more things in heaven and earth

Philosophy Forums Philosophy
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“There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.”

Well, are there? Are there things in the universe, in reality, that we cannot even fathom? To put this in more philosophical terms, are there phenomena, processes, systems, facts or truths, states of affairs, in or about the world that our conceptual faculties are just too limited or ill-equipped to understand, or to conceptualize?

I think most people would say yes–I mean, the universe is just so vast and complex, so deep (it turns out), that there must be things about it that we just cannot understand–but I’ve been starting to doubt this lately.

It’s a little too complicated to explain in full what started me on this skeptical train, and I think to explain it would take me a few days to write out properly (probably enough for a fairly lengthy journal article), but suffice it to say, I’m starting to think that it’s just in the nature of thought itself to be applicable to anything. So long as the mind can be affected by it somehow, it must be possible to form some concept of it–even if only a vague and rudamentary one.

I mean, just to propose the idea that there are some things out there for which no proper concept can be formed is a self-contradictory notion–it basically says that the concept which I am now forming in my mind and expressing to you is inconceivable. Or in other words, just to say “there are some things which we cannot conceive” requires forming the concept of it beforehand.

As Kant put it, if I cannot conceive it, “it is nothing to me.” So how is it possible for us to even propose the idea? Obviously, to propose the idea, it becomes something to me. Yet at the same time, it seems so basic, so plausible, that there have to be things for which no proper concept can be formed. But I think the reason why this seems so basic and plausible is only because we can imagine a human being whose conceptual faculties are just too limited or ill-equipped to form a concept of a thing that might actually exist. But this is just a thought experient. The poor guy who hasn’t got the brain power to conceptualize this thing which you are conceptualizing (because you have to in order to perform the thought experiment) is not you. He’s a different (imaginary) guy. There’s nothing incoherent or self-contradictory about talking about “some guy” who isn’t you not being able to form a proper concept of something which you happen to be capable of conceptualizing. So the thought experiment seems to work out fine and dandy. It’s just that when you take this imaginary person to represent yourself that you get into philosophical trouble.

So at the very least, we seem to be limited to talking about only those things which we can form concepts of (as a wise philosopher once said “whereof one cannot speak, one must stay silent”), and at the very most, everything is conceivable (to a lesser or greater extent)–that is, maybe what evolved in the evolution of human thought is simply a device for making concepts about anything that exists, or can exist (or even things that don’t exist–like pink pokadotted hippos dancing in too-toos). If that were the case, we wouldn’t have to worry over the philosophical webs of confusion that we get ourselves caught up in over questions about the inconceivable thing-in-itself or the God we can’t even comprehend, etc. It would be like our undersanding of numbers and mathematics. As far as our ability to imagine quantities, it seems no number, no matter how large or small, no matter whether positve or negative, whole or fractional, rational or irrational (hell, we even seem to have imagined the imaginary number i), is beyond the scope of our ability to conceptualize. What if the same is true of phenomena in general?

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 Gib: are there unconceived, unconstructed ideas/objects?,  which have the potential to become conceptualised, it seems your logic can allow for this possibility. Said in another way, are our concepts without any foundation?

As regard to phenomenon, do we not form concepts by conceiving them by abstraction from phenomenon? If if so, does the fallacy not resolve itself? Michael Polanyi’s notion of unexpressible embedded ideas comes from this notion.

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Let me start just with this quote, which I Think you are not exactly interpreting correctly. He is not saying there are things that you cannot know (or we can never know). He is saying that Horatio’s philosophy cannot cover certain phenomena. So first of all we are dealing with an interpersonal remark about Horatio. His philosophy no doubt includes ideas about what is real and what can be real, and Hamlet is saying that this philosophy does not cover everthing real.

They have just seen Hamlet’s father’s ghost or had a very odd Mutual hallucination such that neither had experienced Before.

So right there Hamlet pretty much has evidence that his assertion is correct. (given that he knows Horatio likely has a sense of his worldview)

Now let’s generalize this, move from the context to a wider one. Is this true for all of us?

