Let me premise this response by confessing that I am extremely tired now, enough so that my thoughts are like vapor and my vision moves interchangeably between blurred and less blurred. Subsequently, I have indirectly admitted to my awareness of being in such a state while actually in such a state, and therefore must also admit that I understand I run a great risk of composing the current reponse in such a fashion as should only be read by those in a catatonic state. However, knowing such, I still aim to proceed.
Firstly, my thanks and respect to Chiron in return for his/her own same having been previoulsy extended to myself.
To address the issue you have accosted me on:
Your initial premise institutes X and Y. While I understand from the above excerpt of your response to mine that you seem to have intended X and Y to be a cohesive unit, and to so remain from conception to execution and through conclusion, this is an immpossible. Follow the logic… X is represented by “X” and Y by “Y,” and as such bear an implied independence from one another. If X and Y were a true cohesive unit, then they would be represented by a single character (i.e. X = X, Y = Y,
X + Y = Z). Essentially, in saying that if X then Y, or that X and Y are a combined absolute you have established the following… X = Y, Y = X, therefore X and Y are interchangeable. However, your initial premise implies that p seeks to justify the immorality of one by the morality of the other, namely either X or Y, respectively. This proposition gives rise to the implication that the X = Y, Y = X interchangable established values for X = moral & immoral and Y = moral and immoral, therfore the proposition violates the law of non contradiction (“one cannot say of something that is and is not in the same respect at the same time”) and hence the proposition is proved false.
If this is agreeable, then I think we have understood each other well. If my assessment of X and Y seems to be other than what you intended, then please clarify your intention…and subsequently your proposition and inference regarding the properties of X and Y. Namely, as it stands now, the proposition contains two problematic elements. First, that X and Y are an absolute cohesive (cannot exist independently) and that said cohesive has the property of being moral, and the property of being immoral at the same time; such violates the law of non contradiction. Second, that X and Y are represented by characters which implies that X and Y are unique independents, and as well that p is able to “perform X and fail to consider Y in the process” again impliying X and Y are unique independents.
As for your posts regarding the contigencies of moral acts in regards to satisfaction to be had by/in remedial acts is damn near 100%, and are at least within the outter limits of the circumfrence of the proverbial bullseye. What I advise you amend, in your own process (and maybe in your posts) is the manner in which you quantify moral acts. I would not say that moral acts are remedial whose aim is…; rather I would say that moral acts do sometimes include such remedial acts, as well as other variations as to types of actions. Morality speaks to the value or ethical property of an act, whereas remedial is an adjective which speaks to the physical (for lack of a better term) property of an act. One could think of the comparrison in almost the same sense that one would view the separation between spiritual and physical properties as identifying them to be independents, even though spiritual and physical properties can and do take existence as cohesives together. Again, barring the need for some minor linguistic corrections, you are dead-on in your assessment.
I would also recommend you make efforts to clarify the relationship between moral acts (or consequences) and the satisfaction of one’s expectations. For example, I might expect that a doctor performing surgery on my wife following an life threatening condition will save (preserve/continue) her life (X). In so expecting, I also establish the implied expectation that a doctor who performs to protocol and to the pinnacle of medical skill, then said doctor can save lives (Y). However, it is possible for expectation Y to be achieved independently without achieving expectation X, and so it is (or should have been) with your proposition. Moral acts and vis a vis moral consequences are not contingent upon expectations. Morality is an absolute, whereas human expectation is a subjective variable.
If a trusted source tells you they sat in audience at play Z being performed at a local theater, and said source convinces you that the play was poorly put together, the acting was terrible, the dialogue unrealistic, you have formed an opinion. For this premise your opinion is consistent with the description given by your trusted source, the play was bad when measured by the criteria of what makes a play good. The next day you attend said play and sit in audience of it, your expectation was that the play would be bad. After watching said play you find that you now have an opinion which is completely opposite of your previous opinion of said play. The staging was perfect, the acting superb, and the dialogue struck you as a dramtical mirror of your own life. The play was great!
If your original proposition were true, then your expectation that play Z was bad would have been causality for play Z to actually be bad. However, play Z was great and your expectation was in error.
More acurately, moral consequence is based on the satisfaction, not of human expectation, but rather on the satisfaction of the criteria for morality, wether said satisfaction was expected or not.
You are correct in your assertion that barber X is commiting an act of immoral consequence by intentionally disregarding the wishes of customer Y. The following paragraph is in support of your position, and in response to the post challenging said position.
While X may posses a liking and preference for a mohawk hairstyle, he cannot superimpose said hairstyle on Y without commiting an immoral act and thereby an immoral consequence. X’s liking and preference for said hairstyle is based on a subjective variable, and therefore bears no authority of Y’s liking and preference for a non-mohawk hairstyle. For X to superimpose a mohawk haircut on Y, X must violate the law of non contradiction, since X enacts method (r) as a result of the subjective variable of his liking and prefering a mohawk hairstyle over any other, and the cosequence (a) violates the identically subjective variable whereby Y likes and prefers a non-mohawk hairstyle. In violating the law of non contradiction, whereby the subjective variables of X and Y render consequence (a) immoral and moral at the same time, the proposition that the subjective preference of X can morally attain authority over the subjective preference of Y is proved false.
I’d now like to address the argument regarding semantics posed by Impenitent. Again, you (Chiron) are dead on. Impenitent is arguing only on the grounds of linguistic variations, and subsequently skepticism. To clarify the point you have already made successfully, I would add that Impenitent is using the “dated” skeptic assertion that we cannot know anything to be true or false for certain. However, in making said assertion
Impenitent has claimed that the assertion is true, but that we cannot know whether it is true or false. As such, Impenitent has created a circular reasoning as well as violated the law of non contradiction, and therefore negated his/her own argument.
I hope this response will hold some value to you, and I look forward to are next e-meeting!
Take care
-The Author