Frankfurt’s Paper: ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwCompatFrankfurt.htm
Frankfurt, Moral Responsibility, and Alternate Possibilities
In Harry Frankfurt’s paper, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” he argues that the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) is unacceptable in its current formulation. In the course of doing so, he presents the example of Jones, which is designed to refute the PAP by showing that circumstances exist under which someone is both unable to do otherwise and morally responsible. Frankfurt, however is unsuccessful in demonstrating that the Principle of Alternative Possibilities is contradicted by our intuitions regarding the Jones example.
According to Frankfurt, the principle of alternate possibilities states that a person is morally responsible for some action only if he could have done otherwise (Frankfurt 829). This principle is incomplete, he claims, because examples exist in which a person is both morally responsible and unable to do otherwise. Frankfurt begins his paper by tracing the reasons why we think that the principle is true. He claims that it has been tied to coercion in the literature, yet thinks this tie is mistaken. While it is true that bona-fide cases of coercion rule out moral responsibility, Frankfurt asserts that it is a mistake to think that they do so just because coercion rules out alternative possibilities. That is, being unable to do otherwise does not automatically entail a lack of moral responsibility (830-833).
Frankfurt presents a series of examples involving an agent named Jones that he thinks exposes the disconnect between moral responsibility and being able to do otherwise. In the relevant Jones example, Black wants Jones to perform some action. Furthermore, Black is capable of taking steps to ensure that Jones has to perform that very action, whatever those steps may be. Black, however, wants Jones to perform the action on his own accord, and will only take steps to ensure that Jones will perform the action if it becomes apparent that he is not going to. That is, Black has the ability to force Jones to act, but will only do so if Jones does not perform the act on his own (Frankfurt 835-836). According to the example, if Jones performs the action of his own accord without forcing Black to intervene, then Jones is both morally responsible for the act and unable to do otherwise. Frankfurt points out several features of this example that suggest it is a counterexample to the PAP. Chief among the features is the existence of a mirror example in which Black is not there to force Jones to perform the relevant action when Jones decides not to (McKenna 772). Since there is nothing preventing Jones from not performing the action, intuitive analysis of the mirror example suggests that Jones is morally responsible if he does (Frankfurt 836-837). We ought to also hold Jones morally responsible in the example involving Black, since the addition of Black changes nothing about what motivates Jones or how he acts. What is important is that in the mirror example, Jones acts in precisely the same way as he acted in the example involving Black.
Frankfurt’s assertion that the PAP is incorrect hinges on the fact that in the Jones-Black example, Jones both cannot do otherwise and is morally responsible. If it turns out that Jones is either not morally responsible or can do otherwise, then the Jones-Black example fails to contradict the PAP. However, against Frankfurt’s analysis of the Jones example, it doesn’t seem that the example is a case in which Jones cannot do otherwise. Frankfurt tells us that Black only intervenes to force Jones to act if it is clear to him that Jones “is going to decide to do something other than what he wants him to do” (Frankfurt 835). It also tells us that black “is an excellent judge of such things” (835). This means that Black can only intervene to make Jones do something if Jones somehow telegraphs that he is deciding to do the opposite. Since telegraphing a decision implies the possibility of that very decision, the Jones-Black example implies that it is possible for Jones to do otherwise when he does not force Black to intervene. In fact, Black can only intervene if Jones begins to actualize the alternate possibility. For Black to force Jones to act, and thus for the conditions of Jones not being able to do otherwise to be maintained, it has to be possible for Jones to decide or want to do otherwise. This suggests that in the Jones-Black example, when Jones decides of his own accord to perform the action, he still maintains the ability to act in a way that forces Black to intervene. This ability represents a significant alternative.
