My Argument With Richard Rorty.

[detrop]

Relax, man, this isn’t a spelling bee. (Did I spell that right?)

We don’t sweat the small stuff around here.

[Friedrich]

I like to keep things simple.

[She (She (now Ichthus77))]

Freddy, do you ever read at the Boiling Pot or MoL (I suspect not… but it is a strange coincidence you bring up Adler…) …?

I like the turn this thread is taking (natural rights). Adler affirmed Hume’s form of the Is-to-Ought Fallacy… and yet is still an Objectivist (or is it Naturalist?) (or what?)… which has made me curious to study Adler further (to see his explanation) but I’ve never gotten around to it… I don’t have time right now, but I intend to go down that road soon enough…

Ah, dear, kind Freddy keepin’ it simple for us unedumacated folk… (I said “chose” when I meant “choose” up there somewhere but I refused to edit my post on account o’ I like forcing myself to relax…).

Thanks for playin’ the Adler card…

oh yeah, and I’m pretty much in agreement w/ xanderman… great examples of group egoism.

[Friedrich]

She:

Adler did – and did not – affirm the Hume “is/ought” distinction because he was a Thomist, indeed a Neo-Thomist. As a result, in accordance with the Thomistic reworking of Aristotle’s “dynamic” teleology, Adler sees the moral order as a movement towards the realization of the good inherent in nature, including human nature. There are essences, but they inhere in what is. Thus, the fulfillment of a person’s nature, whether for good or ill, is always a process, an unfolding of what is “enfolded” – and you may think of David Bohm’s “implicate order” here, if you like examples from science – which always contains the possibility of progression towards the good … or its opposite, the failure to realize one’s nature so as to become what one is, which should always be (in part) what ALL human beings might or ought to be.

This realization is something real, it exists objectively for each of us and, at the most ultimate level, it is UNIVERSAL. There are goods that one desires, and must desire, because it is part of being a human being to desire such things.

[Friedrich]

“Expedients are for the hour, but principles are for the ages. …”

– HENRY WARD BEECHER, Proverbs from Plymouth Pulpit

[She (She (now Ichthus77))]

Comments on the “Naturalistic Fallacy”

by Mortimer J. Adler, Ph.D.

The refutation of naturalism in ethics rests on the truth of two propositions: (1) that there is at least one good to be sought entirely for its own sake and not as a means to anything beyond itself; and (2) that there is at least one categorical ought that is self-evident. If these two propositions are true, then it is impossible to reduce all judgments of value or all ought statements to statements of fact.

Among the philosophers who assert the truth of these two propositions and who, in so doing, also assert the relative or absolute autonomy of ethics, some charge the naturalists or empiricists in ethics with committing an error that has been misnamed “the naturalistic fallacy.” This has beclouded the issue by introducing irrelevant considerations; for the root error of the naturalists does not consist in committing the so-called naturalistic fallacy. Rather, it consists in failing to recognize that an end can be ultimate without being terminal – a failure that leads the naturalists to deny that there can be any end that is not also a means.

It may be useful, nevertheless, to examine the so-called “naturalistic fallacy”; by correcting the mistake implicit in the formulation of it, we can clarify the meaning of “good” without attempting to define it. But, first, it is necessary to distinguish two forms of the “naturalistic fallacy,” the one pointed out by David Hume in the eighteenth century, the other by G. E. Moore at the beginning of this century.

[b]The logical fallacy to which Hume called attention is formally similar to the violation of the rule governing considerations of modality in reasoning. It is logically invalid in reasoning to infer a necessary conclusion from premises that are contingent in their modality, or to assign contingency to a conclusion that is inferred from premises that are necessary in their modality. It is similarly and just as obviously fallacious to draw an ought-conclusion from premises that consist entirely of is-statements; for the difference in logical type between descriptive and normative propositions is as great as, if not greater than, the difference in modality between two descriptive propositions.

That is why I regard the logical mistake pointed out by Hume – the violation of the rule that an ought-statement cannot be validly inferred from premises that are is-statements-as an analogue or special form of the modal fallacy. I will have more to say later about this special fallacy but, in passing, it is worth remembering that Hume did not discover it. It was explicitly recognized in antiquity, and to my knowledge, no moral philosopher of note-certainly none prior to the eighteenth century-ever committed this error. None is in fact named by Hume.[/b]

I wish to deal now with the other form of the so-called “naturalistic fallacy” – the form to which attention has been called by Moore and which has been made the subject of so much discussion in the last sixty [ninety] -five years. Let me say, first of all, that it has no logical connection with the modal fallacy discussed by Hume, which is truly a logical fallacy, and that, in addition to not being a logical fallacy, it also has no special relevance to naturalism. If there is any error revealed in Moore’s discussion of attempts to define the good, it is the mistake that Moore himself makes in supposing that definitions are statements of identities.

