If X exists if 1, 2, and 3 exist, then X is neither 1, nor 2, nor 3.
We can use this reasoning to refute physicalism.
Let’s take a law of motion, F = MA which we call F. If F exists if the same mass and the same acceleration of several bodies has repeatedly yielded the same force, then F is not any of those measured bodies. Split open the body as much as you want and you’re never going to find F.
Let’s define physicalism as follows:
A property is physical iff it can be quantified.
Given this definition it must conceded that F, even though it cannot be located in 3D space, is physical.
It is quite easy to demonstrate that not all properties can be quantified. So let’s take thought. Physicalists will concede that you need an entire brain for a thought to exist, in other words you need several atoms. Thus,
If a thought exists if several atoms exist, then a thought is not any of those atoms.
Split open any of the 10^25 atoms that make up a brain and you’re not going to locate a thought particle. Thus thought’s location cannot be pinpointed in 3D space just as F=MA cannot be pinpointed in 3D space.
It now only remains to prove that thoughts cannot be quantified.
Definition of quantification
To quantify X is to state that X equals this amount of Y and all X’s and all Y’s are qualitatively identical.
In other words we quantify things in terms of something else. We can quantify a mass unit as one if it is equal to the mass of one hydrogen. We can only do that if the mass of all hydrogen are qualitatively identical.
X is physical iff it can be quantified.
X can be quantified iff X has qualitatively identity with other X’s.
Not all thoughts have qualitative identity with other thoughts.
Therefore, not all thoughts are physical.
Physicalism also has something to do with being able to predict things. Let’s see if that property of physicalism will save the theory.
A property is physical iff given conditions C the property changes from A to B arbitrarily close to 100% of the time.
For example, T has the property S. Apply conditions C and T will now have the property U. That is to say, the property S is a location in space and a certain mass. The conditions C is being struck with a certain force with a certain vector. The property U is a new a location in space. However, it is quite obvious that this new definition will not save physicalism because C, S and U must all be quantified.
That’s because force (F) is not a physical object. Neither is acceleration (A). Both are relationships between physical objects in time and space.
Pressure will inflate a balloon but there is no pressure particle. Pressure is not due to the action of a few molecules but rather the collective action of many molecules.
It’s been quantified as electrical activity in the brain.
I’m not sure what to make of this section so : No comment.
I would sum it up by saying that thought is the coordinated action of many physical objects.
You can’t use math based logic to determine reality. A computer can’t by math determine such thing, such as existance of UFO’s, if a picture of UFO’s are genuine or faugery. That’s why there are so many naive geeks without an ounce of rationally will fall flat for such fraud pictures.
Force and acceleration only make sense when used to describe the actions of physical objects (force on what by what? and acceleration of what relative to what?). They do not themselves need to be physical.
—Then you can’t refute physicalism. That premise is certainly not tautologically true. There’s no reason to think that X can’t be any of 1, 2, 3. Eg., If (red exists if red, blue, and green exist), then red is neither red, nor blue, nor green. That’s tautologically false.
Are you claiming that things that experience force are not physical things? Are you claiming that the properties of physical things are not physical?
Why should we adopt this strange definition? There are many things that one could consider to be entirely non-physical that could be quantified. Angels, for example. Also, there are many things that are in principle physical but perhaps not quantifiable in at least one sense. The amount of galaxies in the universe is something that could be infinite and thus not quantifiable.
Every force is, by the definition of force in contemporary physics, located at a specific point in space.
If thoughts do not share qualitative identity with other thoughts, then how can we tell that they are thoughts? What do you mean when you say that things are qualitatively identical?
Is this supposed to be a definition of predictability? I’m not sure this makes sense. Plus this also seems to fit non-physical things. We could imagine that angels can change their happiness 100% of the time by thinking about God.
You seem to be using a strange definition of quantified. Changes of state can be changes without quantification. Angels could change from sad to happy without there being an amount of sadness or happiness. Plus, what does any of this have to do with thoughts? What is the connection?
No and no. The only thing that is material is a particle. Laws of motion are obviously not material, thus materialists adopted a new position, laws of motion are physical and everything is physical. Let’s see if thought is physical. If only one atoms exists you can’t determine if a law exists, therefore, laws can only be discovered after the observation of how several atoms behave under similar conditions. It’s the same with thought. If only one atoms exists you can’t determine if thought exists. If 10^17 atoms exists you can start to see evidence of thought, which is the ability to determine truth.
