Names

[Faust]

Here’s a topic that’s sure to attract hundreds. I jest.

I have been reading some Kripke, to try to respond to a request to write about modal logic for the beginner. This led to some other things, one of which was the “problem” of proper names. I first encountered this with B. Russell, in a volume I do not at this moment recall. To review, I just read:

plato.stanford.edu/entries/names/

Is it just me, or is that all a tempest in a teapot?

Russell’s view always struck me as sensible in its broadest strokes, but overwrought and in the end, rather confused. I tend to think that entire matter has been overworked.

It seems to me that a proper name is simply a label for an individual and indicating a specific narrative about that individual - a narrative that points only to that indivudual.

So, “my dog” is as much a proper name as “Scout”- that is, while this is understandable only within a context, “My dog has fleas” is equivalent to “Scout has fleas” if my dog is named Scout. Likewise, with enough context, if my wife’s name is Stella, “Stella is in the kitchen”, “My better half is in the kitchen” and "My ball and chain is in the kitchen are all equivalent.

Now, they may not always be - again, it depends upon the context - but “Stella” means different things in different contexts.

So, what’s all the fuss about names? Don’t we all understand what a proper name is? Does anyone find themselves confused by this? Isn’t this just an extension of what we call taxonomy? Just that one more step “lower” than species. As we move from Kingdom to Species, we “remove” classes. Each step down the hierarchy is progressively more specific and therefore jettisons one higher class. Don’t proper names simply follow this same pattern? Why are there any epistemic or logical problems associated with this?

I dunno.

Sorry - not a sexy topic, but I’ve pretty much done all the sexy ILP stuff.

[MagsJ (Surya Loka)]

I remember broaching this exact topic at school but it was in the context of grammar, so I have never seen it as a philosophical dilemma, but as a grammatical issue… that’s the English education system for ya…

[Faust]

I tend to think that it’s not a philosophical dilemma at all. I have read on this topic pretty extensively, and still come up wondering why it matters.

It all started with this:

Here are some examples of identity statements:

117+136 = 253.
The morning star is identical to the evening star.
Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens.
Bill is Debbie's father.

Frege believed that these statements all have the form ‘a=b’, where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are either names or descriptions that denote individuals. He naturally assumed that a sentence of the form ‘a=b’ is true if and only if the object a just is (identical to) the object b. For example, the sentence ‘117+136 = 253’ is true if and only if the number 117+136 just is the number 253. And the statement ‘Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens’ is true if and only if the person Mark Twain just is the person Samuel Clemens.

But Frege noticed (1892) that this account of truth can’t be all there is to the meaning of identity statements. The statement ‘a=a’ has a cognitive significance (or meaning) that must be different from the cognitive significance of ‘a=b’. We can learn that ‘Mark Twain=Mark Twain’ is true simply by inspecting it; but we can’t learn the truth of ‘Mark Twain=Samuel Clemens’ simply by inspecting it — you have to examine the world to see whether the two persons are the same. Similarly, whereas you can learn that ‘117+136 = 117+136’ and ‘the morning star is identical to the morning star’ are true simply by inspection, you can’t learn the truth of ‘117+136 = 253’ and ‘the morning star is identical to the evening star’ simply by inspection. In the latter cases, you have to do some arithmetical work or astronomical investigation to learn the truth of these identity claims. Now the problem becomes clear: the meaning of ‘a=a’ clearly differs from the meaning of ‘a=b’, but given the account of the truth described in the previous paragraph, these two identity statements appear to have the same meaning whenever they are true! For example, ‘Mark Twain=Mark Twain’ is true just in case: the person Mark Twain is identical with the person Mark Twain. And ‘Mark Twain=Samuel Clemens’ is true just in case: the person Mark Twain is identical with the person Samuel Clemens. But given that Mark Twain just is Samuel Clemens, these two cases are the same case, and that doesn’t explain the difference in meaning between the two identity sentences. And something similar applies to all the other examples of identity statements having the forms ‘a=a’ and ‘a=b’.

So the puzzle Frege discovered is: how do we account for the difference in cognitive significance between ‘a=b’ and ‘a=a’ when they are true?