Well, if we look at history, even the history of science, this has been the case. Scientists have discovered things that did not fit previous models or philosophies. Scientific methodology continued (with serious exceptions) through from one philosophy (or set of models) and led to evidence that these were limited.

Given that this has continued to be the case for quite some time, it is a fairly good conclusion to assume that future research will demonstate that current models and philosophy are incomplete. And these models and philosophy could not have dreamed up these new phenomena or truths.

Now note: philosophies cannot Dream, so this is a trope. I am taking this use of Dream as mainly an intensifier. Stuff that could not remotely be justified or thought possible given the truth of this philosophy are out there.

This seems like a safe bet.

If one wants to say that one’s philosophy is Empiricism, and so therefore this allows anything to be found out, this is also problematic because empiricism is a process not a brainstorming mechanism. It does not allow, in and of itself, for speculation. In and of itself it offers no ground for conceiving things not yet verfied by what it Thinks is the best method for verifying. So it is limited also.

This does not mean it is wrong, or even that Rationalism should be included. It’s just the nature of what it is.

To Th Obviously, to propose the idea, it becomes something to me. Yet at the same time, it seems so basic, so plausible, that there have to be things for which no proper concept can be formed. But I think the reason why this seems so basic and plausible is only because we can imagine a human being whose conceptual faculties are just too limited or ill-equipped to form a concept of a thing that might actually exist. But this is just a thought experient. The poor guy who hasn’t got the brain power to conceptualize this thing which you are conceptualizing (because you have to in order to perform the thought experiment) is not you. He’s a different (imaginary) guy. There’s nothing incoherent or self-contradictory about talking about “some guy” who isn’t you not being able to form a proper concept of something which you happen to be capable of conceptualizing. So the thought experiment seems to work out fine and dandy. It’s just that when you take this imaginary person to represent yourself that you get into philosophical trouble.
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I do Think there is validity to this argument. I Think you get into a bind if you say there must be things we cannot conceive of. If that is meant as a certain, final judgment, it includes the hubris it seems to be fighting. However short of that level of certainty, it seems a fairly safe bet. I just want to add that brain Power is misleading. it could be such things as being a mammal. Or being a time bound entity. The assumption that we could if we were smart enough seems to miss that ontology might block us from even noticing, let alone being able to conceive.

But Another way to put the original quote could be: either your philosophy must change to experience/notice some things, or it will if you did, and there are things out there that require this. Hamlet could potentially know this about Horation. I Think it is a safe bet about ourselves. Most of us don’t have the right philosophies to understand some things that have already been confirmed - re: Feynman’s quote.

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Yes, my logic does allow for this. If it’s true that we evolved from simple micro-organisms that could barely form a thought to multi-celled intelligent thinkers who can comprehend some of the deepest truth of our universe, then of course there is the potential for some unconceived, unconstructed ideas that we have not come to yet.

You’ll have to explain Michael Polanyi to me. I haven’t the faintest idea what unexpressible embedded ideas is about.

This is all perfectly sound reasoning, but I’m not sure whether you’re agree or disagreeing with my main premise. If someone stuck to a particular philosophy (say empiricism) then certainly it would be impossible (or hard) for him/her to “dream up” certain facts or scenarios about the world that didn’t fit into his/her philosophy. But when I talk about phenomena that are inconceivable, I mean in principle–meaning that there cannot be a concept of it–either had by us or some ultra-super-mega-intelligence, either now or way off in the future when we gain much deeper insights into the nature of reality, either in actuality or in some hypothetical fantasy where we simply postulate some being who is capable of conceptualized such a phenomenon.

Yet we have the concept. If our theory of quantum mechanics corresponds to something real in the world, then we have some kind of concept about it. If it doesn’t, then we’ve got it all wrong.

The problem here is how to come to grips with the seeming paradox that falls out of this. Even if you aren’t certain about it, even if you think it’s a safe bet, you end up conceptualizing something you say is inconceivable. It’s a philosophical puzzle for sure. Even if it’s true that there are things out there that we cannot conceive, how is it possible to say that without unwittingly getting yourself caught in a contradiction?