No exception can be taken to Moore’s endorsement of Bishop Butler’s observation that “everything is what it is, and not another thing.” A is A; it is not non-A. But definitions, properly conceived, never violate this law of identity. To say, for example, that gold is a fusible metal is ’ not to say that gold is non-gold, but merely to offer the defining properties of that which is gold.

If to define anything at all – the good or anything else – one had to violate the law of identity, then no definitions at all would be logically valid, and every term would be indefinable.

The question of the correctness in fact of a particular definition is, of course, another matter. While defining gold as a fusible metal does not violate the law of identity, that by itself does not assure us that fusibility is in fact a defining property of the metal gold. On the other hand, when that definition of gold is empirically arrived at and accepted in the light of the available evidence as factually correct, then it is no longer an open question whether or not gold is fusible. That question has been settled protem by the establishment of the definition.

I have gone this far into the logic of definitions in order to point out that Moore’s much vaunted “open-question argument,” far from calling attention to a logical fallacy or anything that has a bearing on the relation of facts to values, was merely his cryptic and contorted way of trying to explain why he thought that the good is indefinable. Moore was correct in this contention, but this was hardly an original discovery on his part, as it is sometimes mistakenly supposed. Only massive ignorance of the theory of the good in the first twenty or twenty-two centuries of Western thought could have fostered that illusion. In addition, the argument by which Moore tried to show that the good is indefinable is itself based on a misunderstanding both of definitions and of indefinable terms.

radicalacademy.com/adlernaturalisticfallacy.htm

Comments to follow (not necessarily right away).

[She (She (now Ichthus77))]

I don’t see an explanation in that essay.

Say the basic needs of a tree are light, air, water, and room to grow – how much of each are needed will depend on the individual plant and its environment/nurture. If those needs are met, it will advance from a seedling to a mature tree and it will have the characteristics of a healthy plant. If those needs are not met, it will have the characteristics of a plant that is still needing one or more of those needs to be met … it may even die before the average age of death for its type of plant.

It seems reasonable to say that if the basic needs of humans are met, they will advance from children to adults and have the characteristics of a healthy human. But we have more ‘advanced’ needs – take affiliation, for example… how much and what kind of affiliation a person needs will depend on the person and its nurture.

Here’s some interesting links…

We can not choose our basic instincts or needs –

gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol6_1/Rubenstein.htm
intractableconflict.org/m/human_needs.jsp
honolulu.hawaii.edu/intranet/com … maslow.htm

But what meets those instinctive needs is individualized…
sctboces.org/choicetheory/qualityworld.htm
…and we individually choose how to meet them:
sctboces.org/choicetheory/totalbehavior.htm

[Friedrich]

For a recent book-length demolition of the fact/value distinction, you may wish to examine Hilary Putnam’s book on the subject. In fact, Mortimer Adler goes on to challenge the traditional understanding of the fact/value distinction along Neo-Thomist lines.

A problem for defenders of the distinction is that deciding what is a fact is itself a value-laden determination; and it is always a factual claim to assert that one holds a particular value. It is a fact, for instance, whether I reject the absolute fact/value distinction (which I do), just as much as the date of my birth is a fact.

Both Iris Murdoch and Phillipa Foot have written skeptically about this fact/value “split” – and both of them are women, who happen to be philosophers and whose opinions you may thus regard with some respect, while remaining – in every sense – a “she.”

[She (She (now Ichthus77))]

Thankyou for recommending I read up on challenges to the traditional fact-value distinction, sounds interesting.

I am familiar w/ Phillipa Foot – from what I know of her, I think she kicks ass (including Kant’s, imho). But does your comment mean you think I do not respect male philosophers on the basis that they are male, or that I make the distinction between values and facts in the way that I do because I am influenced by the wrong female philosophers? Just curious. Fyi, I call myself “She” not because I am obssessed w/ being a female… rather, when I first got my computer and was dinkin’ around w/ “chat” a few years back, I thought it would be funny if someone’s name was a pronoun, because it would read: "She said: ____ " or "He said: ____ " and so on… (in the particular type of chat format I was using) as if the person had no actual identity. So, it’s based on a joke, not on something I take too seriously. If I had chosen a name based on the way I see things now, it would be gender-neutral, but those who know me on the net know me by “She” and I’m not that bothered by the name to go changin’ it on people who’d prob’ly still call me “She” after I change it…

both of them are women, who happen to be philosophers and whose opinions you may thus regard with some respect, while remaining – in every sense – a “she.”