Well, I don’t like your use of the argument from conceivability which I will soon demonstrate is a fallacy but you are essentially correct. Thank you for helping me hone my definition. Let’s take the following things which are obviously physical: quarks, electrons, photons, neutrinos, gluons, etc. As well as the immaterial things: mass, energy, pressure, force, acceleration, velocity. What is the one thing all these have in common? Practically nothing. Further, we don’t even know what quarks, electrons, photons, neutrinos, gluons are. As far as I can see, the only thing that these things have in common is that the properties of these physical things can be expressed in numerical quantities, but these quantities refer to something else. For example, mass is quantified sometimes by the mass of one hydrogen, or the mass of one cubic centimeter of water which is a gram, I think. However, we cannot quantify mass in terms of things that for each member of its group it is unique, like humans. If I say that the mass of my house is the mass of 30 humans I haven’t made a correct statement. It must be measured in terms of something else which has qualitative identity. Look up QI if you don’t know what it means. So we can weigh the Earth in terms of hydrogen because the mass of all hydrogens is the same or has QI. Thus we have a new definition for physicalism:
Physical is a property of an object iff it can be quantified in terms of something which is qualitatively identical.
The modern definition of force is that it is carried by bosons which inform fermions how to change their direction. However, the modern definition has merely relocated the problem. Before we wondered how does the Earth know to go around the Sun. Now, we’re asking how does the quark know what to do when it absorbs or emits a gluon.
If thoughts do not share qualitative identity with other thoughts, then how can we tell that they are thoughts? What do you mean when you say that things are qualitatively identical?
This is the fallacious argument form conceivability, widely used in philosophy sadly.
I can imagine X
Therefore X is exists
That’s a fallacy. We have to argue based on what we know not on what we can imagine. I can imagine that you’re a random word generator, that doesn’t prove anything about you, does it?
Of course. What does that prove?
This is the fallacy of arguing from conceivability, elucidated above.
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Let me know if I did not explain the connection above.
You are making some leap of logic that I don’t understand. What does anything you out there have to do with thoughts?
You are arguing from conceivability, too! At least you realize that your definition doesn’t work.
Well, sure, your average frog in Nebraska is green and frog doesn’t have much in common with the color green, but don’t you think that it seems a little strange to say that the color of an obvious physical thing is not physical? We could do the same exercise for any property of a physical thing; that property is different from the thing. But that doesn’t mean that the property isn’t physical. You are introducing a difference that doesn’t matter.
Unless you are being overly skeptical, there are people who study physics that do know what these things are. Don’t substitute your ignorance for the possibility of knowledge.
The problem with all that you have written is that a) you seem to be confusing standards of measurement with the possibility of measurement, and b) you are using “qualitative identity” to distinguish proper standards of measurement when you should be using “quantitative identity”. What matters for the use of a numerical standard is the stability of a standard to have the same numerical quantity throughout appeals to that standard.
Here’s an example to show your problem: humans are used as a standard measure to quantify mass and to quantify volume. Volume first: in some legal jurisdictions, one cannot get a license to sell alcohol without a proviso that there is a maximum amount of people allowed in the room selling the alcohol. Now mass: if you pay attention in any elevator you enter in many legal jurisdictions, you will note that it too lists a maximum ridership along with a maximum mass in some more precise standard. Amusement parks, too, use humans as a standard for mass.
Humans are a somewhat vague standard for mass, as human mass fluctuates from individual to individual. Yet this is a meaningful standard for the people getting on an elevator and it is a meaningful standard for people designing and operating amusement park rides. Where there are problems with this standard (for example, if people in North America tend to have higher masses over the decades and thus put more stress on amusement park rides), the problem lies in the quantitative differences, not the qualitative differences.
You are mistaken. While forces might be caused by and transmitted through subatomic particles, the concept of force still includes location and direction. You should try to work out a few physics problems with force in them.
You seem to be grossly mischaracterizing my argument. I would take it as an intentional insult if you weren’t obviously flailing away with som many other problems on this topic.
