This essay will outline a model of ethics that is both objective and naturalistic. This model, as far as I am aware, is my own although inspiration and influence from other authors and philosophers is a certainty.
Before proceeding, it is necessary to give an overview of several definitions. It is not important for the reader to agree with me on these definitions, but merely that he or she understand what they are so that my meaning is plain when using them. Even I may not agree with these definitions in all cases, but they suit my purposes for communicating these concepts.
First, by “ethics†I am referring to the rules of behavior that can be said to be moral or “right†as opposed to “wrongâ€. They include standards of what is evil and what is good. Whether or not I am referring to a cultural norm or a universal standard will beg the question of this essay. But it is my intention to show that ethics can be viewed as a universal, at least insofar as Homo Sapiens is concerned.
“Naturalistic†refers to the fact that this model is based solely on matters of our material world, as opposed to making use of supernatural or paranormal entities or phenomena. However, it is important to point out that this does not specifically deny the existence of such. Instead, it is more like a set of instructions for building an airplane - something that would apply regardless of the existence or nonexistence of the immaterial. Therefore, what follows should be useful and applicable to the religious and non-religious alike, simply because we all share the same material world.
By “objective†ethics, I mean ethics independent of human culture, human norms, or even human understanding. They are as they are, regardless of opinion, conditions, or preference. At the same time, they are central to human beings and of paramount importance to them. The subjective cultural norms regarding ethics, that change over time, I will generally refer to as “morals†to distinguish them from ethics, which I will argue are objective. From the objective perspective then, all morals of societies are either correct or incorrect - correct if they match objective ethics and incorrect if they do not.
This model claims that ethics must ultimately be rooted in an authority, usually supernatural and all-knowing. However, there are other variants of this model, where the authority may be a state, a philosophic/religious institution or official, a mystical impersonal force, or some other authority. The central attribute of these models I mean to single out here is the alleged necessity of an absolute authority on matters of ethics.
Proponents to authoritarianism say that, without an absolute authority on ethical matters, society would fall apart, or at least that unethical behavior would run rampant. With each individual able to decide for him/herself what is “right†there would be chaos.
Furthermore, proponents argue that human limitations do not allow us to know for certain what is and what is not ethical on our own. This limitation is the reason why the authority in such models is usually a supernatural entity, with the alleged ability to either know these principles or actually define them by choice.
The strengths of this model are that it can provide a very stable basis for an orderly society. It also gives great comfort to individuals who may be questioning what is truly ethical in a dilemma. Being able to simply refer to the proper documentation saves the individual the hassle or the emotional stress of deliberating over the various arguments for or against various ethics. More importantly for proponents, it prevents a slippery slope whereby individuals, pretending to engage in honest moral deliberation, slowly “rationalize away†any and all behaviors out of subconscious (or conscious) desire.
Unfortunately, the model also has some serious drawbacks. First, there is no way to ever verify that unseen authorities actually exist. Even for those that do, there is no reliable way to tell the difference between authorities that really know what is ethical and those that are simply adamant about their opinion. For those that do not share proponent’s particular beliefs about the existence or nature of the authority, it is impossible for them to genuinely accept the ethical dictates. In today’s multicultural world, it is highly unlikely that consensus would ever be reached on improvable assertions. When ethical norms are tied to them it becomes even more destructive to society when those beliefs begin to diversify. Even if a society remained small and/or monolithic, authoritarianism would still have additional failings. These include a tendency to encourage dogmatism, intolerance, vilification, and cruel treatment toward dissenters. In addition, authoritarianism often hinders social, scientific, and even ethical progress because it refuses to re-examine itself in the light of new information and changing conditions. All of these shortcomings can, in many cases, actually destroy what authoritarianism is designed to provide: an ethical society with happy individuals.
Relativism
This model lies at the opposite end of the spectrum. It maintains that, since an absolute ethical authority may not exist, or at least their dictates may not be agreed upon, then all ethics is actually subjective. This means that ethics are simply social norms that have developed differently in different places and times, due to the circumstances a culture finds itself in. So, any one culture’s ethics are no better or worse in an absolute sense. Each society has the ethics that seem right to it; there is no “superior†or universal ethic – no objective “right†or “wrongâ€.
This model has gone a long way in increasing tolerance between cultures. It has also allowed social scientists to analyze diverse cultures objectively, with a lower incidence of their own cultural attitudes getting in the way of true understanding. Cultural relativism avoids most of the pitfalls of authoritarianism, in that adherents are not likely to engage in religious wars or stand in the way of many scientific advancements that would otherwise morally offend.
But relativism too has its downside. It tends to lead individuals to think that nearly any ethic can be violated if a rationalization can be imagined. That, since there is no “real†right or wrong, that all ethics are merely a matter of compromise (or domination). This leaves the relativist completely impotent to argue for or against any ethic on a rational basis.
Ironically, one will find subjectivists debating just as vehemently in favor of many ethics and in opposition to other practices of cultures (their own and others). This would seem to be hypocrisy. In fact, even the relativist position itself displays an inherent paradox. How can one say it is wrong to judge the norms of other cultures, or that it is wrong to consider one superior to the other, if the very concept of “wrong†is subjective? While subjectivists steer clear of the use of such words as “wrongâ€, “rightâ€, “goodâ€, and “evilâ€, their messages of advocacy for and against various actions of society maintain the same content and are expressed with the same demeanor and conviction as someone who believes in good and evil. There is no shortage of alleged ethical subjectivists in protest marches, op-ed articles, and voting booths. So, what are they basing their arguments on, “because I said soâ€?
Lastly, relativism isn’t practical or useful in furthering ethical progress or understanding. If all is mere opinion, then nothing rational or meaningful can be claimed about ethics and we are left with only the options of emotional appeal or brute violence when conflicts arise – ironically the very thing relativism is designed to alleviate.
Commonality
The overwhelming method of dealing with these issues which appears to be emerging, is a sort of hodgepodge merger of authoritarianism and relativism. What I call, “commonality†is the approach which looks at the shared ethics existing throughout several prominent cultures across the globe. These commonly shared ethics provide a sort of multicultural consensus on which many base a sense of the universal in ethics (and religion for that matter).