You are right about that, but brain power can be a limiting factor. Instead of imagining a guy who can’t conceive of something which you can, try imagining a slug and say of it that it can’t conceive the intricate complexities of quantum indeterminism. Certainly, in that case, it comes down to brain power. We humans have it, the slug doesn’t.

Yes, but again, I’m talking about conceivability in principle.

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I did get that. My first Point was that that was not what Hamlet was saying to Horatio.

Some would say we have data.

The data keeps coming up in the same pattern. But it is unclear whether we have a concept level understanding of it.

No, you can keep it black boxed. You can have an intuitive sense of it being likely there is something beyond.

I don’t Think saying there is something beyond what I can know, means I have conceived it. It is a negative description not of the thing itself or even what it would be like to experience it.

I am not saying brain Power doesn’t limit, I am saying that it is not the only kind of limit. Slugs are aware of things we are not aware of. There are facets of reality they know in a way we cannot. But slugs and we share qualities and time bound, spatially limited X dimensional creature, with a local vantage Point. They may be other kinds of ontological limitations also that I can’t be objective about or imagine as factors. It seems a fair bet to me that given I can only know in certain kinds of ways, there are things I cannot conceive of, just as a slug cannot.

What I mean here is in the context of a certain philosophy. I Think the argument is better with out the quote, because I Think the position in the quote is hard to refute.

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I think that Moreno got the most of it right.

That is true hence it is important to keep the possibilities open.
We never can be able to be sure of what is coming next.

But, as i see that, more often than not, it is scientists who deny this simple premise. They keep coming with amendments and altrations all the time, but, tend to claim that it is final this time, though, it has not happened so far.

Moreno, here you have taken two extreme positions but i think that the ideal way of philosophy lies between the two.

Technically, Empiricism is the perfect tool because it confirms only right option and negates all others. But, on the other hand, it becomes too restrictive for further development.

Thus, the ideal way should be is to add a little bit of imagination to the empiricism, but, not too much. Otherwise, it would become irrational as you pointed out.

Let me take an example to explain my point.

It is immpossible for a man to experience the gravitational of many g’s which astronauts use to experience during the boot stage of the rocket. But, one can feel somewhat similar experience during riding on modern amusement rides. Thus, he would be able to empathize the experience of an astronaut to some extent, though, not completely.

One cannnot have even a hint of what is on the roof of the 20 story building, standing at the ground floor and trying to see from there. But, if one has been crossed 15th floor, then he would start getting the idea of roof also. Though, it may not be precise, but, certainly not a trope either.

The same formula should be applied in the case of philosphy.

Believe to that extent only, which has been experienced. Imagine just one or two stages further to keep the things going, wait until those become proven, but do not dismiss any possibility till then, whether it appeals you or not.

I have not read much about Hanlet or Feynman but completely agree with this.

[u][b]To be a true knowledge seeker, one must learn or have the courage to accept that i am not sure about this because i have not experienced this yet.

Accepting ignorence is the first but essential step of learning. Nothing further is possible without it[/b][/u].

with love,
sanjay

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I was wrong then. (though I got that interpretation from others). However, I guess you could think of Horatio as like that hypothetical guy in our thought experiment. We know there is more in heaven and earth than he can dream of, just as Hamlet knows the same about Horatio–but this is only in the limited sense of what you were saying about the empiricist.

All these seem to be pointing to the same idea–you seem to be saying we can “black box” an idea without making it into a concept–but isn’t an idea just another word for a concept? IOW, I think of the black box as the beginning of a concept, not a precursor. If you can use it to refer to something, you’ve got a concept. I think it would help if you explained what you mean by a “concept level understanding”–do you mean a furnished concept (where the black box would be “unfurnished”)?

But you had to use the word “something” in that statement. You’ve got the concept of a “thing” there. If that’s not a concept of the something you’re talking about, then you’re refering to the wrong thing.

I agree with this. I was simply using brain power as an arbitrary device in the thought experiment (to give some explanation of why the guy couldn’t conceive of something which I could conceive of). But it needn’t be brain power; it could be something else.