– Freddy

I’ll be back…

[Friedrich]

She:

Phillipa Foot is a wonderful philosopher and Iris Murdoch is even better, but Kant is in a different class from nearly everyone. This is a fairly typical assessment by a philosopher who disagrees with him on most things: “[Kant] … is the most influential philosopher of the past 200 years.” (Mark Rowlands) That is about right, I’d say.

[She (She (now Ichthus77))]

I am very aware Kant was highly influencial… all I meant by saying Foot kicks ass (haha) is that she raised points I agreed w/ very much which challenged some of Kant’s arguments. I didn’t mean she kicks ass above all other philosophers, even Kant… no.

I am not actually back yet, in case you noticed otherwise.

[Friedrich]

You will be back. Yes, Ms. Foot does raise fine objections to Kant; and also to her preferred philosophers: Aristotle, Mill, Hume and Kant. I like the idea of virtue ethics and her discussion of the doctrine of couble effect, which should be your favorite. That’s what philosophers do, raise objections.

“Live strong…”

[She (She (now Ichthus77))]

okay, Mister States the Obvious, I just stopped by to say I’m reviewing this:

csun.edu/~dp56722/460l5.pdf

and it is interesting, but I am definitely going to be back (as you know)

double effect is interesting to me, and I like Foot’s emphasis on intention which can be seen in all her ‘work’, but that is for another time…

[Friedrich]

I am glad that you’ll be back. I’ll always be here, cheering for you to draw the right conclusions.

[She (She (now Ichthus77))]

Okay, well this has been fun. First of all I have to say that I agree that, not only are values subjective, but we also see ‘facts’ through values-tinted glasses… our values determine which facts are more appealing – what we are more curious to know… how the facts will be interpreted… and so on… I also agree with the statement in IIIA that we have to restrict the evidence of John’s goodness to the range of choices and actions that are open to him – I agree with this more than Foot probably agrees with this, lol. I also agree w/ this li’l snippet from my Ethics text (p. 15): “Feelings such as disappointment, elation, grief, and even love are all responses to certain situations. They develop according to some inner logic; they don’t strike at random.” (discussing Martha Nussbaum, ever heard of her?) == heavy emphasis on “inner”. I agree w/ you in the love (is it worth it) thread that we are more alike than we are different, with our basic human needs.

One thing Foot brings up is, the virtue value is switched off when the motivation behind the trait (ex.: courage) is evil – for example, according to those who think acts of terror are absolutely immoral, the terrorists were not “courageous” (in any virtuous way) on 9/11, even though they gave their lives for their “inner” convictions (this is my take of how the text put it – this is not an example Foot uses, btw).

I am working on an essay that needs some serious smoothin’… I’ll post it when it’s ready. Should I post it here, in the love thread, or start a new thread?

[Friedrich]

She:

Start a new thread. I’ll enjoy reading it. I disagree with anything that you say to the effect that morality is all subjective, of course, and I don’t accept much of the other stuff you say, but we do agree on some things.

[Ichthus77 (Ichthus77 (formerly She™))]

@She

call myself “She” not because I am obssessed w/ being a female… rather, when I first got my computer and was dinkin’ around w/ “chat” a few years back, I thought it would be funny if someone’s name was a pronoun, because it would read: "She said: ____ " or "He said: ____ " and so on… (in the particular type of chat format I was using) as if the person had no actual identity. So, it’s based on a joke, not on something I take too seriously.

because @Flannel_Jesus asked in the chat. My origin story.

Oh… p.s. … relevant to the fact-value distinction… I’m still working on that presently. But it’s also a (well… the…) harmonic triad … is-ought-value… or fact-ought-value.

Current situation:

More: The Harmonic Triads

[Dan1 (Dan~)]

@She

Intentional altruism does not exist. All acts are selfish to varying degrees… you have less selfish and more selfish (relative ofcourse)… altruism would be no-selfish… it would be no-self… dead, or instinctive rather than intentional.

What about Jesus?
He was supposed to be selfless,
and he died fairly soon in his life too.

[Ichthus77 (Ichthus77 (formerly She™))]

Dan… I would be arguing with her/me, too. Some things she/I used to think, she/I still do(es)… but not all. Her/my words from back then reflect the error of Ayn Rand, who was confused and equivocating on words.

You are right that Jesus was selfless in giving his life (at any age). Rand (and myself back then) was wrong that the fact he had a WHY automatically made his HOW selfish.

That bit I said about instinctive … was not Rand. Take everything I said back then with … like … all the salt.

And examine everything I or anyone say(s) at any time.