Yeah you are just gettin gold and not satisfied with the stories.
I used to love cinema, but as the years pass all I seem to see is the same story formula regurgitated over and over.
Things have got out of hand.
For action films the reliance on special effects is too much. And its not just to make things look real. CGI is mobilized to do things that are physically impossible. This just makes things look absurd.
But compared to ANY DC, Marvel film, or recent so-called Sci-fi film from Hollywood there is far more to recommend any episode of Dr Who in terms of ideas and scripts; more invention; more jeopardy; more interesting characters.
THere are a few exceptions, âTenetâ was good.
But watch for the pattern in most filmsâŚ
crisis
hero emerges
saves the girl
identifies the solution has crisis of confidence.
heâs reminded of his past, ot some other devise to give him courage.
There is only 24 hours to beat the bad guy.
Struggle to get to the bad guy.
They have a punch up = despite all the tech. It always ends up with fistycuffs!! How many times have you seen that?
bad guy dies (or does he), at the last moment bad guy recovers to threaten the hero, but fails.
The whols place blows sky high after the hero expaces with whomsoever he has rescued.
Iâm old enough to have seen the first Dr on TV in the 1960s. THe Daleks were seriously scary, and in post war Britain summoned up the image of Nazi tanks.
Some of the ideas in DrWho are the best in sci-fi.
But of you grew up expecting Star Wars then you are not going to be able to understand WTF Dr WHo means.
Or⌠the stories are ridiculously over the top, and yet still unimaginatively stupid.
âŚthough the Doctor Who series were known for that style of production/direction⌠minus the new âstupidâ angle.
There are many genres of films that donât conform to that methodology⌠I think the âdocu-dramaâ or âfilm-biography/autobiographyâ are much more interesting than cgi-enhanced productions⌠tho Iâm not averse to a cgi production or two.
The phenomena known as âthe seriesâ is equally also good⌠and I ainât talking Netflix or Disney+ here, but the âmurder mysteryâ âdocumentaryâ âdramaâ etc.
Yea⌠not been to the cinema since Star Trek 2⌠the mind says yes/go, the body/heart kept saying no.
What- the original ST2??
That is a fucking long time ago.
Let me assure you the floors are still sticky and people still much through popcorn and potato chips in noisy bags.
Iâve not been since a year before the pandemic, and only frequented the smaller bijou cinemas, and in the afternoons midweek so has not to have to listen to the dregs of society.
Mercifully British audiences still, mostly, respect other people. And are not overly demonstrative.
I was horrified, when Il lived in Hollywood, by the noise US audiences make, such as whoops, and cheers, and other unnecessary things like applause.
UK audiences never applaud- because the film makers and actors are not actually present FFS.
I apologies, but I have some bad news for you if you are expecting prompt responses from me⌠to the extent that it is intentional, it is a benign neglect.
I started a reply some months ago, but in an attempt to give replies due consideration/because I am a windbag, I had yet to find the time to complete it. Iâve added a reply to you at the end.
I had not considered this, but Iâm not sure it works as an objection. Ecosystems are not absolutely co-dependent, they are flexible and adaptive by their nature. A food chain is brittle, if one link breaks, the whole chain falls. But a food web can lose one node and still have multiple alternative paths through which the same work can be accomplished; an ecosystem does not depend on any specific species, even though all species depend on the ecosystem.
But I also donât see the alternative as avoiding the problem. The alternative to an interdependent web of moral systems is a single moral system in which everyone participates, but that is vulnerable in a similar way. If a subset of a monoculture defects, what happens to the monoculture? It either devolves in to the same interacting web or moral systems, or requires increasing effort to quash defection and enforce monoculture. This relates to something I discuss more below in response to Diekon and Mad Man P: there may be no positive stable moral equilibrium, i.e. moral systems may by their nature bloom and divide and compete and die, diversifying and centralizing over time.
I agree, and this has long been humanityâs niche: we are unrivaled among animals in our ability to see the world from anotherâs perspective, because in a sense we literally spin up simulations of the people we interact with.
Iâve increasingly internalized the idea that we are not merely individuals, but parts of larger systems with real inherent value (at least to the extent that individuals are thought to have inherent value). Part of that process has been taking seriously the idea that morality operates at the level of the group rather than the individual. And through that lens, we can see a moral ecology in which the group maintains multiple competitive-yet-interdependent moral systems as a way of giving the group the benefit of seeing the world on multiple levels.
