Mind and free will?

I was wondering if it is at all plausible to posit that free will is a characteristic of the mind. My line of thinking would follow something like this: if having a mind gives one characteristics such as consciousness, intentionality, phenomenological experience, and so on, couldn’t we say that free will is also a product of the mind? It seems to me that those things that at least think they have free will have minds, and as such it doesn’t seem absurd to say that free will is simply part of having a mind. Anyways, I’m not really sure how to argue this convincingly, so I was wondering what you all thought about it, and if there are any reading out there that one could suggest for me. Thanks.

G.,

“It seems to me that those things that at least think they have free will have minds, and as such it doesn’t seem absurd to say that free will is simply part of having a mind.”

One would have to ask, ‘Is there a difference between experiencing one’s will as free, and having a free will’?

Dunamis

Im probably stating the obvious, but if you are speaking of a free will within this universe then it probably has to exhist, therefor taking up space and going forward in time. This mind would have to submit to the laws of nature to even exhist and would require a body to preserve it.

In terms of the will being free, I suppose there would have to be a possiblitly for that will to either contain itself or regulate it’s actions to distinguish itself from a free and bound state.

I suppose having a preference to anything might evolve into discretion which could evolve into discipline which could turn into an example for other minds in which case the original mind might see how others adapt to him and adjust accordingly.

The concept of “freedom” is adjacent to the contingency, or the exception, of meaning as a determined event in both the world and in logic, materially or not…doesn’t “matter” (pun intended). Freedom as described in notation or word is not freedom proper. It is a dilution.

As it is approached epistemologically the concept of freedom fails under the scrutiny of basic logical consistency, ending in a paradoxical attempt at defining what, by definition, cannot be defined, for then it wouldn’t be “free from definition,” and encapsulating “freedom” into the causal networks of logical necessity rendering “freedom” a true or false state. It isn’t a “state.” States are things that remain long enough to be recognized as settled and identifiable among alternatives…like the properties of a logical statement in contrast to one another. Am I saying that one cannot utter the word “freedom?” Certainly not. I must make it known, however, that the concept of freedom is not identifiable by practical logic.

The validity of such propositions has nothing to do with the truth about any one individual component in said propositions. Obviously, as Hume has shown, causalty is inferred, and is indeed during logical progressions. Chances are a proposition about freedom would eventually be bound to very explicit definitions, and in that become shackled. Yet at this point the essence of freedom has not been touched upon, as the question is not about the autonomy of events, which is granted if not probable, but rather the narrative meaning for events. Everything is determined, even necessary, except what it means.

Conscious thought is fundamentally an intentional activity, though simultaneously its activity is contingent. Its a “meaning maker.” This means that while the world exists with or without consciousness, having no apparant meaning in either case and not mattering even if it did, the chance that an unecessary aspect of being, being an activity that need not exist, “consciousness,” evolves and represents this event meaningfully, and not apathetically, is slim.

Aside from these more idealistic queries, I think Sartre’s concept of freedom is on the money. If ever there were something more than the same old tired determinisms, and there is, it should be the mark of one such ugly toad, as the “man with the golden brain” once called himself.

You wont be able to define something like the concept of free will into a single word or statement and maintian consistent interpretations. such a vague concept is interpreted through filters of society, family, along with an uncountable number of other influences.

completely agree with with first bold one

second one – meaning is also one of those things. who decides what is meaningful and what isn’t? although i agree with what you’re trying to get across i think by using meaningfully, in order for the pieces to fit together , would also have to be defined in great detail… even though you rule out emotions, this still leaves words of possibilities… i’m thinking the conscious needs to be (at least) somewhat aware of its subconscious in order to be happy :slight_smile:

gofez

I believe that an act of free will is the result of more than just the mind. Free will as I understand it results from the cooperative effort of the whole of oneself.

The mind provides a directed intent but by itself is powerless. The force for action comes from the emotions while the physical body provides the vehicle by which the intent is actualized.

Most often they do not cooperate. The mind may have an intent but the emotions may be annoyed because the cute blonde gave you a dirty look. It may captivated by fear because the boss is annoyed with you. There are countless reasons why the emotions will be captivated by habitual reactions and not caring about the mind’s intent. Then the body may be out of shape or tense to the point that it uses up all the energy necessary for the actualization of the mind’s intent. The bottom line is that it is rare to find someone in which these three separate aspects of oneself are in harmony. Free will reflecting the totaility of ourselves requires a quality of sustained consciousness we do not possess.

