the rules favoured their ability to do so over the slave-owners’ ability to quash dissent, but you’re not saying anything as a theory with that.
By extension: if there are any correct ways to scientifically describe the universe, they must be innate - discussions won’t exist, and it won’t have to be protected?
Unless the ultimate “right” is also self-evident and indisputable, groups with other interests and agendas will have good reason to obscure it. See creationism, drug trial data, etc
Oh my God, Only Humean, I love you. You are amazing.
I have little doubt that the abolitionists believed they were “doing god’s work” or believed in some form of a priori human dignity for all, but given today we can safely assume there are no absolute moralities given from without or within, aren’t they just favoured interests from the perspective of slaves and abolitionist groups? Doesn’t it result in a loss of power for the slave owners? One group’s morality wins out, the other loses.
I know this power theory I have going falls in deep trouble when it comes to physical aspects of the universe; things like “the cat is on the mat”, “there is a chair in the room” are somewhat self-evident. I was keeping mainly to morals and traditions in regards to their teleologies.
But according to what function? You say might; I say that that is but a negligible factor in the determination of moral mutation. There’s a litany of other reasons. The dynamics are infinitely detailed since they relate to a process that makes up the very observer, even a distant one. It’s far too easy to say that social change follows the logic of might, or relations of production, or patriarchy, or the will-to-power, or whatever. The usurpation of one moral sentiment over another never happens wholesale or in a vacuum; there are always surrounding sentiments that remain mostly the same and help underpin the alteration at hand. To argue with a racist why racism is wrong, you would have to appeal to principles that a) she already accepts and b) she would be hard pressed to abandon.
Like Aristotle thought, morality is more of a skill than a model. Sometimes we find better, more skillful ways of doing things. This evolution is similar to the evolution of technology. We don’t consider the Romans stupid for not yet inventing the computer. They did quite well given the margin they were working with. But to question slavery within the setting of, say, 18h to 19th century America was quite reasonable; the margin of resources and social climate allowed for the abolitionist ideas to gain a foothold.
My neurologist friend says that the pace at which health care practices have been innovated (and therefore usurping older practices) has been rather exponential. More and more, stubborn old-timers fuss over the new methods. But since health care is such a serious matter, these dinosaur doctors are being faced with the options to accept the way things are going or get out.
There tends to be two people who view secular morality as a mere product of society: those who believe that all moralities and ideologies ultimately flow from the same teleology and those who think that that conception itself is ideological and relative. I belong to the former. I have no reason to distrust that social understandings are abiding by the same selection process as most animals’ biologies. Perhaps to say that it is following a teleological path is misleading since it connotes that one could effectively interpret the current standing of things, research the past trajectories of things, and predict which new moral sentiment will pop up next. However, it doesn’t necessarily debase one’s moral beliefs to view those beliefs as products of expediency. I’ve internalized rules of conduct much like I’ve internalized recipes; as long as I cook edible and nutritious meals, the regional and meritocratic preferences for these delicacies is but a trifle.
What’s right is that which we consider to be identified as our identity. Essentially, however much a concept or idea relates to our identity is however much it feels to be right. If I consider or identify myself and my identity as having no relationship to what a slave is (in this case I might see a slave or African American as sub-human, and as such they have no relationship to my humanity or what I consider myself to be), then a slaves identity and therefore any existence of right has no relation to mine. As such, if I identity the slave identity or “being”/existence as being the opposite or wholly differentiated from my identity, and my identity is right, then their identity must be wrong. I have to consider my identity or whatever myself to be as “right” for the simple purpose of self-preservation. We see this happening constantly on this board. We establish an identity with our thoughts here, and as such, if they are proven wrong logically, the self or identity we had maintained is proven wrong and will either have to be disregarded (we reluctantly reject that piece of ourselves) and dismissed as wrong (which means dis-identifying ourselves with those ideas); or we might (and this often happens), keep that identity self preserved and try to fight for and maintain our “right”-ness on the subject. We say, “I’m right and you’re wrong”. I (my identity) am (is) right. So, we establish right with our identity and what we identify with.
I’m with you entirely on the relative nature of morality. I’m saying more that it’s purely explicatory, rather than in any way predictive. Might is the power to win arguments, therefore whoever won the argument had the might. Similar to evolution - whoever survives turns out to have been the fittest. But formulated as ‘might makes right’, the danger is that it assumes the connotations of physically coercive might - armies, police, bullies, criminals - that leads to muddy thinking and even justification of coercion. It’s not the fault of the theory, mind, just of sloppy thinkers, but some theories are more prone to it than others. You see the same in evolution, with people thinking that ‘fittest’ implies strength, speed, stamina, while it simply means reproductive success.
Granted, you added ‘subtle ways’ as an important caveat, but followed by ‘power structures enforced by violence, the threat of violence, shame, guilt’, hitting straight with the coercive aspects of might. Consensus, discussion, persuasion and compromise are also forms of might.
My point was more that even those physical facts about the universe are rarely so evident that they cannot be debated by those intent to push their views.
I could argue, though, that neurologists, when treating their patients, use an ideal of “normal behaviour”. Who posited the particulars of “normal behaviour”? I realize that people with impaired nervous functions often cannot operate as a useful or normal member of society. Therefore, they are deemed by someone or some organization as not fitting the criteria of “normal behaviour”. Again, I could argue that this paradigm of supposed proper human activity serves the interests of a group of people.
I agree with this to a large extent. What is considered “right” is very, very often wrapped up in how we can maintain a feeling of power. And I would put things like happiness and hedonism as well as “self-preservation” under the guise of a “feeling of power”.
There doesn’t seem to be any teleology at all, there is simply a means to preserve and/or gain a feeling of superiority over something.
I’ve been thinking about this issue from a Darwinian perspective recently. Does merely attempting to pass on one’s genes fit into the criteria of power? Is the initial sexual impulse that gives rise to the oppotunity to pass on one’s genes a power struggle?
Allow me to meditate on this for a while.
What does might makes right mean, Fent? That “might” gets to decide and impose values? That “might” has the normative right to decide? That might is equivalent to right? That might, by virtue of being the superior force, determines the order of things?
If weaker forces are always overcome by stronger forces, then might makes is, but is that really a meaningful statement? is it not the case that the force that “decides” the “is,” is the one that we say has the “might” after the fact? “Might makes is” because that’s the definition of might, but it really doesn’t say anything about the force - it is a relation between forces. Which is to say, might cannot do anything.
Whilst true that it’s merely a “relation between forces”, I disagree that “might cannot do anything”. Might, whether it be by brute force or sneaky introjection methods, does in fact give human beings a teleology based on what that dominant force is. The dominant force dictates to people “you must act as such and such”. And this dominant force will be in the interests of those who benefit from it while disregarding those who suffer from it.