What I said was not that angels exist, but that we can conceive of them as purely non-physical beings that have predictable changes. This means that your definition of physical includes things that are not physical. You are trying to argue about the conception of the physical and you have made a huge error.
That your definition of physical doesn’t identify physical things.
You still haven’t explained what any of this has to do with thoughts.
If horses exist if mammals, animals, and objects exist, then horses are neither mammals, animals, or objects?
You’re right that force is not the same as either mass or acceleration, but you have your reasoning all wrong. It’s not because F exists if m and a exist that F is not mass or acceleration, but because we don’t define force as mass or acceleration.
That’s an unorthodox definition of “physical,” but OK.
What is force a property of?
What physicalists say that?
True, but again, you’ve got faulty reasoning.
Now wait a minute–if this is your argument for why thought is not physical, then why are you applying it to force? Just a minute ago, you said force was physical.
A glass of water equals (let’s say) 8 cubic inches, therefore all water and all cubic inches are qualitatively identical?
What does that mean? How are the masses of hydrogen atoms qualitatively identical? Aren’t they quantitatively identical?
If you mean that all X’s can only be identified as X’s because of some essential quality they all share in common, then yes–they would have to have that common quality in order for us to say there are n X’s.
Well, they have to have some quality in common–otherwise, what makes them all quintessentially thought.
In a sense yes, but only because verifying predictions requires looking at physical outcomes. But you should note that being physical, in and of itself, does not imply causation or determinism, which are essential for predictions to make any sense.
If you’re depressed, then under the condition that you suddenly hear some good news, you become happy. Does that mean your mood is physical? Given that you don’t think thought is physical, I would think you certainly don’t believe emotions are physical.
You just swapped A and B with S and U (and added T).
If you don’t understand what I’m saying then how can you refute me?
I can’t make my ideas regarding thought any more clear than the following: If only one atoms exists you can’t determine if thought exists. If 10^17 atoms exists you can start to see evidence of thought, which is the ability to determine truth. If thought requires at least 10^17 atoms then there is not thought particle that you can point to. If it does not exist in 3D space and it cannot be described with an equation, then it’s not physical.
You are arguing from conceivability, too! At least you realize that your definition doesn’t work.
First, I can’t prove that something is not physical by your definition if you don’t even have a definition for physical. Second, colors are not physical. This can be demonstrated as follows:
What is physical does not require a brain to exist.
Colors require brains and subjects to exist.
Therefore colors are not physical.
The mind just translates the information of EM wave length into colors.
I agree with this. I don’t see how it refutes my thesis.
It’s true we don’t know what these things are, we only know what they do. That’s a common cliche among physicists. If it’s true then tell me what an electron is. Inevitably you will say it is like something else which does not inform me of anything. Next, you will list its properties which also does not tell me what it is.
We’re basically in agreement here.
However, using humans as a measure does not yield precise measurements. Not even down to one decimal place.
You don’t understand what qualitative identity is. Look it up. It’s a technical term.
You are mistaken. While forces might be caused by and transmitted through subatomic particles, the concept of force still includes location and direction. You should try to work out a few physics problems with force in them.
You don’t understand. You’re making conclusions about the real world based on what you can imagine. It’s a fallacy to assert:
I can imagine X
Therefore, the real world is Y
You can’t do that. Whatever you can imagine has nothing to do with the way the real world is.
It’s the same with the ontological argument:
God is the most supreme being I can imagine
Therefore the Big Bang was caused by God
There’s obvious a premise missing, the only way we can get that to work is
The most supreme being I can imagine is the same being that caused the Big Bang
God is the most supreme being I can imagine
Therefore God caused the BB.
Statement 1 is obviously false.
Just assert any thesis about the real world and I can always imagine a state of affairs that will falsify your thesis, so long as what you’re asserting does not contradict an analytic truth. Go ahead I challenge you. Make an assertion about the real world and I can imagine something that will falsify it.
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You’re just assuming that all changes of state are physical. Of course some changes of state can not be quantified and those changes are not the result of physical causes. For example, what causes motion? Those motions which can be quantified and which obey an equation (such as a rock falling towards a massive body) are physical motions, those which do not obey an equation (such as lips moving to speak language) are non physical motion. Both are changes of state.
Definition of state
Several objects and subjects located at different points in space is a state.