Then there is the problem of what in the mind speaks for the wholeness of oneself? I believe that man exists as a plurality much like the Buddhist’s do. There is no central “I” that defines us. Instead we exist as a plurality or a multitude of small “i,s” and each one becomes dominant for a short while until the situation calls for a new grouping of “i,s” whose habitual nature is in accord with the situation. So for me, we don’t have free will if for no other reason than this “we” doesn’t reflect the whole of ourselves that allows the will to be free of internal opposition and result from conscious intent coming from “I” which is only a potential, instead of an “i”, emotional force and a capable body.

The psychological danger for a person is if one set of “i’s” reflecting a strong side of our egotism becomes overly dominant and begins to harness the power of the emotions and the body for its aims at the expense of the totality of ones being. It becomes like a cancer sucking out the life force and starving the totality of ones being for the sake of its growth and aims. Rough stuff.

Jesus was tempted by the Devil to go that route since he was without inner opposition. He denied the invitation for the sake of the greater good.

I’d like to start by introducing the distinction between actually-free-will, the truth of whether or not our will is indeed free, and apparently-free-will, our perception of free choice in our actions.
It seems that apparently-free-will is certainly a characteristic of the mind. Anything that is said to have a mind would almost certainly describe itself as having free choice, and objective observers would also say that it behaved as though it had free-choice.
But in order for actually-free-will to arise from the mind, the mind would need to be outside of the causal change of the rest of the universe. It gets into philosophy of mind, because if the mind for humans simply arises from the function of the brain, it seems impossible for it to escape the regularity of the physical world, and so the will could not be actually free. It is paradoxical that something without cause could be caused by the physical world.
It seems that apparently-free-will is a characteristic of anything with a mind, and vice-versa. Which arises from which is difficult to say, and the question may not be intelligible. Both seem to be required to even ask the question. What would a thing with free will but without a mind be like? An animal like a dog, perhaps? What would a mind without free will be? A computer? Perhaps mind and freedom of will are seperable. If they are, one certainly cannot arise from the other, or at least not only from the other.

While it indeed seems to be the case that the existence of free will necessitates a mind since the will itself (free or not) seems to go part and parcel with the mind. Perhaps we should discuss if it is possible to have will without the mind? I seem to feel this would be a moot discussion. So I’ll assume to have will is to have a mind.

Upon consulting my handy dictionary of philosophy under “mind”, I find the first sentence to read “You have a mind if you think, perceive or feel” (Oxford companion to philosophy). While thought and feeling may be debatable in interspecies analysis, perception seems the broadest of categories.

It seems to me that a dog then has a mind. If we reflect upon the concept of perception, it can be as primitive as spacial perception. That is, I can perceive there is an object in front of me, therefore I will walk around it. Most animals seem to have this. So most animals have a mind.

While a computer is a good analogy to a mind without free will, a human would do just as well, albeit working under certain assumptions. I cannot think of any way of positing free will except by accepting the Theory of Agency. That is, one must accept the human being as it’s own agent having the capacity to start a causal chain. Under a materialist construct, this seems unlikely. Therefore it seems we must posit some sort of non-natural property.

So perhaps the relevant question is: Does the concept of free will necessitate non-natural properties? Because it seems to be the case that natural properties function by cause and effect hence some form of determinism. Another plausible alternative, in a naturalist sense, is quantum indeterminism. Both of which deny free will.

free will doesn’t need to exist for people to have it, just like god doesn’t need to exist for people to have a god, or souls don’t have to exist for people to have souls, and like santa claus doesn’t have to exist to get xmas presents

make believe is fun, mr rogers likes it

I am convinced more then ever that we need more education. There are still some that do not accept this reasoning.

Having been convinced of its soundness, I stopped in at my local Subaru dealership not wanting to own something too expensive. I chose an Outback I liked and when the salesman asked how I would like to pay, I replied that money doeesn’t have to exist for people to have it. It is just paper. But to be respectful and cater to this archaic habit, I produced a wad of hand made money personally designed with by me. The pictures were beautiful.

Not being a man of education he proceeded to throw me out telling me where to shove this money clip. Even with all the money being spent on education, some people still cannot understand.