The mirror to the Jones-Black example informs this line of reasoning when Black is not present. We would have no intuitive problem saying that Jones could choose not to perform the action in the mirror example. Frankfurt’s analysis of the mirror example hinges on this intuition. Suppose, however, that the action Jones is to perform is that he will stab Jesse at midnight (McKenna 771-172). Jones is free not to want to stab Jesse at midnight in the mirror example. Further, Jones is free to act on this desire by actually not stabbing Jesse. It is this freedom that makes him morally responsible in the mirror example. Juxtaposing this against the same example when Black is involved, Jones is either free to act in a way that forces Black to intervene or he is not. (1) If he is not free to do so then the mirror example is relevantly different from the Jones-Black example. It would have to presuppose as a premise that Jones, in his capacity as rational agent, is incapable of acting otherwise. But this violates the conditions of the Jones-Black example. As Frankfurt puts it, “(Black) waits until Jones is about to make up his mind what to do.” (Frankfurt 835). If Jones is not free to act in a way that forces Black to intervene, then Jones cannot “make up his mind” in the relevant sense. This suggests that he is not morally responsible in the relevant sense. (2) On the other hand, if Jones is free to act in a way that forces Black to intervene, then Jones has a significant alternative. It is Jones decision to not to stab Jesse at midnight that forces Black to intervene. This means that Jones displays morally relevant freedom by forcing Black to intervene at some time prior to midnight. Whether Jones actually forces Black to intervene is irrelevant; what is important is that he can, and this ability represents a substantive alternative. In (1), Jones is unable to act otherwise, but this inability is present by virtue of a lack of agency. This suggests that he is not morally responsible. In (2) Jones is morally responsible when he acts of his own accord, because he is free to begin to decide to not want to stab Jesse. This beginning of a decision represents a relevant alternative. In (2), Jones maintains the possibility of doing otherwise in the relevant sense. Either way we view it, Jones is not both morally responsible and unable to do otherwise.
That, however, does not answer the question of whether a successful Jones-like example can maintain Jones’ moral responsibility when it effectively rules out alternate possibilities. In order to explore this problem in a Jones-like example, consider the following example that outlines exactly what has to happen for it to exclude alternate possibilities. Suppose the action that Jones is to perform is that he will drive a car in a straight line. The question is, what exactly is required of Black to make it such that Jones cannot deviate from the straight line, fail to perform the action, and not have alternate possibilities. Suppose Black places Jones on a perfectly straight highway and lines it with guard-rails about which Jones does not know. While it is true that under such circumstances Jones will go where the highway and Black take him, Jones can still deviate from going in a straight line. He will be able to weave from one side of the highway to the other within the confines of the guard-rails, which means he will ultimately be able to perform an action alternate to driving in a straight line. Likewise, Jones will be able to weave from side to side of the highway if there is even an inch between the guard-rails and the car. In order to prevent alternate possibilities and ensure that the only action Jones can perform is driving in a straight line, the rails must ensure that the car cannot deviate or even begin to deviate from going perfectly straight. The only way this is achieved is if the guard-rails are moved in and butted up against the car. This suggests that the rails must be such that the course of the car is essentially controlled or maintained by them at all times. Further, it does not make sense to say that Black can lay in wait until Jones begin to go off the path, because beginning to deviate from a straight line is equivalent to actually deviating from the line. If Black arranges the rails such that they pop up as soon as Jones begins to turn right or left, then it is too late. Black must place the guard-rail controllers up against the car as soon as the example begins, and must keep them there until Jones reaches the destination. Otherwise, Black will fail to prevent alternate possibilities.
Under such circumstance, however, it is not plausible to hold Jones responsible for driving in a straight line. Whether he drove in a straight line was not up to him because he had to do it and was continually forced to do it by the guard-rails. That he would have done it without the guard-rails does not establish that he is responsible for doing it when the guard-rails are there. It is no longer up to Jones whether he drives in a straight line, as he is being forced to perform the action at all times by the rails. And because of that, Jones no longer has effective agency regarding the action of driving in a straight line. Hence, when alternate possibilities are ruled out in the car example, so is Jones’ moral responsibility.
The car example is a close analogue to a true Jones-Black example, because the car has the same conceptual relation with the guard-rails as Jones’ decisions have with Black’s device or power that makes him capable of controlling mental states. We can replace the car with Jones’ mental processes and replace the guard-rails with whatever Black uses to control them, and we can do so without changing our reasonings regarding either. This means that the car wandering from side to side on a highway lined with guard rails is equivalent to Jones beginning to deviate from his original decision to perform the action. Since the wandering constituted alternate possibilities, so does Jones beginning to deviate from his original decision. Further, since the premise that Black lays in wait necessarily means that Jones has to act in a way that brings Black to action, it means that Jones must at least be able to begin to deviate from his original decision. Hence, the premise necessarily builds alternate possibilities into a Jones-like example. This means that the car example shows that Black must act as soon as he comes into the example if he has any chance of ruling out alternate possibilities for Jones. Black must place a device on Jones such that it maintains Jones’ original decision at all times. It must maintain them from the time Black enters the example until the time of the action. As the car example also shows, however, this results in Jones no longer being morally responsible for the action.