You seem to imagine that the burden is on me to simply accept that what you are saying is some kind of revealed truth. As it stands, what you write seems to be mostly nonsense and at this point the burden is on you not merely to make your case for your position, but also to make the case that you are coherent.
Is English your second language? Perhaps you can express your thoughts in some other way and we can work on a translation.
Who (besides perhaps Leibniz) ever said that there was a thought particle? There aren’t computer particles, but computers exist, made from other particles.
As it stands, you haven’t explained what the relationship is between number of particles and thoughts.
OK, so if we just use the average light reflected off of frogs, then my argument still goes through. Your reasoning is equivalent to deriving that because the average light reflected off a frog is not a frog either the light or the frog is not physical.
Regardless, it is not true that, “What is physical does not require a brain to exist.” Brains require brains to exist. Blood vessels feeding brains require brains to exist. Brain activity requires brains to exist. All of these things are demonstrably physical.
What else do you want?
So? You never said anything about precision; you only talked about what it means for something to be physical. Now you have to explain what you mean by precision and why we should take it seriously as part of a criterion for the physical.
I know the term. Its use doesn’t match what you seem to be doing. What do you mean by the term? Again, the problem here is that you don’t seem to be coherent with the use of English language terms. This is a difficult subject, so it’s not surprising that it requires careful language.
In this case, I am simply presenting a matter of fact: many physicists and philosophers of physics accept that there could be physical things that cannot be quantified (in some senses of the word). In their conception of what it means to be physical, they include things that are not quantifiable. You disagree with this possibility/conception and the burden is on you to justify your position against the common usage of those who work in and study the field.
Again I must ask if English is your second language. I specifically used an example of a change of state that was non-physical.
I hope that you are not being intentionally rude.
Yet the motions of lips speaking language are obviously physical and, as any good programmer of computer animation knows, they do obey equations of motion. Your example here is obviously wrong.
If they don’t exist then that theory is called eliminativism which I don’t think you are.
It is fact that atoms and motion exist.
If thoughts do exist, then they are either (a) atoms, (b) the same thing that moves atoms or (c) something else.
You have rejected A and if you accept B then you agree with me, so you must believe C. If you believe C then that is substance dualism.
A computer is an abstract concept which is composed of a certain arrangement of atoms. Abstract concepts are causeless. What we’re arguing about is whether or not something that is not an atom and is not a law of motion can have causation. Take the double slit experiment. Particles go through one slit or the other and you can’t predict it. I’m guessing you believe that it’s random. I’m saying that they choose to go through one slit of the other. We can prove this using the reductio ad absurdum, which is proving that you’re position leads to a contradiction:
Either particles desire to go through one slit or the other or they do not desire to go through one slit or the other.
Particles do not desire to go through one slit or the other.
I am made of particles.
I desire.
Therefore, particles desire and they do not desire.
Your theory leads to a contradiction. Now, the only way to get around this contradiction is to assert the following:
Collections of particles desire.
I am made of a collection of particles.
Therefore I desire
Now, the problem with this your theory has less explanatory power. It cannot explain how the right collection of particles arises. It has to make an appeal to luck. At what point does desire arise? When a bacteria forms? If that is the case then you have to just say that 10^17 particles have to get lucky which is simply too improbable. After the Cambrian Explosion? Then you have to wait for about 10^24 particles to arise which is even more improbable.
You still won’t give me a definition of physical, so at the moment your position remains unfalsifiable and hence is not even a theory. Second, a frog is an abstract concept which describes a certain arrangement of atoms. The concept frog is not physical, it is the atoms that are physical and that which moves the atoms is non-physical.
Again, a brain is an abstract concept which describes a certain arrangement of atoms. Sure, brains require brains to exist, that’s a tautology, but more importantly they require atoms to exist and for brains to execute the desires of a subject, they need that which moves atoms.
You just failed to tell me what an electron is.
Every physicist in the world cares about precision. Physics, among other things, is about predicting things. If your predictions are not precise, then you haven’t predicted anything. A prediction by definition is precise. Let me prove this:
X will happen
If you cannot define X precisely then you haven’t predicted anything.
If there is one thing that a good physicalist theory must do is it must rule out teleology. If you admit teleology exists then you’re a dualist who merely calls himself a physicalist. The thing about teleology is that it cannot in principle be predicted. Things happens because subjects desire them to happen and subjects are unobservable, not composed of atoms and hence cannot be predicted.