Commonality takes on at least two forms. One of these leans more toward authoritarianism and the other towards relativism. In authoritarian-commonality, the shared ethics which exist across many cultures are seen as an indication of their objectivity or universal nature. Global religious union movements and new age philosophies have often taken this slant. With relativistic-commonality however, the shared ethics are seen merely as an indication that there is broad agreement, and such can be used to attempt harmony and understanding. By doing so, relativists can make moral arguments on the grounds that “everyone agrees that…â€
But in authoritarian-commonality, how many cultures must hold an ethic before it can be considered universal? To what level of importance must they hold it? Does the reason they support an ethical principle matter?
In relativistic-commonality, what happens when most or all of the world agrees on something, but it happens to be misguided? How could one ever determine if the majority of cultures were ever misguided if one’s definition of ethics itself is hinged on the majority?
In the case of specifics particular to the conditions of a region commonality is less helpful. Commonality will give us very general ethics, such as not killing or stealing, but aren’t more specific ethical principles and guidelines important? Shouldn’t these specific ethics be dependant on the specific conditions facing all of these different cultures?
There are many difficult issues that arise with commonality but they are not insurmountable in specific situations. Still, one is left with a situation where argument for or against an ethical principle is based either on bandwagon logic or on other matters not yet well defined. Many of these other matters pertain directly to Natural-Objective Ethics.
SECTION 3 of 5: The Natural-Objective Model (part 1)
Ethics as a Science
In one sense, ethics are already studied as a science. The social sciences include not only ethics, but all human social behaviors across many cultures. Sociologists may study differences in cultural norms and how they evolve over time under varying conditions. More recent studies involve complex systems theory and the evolution of how and why our moral ideals came into being. However, this is not what I refer to when I use the phrase “ethics as a scienceâ€.
Instead, what I mean is that the field of ethical inquiry, development, and even advocacy itself can be a science. Rather than “the study of ethics†I am referring to “the pursuit of ethicsâ€. This is the process whereby ethics are evaluated and arguments are formed for or against different morals, behaviors, and choices in a scientific manner. The difference would be akin to the difference between the anthropologist who studies and records the dental hygiene habits of different peoples, and the biologist who, after studying the effects of brushing teeth, recommends that we ought to do so.
I do not mean to suggest that other fields of science can tell us what is ethical. For example, some biologists point out the anatomical or evolutionary reasons behind our various behaviors, including unethical ones. This explanation is not an excuse to label such instincts as “right†or “wrongâ€. Biology and other sciences tell us only what is, and why it is, not what it ought to be. So, in a manner of speaking, it is true that current branches of science cannot tell us what is right and wrong.
But that is simply because the branches of science that currently exist are not designed to study what is right and what is wrong; they are meant to study biology, physics, astronomy, and so on. Nevertheless, there is nothing about the scientific method that would keep it from addressing the matter, and everything to make it very adept at it.
By saying that ethical inquiry can be conducted in a “scientific manner†what I mean is that we can do so via the same process by which all other science is conducted. This involves forming hypotheses, gathering empirical data, making predictions, and testing those predictions and hypotheses against further data which strengthens or weakens current theories. The issues to be addressed include what objective standards should be used in evaluating the morality of behaviors and what empirical data is relevant to that evaluation.
The Function of Ethics
The process of ethical deliberation is one whereby the merits of various ethical principles and options are measured up. The first step in measuring anything is to strictly define what is being measured and how it is to be measured. In looking at ethics, we must begin by considering the function of ethics. To do so we must look existentially at the Homo Sapiens.
From the “outside looking in†we see that, regardless of their circumstances, human societies tend to form moral norms and principles over time. These principles may be vastly diverse and often at odds with one another. But what is consistent is that the species appears to have the innate tendency to form commonly accepted standards of behavior within its population group. It then enforces these behaviors through social pressures and, in more severe violations, through direct punishment.
So then we must ask, why? Why is it that Homo Sapiens will tend to do this?
• The survival power of cooperative behavior between humans cannot be denied. Many morals of a society tend to focus on the reciprocal process of behaviors that govern how the individuals are to interact with one another for their mutual benefit.
• Of the various morals, some are more strongly enforced than others. Often, the most strongly enforced morals are those which center around matters of mating, reproduction, birth, death, and other parts of the life cycle. These norms are often shrouded in religious ritual – a sign of their primal importance.
• Although many moral customs involve only the individual, those with a primarily secular basis will tend to be largely social in nature. Therefore, strictly non-social morals can often be seen as an anomaly due to misunderstood or improvable beliefs that a population has about its environmental circumstances.
In this essay, I refer to “morals†as a society’s model of what it thinks is “ethicalâ€. Ethics, then, I use to refer to what really is ethical, not just for that society, but the universal ethical system for all Homo Sapiens.
When looking at these tendencies, it appears that the primary function of forming social behavioral standards (i.e. morals) is primarily one of enhancing survival and prosperity for the species. This would likely be the conclusion of any objective being looking at humanity from the outside.
The Measure of an Ethic
It is important to point out that although naturalistic objective ethics are not reliant on cultural understanding, they do not exist without human beings, or independent of them. Here is where the apparent oxymoron must be explained thoroughly.
When humans develop moral standards, they are not simply making choices of preference, but they are endeavoring to do something (whether always conscious of it or not). They are endeavoring to determine a set of behaviors for interacting with one another, which will most affect their survival and prosperity in their current environment.
The environments that human population groups find themselves in are objective. They face definite conditions of food, climate, terrain, reproduction, hostilities, and so on. Homo Sapiens as a species is an objective entity with definite physical and mental needs, abilities, and inclinations. This being the case, various moral models will and do have an objective affect on the survivability and prosperity of a population and a species.
With environmental, physical, and mental abilities objective and finite, it stands to reason that there would be one set of behaviors that would most efficiently achieve the maximum survivability and prosperity for a species. This would be “ethical†by definition, and “morals†would be those social norms which attempt to match and encourage what is believed to be ethical.