Iâm not sure I see how to apply the concept of umwelt here, because Iâm not very familiar with it. Is the idea to extend the multiplicity of competing moral systems to the logical extreme of a separate moral system for each individual? I donât think that follows, it seems like an equivocation on morality that conflates (1) the systems of norms negotiated between many people to allow a community to function, and (2) the system of motivations internal to an individual, which includes (1) but also encompasses subjective preferences or goals that may be in conflict with the norms of (1). Am I misreading you, misunderstanding umwelt, or wrong for some third reason?
(My condolences about your father. If your contributions here owe anything to his influence, the world is worse for his passing, but the better for his having lived.)
Good point. By analogy to ecology, we should expect this kind of dynamic; a large population of hares creates a boom in foxes which brings about a collapse in hares followed by a collapse in foxes followed by⌠A peacefully plural system protected under the umbrella of a dominant system may bring about the downfall of the dominant system. As I said to Dan~ above, Iâm not at all confident that there is a positive stable equilibrium. But I donât know what to do with that.
This back-and-forth is good:
Might we be being led astray by a cyclical dynamic? I would have said that expanding empires tend to be monocultures, strictly policing compliance within conquered lands and rallying support for continued adventuring by appeals to one-ness (since I am writing this on St. Patrickâs Day, let me offer the example of the intentional suppression of the Irish language under English rule). But if there are examples of both inclusive and repressive expanding empires, and inclusive and repressive static states, then maybe the cycle of monoculture â division â diversity â conflict â monoculture is swamping any causal relationship it has to expansion (I canât believe there is no causal relationship, but I can imagine a story for multiple versions of how it works).
Something that comes out of this anyway is that whatever the implications of an ecological framing of morality, it may be contingent, and how a society should respond to moral ecology may depend on amoral factors.
This is a reasonable candidate for what I called a âmeta-moral systemâ, because it seems near universal and gets at the heart of what morality evolved to do (make society possible). But I donât know if it succeeds in that aim. In a very diverse society, othersâ wants are incommensurable with our idea of sanity. I think the modern US is going through this now, with both sides not merely disagreeing with each other, but believing each other to be stupid, dishonest, or evil. If one person believes that another personâs sexual mores are equivalent to pedophilia, or to religio-fascism, âdo unto othersâ doesnât really address it. Indeed, it seems to depend on a monoculture (and to the extent that it is universal, it has been found in societies that well-approximate monoculture).
The argument that Iâm making suggests a much stronger precept: that perhaps even acts which by Our moral system are considered evil should be tolerated when the actor is one of Them. In the style of the Golden Rule it might read something like, âjudge other people by their own moral standardsâ (which I actually quite like).
This seems a distinction without a difference. The point is that the predator-prey relationship is not one in which removing the predator is an unalloyed good for the prey, there are feedback loops in the web such that each node can be described as either above or below another depending on where in the cycle you start. And most importantly for the moral implications, the prey may depend on the health of the predator.
This has interesting moral implications, and may suggest a limit to the extent of moral pluralism, e.g. some moral systems are beyond the pale, and only related systems can co-exist productively.
But this may be taking the analogy too far. Ecosystems donât handle invasive species well because the relationships between species evolve over many generations, and their behaviors are much more closely tied to genetics; the rapid introduction of a new species canât be accounted for until itâs too late. But much of the specifics of human morality is learned, so an âinvasiveâ morality becomes effectively ânativeâ after a single generation. As such, even very divergent moral systems can be fused into moral creoles. So if this point does suggest a limit to moral pluralism, it does not limit it very much.
First, there is a distinction in viable strategies between repeated games and single-shot games. Morality is a survival strategy for repeated games: killing and stealing are great strategies in a single-shot game where your the murder or thief, but in a repeated game theyâre worse than break-even in expectation. In a repeated game, pacifism is a great strategy, because every player avoids wasting energy on violence. So, in the sense that any evolved trait can become selected against in the face of changing context (e.g. sugar craving was great in a calorie scarce world, less so in a calorie rich world), a moral system can be an effective strategy until it isnât.
But what evolution has selected for is not the specific moral systems, but the tendency to generate moral systems within human societies. That trait is more strongly and consistently adaptive: cooperation is humanityâs evolutionary niche.
I was thinking specifically of money-lending when I wrote it, but it could also apply to abortion, midwifery and other medical practices, alcohol/drugs, consumption/production of certain foods â there are a lot of examples where one moral community relies on another moral community to do things that it cannot.