And that seems so intuitively true. It may be true.

Moreno, I don’t think you understand. You seem to have no trouble understanding the content of my OP, but I don’t think you understand my motives in posting it. This, to me, is a logic puzzle. Many things in philosophy are. It’s not that I think I’ve proven that we can conceive everything, nor that I think I’ve proven that we must say that we can conceive anything we talk about (in order to avoid contradicting ourselves), but that the logic of the idea seems to lead to a self-refuting conclusion: that the things we say are inconceivable must be conceived of in order to say it. This is a kind of logical paradox for me–on par with the liar’s paradox, or Russel’s paradox about the set of all sets that don’t contain themselves. Or like the son whose father died in a car crash and who gets rushed to the hospital and the doctor says “I can’t operate on him; he’s my son.”

That’s not to say I’m not partial to my precedent view that human thought may be capable of capturing anything in existence, and this puzzle certainly has come to the forefront of my mind because of that, but I recognize how silly it is to suppose I’ve proven anything at this point. It still sits in my mind as a philosophical conundrum to be solved, nothing more.

Sanjay, these are some wise words indeed. I’ve believed something similar for a long time about the function of science in human thought. Science is the ground level from which human thought can soar, but it mustn’t soar too far, or for too long, without coming back to the solid grounds of science. Science is the beacon that guides the way, though we may venture into the darkness for a while.

This other analogy just came to me: rock climbing! A rock climber needs to anchor himself frequenly. Every few yards up the mountain, he must drive in his stakes. He mustn’t do so too often–like every couple feet–because he will never get anywhere (and also run out of stakes pretty fast), but he mustn’t wait too long either before anchoring another stake into the rock–because then he stands a greater chance of falling precariously from his flights of fancy. Science is the stake, human thought is the rope, and conjecture is the slack of the rope between the stakes.

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DOUBLE POST

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[i]Think of it this way Gib. What you see as a paradox, it seems to me, is also present if I say

There are things I don’t know about. (or there is stuff I don’t understand)

I have asserted they exist, so this means I know stuff about them, so I can’t really say that and how would I know?

But frankly, I Think making that statement is not a paradox.

I also Think it is true and true for everyone.

person a: There are things I don’t know.

person b: oh, but you do or you wouldn’t know they are things.

Now this is not the same paradox, but it should be a paradox by the same logic as the one you see.

[/i]

This is where we differ. I am pretty sure I understand. I just don’t Think I have conceived of something I cannot describe in any way at all. In fact I don’t even have an individual X. I am just saying there is some X Y or %& beyond. You are saying that if I say this I have conceived it. To me that makes no sense.

To me it is a paradox if you say THERE MUST BE. Not because I have conceived of the X or Y, but because I am saying I cannot know and I know for sure and the two are grounded in the same area.

I just consider it a very safe bet. And I would bet everythign I own and all future earnings also
on the slug scenario.

Sure, we are smarter than the slug, by a lot, it seems. But we are also, like the slug, time bound animals with a lot of imprinting - though much more from Culture.
I Think it is a fair deduction that we are also limited like the slug. And especially as we are now. I would guess that we would not be quite homo sapiens anymore if we could know everything. I Think that is pretty Close to an analytic conclusion as opposed to a synthetic one.

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Whilst I agree that there are many thinks for which we can have no knowledge. That there are processes at work of which we are unaware or distant from our perception by I think phenomena, facts and truths are all human conceits and are all within the human world, by definition.

Phenomena and the truths we glean from them are derived from the realm of existence that we do in fact know about. And that however partial we might know them, that which we derive from them is know as “phenomena”.
The rest we are ignorant of and are largely of no consequence or significance to us, until they become part of our perceptual realm.

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Okay, but your constructing your own definition of “concept” here. My simple rule is that if you can say it, it expresses a thought, and if it expresses a thought, there must be concepts involved to constitute that thought. So to say “something exists” is to think that something exists, which in turn is to have a concept denoted by the word “something”. I mean, if someone asked you, “do you know the meaning of the word ‘something’?” I’m sure you’d feel compelled to answer ‘yes’. That’s because to understand the meaning of a word is to have the concept denoted by the word.