Take the following hypothetical if you will. If we were a minor god or sorts with only two powers, we might be able to see the effect of various moral norms first hand. Suppose that we had the ability to arbitrarily and immediately set the moral norms in a society. This would not mean that everyone would always obey them, but simply that our rules would be considered by everyone to be the socially accepted behavior, and it would not change over time, unless we ourselves magically changed it. For our second godly power, imagine that we are able to travel forwards and backwards through time at will. Now we set the ethical norms in a particular manner, according to what we think best, then we travel 1000 years in the future to see how things have come along.
Since omniscience and omnipotence are not within our power, we would probably discover that there are some things that had occurred historically over the past 1000 years which we didn’t care for or anticipate. Perhaps they have a wonderful respect for the ecology now but a terrible problem with poverty. So then we decide to go back 1000 years and make some adjustments to the ethical norms.
No matter how many times we do this, we would probably never get everything perfect, since we cannot know what effects even the smallest of changes would have 1000 years down the line. Nevertheless, each time we made a change in the ethical rules, this would have an objective effect on the society, for better or worse. While we would not have our utopia, we would have one set of ethics that we had tried, and gotten the best results. Maybe if we tried a hundred more times we might even find a better set than that.
What this fantasy points out is that our ethics have objective effects on the ability of human beings to thrive and survive and this, as we have established, is the functional purpose of ethics for Homo sapiens, whether we are aware that this is its purpose or not. It therefore stands to reason that, at least in principle, there are one set of behaviors that yields the greatest likelihood of prosperity for this particular species, with all other factors being equal - hence objective ethics.
Another good analogy might be the design of an airplane wing for one particular plane. There may be all manner of shapes and angles used, and they may be tested in wind tunnels and computer simulations. But, even if we do not ever discover it exactly, there should be one particular shape that will yield the greatest efficiency. More importantly, there are objective qualities that make one wing design superior or inferior to another. Although airplanes are a human invention, and nowhere may such a wing actually exist physically, there is an “answer to the equation†that is objectively true, regardless of our understanding of it. We may build wings that achieve 98-99% of that potential without ever realizing that we need to make one small adjustment to perfect it, but those facts would remain nonetheless. Like all sciences, the entire endeavor of aerodynamics is predicated on the assumption of objective qualitative measure. Can you imagine development of wing design in an environment where all shapes are considered equal and merely different, and where preference for one over the other were considered merely human subjective bias? One can see here how ethics is objective and independent of cultural understanding, while at the same time a product of the human condition and meaningless apart from Homo Sapiens.
With understanding of the purpose of ethics, measurement and evaluation of various ethical models can take place in a scientific manner by looking at the efficacy of those models on that purpose. In this manner, ethical models are theories, which are supported or undermined by the continuous collection and analysis of evidence. They attempt to make predictions (such as, “this will lower crime†or “this will increase happinessâ€) and they are evaluated on the social evidence generated. Based on these standards, one can have an objective basis for arguing something as ethical or unethical. This is no less subjective or precarious an endeavor than the field of meteorology, cosmology, sociology, or the cognitive sciences (or for that matter - even experimental physics).
SECTION 4 of 5: The Natural-Objective Model (part 2)
Environmental Variability
Of course, if a moral system were especially specific to deal with local or transient issues, it’s utility would be limited to those conditions it was born out of. Often, subjectivists point to the variability of moral systems with respect to environment and culture as evidence that universal ethics are unlikely and an impractical concept. They use local variability to support claims of subjectivism.
But this variability shows nothing of the sort. The very same people, when explaining local variability in moral norms will explain that x might be ethical in one culture, but unethical in another. When asked why they will point out the biological, historic, and environmental reasons behind the development of those morals.
But even in the act of explaining why x is believed good in one place/time and believed bad in another, we speak from an overall point of view - an umbrella set of principles that tells us why x is moral here and not moral there. When these arguments are analyzed, they invariably come down to matters of survival and prosperity for that group. This means that, it is through universal principles of ethics that we assess the need and purpose for variation between cultures, individuals, places, and times.
Yet another analogy may explain the concept. When we look at the tread of a tire, we see that all manner of designs, shapes, depths, and angles is possible. Yet, we can measure the effectiveness of different treads by their performance according to their purpose (in this case traction).
In some cases racing slicks may be the more efficient, whereas in other cases a deep tread may be the proper design, depending on the surface. Nevertheless, one would not say that the design of tire treads is subjective - simply a matter of taste. Even though there are different treads appropriate to different conditions, there is one overall set of principles on which we measure treads, and by which we measure when variation is proper. In this analogy, that set of principles would be such things as distance over time, revolutions, wear & tear, and so on.
In the very same manner, local variability of moral norms does not suggest subjectivity. Like the tire tread, different models may be appropriate to different conditions, times, and places. Nevertheless, we can plainly see what the purpose of moral norms are among Homo Sapiens (i.e. behavioral norms moderating social interaction for the purpose of enhancing survival & prosperity, enforced through social pressures). Given that, ethics can be evaluated by how well they accomplish that purpose - by their effects or best estimations of future effects. Therefore, this provides one overall set of standards by which moral norms can be measured. These standards amount to universal, naturalistic, objective ethics.
The Nature of Objective Principles
What I am saying here is that where ethics are concerned, there is an “answer to the equation†that is finite, objective, and true. There is one set of overall behavioral principles, malleable to local variation, that would yield the greatest benefit to Homo Sapiens.
Some immediately imagine some sort of “ethicocracy†or oppressive cultural regime imposing strict robotic behavioral controls to the “one true†ethical system. But in order to truly accomplish long term survival and prosperity for humanity, the needs and desires of humanity would have to be taken into account. These principles could not treat humans as robots or subjects. Nothing that truly benefits humanity could ever be dehumanizing. Instead, such principles would have to embody concepts of rights, compassion, individualism, and other human values & inclinations.
Another aspect of universal ethical principles would be that they be complex enough to address variability with different environmental and cultural conditions. In other words, they would not be a simplistic set of commandments, but rather, a set of priorities providing a framework and basis for moral deliberation.