The claim is that the best possible moral system is likely to be one in which people live by different moral systems. I offered the example of class-based differences to show how it might work in practice, and how it has worked historically. But I donât think itâs necessarily âgood on its ownâ. But I do think we can make a reasonably strong case that moral diversity is good-on-its-own in theory, in the sense that we should expect the best achievable system to be a pluralistic system rather than a monoculture.
As I said to Xunzian above, I think this is using a different definition of âmoral systemâ than I intend. A moral system as I intend it cannot live in a single personâs head, and they arenât synonymous with the full set of an individualâs constraints and goals. Rather, I mean the moral systems that exist in the agreements (both tacit and explicit) between people, that act as additional, mutual constraints and goals for the members of the moral community. There may still be individual differences in understanding and practice, but coherent, identifiable moral systems nonetheless emerge from the commonalities (compare language, in which individuals may differ slightly in their understanding of words, but which can still be coherently identified).
Apologies again for the delay, and also for the likely future delays.
Thank you for responding, Carleas. Iâm sure the drag queens (or heterosexuals) who dance sexually in front of children, and those who stop the children theyâve sexualized from going through natural puberty, would do things differently if they were following self=other and us=them.
Likewise, Iâm sure the religio-fascists (letâs assume you donât mean worldview-fascists, like those thrusting a sexual worldview on prepubescent children) who fail to recognize the consequences of childhood trauma, including graceless expectations they never met themselves, and fail to genuinely care what leads up to such acting out with children⌠would do things differently if they were following self=other and us=them. They would still protect children, but they would express care and concern for the trauma predators must have endured during childhood, rather than expecting wholeness from brokenness, as they themselves demonstrate their brokenness in lacking grace.
Weâre all broken. Only one is whole. Start there.
I did not watch the clip and I donât know what you mean by âsimulated negroesâ but ⌠somethin tells me there are other issues to untangle thereâŚ
I am neither right nor left, and have no idea who Irving Berlin is, but Ronald Reagan, with his booting all the mentally ill to the streets & delusional Reagonomics, is not the icon for anything good, in my opinion, except maybe, âMr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!â But what do I know?
Ichthus: Itâs not obvious that this is a failure to treat the other as a self. I donât want to get too far into current culture war beefing, so Iâm going to use a somewhat more quaint example.
Suppose two people disagree about premarital sex. Each has a similar life situation, is currently married, and had a similar amount of premarital sex. But one person thinks itâs a good thing, and wishes they had had more premarital sex, so they would support and encourage it in others; the other thinks itâs bad, and wishes they had had less premarital sex, and so they would prohibit and discourage it in others. Which of these is failing to apply the Golden Rule if they parent/vote/advocate in line with their beliefs? It does not seem that the Golden Rule does any work in resolving the disagreement, or guiding us in how these opposing values should exist in society. And that wouldnât change if these people thought their values should benefit from the strongest legal protection or carry the harshest criminal punishments. Their ultimate disagreement is metaphysical, and the Golden Rule doesnât resolve the conflicting moral consequences.
To anticipate a rebuttal, I think itâs possible to tell a story about how the Golden Rule might lead to a resolution: it may limit the punishments we permit, or that we allow normal political processes to decide; it may counsel non-intervention in the choices of those considering premarital sex, or in the choices of people who make rules for their families; it may demand epistemic humility, or a bias to action.
The Golden Rule works well for interpersonal interactions within a community that mostly shares a worldview. It breaks down when people disagree sharply on the nature of the world or the Good Life. As I said, I like it as a model for what you called âtranscultural mathâ, but it being universally used within communities does not mean it will function well between communities â or between the diverse moral systems and worldviews that may coexist in diverse modern societies.
â Like I said, in my first post: âWhy have factory farming, when you can have local farmingâŚâ that caters to that local community⌠for we do not have to feed the world but communities within countries⌠so living local [sustainable] lives that are more in-line with nature.â
Yes , but.
Local communities fragmented toward international matrixes of un identifiable, unfamiliar parts, who at times, other then the ones who have ancient connections, some say have irretrievably lost-their sense of belonging locally as much as globally.
The way human law usually works (which is wrong) is to protect the interests of the advantaged.
The disadvantaged must resort to street justice.
Parents or guardians from both advantaged and disadvantaged households or facilities teach their kids to navigate survival with the resources available.
A problem occurs when the advantaged expect the disadvantaged to follow the same rules without the same resources, a problem compacted by the reality that the advantaged benefit from resources the disadvantaged lack.
The resolution is: treat the muthafricken other as the muthafricken self.