The point about qualitative identity is that we measure things X in terms of other things Y. If we say that the length of X is 10y. Now, length ranges from 10^-35m to 10^27m, that’s something like 62 orders of magnitude. Say you want to measure a human which is 10^1 m. If you measure it in 10^-1m or decimeters, and if the thing Y you’re using to measure the human is QI at 10^-1 but not QI at 10^-2 then you’re not being very precise. So if you measure a human with the length of one hydrogen which I think has QI at 10^-15m, but does not have QI at 10^-16m then you’re being very precise. And if you measure a human with a quark which has QI at 10^-19 but not at 10^-20 then you’re being even more precise.
The point is physical properties are only called physical because they can be precisely defined.
First, can you give an example of something that cannot be quantified which physicalists believe to be physical. Also, provide a definition of physical and show why X is physical. Second, what could exist does not matter. We have to argue about what does exist. To show why consider the following:
Anything which is logically possible can exist.
There is not one thing in common that everything that could exist has.
Therefore, you cannot make a statements describing everything that could exist.
Third, the only way to get you to understand that you cannot just use your imagination to assert facts about the real world is for you to make an assertion about the real world and then I will falsify it by the argument from conceivability. I can falsify any hypothesis with the argument from conceivability. Take empiricism:
The only knowledge we get is form our senses
I can imagine getting knowledge from some weird device without sensation.
Take logical positivism:
The only thing that exists is that which can be verified.
I can imagine something that exists which cannot be verified, for example, Santa Claus.
Take epiphenomenalism
Thoughts are like smoke that float off of physical matter but they do not affect physical matter.
I can imagine thoughts affecting matter.
You see, this argument is useless because it doesn’t tell us about anything that exists. It can show that anything exists.
How is the sentence “You’re just assuming that all changes of state are physical,” in any way bad English?
If I wanted to be rude I would ridicule your ideas. When have I ever done that? Second, another way of being rude is to claim that someone can’t write English which is what you’re doing or make statements like this: “what you write seems to be mostly nonsense.” I also take exceptional offense to this statement because I am probably the friendliest person you will ever meet. Just call me on Skype and I would be happy to talk with you.
Yet the motions of lips speaking language are obviously physical
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You don’t even have a definition of physical so how is that statement true? The atoms that make up the lips are physical, but that which moves them is not physical.
Not ALL computer animation obeys equations of motion, only SOME. I’ve actually seen a computer programmer do computer animation so I know how this works. What happens is a human takes an already existing figure which is specified with 1’s and 0’s. The human will then move one piece of its arm from A to B and the computer will extrapolate using equations what should fall between A and B. The human knows that the movement from A to B is plausible not based on an equation but on experience. Now you might naturally think that the human as well is using an equation. This can be falsified as follows:
If one wants to reduce all motion to for every input A, there is a finite set of outputs, then one must must specify all inputs A.
The number of possible inputs A is transfinite.
If you want to specify a transfinite number of inputs, then it requires a transfinite amount of time.
Therefore, one cannot reduce all motion to for every input A, there is a finite set of outputs, then one must must specify all inputs A.
1, 2 and 3 are particular objects, not variables. Plus X is contingent on all 3, not on just one alone.
The key take home point here is that force does not exist in 3D space yet it changes the direction of objects and thought behaves in a similar way. Many think that force is identical with a boson but this is false. Fermions exchange bosons and the bosons inform fermions how to change their direction, but at the end of the day when a fermion absorbs a boson it still has to “know” what to do based on that action.
Force is a property of an object which has properties mass and acceleration.
If you believe that you do not need a brain for thought to exist, then we’re in agreement. Do you believe this?
Since you don’t point out why, this statement can be ignored.
Force is physical if it can be quantified precisely.
All water that is 8 cubic inches is QI, yes. And all cubic inches are by definition QI.
QI is a technical piece of jargon. Look it up.
Right, but that quality cannot be quantified.
To quantify something is to quantify X in terms of Y if all Ys have QI.
Y must be observed.
Thoughts cannot be observed, only their effects can be observed.
Therefore, thoughts cannot be quantified in terms of Y.