Ethical Knowledge
The central thesis of Natural-Objective Ethics is that there is a true and objective ethical model for Homo Sapiens that is independent of culture or the level of human understanding on the matter. However, it is critical to point out that the thesis only claims that such a model exists, and on what basis it exists. My thesis is not to make claims as to what the exact content of that ethical model is.
The objectivity of ethics means that it is a legitimate pursuit of science – that matters of “right†and “wrong†can be investigated on a scientific basis. However, this also implies that, while ideal ethical principles are objective, our knowledge of them is subjective and tentative, as is the case with any field of science. Therefore, any theory concerning whether one ethic is superior or inferior to another, or whether something is unethical, must be exposed to the same scrutiny and evaluation based on the evidence as any other scientific postulate.
The Propagation & Progress of Moral Norms
How then are we to proceed if knowledge of ideal objective ethics is subjective? Does this bring us back to relying on authority or subjectivity? Not at all. It is precisely because the field of ethics is objective, that we can pursue knowledge of it scientifically.
As stated, we know what the purpose and function of ethical norms are for Homo Sapiens. We can therefore measure the functionality of ethical principles by their impact on that purpose. This means we must look at psychology, human needs, and social/historic evidence.
Through sociological and historic analysis, we can build theories about the effects of different ethical concepts in a society. We can then test the predictive power of these theories as events unfold and new data is collected. Since the purpose of ethical norms is to allow greater ability of Homo Sapiens to cooperate for mutual survival and prosperity, those social value systems that have the most beneficial effect in this regard are, by definition, “more ethicalâ€. Those morals and behaviors having a negative affect on survival and prosperity can be considered “less ethical†or “unethicalâ€.
Who then is to be considered the “moral authority� In essence, everyone and no one. As is the case in the scientific community, consensus tends to build over time, with the clearer data resulting in more unity of opinion than the more ambiguous data. In the marketplace of ideas, society works out its moral norms as individuals and groups argue their side and present their evidence and rationale. The most immediately important ethics tend to emerge with greater consensus than the more complex issues.
In this sense, moral norms develop much like a language. Although we have books telling us how it’s done, and we have teachers who present the way it should be done, it is a constantly evolving system. Critics of secular ethics tend to paint them as though they supported individuals simply doing as they please, or “if it feels good, do itâ€. But in language no one can simply “make up†how to speak completely on their own, lest they be unable to communicate. Instead, the norms change with the collective trends in the population. At the same time, there are solid arguments to make about how a language should be structured or how something should be communicated for best effect. These arguments are based on their effectiveness in communication. More often, the norms simply change because human beings will gravitate to what works best, and ethics works much the same. It is dependent on human preference and needs, but it does not allow unbridled individual action apart from the norm. Those babbling in their own homebrewed tongue would see their language not fulfilling its function (communication). By the same token, those making up their own rights and wrongs will see their morals not fulfilling their function (mutually beneficial relations with others). In both cases, social pressures react to enforce blatant disregard for norms.
Significance of the Distinction
So, if moral norms evolve through consensus over time, and our knowledge of ethics is subjective, one might ask what difference it makes that ethics are actually objective. The purpose of the distinction is extremely important in my view. When we make arguments for or against different behaviors and values in an ethical context, we must have some sort of basis on which to make those arguments. If not, then ethical deliberation simply becomes, at best, a matter of who can persuade whom through emotional manipulation and subterfuge. At worst, it breaks down to a matter of physical violence and domination.
However, if we acknowledge that there truly is a better and a worse way to conduct ourselves (regardless of our knowledge of that way), then we have a framework within which we can present hard evidence supporting various ethical claims. We can take up moral positions in support of or in opposition to certain behaviors and policies, but be open to changing those positions based on new evidence.
Some may attempt to argue against this course of action, but I am not suggesting a new course, so much as I am merely describing what is already the usual manner in which ethical arguments are made by absolutists and relativists alike.
Some objections to what I call the Natural-Objective Ethical model has been that it rings of imperialism, eugenics, and even Nazism of all things. In other words, complaints concern what is thought to be a sort of “survival of the fittest†among humans in the model.
But there are important aspects of Natural-Objective Ethics than need to be emphasized again in response to this. When we say that the purpose of ethics is “survival and prosperity†we cannot ignore or leave out the part that says that ethics’ purpose is to provide a means of cooperation, through which human beings can enhance their survival and prosperity. This is not meant as a judgment of what ethics should be, but merely a detached observation as to why the concept of ethics seems to exist in humans.
Because ethics deals specifically with our treatment of one another, ethics is inherently social in nature. This means that all human beings, because of their capacity to reason, make agreements, and modify their behavior, are capable in participating in that web of interactions. Because this tendency exists throughout our species, it is Homo Sapiens as a whole to which ethics must apply. So, if one population of humans has an ethos that makes it aggressive to other humans, this might enhance survivability for local islands of humanity, but when looking at what is ethical, it is only applicable to look at how the species as a whole is affected by this population’s aggressiveness. When one sees a species expending exorbitant resources and time on killing others of its kind, or on protecting itself from others of its kind, it is difficult to argue such things are beneficial to that species’ survival and prosperity. The same applies whether we are talking about nation-to-nation hostility or hostility among individuals within a society.
While one may argue that infighting improves the overall caliber of the species because the “weakest are killed off†this seems to be misapplied Darwinism. In the case of human populations and their political activities, destruction comes at such a quick pace that evolutionary genetic improvements do not have time to manifest (even without nuclear technology). More importantly, in a modern society, the distinction of those who perish and those who live is rarely connected to genetic “fitnessâ€. If any genetic evolution happens to allow humans to thrive better in a politically hostile world, it would be adaptation to environmental hardships of our own making, which need not occur in the first place.
Another fear of Natural-Objective Ethics is that it rings similar in sound to religious demagoguery and intolerant authoritarianism. However, this is only so when the reader glosses over the specifics and only pays attention to some of the vague concepts being discussed. There are very important distinctions, primary among them the concept that has already been mentioned: that claiming that ethics are objective, and claiming to know what those ethics are, are two entirely different things.