[quote=“philosopher”]
free will doesn’t need to exist for people to have it, just like god doesn’t need to exist for people to have a god, or souls don’t have to exist for people to have souls, and like santa claus doesn’t have to exist to get xmas presents

Free will doesn’t need to exist for people to think they have it. God doesn’t need for people to think they have a god. Santa Claus doesn’t need to exist for one to get presents, but indeed the presents are then not from Santa. But I think when people talk about free will, they’d like to think of it as a little more than illusion. I think it’s actually a question of ontology, and true ontology at that. But if we look into reality, we’ll realize that people think that a lot of things are the case that actually are not. It’s up to philosophers, or like-minded individuals, to find what the truth is.

I’m not sure that the concept of “free will” has been sufficiently defined in this thread; if the term “free will” means the ability to initiate a causal chain, to take action that is caused by nothing external to the will, then it seems to me that there can be no such thing, as even the awareness of things to act upon, the very awareness of the capacity to act, to think, to contemplate-- these are all causes. This would seem certainly to be the case if the will is attached to the mind, and I do not see how it is possible for the will to exist externally to the mind. A will must have an identity, and if it does not identify within the mind, where is it so identified? One could venture into the realm of souls and spirits, non-corporeal things that might be said to have wills… but if we are talking about human free will, then the question should be framed strictly in the presence of the mind.

If “I” have a will, then I am not will; If “I” am mind, then will is perhaps a characteristic of mind. Whatever “I” am is capable of exerting influence over the will, and thus the will is not truly free. Otherwise, the will has me; if the will has me, and I am mind, then the will has the mind (and mind is a characteristic of will,) and there remains the question of what the will identifies with. Regardless, any will that I “have” is not, by definition, free. Détrop’s comments not withstanding, of course; I think he has exposed that the limitations of language do not allow for a proper vetting of the concept.

I would venture to speculate that nothing operates truly free of cause-- not even God, if he exists. For if God created the universe, surely he did so because he could, and not in spite of the fact.

If by laying claim to a “free will,” one is claiming that one is capable of making a decision independent of any other will-- that one is capable of choosing from available options without intervention or coercion from another will, then I am satisfied that one does in fact have free will.

I think first we must separate “cause” from “reason”. If we say the mere act of awareness and contemplation give rise to cause for willing one way or another, I wonder what is meant by cause. To say I have a reason for acting in this way or that, does not mean that I was caused to act in this way or that way. If I could have done otherwise, as free will would seem to imply, it means the cause had to start with me, not with anything else. External factors then would provide justifying reasons for my actions.

I will agree to saying if the will is mine, then I control it, and thus it is not free. But I think free will then might be looked at from the perspective that I, whatever it is that I am, have complete control of my will. Therefore, I would begin the causal chain by exterting myself on my will. But I would then just say this exertion itself is the definition of will.

To say one is free is to say that X could have done otherwise. That might be the better definition in this case. But if we say everything has a cause, and find ourselves in the infinite regress causal chain, we could then ask, where did it all start? And furthermore, we have reason to suspect if we really truly are free. If free will is simply no influence from other wills, then perhaps a better definition of will is in order. I think many people would not see a will as free if it is simply the product of a causal chain of genetic and environmental factors.

Hmmm… I agree to an extent. However, if I have X reason for acting a certain way, X may or may not be called a “cause.” For example, if I choose not to walk in front of a speeding train, and my reason is that I do not wish to die, then I must ask myself this: do I not wish to die because I am caused to desire survival by my instincts? It is certainly true that I am free to act against my instincts, to a certain extent anyway. But when does a reason not become a cause? Is it that whatever reason I act upon becomes a cause, and those that I do not act on, are not? Indeed, they are often cause for inaction.

But do you have complete control of your will? If you will that you should hang by your arms from a bar for an hour, and find that you are only able to do it for 5 minutes, could it be said that your will was not free to choose to disregard the exhaustion of your body and continue to impose itself? Or is it that your will simply is not omnipotent? Then again, can a will be truly free that is not omnipotent? Descartes seemed to think that it could, so then it may be sufficient to say that you are free to will anything you wish, but that you are limited by the physical world in what your will can accomplish. Along these lines, the concept of “will” as separate from mind, one that is anything more than the collective result of several biomechanical processes, seems to disappear.