If you believe
If it is physical, then it can be predicted,
Everything is physical
Then you must believe:
Everything can be predicted.
Can you name me something that is physical which does not obey an equation?
I think what you mean is if it’s a bachelor, then he’s unmarried, does that mean that bachelorhood is physical. I think that’s a better example of what you’re getting at, correct?
You’re reasoning is as follows.
If something is true of the abstract world, then it is true of the real world.
All abstract concepts have necessary consequences.
Therefore all physical things have necessary consequences.
Premise one is false.
Stated another way, what is true of the abstract world is not necessarily true of the real world. Logical necessity describes the abstract world. We’re arguing over the nature of the real world. You’re using truths about the abstract world to prove truths about the real world. Observation determines truth about the real world, not the consequences of abstract relationships.
You just swapped A and B with S and U (and added T).
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I don’t see your point.
The physicalist position seems to be that thoughts are part of the operation of physical things (“atoms”, if you want to be 3rd grade physics about it). But you were writing as if thoughts were each individual atoms. That seems to make no sense and, at best, be a gross straw man of the physicalist position. Have you read any physicalist philosophers?
It sounds like you’re trying to sell some kind of product based on quantum mysticism. This makes you look intelligent if you are trying to make money off of dopes. If you aren’t, then it makes you look like a dope.
You seem to be a dope. You are confusing the particles that make up you with the particles that go through a standard double-slit experiment. You are equivocating on the word “particles”. Even if English were your second language, that would not be excusable. Again, you seem to be assuming that there are physicalists that claim that thoughts are part of individual particles. I know of only one physicalist philosopher that makes this claim and even he does not argue that the consciousness of individual particles leads to their actions.
This may be a challenge to the hypothesis, but we observe large collections of particles with brains making choices and we do not observe collections of particles without these structures making choices.
You are trying to weasel out of the problems and you are beginning to look more and more dishonest. You may not be able to remember, but we were discussing problems for your definitions of physical, ones that you have to defend. If you do not agree that frogs are physical and that the light that reflects off of frogs are physical, then you don’t really seem like the kind of person that we should be listening to about what is physical. You seem more and more like someone trying to peddle some sort of quantum mysticism, either to take advantage of others or because someone has taken advantage of you.
I don’t know what to tell you about it beyond its physical properties. I suspect that you want me to tell you about its soul. The soul that makes it behave in ways that appear almost entirely randomly when possible?
You use a strange definition of “prove”. You seem to have tried to steal the way that textbooks in math and logic present proofs without any understanding of the word. What do you think that “precise” means?
Physicists tend to rule out teleology as a final cause (in the Aristotelian sense). Clearly people and animal want to do things and have emotions and goals. This is part of their consciousness. And goals and desires can be predicted, at least to a certain degree of precision; this is how people get through life with other people around.
But what do you mean by qualitative identity? Why is it so hard for you to give a definition? All the uses of “QI” above should mean “quantitative identity” because you are using them quantitatively.
Above, you reject things as possibly being physical because they are abstract, yet here you rely on the abstract as the fundamental essence of the physical. You are either very, very confused and contradictory or your talk of “abstract” above was simply a dishonest attempt to avoid questions.
First, can you give an example of something that cannot be quantified which physicalists believe to be physical. Also, provide a definition of physical and show why X is physical. Second, what could exist does not matter. We have to argue about what does exist.
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No. You are the one trying to give your own personal definition of physical and set boundaries on what can and cannot be physical. You have to answer the questions, not duck them again and again. You have made claims that go against the practice of physics.
Because you are grossly missing the point. I was trying to be charitable and assume that you had some sort of linguistic barrier. As it stands, perhaps you made a really, really dumb mistake. Perhaps you, oddly, consider angels to be physical beings. I do not.
At this point, I suspect that you would try to sell me some products based on quantum mysticism. You have yet to demonstrate that your claims on this topic are serious. That you continue try to put the burden of defense on others when you are here presenting your ideas is not a good sign.
You don’t even have a definition of physical so how is that statement true? The atoms that make up the lips are physical, but that which moves them is not physical.
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If you want to merely assume that all thought is non-physical, then you should just say that. You don’t have to make up (bad) arguments. This is just making you look more and more dishonest. You say that you are “the friendliest person you will ever meet”, yet when you start a thread claiming to present problems for physicalism and all that you do is present false definitions of physical and claim, as dogma, that thoughts are non-physical, this gives me reason to believe that you are possibly a serial killer. Your actions do not match your promises.