I have already explained the importance of recognizing that ethics are objective. But it is equally important that we recognize that we are all limited in our ability to know for certain what the best ethical model is, especially when it comes to highly complex issues. The best we can do is make social measure of the effects of current behaviors and policies, use that data to make estimates of the future effects of various behaviors, and then reason out the most likely ethical position based on that. Then we can present our ideas to those around us, perhaps even going further to take more broad cultural or political action to support those things we think best. All the while, we must be tolerant of the varying opinions of other well-meaning people, and be open to the possibility of being wrong. But it is precisely the realization of ethics’ objectivity that will give us the framework within which to form arguments during such deliberations.
Reactions
I find it strange that many react to these concepts as though I were proposing something new, different, or radical. In fact, all of the above is not a plea for us to handle ethics differently. Rather, it is a description of how ethics is and always has been handled by human beings. We have always formed moral norms since we had the mental capacity to do so. With or without knowing it, we have always tended to support those norms we perceived best aided in our survival. Lastly, regardless of religious or political accoutrement, those norms have always changed over time due to general consensus and pressures from environmental factors. Over time, given the empirical evidence of historic experience, societies have improved in many areas of morality while declining in others, with an overall upward climb globally, which is obvious to any impartial assessment not burdened with ignorance of history, apocalyptic superstition, or pessimistic fantasy. But in the end, all of these ethical models either uplifted or damaged their creators to an objective degree.
When pressed for reasons why on positions and policies they dislike, even ethical subjectivists will tend toward arguments coming down one way or another to matters of survival and prosperity for the whole. Pragmatic clergy and pastors will begin sermons with religious notes about why x is wrong, and then go on to use real-world examples illustrating how x harms our survival or prosperity, and then wrap up with more extraneous religious references and a song. One will find that it is impossible to seriously argue for or against anything of ethical relevance without referring back in some way to the core purpose for which all ethics ultimately exists.
Even amidst claims of authoritarianism, imperialism, and intolerance concerning Natural-Objective Ethics, when asked why those things are bad or undesirable, the accuser will invariably end up pointing out how authoritarianism, imperialism, and intolerance are ultimately harmful to the survival and prosperity of humanity (while trying their best to avoid using these words per se). Thus their circular logical loop is completed.
I should mention that I have my own personal philosophy that I call OMF: Objective Mechanistic Fatalism. I’ve yet to post it here, but I thought I should mention it since it sounds a bit like “Natural-Objective”. I’m guessing there are similarities!
Here’s a link to my referring to it on Craigslist in September of 2003:
Prosperity is a very relative idea. I would propose that the driving force evident behind societal policy is pleasure. This may be what you mean by prosperity, but it definatly overides survival, as seen by the act of suicide.
I would agree that there is an objective “answer to the equation” in that there is a naturalistic and logical way to develop a system of rules. But as always, these rules are not absolute. It may be the most efficient set at acomplishing its goal, but not absolute. Just like society can be seen to develope rules in persuit of prosperity (though I say pleasure) each individual apparently acts in persuit of the same. So if an individual can encounter a situation where he can profit from the breaking of ANY moral, ethical, or legal system, than I do not see how his action can be classified as wrong or evil. Relative to the rules he is breaking, or relative to the society, he is indeed wrong or evil. But not as an absolute. No action can be deemed absolutely wrong or right. It can only be deemed wrong or right relative to something else. Even if an action is unprofitable, leading to undesirable outcomes, and the person making the action regrets his decision, it can still only be deemed wrong relative to that person. But human action can never be labeled absolutely wrong or right, evil or good, moral or immoral. No matter what your best objective system of ethics is, if a man murders another man, obtains pleasure from the act, and faces no consequence from enforcers of your ethical system, than in terms of the individual, this is a “right” act.
Yes, the prospect of whether or not ethics are objective and whether or not they are absolute, at least insofar as they are commonly discussed on this forum, seem to me to be two different things, with different connotations. My paper deals strictly with objectivity. But you raise good questions about absolutism. Russiantank also brings up the issue of absolutism and goes into even more detail, so in my response to his post (to come) I’ll give my impressions of what Natural-Objective Ethics means for the concept of Absolutism.
On a side note, in your thread on shooting the girl, I must admit that this is a very difficult issue. When I posted my response, I have to admit I’m not completely confident of it. Many times, I’ll post what I’m leaning towards in order to put the position out there and see if it’s torn apart so that I can learn more
However, my answers to Russiantank’s post should address both of your points.
This sounds very interesting, although I’m not certain how I feel about Fatalism in general. I’ll check it out when I get a chance though and let you know what I think - thanks!
True, it is relative in the sense that it relates to a lot of things, and precisely what it means will vary by context. But I’d like to interject and point out that there is a distinction between that which is “relative” and that which is “subjective”. Something may be relative and objective at the same time, if the means by which it relativistically changes under circumstances is an objective set of qualities.
Like, “prosperity”, the word “fit” is also a bit fuzzy and relative, yet we understand the concept of “survival of the fittest” in evolution, and we also understand that while we humans may have “fuzziness” in dealing linguistically with the concept of fitness, that nonetheless the reality to which the concept refers to is objective, concrete, and has real, precise, and objective effects within the biological systems which evolution describes.
In other words, we understand that the mechanisms behind evolution, like all biological processes, is an objective reality, despite our linguistic shortcomings with words like “fit”.
So, while “prosperity” may be relative an imprecise, the basic concept itself, to which I allude with the phrase, is not. We know that planting 10,000 nuclear bombs at the highest concentrations of population around the globe is “bad” for our prosperity. We also know that discovering a single cure to all human disease would be “good” for prosperity. Everything else, in sum, is as clear and objective as this in terms of actual effect, even though our limited perception and conception of the complexities, and ability to discuss them linguistically may be less precise.
Refining our conception of the term “prosperity” and exactly how it is measured would be the work of those who would take to the “Natural-Objective” model, and continue from there - but you are correct that it is indeed work that needs to be done.
Actually, what humans find pleasurable and what they do not find pleasurable has evolved according to our needs of survivability. For instance, we are pleasured by the smell of food and are discusted (displeasured) by the smell of rotting meat. These instinctive responses have come about because of their effect on survivability.