In order to rule out alternate possibilities, Jones’ mental states have to be controlled and thus determined by Black. This means that Jones is no longer in control of them. So while it may be true the Jones would still have ended up performing the action without Black’s intervention, this doesn’t mean that he is morally responsible for the action when Black is present. Black removes his agency by taking control of his mental states and actions, and this means he couldn’t possibly be morally responsible. Perhaps we would say that if Jones would have done the same without Black forcing his mental states to maintain, then Jones is exposed as the type of person who, given the opportunity, would perform that action. But Jones cannot be said to be morally responsible for the action itself since he had no agency regarding it. Hence, the car example shows that a Jones-like example cannot hold Jones morally responsible when alternate possibilities are ruled out.
Setting aside prior concerns about alternate possibilities that issued from the car example, we get a similar result and contradiction if we examine a Jones-like example from the standpoint of assuming Jones can be morally responsible. An example that allows for moral responsibility takes the form of Frankfurt’s original example, having two paths built into it. There is a path in which Jones acts of his own accord, and there is a path in which Black is forced to intervene. However, the normal question of how Black comes to know that Jones is going to change his mind and what steps he takes to ensure that Jones cannot, does not need to be pinned down since our only concern is with constructing a Jones-like example that allows Jones to be morally responsible. What is important is that both of the paths are built into a successful Frankfurt example, because Jones acting on his own accord is what allows him to be seen as morally responsible; similarly, the possibility of him acting in a way that forces Black to intervene is what allows the example to supposedly rule out alternate possibilities. That is, there has to be a counter-intervener built into the example in order for Frankfurt to claim that he is ruling out alternate possibilities. However, if it turns out that Black intervening necessarily represents an alternate possibility, then the example cannot reconcile itself and thus has internal contradiction.
Suppose Jones takes the normal path in which he chooses to perform the action of his own accord without forcing Black to intervene. Then, in a successful Jones-like example he is morally responsible. On the other hand, suppose Jones acts in a way that forces Black to intervene. Supposing he takes this path, Jones is not morally responsible because Black forces him to act. That Jones always takes the first path in a successful Jones-like example does not change the fact that he can take the path in which Black intervenes. Jones has two possible paths at any given time prior to the action, and depending on which one is taken, he is either morally responsible or not morally responsible. In addition to the shift between the paths regarding Jones’ moral responsibility, however, is a shift regarding Jones’ agency. Jones has effective agency regarding the action when he takes the path where he performs of his own accord. On this path, it is Jones’ self-motivated decision that brings him to act. On the other hand, when Black intervenes, the decision to act is no longer in Jones’ control. Black forces him to make that decision, which means Jones has no moral agency regarding it. The two paths are therefore distinct in two ways. First, when Jones acts of his own accord, he is both morally responsible for the act and has effective agency regarding it. Second, when Jones is forced to act by Black he does not have effective agency nor is he morally responsible.
Now, it stands to reason that paths that change moral responsibility and agency are paths that represent significant alternatives, because PAP is concerned directly with the interrelation of the two. Within the confines of the example, Jones had the possibility of acting in a way that would have necessarily resulted in him not being morally responsible nor having effective agency for the action. This means that when we assume that Jones can be morally responsible in a Jones-like example by allowing him to perform the action on his own and by using a counter-intervener to rule out alternate possibilities, we get the necessary result that there are alternate possibilities built into an example.
A Jones-like example is designed to show that an agent can be both morally responsible and unable to do otherwise. In order to do so, it premises that the agent originally wants to perform some action, and that there is a counter-intervener that can prevent him from doing any action alternative to the one associated with this want. It turns out, though, that these two premises contradict each other. As the car example shows, a Jones-like example can only rule out alternate possibilities if the counter-intervener controls Jones’ mental states for the duration of the example. But in doing so, the counter-intervener also precludes Jones from being morally responsible. On the other hand, when it is assumed that Jones is morally responsible, it is built into the example that Jones has the possibility of being morally responsible or not, and the possibility of having or lacking effective agency. These distinctions are relevant and robust enough to make two paths two alternate possibilities. Hence, a successful Jones-like example in which some agent is both morally responsible and incapable of doing otherwise is not theoretically possible. This means that a Jones-like example cannot possibly contradict the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, and Frankfurt is thereby unsuccessful.
Works Cited
Frankfurt, Harry. Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. 1969 The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 66, No. 23 (Dec 4, 1969). PP. 829-839
McKenna, Michael. Frankfurt’s Argument against Alternative Possibilities: Looking Beyond the Examples. 2008 Nous 42:4 (2008) 770-793