Just because you can’t name any characteristics about that something does not mean you don’t understand the meaning (i.e. have the concept) of the word ‘something’. It’s a pretty bland and rudimentary concept, of course, but that’s how concepts start.

You can say this when it comes to knowledge, but I think we have to distinguish between claims about knowledge and claims about conception. I read what you said at the beginning of your last post–a claim about knowledge leading to the same kind of paradox–and I see the commonalities, but there are subtle ways in which such claims can make a difference. Claims about knowledge wouldn’t be paradoxical if we do away with absolute certainty whereas claims about conception still would be paradoxical. The claim above isn’t paradoxical, but if you were to say “there are things that exist that I can’t even conceive (except that part)” that does sound paradoxical to me. The “except that part” part is in direct contradiction to the notion that you can’t conceive of these things. If you conceive that part, you’ve conceived it period.

Knowledge is a belief that is right (and justified somehow–we’ll go with Aristotle for now). Conception is just an understanding of what a thing is (which doesn’t require believing in its existence), and this understanding can be as bare and germinal as a black box–that you understand that it is a thing at the very least is a first step in any understanding. You can even have concepts of things that you don’t believe exist yet are wrong to believe that–does that mean you comprehend something real without knowing it?

Why? At what point can one finally say they have the concept? What is it before then? If you can only start out by saying it’s some vague, mysterious “something”, what is that if not the beginnings of a concept? (it’s cognitive at least, isn’t it?)

But why? You have a concept of “house,” right? If you were to spot a house in some neighborhood, you’d be able to identify it. So you have a concept of it. This is true despite the fact that you may know nothing about what’s inside the house. Your concept is adequate yet incomplete. Our concepts can always stand to be made more complete. So what is wrong with calling the identification of some unknown as “something” or “a thing” a concept–it is like a shell that hasn’t been filled in yet, like the idea of a house without knowing anything about its contents.

You see, you can make a knowledge claim about the house such as “I know nothing about the house except that it exists” without saying anything contradictory. But if you make a conceptual claim such as “I cannot conceive of the house because I don’t know its contents” that’s like saying you don’t even have the concept of the house.

Well, Moreno, I may have a solution to this puzzle, but I’m going to wait until you reply to this before presenting it.

So what does this mean? Can we say that there are some things for which we cannot form a concept? Is this even coherent?

So it seems like you’re saying everything within the phenomenal realm (which exhausts all of existence for human beings) is potentially conceivable. But then if you say “the rest we are ignorant of…” aren’t you conceiving something outside this human phenomenal realm? What is “the rest”?

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Gib,
it seems to me, as I said, that if you are right, it should also be a paradox if I say

there are things I do not know.

You could then say, ah but you know them at least somewhat, you know they are things.

I Think
there are things I do not know
is both true and not a paradox.

I Think there is something similar to an equivocation going on around know and conceive and things.

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The ability ofthe brain to conceive is itself extraordinary let alone the product of a self that thinks it is conceiving.

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Moreno, I’m not sure how to think about this one. At first, it doesn’t sound paradoxical at all (as I’m sure you agree).

The response:

seems like a play on the word “to know”.

It brings to light two meanings of the word “to know”: 1) to know that, and 2) and to know of. To know that is the more common usage, and we use it to state certain facts or propositions that we think we know are true: I know that Gib misinterpreted Shakespeare’s line. To know of is a slightly less common usage, but common enough, and we use it to express our familiarity with something or someone: I know of Shakespeare’s Hamlet (better than Gib). In the latter sense, we usually drop the “of” and say: I know Shakespeare’s Hamlet, or I know Bill, or I know chemistry, or I know my wines.