This is not to say that there are not inefficiencies. Instinctive responses are crude, inexact things and will often result in behavior that is contrary to the purpose of their original function. Certainly, pleasure plays a roll in our decisions, but in cases where our intellects can perceive that our pleasures are leading us to behave in a manner that is contrary to our prosperity, we should (by N-O standards), and in fact DO often curve that behavior with our ethical rules.
It seems to me that you are saying when something is “not absolute” that it does not apply in all cases. It is true that there are many “sub-ethics” that do not apply in all cases. This would be the “environmental variability” I mentioned in my paper. But the umbrella principles would apply regardless. I must point out that, by the definitions and standards of N-O ethics, when you say, “It may be the most efficient set at acomplishing [prosperity]” that this is, by definition, what is ethical. So, in cases where such would not be the most efficient way to provide for prosperity, the ethic would not apply. But this system of “if-then” is the absolute which applies, regardless.
But “relative to society” is all that matters. When you think about what ethics is, and why it exists in Homo Sapiens, it is clear that the tendency of human populations is to form ethical standards between themselves. As I mentioned, ethics is inherently social. That means that ethics itself exists for, and as a result of, mutual cooperation, happiness, and survivability (or “prosperity” to sum up those elements). Therefore, to apply ethical concepts or framework outside of that function is misplaced and nonsensical. There is no such thing as “individual ethics” or “what’s right for me”. At least, not as far as we can tell by an unbiased, materialistic, and objective look at the behavior of Homo Sapiens as a species.
If something is in contradiction to the overall ell being of the whole, then by the definitional framework of N-O ethics it is unethical. Just to emphasize my point: I am not saying that it is simply “bad”, I’m saying that it is categorically in opposition to the definition of “ethical”.
In your response, you may want to therefore focus on the N-O definition of ethics because that seems to be the root of our differences here.
Yes, but when you consider the proposal of N-O ethics, that ethics is itself a relational concept, and nonsensical outside of that framework, then if “an action is unprofitable, leading to undesirable outcomes” it is absolutely unethical by definition. Ethics is therefore absolute and relational. It only seems to not be absolute when ethical concepts are used outside of their sphere (i.e. in relation to only one individual).
It can if you have a specific definition of ethics that provides for that.
This may point out the difference between “pleasure” and “prosperity for society” as definitional standards for “ethics”. I make a case for why the definition of ethics is more reasonable the latter, but I have not heard a rationale for basing it on pleasure that is based on an objective, materialistic, and athropologically neutral assessment of Homo Sapiens.
I would plea that you read again the section of my paper titled “The Function of Ethics” and “The Measure of an Ethic”. Here, I make an argument for a definition of ethics that does indeed seem to lead to the logical conclusion that some general ethics are absolute for the species.
By these standards, your use of the phrase “in terms of that individual” is nonsensical and misapplied, for there is no such thing by N-O standards. You may have compelling arguments against the N-O definitional framework of ethics, however.
just wanted to suggest a couple of things to look at…
I’d check out Giddens ‘Central Problems in Social Theory’ (first few chapters) to follow up this line of reasoning… the language metaphor… parigmatic and syncronic dimensions of those structures in time and space… very good unpackaging of the idea you seem to be employing here…
also I think ‘The Abuse of Causisty’, ‘Economies of Grandeur’ (cant remember who or how to spell…)
and serres’s ‘the natural contract’ and section four of his “Conversations on science culture and time”
lost myown train of thougt… but those are all very interesting ethical discussions…
I understand DT strain, you are only pointing out the objectivety of your ethics relative to the society. Sure, I agree, but since ethics is only relative to a society, I see no reason to adopt your ethics as a rulebook for all human action. If your desire is to act in accordance to society, than you may indeed logicly say that your system is the best way to do so. But acting in accordance with society can only ever be said to SOMETIMES be most prosperous, or beneficial, or pleasurable, or whatever, for the individual. Maybe it is even best most of the time, but not always. And I can imagine so many situations where not acting in accordance with society can be most beneficial for individual gain. So your system cannot apply to all human action, it can only apply to all human action whose intention is to benefit society. To determine an ethical system for individual behavior is pretty much impossible.
About pleasure, I know pleasure is an evolutionary measure, designed to drive us to seek out that which benefits our survival, but I think it can be said that nature got ahead of itself in a way. Finding pleasure in Picassos art in no way benefits survival, and yet there are people out there that would give their lives to the preservation of his art. Or any number of such situations, most notably suicide. People that dont find pleasure in life kill themselves, it seems simple what drives their actions. And the fact that staying alive is usually most conducive to obtaining more pleasure in life is an easy explenation of why most people try to survive. But I do not see a logical reason that any one would choose survival without the incentive of pleasure. Why live if theres nothing to live for… It may be an instinctive act to stay alive, but such instincts should not play a role in the development of your ethics, because that same instinct can create some results that I doubt your ethics supports.
Based on what follows, I don’t think you do. And this may be due to my inability to communicate my point clearly. I will explain…
Actually, my system does not lay out the “best way” or any “way” to act. It merely defines “ethical” and states that, whatever way of acting is compatible with ethics is ethical. As to what that is, these specifics are not mentioned.
No part of my paper is prescriptive (except for the implied plea that its conclusions be taken). The paper is strictly descriptive. This means when I say that acting against the whole is unethical, this is not a “shame on you!” sort of value-judgment statement. It is a categorically descriptive statement, in accordance with the definition of “ethics” described.
Here it is apparent to me that you are mistaking what I’m saying as meaning a “society-first” or “supremacy of society over the individual” approach. Nothing could be further from the truth.
In my view there is no “society”. That is mere illusion. Illustion, too, is the idea that a society can or should have needs that trump the individual. All that is, in reality, are a lot of individuals trying to get along for their own mutual well being. “Ethics” is the name for the system of behaviors they mutually agree on to do so. Those behaviors which are contrary to the purpose of ethics are, by category and by definition, UNethical. This is true regardless of any individual/society dichotomy that might be imagined.
Yes, but what has this to do with ethics? By the definition of “ethical” I have outlined, those behaviors which are contrary to the good of humanity as a whole (or by extension of the categorical imperative would be contrary to the good of the whole), are unethical, regardless of whether or not they aid the individual.