Perhaps not, but I would argue that everything human is the product of a causal chain of genetic and environmental factors. I have not seen a good argument for the existence of a part of a human being that is not dependent on the body. Holding to that, then it doesn’t seem that there can be a “free will” if it requires something else, nor that it is properly called such if it is merely an expression of “a will that is independent of other wills.” Now, if one abandons the idea that the existence of the body is a prerequisite for all processes human, then it becomes easy to accept the concept of a free will, but far more complicated to prove or disprove it.

It is not very rigorous to say that free will is a product of mind. That just changes the locus of the question to one of, “HOW does the mind produce free will?” As the production of mind itself is still a mystery identifying free will as a product of the mind does not clarify much.

We have never met a free will without a mind and we have never met a mind without a body so in a positivist sense we could say that these three always go together.

In a broad sense having an eyeball is part of having a stomach because they are both part of a body but information about one specialized subsystem does not give us much information about the other specialized subsystem. A lot of info about the eyes does not give use much info about the brain and vice-versa.

I was thinking of the question of freedom this morning as I was driving into work and the image that came into my mind was of a bicycle wheel. Now in a cheap bike if you lift the front of it up you can give the wheel a good spin and you might say that the wheel is spinning freely. Then again is it really? The motion of the wheel is partially inhibited by the mooring of the hub to the frame. So then image taking the wheel off the bike frame and attacking it to a wire suspended from the ceiling of an otherwise empty room. Then you give the tire a good spin and it turn on its axis and wobbles through space. Yet it is not entirely free. So imagine taking that wheel up into outerspace. Then you try to spin it and it is finally free to move in all directions.

So how free does our own free will have to be in order to be considered free?

I don’t think it can be if you are describing it mechanically, like the wheel analogy, which by the way was good, I thought.

There is a great deal of information in phsycological circles that links so-called “free” will with cognitive behaviour and the sub conscious mind. In short if we define free as, without hinderance, and apply this in the example of a toddler approaching a hazard, say a fire for the first time it is not cognitive(subconsciously) of any hindrance and will proceed even to burn itself. After that, experience is registered in its subconscious as a hinderence to be refered to in future.

Throughout life we register many experiences(hindrances) maybe millions, so any action we take is refered to the subconscious, not freely as will, but checked against known hindrance by brain/mind function.

Reference; Essay on the Freedom of the Will
Book by Konstantin Kolenda, Arthur Schopenhauer; Liberal Arts Press, 1960.

This is a good point. Nevertheless I am still inclined to believe a distinction can be made. In colloquial speech we will often say that this or that was the cause of my action. Or sometimes we use the word reason. But I think these words have a technical difference. If I decide to go the grocery store to get milk, it seems to be a different causal relationship than that of reflex when the doctor hammers my knee so that my leg may kick. My leg has been caused to kick because I had no choice in the matter. On the other hand, I had reason to go to the store but I was not caused to do so. Of course, this is assuming we have free will. That is, a will that is free within its own context.

I suppose to have ultimate freedom one would have to be omnipotent but we’ll have to be content with a more limited definition. In the case of holding on to the bar, that is simply another limitation, the limitation of the physical. For every example like that I can say that I can freely sit here and choose to write this message or I could desist immediately and not bother. What is constraining me here? Constraints then might limit choice, but they do not entirely eliminate it. As long as there is some choice, there seems to be some free will.

But that would be moot speculation really. For what sorts of wills are we talking about if they’re not ours? But perhaps I misunderstood your point. What are the human processes you mention? And how do you conceive of a will apart form those?

Choice is not free will is it? Choice is the ability to choose influenced by past experience. This explains the exhuberance of youth and its conscequences through lack of experience, when compared to the cautious approach of those more experienced. This comment is in no way suggesting a lack of wisdom in the young, as I have known unwise choices made by both young and old.

The gap between Philosophy and Psycology seems to be narrowing. Whereas ancient philosophers like Aristotle, no disrespect intended, could refer any physical effect impossible to explain as metaphysical. Modern advances in psycology, not available in Aristotles day, may be a useful tool.

Ah! The very description implies the answer to the question. I didn’t even think about that.

I wonder now, does the free will have to cross over the Cartesian Abyss in order to qualify as free?