http://www.mjburgess.co.uk/TheIdeaOfPhenomenology-Husserl-1902.pdf
I am on the waiting list to attend a philosophy club discussion on the below… this is one of the areas in where my philosophical interests lay, so I will read the text regardless of whether I make the attendee list or not.
You are on a waiting list for a philosophy club discussion??? 
…is that the height of decadence, or what? 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_(p … hy_of_mind
The problem with phenomenology - if i may, is that it uses a dualistic approach separating things into distinct classes of things. Things of the mind made into distinct objects or entities, are separated from physical things of the mind equally separated. This cannot be the case - i’d argue, you cannot have a whole thing like here, the mind, and say that some parts of it are not part of its physical nature. Then equally you cannot say that some things of the mental realm are not part of the physical and ultimately both of the same overall set. Not when there is only one thing; the mind or the one thing; reality.
Every aspect of the mind must be of the mind, every ‘thing’ must be part of the group of ‘all things’, ergo reality must have all the attributes of mind available and cannot be divided into physical and non-physical where the latter excludes its attributes from the class of ‘all reals’ and of all things.
there are no distinct things.
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QFT, great post =D>
But wait. Is that the problem WITH phenomeology or the problem OF phenomenology or, one conceptual problem with which a successful self-consistent phenomenology would solve?
What then are “things of the mind” as you put it? How do you recognize “physical things” without “separat[ing]” them as you claim phenomenology does?
Who says the mind has a physical nature?
Who is making these claims?
Who does this?
Then against what fact or who’s assertion did you make this proposition?
Ditto to Felix’s questions (we seem to have the same questioning on this one Felix).
QFT?
A good ‘Devils Advocate’ post, yes 
…or a sign that they need a bigger venue 
I’ll be sure to sign up to the next discussion tout suite
felix dakat
It is the whole problem with the whole of phenomenology, that the basis of reality doesn’t match its basis. Sure it is a useful tool, but the way i see it is that for us to advance we need to have philosophies based upon what reality is. If you separate any things, you are already making a cardinal mistake, because is it not true that there are always more then one truth about a thing. If you look at light, to understand it you need to understand it is a universal medium and its particles can be made to appear at differing locations or two at once.
On the other hand, chemistry requires distinction.
The problem here though, is in reference to mental occurrences in the mind i.e. As distinct to the very things they are composed of. This gives us the delusion that a mental object or a colour in the minds eye, is less real than a photon or an electrical signal. Both the physical and the mental should be considered as part of reality in some manner.
For sure the intellect works by making distinctions, comparatives and contrasts, but when it does that, primarily it is looking at both [or the group] at once. We should then be able to make the distinction between the abstract set of things ~ the observed, and the actual nature of things i.e. As they are prior to our intellectual functions. This is what philosophy and ergo science does [attempts].
Point here though is only that the truer philosophy is the less dual based? When we compartmentalise it is an abstraction and we cannot hope to get past that by using it as the tool.
A mental object. Hmm well if you zoomed out of your mind to see what you are thinking in third person, mostly you would not [if you could] see a distinct shape of e.g. A cube, when you think you are imagining a cube. This is because there would be other things in the minds eye/sphere at the same time, because that’s how we think and also how reality is [morphic]. However, when observing a cube, that mental object would be a cube, but again this is an abstraction, if you moved around the object it would change in appearance, thus is temporarily a distinct thing.
I think generally we could say that phenomenology is ok for ‘describing’ temporary things, but cannot describe what a/reality is. Hence our concern here is actually that it is a self-believing all consuming religion; that there are phenomenon and not other.
There is no physical nor non-physical.
Phenomenologists [phenomenology]. Some physicists, atheists, its the basis of the modern science ‘religion’.
An idea is not a distinct thing. My assertion only affirms that there are no absolute distinctions. If i added [anything]; ‘except when there are distinctions e.g. In the observed’ then i would still be making a distinction. …when there are no distinctions.
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If phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view how can there be a “whole” phenomenology? Wouldn’t each phenomenology be a study from a different point of view? Or are you finding a problem with the notion of structures of consciousness? Or do you have a different definition of phenomenology that you are working against?
Who says that isn’t the case?
Whose intellect are you referring to? Yours? Some philosopher’s that your read? Intellect in the abstract? If the latter, how do you know?
To “zoom out” is an imaginary act. There isn’t a single word that can go on the page that isn’t an abstraction. "Mind’ isn’t an entity. It seems to be only because we objectify “it”. We make “it” into an it so that we can think about thinking in an objective way. Anyway, it seems to me, that what you are attempting in your thought experiment above is an instance of phenomenology i.e.that with which you have a problem.
Well, “reality” is a big nut to crack. It seems to exceed every positive proposition we make about it.
That’s a self-refuting tautology.
Which ones? Got names? Without names it seems to me that you are making "phenomenology into a totality out of texts you read or perhaps statements people made to you in conversation.
“There are no absolute distinctions.” is an absolute distinction and thus another self-refuting tautology.
hi
The whole of phenomenology = the utility of the functions of the intellect which compartmentalise the world into objects it can easily distinguish between. That isn’t to say we shouldn’t make utility of that aspect of the intellect, it is simply looking at what is there and seeing more. if reality is more object like at the macroscopic scale, ~ more defined, and that at the other base/universal end of the scale it is increasingly less object like, then our descriptions are more true relative to that area of reality; the ‘solid’ through to the impermanent.
Is it not reasonable to state that a full comprehension of the macroscopic ~ phenomenon, cannot describe the impermanent, any more than philosophies and intellectual function pertaining to the impermanent, can define e.g. Physics.
It was a metaphor. Everything is indeed abstract, and can we not keep abstracting endlessly when we define a given thing? Hence there are no entire things [anything, ‘x’], only vague things.
Indeed. Do you think it cannot be known? Even if not, we can use abstracts which are less defined than phenomenon, e.g. ‘A layer of quantum soup [like coins with two potential sides] + a layer of information’, describes the whole of reality metaphorically until we can add a further layer if found.
See also here;
viewtopic.php?f=1&t=187703&p=2530496#p2530496
This explains the layers further, and i think helps us make sense of what we are and how we connect to the world. It also tells us a different story concerning how information works. Take for example, that it infers that we know the world, rather than we don’t.
Only if there is physical/non held in the perception [or both], where the statement is refuting that as an incorrect basis. It is saying that; ‘the class of all reals = physical’ is untrue, and there are no such distinctions in reality.
I don’t really want to indulge in names if i may, it seems to distract from the otherwise impersonal nature of the philosophy.
It is making the statement that; it is incorrect to begin with to make absolute distinctions, not that in a secondary way this perception/idea is something and distinct. If there are no distinctions then that cannot reasonably be such a distinction as it has refuted the existence of.
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