I too, can think of many behaviors that are beneficial for an individual. Some of them are ethical, some are non-ethical and some are unethical. My definition and categorization of the ethical from the unethical as stated here carries with it no suggestion of advocacy or disapproval (although I do happen to disapprove of unethical behavior as I have defined it). Again, ethics is by its nature a social phenomenon.
Ethics does not apply to all human action, so it’s not meant to. Some human actions are unethical or non-ethical. But all human action that is beneficial to humanity as whole is “ethical” and all human action opposed to the well being of the whole is “unethical”.
Ethics do not apply to individual behavior. It’s like discussing air pressure with only one atom of a gas. If one person were alone in the universe, there would be no function or purpose for ethics to exist - it would be impossible for that person to do anything ethical or unethical.
If you’re looking for “words of wisdom” by which an individual should live to have a happy and prosperous life, this is entirely different and distinct from the social-system of ethics. It is “self help”, and in my opinion, includes adherence to ethical principles, but also many more behaviors that are wise but have little to do with ethics.
I agree with all of this. Actually, such instincts don’t play a role in the development of my ethics. I speak of survival and prosperity of a species. By prosperity, I mean to include more than simple biologic existence, but existence which includes thriving in terms of resources and control of its environment, and also includes that which the species on the whole desires. As you say, “I do not see a logical reason that any one would choose survival without the incentive of pleasure”. This is true for most of the species.
But it is not by my choice that “happiness” is included in the definition. It is merely an impartial observation that Homo Sapien populations will mutually agree on rules of behavior which they believe will lead to more preferrable conditions for themselves. This is a fact, and so it is necessary to include it in the definition of “ethical” because human beings do when they establish their rules.
Very good and thought-out essay—I liked it. I have, however, made several criticisms as I was reading through your piece; some of my objections were broached in the succeeding parts of your essay, nevertheless, I have responded to those objections when they came up—so though, I’m asking a hypocritical thing, please read my remarks as a whole, then respond, if you will, to my objections.
Absolutism
Authoritarianism isn’t supposed to provide happy individuals. Moral duty would always take precedence over one’s happiness or inclinations.
Relativism
Ah, but such alleviation is only sought by social relativism (as a principle of social study and research in fields like sociology, psychology, and the like). Relativism, as a philosophic position, is an objective worldview of a subjective ethical world; hence, it isn’t designed to alleviate anything, but is only a philosophic position with positive and negative consequences.
Ethics as a Science
This is what John Rawls has done. Are you familiar with his work?
The Functions of Ethics
Prosperity is such a vague term. For example, by prosperity, would you include the function of forming morals in order to satisfy spiritual, emotional, and psychological ends?
Furthermore (I’m not sure if you include the above under your term of prosperity, but if you do, then this pertains), do you presuppose that all human beings have the same psychological, emotional and spiritual needs? I for example, do not think that they do; hence, I would ask the question of how we could form objective assessments of correct “morals” when we are dealing with dynamic, and unknown variables in the subjects?
The Measure of an Ethic
Each society/individual, when considering their own prosperity, has different needs and ends that they aspire to achieve. But your asking each society/individual to consider the prosperity of all of humanity. Why are we obliged to consider the prosperity for all of humanity?
Yet, these needs, inclinations, and abilities, are not universal. They all vary by degree with one another to say the least. Furthermore, practically, on a massive scale, how would it be possible to measure all variations? Without knowledge of all variables, how can one form an objective scientific hypothesis? Sociology and psychology, for example, are imprecise sciences—they are all playing with statistics and quasi-scientific formulations. And lastly, we shall never be able to account for extreme cases of variations in our objective assessments.
It does not stand to reason this, because environment is always in flux; therefore, your ethically correct sets of behaviors would always be in flux as well, and would always be beyond any practical methods of determining what those behaviors are. Secondly, to reiterate, the major flaw in your argument is the assumption that human needs are universal, hence: objective.
If what is ethical is “what is believed to be ethical” then you have not freed yourself from the relativist critique. You falsely assumed that you had because you thought that you would be able to objectively assess all variables—which is impossible. To illustrate the impossibility of such an attempt further, I ask you to consider unconscious motivations and desires. Not only would the “outside the box” observers be unaware of such motivational forces, but so would the subjects themselves! And again, this “prosperity” principle is not universal (if by it your taking into consideration spiritual, psychological and emotional ends—which I think you must if your talking about the prosperity of an individual or a society).
The relativist criticism is that, like you acknowledge, we can never know all the factors due to our limitations, therefore ultimately we can never know what are the correct moral standards to adopt. With that in mind, a society which adopts certain standards to meet what they consider their ‘survivability’ and ‘prosperity’ needs, may be in conflict with what a different society deems the morals to be—even under equal environmental conditions, because, all else is not equal, what one society considers to be prosperity may be at great odds with what is another society’s assessment—consider spiritual concerns as an example.
Here is really my main question: On what authority do you, or anyone else, claim that the prosperity of the entire species should be the most important principle?
This is a bad analogy. There may be, in principle, one best system of ethics for a given airplane, but in human reality, there are a multitude of airplanes, each requiring their own specific wings. Unless you can prove the universality of all individual human needs, as well as that of different societies, you cannot claim that we are all one airplane. The relativistic critique is precisely this: each society is a unique airplane, requiring its own specific wing, as well as the individual.
This is all well and good for social ethics. We are constantly employing utilitarianism and the like when we set social principles as we attempt to achieve the best possible consequences. The criticism is that we cannot ever know whether we shall produce the desired consequences; that is Kant’s critique: the only objective fact we can ever be certain of when making a moral decision is our intention. Now, one step further, here is a relativistic criticism: if we are only certain of our intention, we do not have the certainty to judge another’s intention(s); we cannot say that a society which practices contradictory moral behaviors from our own has ill intentions, for doing so would presuppose that we could know their intentions—this even holds even if our own actions are based on what we’ve considered to be good intentions!