Not ALL computer animation obeys equations of motion, only SOME. I’ve actually seen a computer programmer do computer animation so I know how this works. What happens is a human takes an already existing figure which is specified with 1’s and 0’s. The human will then move one piece of its arm from A to B and the computer will extrapolate using equations what should fall between A and B. The human knows that the movement from A to B is plausible not based on an equation but on experience.
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This is not what I meant. What I meant was that a good animator knows that the motion of the lips obey equations of motion. The animator can cheat in approximating the visuals, but there is still an underlying ideal.
No. Physical systems do what they do without knowledge of equations. The equations that physicists use are abstractions.
What do you mean by “transfinite”? This argument makes no sense.
Physbang,
You’re really starting to employ the fallacy of appealing to ridicule so this debate cannot go on much longer. When your opponent has nothing more to offer than ridicule then by definition you cannot learn from him and debate becomes useless. I will now demonstrate that many of your arguments amount to nothing more than asserting X is nonsense, which is not an argument.
Further, this whole debate centers around my definition of physicalism as follows:
a property is physical iff it can be quantified in terms of something else which has QI
You can only refute this by taking the contrary position:
Some properties are physical which cannot be quantified in terms of something else which has QI.
This is about the 4th round of debate and you have yet to name me one property that is physical which cannot be quantified in terms of something else which has QI.
You also have a lot of problems with QI. QI is distinguished from numerical identity. The only thing that is the same is that which is identical to itself. However if we are going to think at all, which is to say, determine truth, then we have to make modus ponens and identity statements. We can’t make a modus ponens statements if everything is different. If I say if P then Q and there is only one P in the universe which exists at only one Planck time then my statement is useless.
Definition of Quantitative Identity
QI = things are same if some of their properties are same. (same cannot be defined but it can known through intuition).
It is quite reasonable to say the length of every hydrogen is the same down to 10^-13 m. At 10^-15 m the length of every hydrogen is different. Thus, we can make a valid modus ponens statement:
if it’s hydrogen then it’s length will be 1.2 * 10^-13m
Do you now admit that the argument from conceivability is a fallacy?
My position is that the mover is distinct from the moved. My position is not that mover and moved are the same thing. If that which moves atoms can be described with an equation then it is physical, if it can not then it is non physical. Are you willing to take the contrary view? If not, then we’re in agreement you’re just calling things different words.
This is just an argument from ridicule.
This is a condescending and rude question. How would you like it if I assumed you have read no philosophy? Let’s see Fodor, JJC Smart, UT Place, Searle (a physicalist who denies it), Georges Rey who I studied under, Stojar, David Lewis, David Armstrong, Tim Crane (not exactly a physicalist), Nagel (used to be a physicalist), Ned Block, Jackson, Joseph Levine, Kim, and Paul and Patricia Churchland the only true physicalists in my opinion, plus some others who I’ve forgotten.
More ridicule. This just demonstrates that you disrespect reason.
More ridicule and hence a fallacy. Do you even know the difference between reason and ridicule?
I’m well aware that what goes through the slit is neither a particle, nor a wave. Nevertheless whatever it is that goes through the slit cannot be predicted.
If you want my honest opinion eliminativism is the only true physicalism.
Well, if thoughts exist and they are not particles, then how do you justify them being physical?
You’re just assuming that that which chooses is physical. Justify this claim.
There is almost nothing but ridicule in this paragraph. The only thing that looks like an argument is a restatement of your belief that a frog is physical. I have already made my position on frogs clear. Frog is an abstract concept which describes millions of unique arrangements of atoms. Many properties of atoms are physical with the exception of that which moves them which is non-physical.
The point is when you say X has properties Y and Z you’re not stating what X is. You said: “Unless you are being overly skeptical, there are people who study physics that do know what these things are. Don’t substitute your ignorance for the possibility of knowledge.” That statement is false. We don’t know what electrons are.
Prove in philosophy has a different definition than it does in mathematics. Don’t nitpick over the definition of words that are not central to the debate.
Then teleology exists.