I think the above response is treating “to know” in the second sense, because in that sense you could draw out the paradox. The second sense of “to know,” pivoting on familiarity or knowledgeability of something or someone, is a lot more like conceivability than believing. To say “I know Shakespeare’s Hamlet” means that you have a correct (and detailed) conception of Shakespeare’s Hamlet. So strictly speaking, to say “I don’t know Shakespeare’s Hamlet” would seem paradoxical on this reading. (although I must say that to use “to know” in the sense of “to know of” typically means more than having a concept of it, but having a thoroughly fleshed out concept–the idea is usually that you have a deep familiarity with the thing that surpasses most others or many others–so if we were to take that into consideration, we could avoid the paradox by saying that just bringing up a empty shell of a concept for a thing is not the same as being thoroughly familiar with it–but we can let that slide for the sake of your example).

Getting back to the first sense, I don’t see it as paradoxical. To say that there are things I do not know does not imply that you are bringing to mind or into the statement, in the same breath, those very things you claim not to know. For example, if I didn’t know that Jupiter had 63 moons, I could say there are things I don’t know without think about the 63 moons of Jupiter or mentioning it in that very statement. On the other hand, if I were to say “I don’t know that Jupiter has 63 moons,” that does seem paradoxical because you have to know it in order to say of it that you don’t know about it (unless of course what you mean to say is that you don’t believe Jupiter has 63 moons or that you aren’t sure–but if you mean it as a fact, and then say of it that you don’t know it, then it becomes paradoxical to present it as a fact just to say you don’t know about it).

I don’t see statements about conception in the same way: it just seems to me that you have to bring up the conception in any statement or thought about how that thing you just conceived is inconceivable. Suppose you said of something that you could not conceive it, and then at a later time your brain was somehow magically changed so that you could conceive it. Would you not be able to say that this thing which you can now conceive is the same thing which you said earlier you could not conceive?

Anyway, that’s my long-winded response to something which should have been a lot simpler (ha, ha). At least you got me thinking, which is good.

Oh, and I still haven’t told you my work around to this problem. Maybe next time.

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Do not have much time right now, still, want to make a small comment.

1: Ignorance - At first i do not know anything because neither someone told me nor i experienced.

2: Possibility or assumption - Then, someone told me somethings. But, it is a mere information for me, not knowledge because i have not expreienced anything such in person. I may believe it or not. It either case, it is just a possibility right now as even by belief cannot convert it into truth. Thus, the possibility of being this a reality is neither confirmed nor dismissed.

3: Experience - Then i experienced something in person for the first time and able to realize that what the reality could be, but, to the extent of my experience only. Now, i have some confirmation, thus, i can say that it is quite possible to experience the same again. But, still, it is possiblity ,though strong enough.

4: Confirmation - Then, i experienced the same again and again. This confirmation confirmed me that it would happen in the same way each and every time. Now, i am quite sure of it. Thus, i am sure now that is a fact or truth now. But, it is not a knowledge yet.

5: Reasoning - Now, i experienced some more stages, both above and below and able to cogitate why i am having the same experience again and again. And, i also came to know what this experience is in itself.

Now, the chain is complete. I know not only what is it, but, why it is so also.

This is knowing or knowledge.
Knowledge requires both; experience and reasoning too.

6: Further - But, it is not the end. Because, i donot know what else and how much is lying there. Thus, though, i can assume further whatever i want but cannnot either dismiss or confirm any further possibility, unless any further experience happens.

with love,
sanjay

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Gib: polanyi’s emebdedness is simply the realization that language is inadequate to express the full meaning of what was intended. Parts of meaning has been embedded, or de-differentiated into more general concepts.

This supposes the idea, that we gain increased ability to express or differentiate embedded ideas through experience.

Emebdedness of meaning is structural, in the sense of what Jung implied by deeper levels of meaning. It is soci-structurally archityppical.

Sorry gib. Just came back from a few days off, and had no internet connection.

I think Zinnat’s views are very similar to support this notion, and I hope to read her comments more carefully before responding to them.

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Well, of course. I knew this forever. So did Wittgenstein.

If we all mean something slightly different by the word “creativity” (for example), how will the word be guaranteed to convey the full meaning of what the speaker intends in using it?