Take a concrete example like Cambodia. In order to enhance the survivability and further their own ideas of “prosperity,” many Cambodians justified to themselves, the killing of thousands of innocent people (Cambodian peasants). Their intentions, according to them, may have been good. Were they “right” or “wrong”? According our principles they were wrong, and upon our principles we would judge their actions as such–not upon the basis of an objective moral standard, because they used such a standard themselves and concluded that such a wing was the correct one to build for their airplane. Even if such a wing was the correct one to build, we would condemn their actions out of our principles for the sanctity of human life—and out of our opposition to the principle that the ends justify the means. Can your ethical theory argue against the principle of the ends justifying any means?
For at this point, in such a judgment, we are going beyond objective assessments, and such moral judgments have no room for your naturalistic-objective ethics.
Environmental Variability
So your ethical model is contextualistic in application. It seems as if your moral system is qualitative utilitarianism on a global scale; it is therefore, relative in action, and universal in principle. Do we assume, by common sense, that we must enter this social contract with one another to ensure survivability and prosperity of the human species as a whole? Furthermore, can you please elaborate what exactly “prosperity” is? Is prosperity the rights of equal opportunity, and fair and just treatment of all peoples? I’m still at a miss as to what exactly this term implies—and yet this is the central term of the entire model.
The Nature of Objective Principles
But see, here again, the problem is that values and inclinations vary, and it is impossible to assess them all. Furthermore, given the unconscious critique I presented earlier, it may not be possible to know many of the factors at all.
The Propagation & Progress of Moral Norms
No we don’t. We know the purpose ethics serves for society; and we know the purpose of society—to propagate survivability and prosperity—but to say that such is the purpose of the human being, is to take a big leap—one I don’t think we are allowed to take.
Which will serve for proper social theory, but will not give us any moral authority to claim that the behavior of another society is “morally wrong,” if that society is functioning within the principles of “survivability” and "prosperity"—as in any case wherein our ideas of prosperity differ from theirs.
Again you leave no room for condemnation of well intentioned ethical rationalizations, such as in the Cambodian example.
Here is where I will anticipate that you will react to my Cambodian example–in the sense that such action will not be beneficial to Cambodia because it will sour all macro relations with other countries. However, then the Cambodians would have to act against what they found to be “objectively right” due to outside social pressures. So it is power, and conviction in principles, whether they are rational or irrational (perhaps originating only from pathos) which shall determine behavior. As to what is ethically “right” or “wrong” has yet to be established.
Fears and Objections
And what if this population’s aggressiveness has no negative affect on humanity as a whole, but only increases survivability and prosperity of the said pocket of humanity? Would a genocide in such a circumstance be ethical?
My overall opinion is that this isn’t ethics, but social theory on how to best provide a prospering (a very loose term) global society, which will in accordance to variables and different conditions be non-universal in practice. It is a social theory, open to heavy criticism of the imprecision the science will have due to constant variations and inadequate assessments.
Not only that, but your theory presupposes that man places reason in highest regard, and shall always act in accordance with principles of survivability and prosperity for the whole—completely neglecting the irrational aspects of human nature.
Yes. Prosperity means a maximization of quality of life (not merely survival). Of course, this is a gradient.
No I don’t think this. The most ethical model would allow for a maximization of prosperity, and be flexible enough to accomidate each individual seeking their own sense of prosperity, within reason and within compatibility with society.
Yes, they are. That is, when you’re talking about the most primal, basic needs on a general level. This is all that’s required to be acknowledged under the N-O model.
Thus, the very situation we currently find ourselves in, and have been in since the beginning of human history. This is not news. Our moral norms ARE in flux - yes, even those followed by people who claim theirs are eternal. And, there are methods of determining the best behaviors. They are not perfect but people employ them all the time, which is exactly how moral norms change over time.
I am not claiming that. I am claiming that the prosperity of the entire species is, by definition, the function of ethical behavior in Homo Sapiens. This is no different than saying that birds use wings to fly. Your question is as if you asked a biologist, “Who made YOU the dictator to be able to decide for all birds that they should use their wings to fly?”
I am not saying that we “should” do anything. N-O Ethics is not prescriptive - it’s descriptive. I’m saying: this is what the species I am currently disecting appears to be doing.
Human beings have this behavior, which is forming moral norms in their populations. This is a behavior of that species, which has evolved for the benefit of that species. Saying that ethics is about human survival and prosperity is not a judgment or a plea - it’s a description and an observation. No individual human being anywhere needs to realize it or agree with it consciously for this to be a true fact.
According to N-O Ethics, it doesn’t matter what “they believed” or what they thought “from their point of view”. It also doesn’t matter what their “intentions” were. The fact is that, “killing thousands of innocent people” has an objective effect, one way or the other, for the species.
Secondly, it’s not about “their” survivability. The behavior of forming moral norms is a biological trait of the species, and so it functions on a species-level. Any individual sub-group that forms a moral norm that seems to help itself, but makes the species as a whole less well off, has a mistaken belief about what is ethical. Their moral norm is unethical.
Now, one could make an argument using an N-O approach that killing thousands of innocent people was, overall, good for humanity. They would have to gather data, consider psychological implications, consider social stability, consider the effects of violence and the betrayal of human rights, and so on. My guess is that they would have a hard time making this case, and my current belief is that the opposite would be true: intentional violence against thousands of innocent people is disruptive and counter productive to the species in the long run and is, therefore by definition, unethical.
And it is my belief that they were incorrect. That, what they THOUGHT would get them a better lift, better airspeed, etc. actually won’t turn out in the long run to have performed well.
Nothing of the sort is assumed. N-O is not a model of how human beings behave on the whole. Humans are frequently quite irrational and often act against their best interests and against the best interests of the species.
But not everything a human society does is because its part of its moral norms. What I’m saying is that, the reason we tend to form moral norms is because of our nature as social animals, and that this tendency evolved because it aided in our survival. And that ethics, by definition, is the best possible combination of moral norms at fulfilling that function.
This does not mean that individual human beings know or thinking consciously about “survival of the species” and it doesn’t even mean that they SHOULD. It just means that this is the ultimate effect and nature of our collective actions, whether we know it or like it.