I think the answer is that a=b in certain contexts but not in others. But this is true for virtually all names, taken singly. Here, i think Frege misses the difference between logical equivalence and what we might call absolute equivalence. An example I used earlier that does not relate to proper names but makes the point is when you’re playing Hearts and all you have left in your hand is three cards of the same suit with “adjacent” (can’t think of another term) cardinality. They are clearly of “absolute” values a, b and c, but they are just as clearly equivalent under the circumstances. I see no dilemma here.

Another example is “constant dollars”.

[Faust]

I knew this was going to be a red-hot topic.

[Trajicomic]

@Faust

I think the answer is that a=b in certain contexts but not in others.

Welcome to Irrationality, where women are always smoking hot…now somebody fetch a fire extinguisher and put these flames out!

The Law of Identity does not apply to implied meaning of words and communication. A only equals A by induction, concerning language.

[anon]

I can’t tell if this topic is over my head or if professional philosophers are, in the end, just lawyers.

I don’t see how the concept of a rigid designator makes any sense, when what terms designate aren’t themselves “rigid”. Objects are neither permanent nor objectively established. How can whatever name we give an object be any more permanent than the object itself?

There’s a kind of idealism at work here, it seems to me. The idea that we can strip away sense and describe pure worlds.

[Faust]

Frege was trying to establish an ideal language for use in logic - one that was free of ambiguity. he made great strides, but didn’t complete the task. I think there is a simple answer to his puzzle. However, in giving his answer, Russell seems to be introducing epistemic considerations that only confuse the issue, and Kripke seems to be flirting with metaphysics, at least in some sense. In fact, I think he did more than flirt. His answer seems to give metaphysics at least a hug and a kiss.

[anon]

@Faust

Frege was trying to establish an ideal language for use in logic - one that was free of ambiguity. he made great strides, but didn’t complete the task. I think there is a simple answer to his puzzle. However, in giving his answer, Russell seems to be introducing epistemic considerations that only confuse the issue, and Kripke seems to be flirting with metaphysics, at least in some sense. In fact, I think he did more than flirt. His answer seems to give metaphysics at least a hug and a kiss.

Can you clarify? What is the puzzle exactly? Are you just saying that the puzzle is how to purge ambiguity from logic? If so, what is the simple answer?

[tentative]

I question that equivalence or A=A can ever be established objectively. Simple differences in cultural grammar rules will always force a lengthy “what do you mean by what you say” discussion. In fact, we see the results of ‘miscommunication’ constantly. How many ILP discussions end up with people talking past one another even after aborted attempts to define words? How many pages of posts exist that are nothing more than the participants asking the ‘what do you mean by what you say’ question? Perhaps in a formal logic discussion there can be improvement in the process of name definitions but I haven’t seen much success whether in formal philosophy or in casual bar room discussion. The chain of complexity in naming is tied to the same issues in finding agreement as to meaning. All disappears into the fog of context and perspective…

[Faust]

anon - the puzzle was more specific than that, but an example of that.

it’s in the quote, here: posting.php?mode=reply&f=1&t=179077#pr2310930

The puzzle was that a=a seems cognitively different than a=b.

Frege supposed that

The statement ‘a=a’ has a cognitive significance (or meaning) that must be different from the cognitive significance of ‘a=b’.

That is,

We can learn that ‘Mark Twain=Mark Twain’ is true simply by inspecting it; but we can’t learn the truth of ‘Mark Twain=Samuel Clemens’ simply by inspecting it — you have to examine the world to see whether the two persons are the same.

a=a is analytical and a=b is empirical.

However, I don’t see any difference in usage except that the first expression is axiomatic and the second relies on context. But in truth, I think they both rely on contexts. They are just different kinds of contexts. But we accept that “Socrates is mortal” analytically if it’s the conclusion of the argument but synthetically if it’s arrived at by induction. The statement makes the same claim.

[Only_Humean]

@Faust

I think the answer is that a=b in certain contexts but not in others. But this is true for virtually all names, taken singly.

I think the “sometimes/virtually/often/maybe” bit of this is what irritated the logicians. If you’re going to base everything on logic, you don’t want to worry about marginal cases.