People’s goals can be predicted in only the crudest sense. First, you can’t precisely define a goal, almost all goals are unique. Hydrogens on the other hand exhibit a remarkable degree of sameness though of course there are properties of hydrogen which are different for each hydrogen. To predict something is to say if X then Y. If all X’s are different then that statement is false because it’s really if X1 then Y1 and there is only one X1 in the universe. If there is only one Y1 in the universe then you have to define Y1 in terms of something else. If you then say Y1 = Z1 and A1 and Z1 and A1 are unique then you have to define Z1 and A1. This chain will go on to infinity and you will never make a statement. Thus, human goals cannot be predicted.
But what do you mean by qualitative identity? Why is it so hard for you to give a definition? All the uses of “QI” above should mean “quantitative identity” because you are using them quantitatively.
This is a good point and it is a reasonable objection but I can explain your confusion. Properties by definition are abstract. Let me explain. In the sentence:
If Y describes X, then Y by definition is abstract. All descriptions will always be abstract and the thing itself will always be either real or abstract, since you can describe abstract entities. So when you describe physical properties the properties will always be abstract but they are describing a real thing.
Definition of real
A thing is real iff it is a cause or an effect (cause and effect cannot be defined but we know them through intuition)
First, can you give an example of something that cannot be quantified which physicalists believe to be physical. Also, provide a definition of physical and show why X is physical. Second, what could exist does not matter. We have to argue about what does exist.
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I’m not ducking questions you are. If I assert: X is true. The only way you can falsify that is by showing, one, that X is true leads to a contradiction and, two, that you believe X is not true and that belief does not lead to a contradiction.
So I assert: a property is physical iff it can be quantified in terms of something else which has QI
You can only refute this by taking the contrary position:
Some properties are physical which cannot be quantified in terms of something else which has QI.
Lots of ridicule here but you wrongly interpreted my explanation as myself assuming that angels were physical which is not what I was saying at all. What I was saying was some changes of state are not physical.
This is just ridicule and hence a fallacy.
False. As I said: If I assert: X is true. The only way you can falsify that is by showing, one, that X is true leads to a contradiction and, two, that you believe X is not true and that belief does not lead to a contraction.
So I assert: a property is physical iff it can be quantified in terms of something else which has QI
You can only refute this by taking the contrary position:
Some properties are physical which cannot be quantified in terms of something else which has QI.
You don’t even have a definition of physical so how is that statement true? The atoms that make up the lips are physical, but that which moves them is not physical.
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This is not an argument. This demonstrates your inability to understand what an argument is.
One, if you think disagreeing with you is rude, then you have a strange definition of rude. Two, I have done a lot more then present false definitions of physical and claim, as dogma, that thoughts are non-physical. Three, you’re not willing to show that the contrary of my definition of physical does not lead to a contradiction. Four, I have no dogmatically asserted that thoughts are non-physical. What I have said is that that which moves atoms is thought if it can be described with an equation and it is physical motion if it can be described with an equation. That’s where I stand, now let’s see you show that the contrary does not lead to a contradiction.
Not ALL computer animation obeys equations of motion, only SOME. I’ve actually seen a computer programmer do computer animation so I know how this works. What happens is a human takes an already existing figure which is specified with 1’s and 0’s. The human will then move one piece of its arm from A to B and the computer will extrapolate using equations what should fall between A and B. The human knows that the movement from A to B is plausible not based on an equation but on experience.
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You’re going to have to explain what you mean with underlying ideal.
But physical systems can be described with equations, correct? And if you’re a good physicalist then you believe that all systems are physical and all can be described with an equation. I’ve already demonstrated that that’s false with the following: To predict something is to say if X then Y. If all X’s are different then that statement is false because it’s really if X1 then Y1 and there is only one X1 in the universe. If there is only one Y1 in the universe then you have to define Y1 in terms of something else. If you then say Y1 = Z1 and A1 and Z1 and A1 are unique then you have to define Z1 and A1. This chain will go on to infinity and you will never make a statement.
What do you mean by “transfinite”? This argument makes no sense.
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First, transfinite used in the Stuart Kaufman sense means more finite units that exist in the universe if you divide the universe into Planck time and Planck lengths and number of atoms in our universe which works out to 10^150. Second, you have only an appeal to misunderstanding which is not an argument. To say: I don’t understand X is not an argument.