It’s where a!=b that the problem lies. Hypotheticals/conditionals cause all sorts of problems. Say, umm: “the morning star could have turned out not to have been the evening star”. Seems true in a conversational sense at least, and I think most astronomers would understand what you were trying to say. Or “the murderer didn’t have to be the butler”. These are cases where a != b, you can’t substitute, because the murderer had to be the murderer. And then again, it’s tougher (but not impossible) to put “117+136 doesn’t have to equal 253” in a meaningful context.

The only thing I remember about Kripke on the subject was something about ‘Mark Twain=Samuel Clemens’ being an example of an analytical a posteriori statement.

[anon]

@Faust

But in truth, I think they both rely on contexts. They are just different kinds of contexts.

That strikes me as difficult to refute.

[Uccisore]

I think proper names are only problematic if you’re trying to declare an absolute equivalency between language and mathematics, like SOME people mentioned in this thread. The idea that every meaningful sentence could be expressed with mathematical notation created all sorts of problems with things like proper names, fiction, &c that aren’t problems for every-day language users or even most philosophers.

[James_S_Saint]

Logic statements are not referring to the labels/names being used, but what those labels represent.

“A=A” means that whatever “A” represents must be equal to whatever “A” represents. It is a declaration of usage basically stating that the label “A” is not to change in mid syllogism.

“A=B” means that whatever “A” represents is (not “must be”) equal to whatever “B” represents. That is not a declaration, but an observation stating that “we can see that the item represented by “A” is identical to the item represented by “B””.

A “proper” name or label is one that refers to “the definitive article”, not merely the type. Each type of an entity might have an actual physical instance from which the definition is derived, such as a person. That one item is the “proper” item within the class or type of all similar, but not identical items.

“I am The Doctor, not just A doctor. The definitive article, you might say.” - Doctor Who

[Trajicomic]

@James S Saint

Logic statements are not referring to the labels/names being used, but what those labels represent.

And that “representation” is exactly why the Law of Identity uses inductive reasoning so often. Because you are guessing at what people mean, when they communicate. Math is better than communication, because you don’t have to guess what a mathematician means by presenting an equation. It’s already abstract and meaningless.

[Faust]

O_H -

I think the “sometimes/virtually/often/maybe” bit of this is what irritated the logicians. If you’re going to base everything on logic, you don’t want to worry about marginal cases.

But it shouldn’t. Material implication and inclusive disjunction both capture only a common partial meaning of the different types of expressions that they represent. Granted, material implication does bother some logicians, including Kripke. I understand his motives, but even he wasn’t completely sold on his solution.

Say, umm: “the morning star could have turned out not to have been the evening star”. Seems true in a conversational sense at least, and I think most astronomers would understand what you were trying to say.

This I will respond to more fully later. because I think this is the real problem.

Or “the murderer didn’t have to be the butler”. These are cases where a != b, you can’t substitute, because the murderer had to be the murderer.

That’s just formulated wrong, but again, I’ll have to respond more fully later.

The only thing I remember about Kripke on the subject was something about ‘Mark Twain=Samuel Clemens’ being an example of an analytical a posteriori statement.

And that’s where he truly goes astray, which is to say he went wrong from the outset.

Some great responses. I’ll be back.

[James_S_Saint]

@Trajicomic

you don’t have to guess what a mathematician means by presenting an equation. It’s already abstract and meaningless.

HAha… good point.

The problem is that it seems that in modern theoretical science, they forgot that it was meaningless and decided that the thought of the math and reality are the same thing.

[Faust]

Humean, let’s get back to this -

here’s another example like the ones you cite:

The problem of co-referring expressions originated primarily with Gottlob Frege as the problem of informative identities. For example, if the morning star and the evening star are the same planet in the sky (indeed, they are both the planet Venus), how is it that someone can think that the morning star rises in the morning but the evening star does not? This is apparently problematic because although the two expressions seem to denote the same thing, one cannot substitute one for the other, which one ought to be able to do with identical or synonymous expressions.

They just do not denote the same thing. Sure, both are Venus, but they are not the same thing within the same context. I am married to Stella. Stella is my wife. If I say “my wife beats me” and you know my wife’s name, each expression functions exactly the same way - each is a proper name and I can use them interchangeably. But while Stella is Stella to all who know her, only I can call her “my wife”. And if we divorce, then I will probably call her something else.

The morning star and the evening star are different in the sense these expressions are being used, even though they are but two aspects, in relation to the speaker, of the same planet. “This dog” and “that dog” operate in the same way. if I am standing near Scout, I may call him “this dog”, but if you are standing near the other dog, you may call Scout “that dog”. Clearly, “this dog” cannot be “that dog”. But it is. You don’t need to bring counterfactuals into it.

The prpblem with Russell’s theory is that he was trying to get too cute with ontology. But this isn’t ontological at all - it’s language.

Do we know that mark Twain is another name for Samuel Clemens? Yup. If we don’t we can get confused, but that doesn’t confuse the logic when we do
know.

James -

“A=A” means that whatever “A” represents must be equal to whatever “A” represents. It is a declaration of usage basically stating that the label “A” is not to change in mid syllogism.

Correct.

“A=B” means that whatever “A” represents is (not “must be”) equal to whatever “B” represents. That is not a declaration, but an observation stating that “we can see that the item represented by “A” is identical to the item represented by “B””.

That it’s identical within a certain context.

“I am The Doctor, not just A doctor. The definitive article, you might say.” - Doctor Who

Actually, the demonstrative article.

Ucci -

I think proper names are only problematic if you’re trying to declare an absolute equivalency between language and mathematics, like SOME people mentioned in this thread. The idea that every meaningful sentence could be expressed with mathematical notation created all sorts of problems with things like proper names, fiction, &c that aren’t problems for every-day language users or even most philosophers.

I agree in this way - that logic sort of got on the Frege-Russell bandwagon after Wittgenstein. What they are trying to do is to find a way to formulate every ordinary-statement in unambiguous terms. I think this can be done, but to do so, you have to leave out (or assume) the ontology/epistemology. if Nietzsche had taken a few math classes, this probably wouldn’t be such a big problem.

back to our butler - playing with the tense might help. Both “the butler” and “the murderer” (assuming there is a unique murder in play) are proper names when we say “the butler was the murderer” - because you are saying, at the time of the murder, and while the butler is still alive, that the butler is the murderer (of the victim - this is a specific murder). If we say "it needn’t have been that the butler is (was ever, but at some point “is”) the murderer, we are not using “the murderer” as a proper name at all, because we are now saying that the butler is not one of the class of people who could be the murderer. There is no particular, here. if you use the past perfect tense, to indicate what you do know (or assume that you know), about some state that was at some point a “now” then you are left with an indeterminate number of candidates, but no one in particular.

Maybe I’ll look back at that and wish I’d expressed it better. Still rushing around.

The point is that what might be a proper name in one context may not be in another. I think counterfactuals usually ignore this distinction.

[Uccisore]

@Faust

I agree in this way - that logic sort of got on the Frege-Russell bandwagon after Wittgenstein. What they are trying to do is to find a way to formulate every ordinary-statement in unambiguous terms. I think this can be done, but to do so, you have to leave out (or assume) the ontology/epistemology.

I guess I would agree that every ordinary an be put in unambiguous terms, but I think philosophers have trained themselves to have a very strange idea of what's ambiguous and what isn't.  The issue with names that you raise is just one example of something that is (apparently) only confusing to people that are trying very, [i]very[/i] hard to be confused.  Free will and causation are other examples- things that everybody understands, until we try to 'understand' them, and which point we're tempted to say that nobody understands them at all.  
  So what if there's terms that can't be unpacked? Can it be that the relationship between a name and a thing named is unambiguous (in the sense that we all immediately get it), but is still resistant to precise formulation? You mentioned Kripke, he says that the most basic form of definition is pointing.  Maybe that's all we have in these cases.

[James_S_Saint]

Well now, you can’t say that “murderer” is a proper name if you are talking about one specific murderer.

The “proper” name “Murderer” (to be capitalized) refers to the very essence of what it means to be a murderer, the definitive quality of one who murders. In a sense, it is somewhat of an anthropomorphism or metaphorical entity. It can never actually refer to a specific murderer unless that murderer is to be considered as the definition of what it means to be a murderer, meaning that whatever that person does is, by definition, “murder”.

Proper personal names are capitalized for that same reason, as is the words “God” and “Devil”.

It is just an issue of proper semantic representation of intended meaning.