Perhaps best suited would be someone like saitd, aporia, detrop or Xunzian:
Switching between Wittgenstein and Kant, and just on a personal observation, they both seem to have a fixation with “temporal reality”, but not necessarily driving a definition of such into their language use.
Any ideas? Temporal as in??? Frontal lobe constructs or interconnectivity of fragmentary stimuli subjectively/objectively?
That causes problems with all the “defining” and uses of words in the fashion given. Besides, time is a logical construct, and I would think it would be bad philosophy to try to build logic onto construct with definitions that “appear” to be very static.
for kant the human mind is built in a specific way, and one part of that construction includes time and space. humans cannot percieve anything outside of time and space. for kant, time and space are constructions of the human mind but they are not logical constructions, they are necessary constructions. time and space do not exist “out there” in the world. time and space for kant is purely a mental construction.
his arguments can be found in the CPR (kemp-smith translation) antimonies
Yes, I understand that, and Kant and I are in complete agreement on that subject.
That, unfortunately, is not my quandry.
I took the liberty of reading through the other articles attached to that link, and there my moronic confusion with particular things becomes more befuddled, futher extrapolated by Wittengstein’s use of similar language and terminology.
Appreciate the attempt, the failure is on my part.
just a guess, but kant’s idealism seems kindof realist to a neurobiologist, w/ a priori categories corresponding closely to sensory modalities, hence ‘temporal reality’. (i think) what kant means by this is the continuity of identity that links many moment by moment perceptions of the same object into the perception of a single object.
in contrast, i think wittgenstein’s idealism is of a more ‘radical’ & linguistic nature. i think wittgenstein thought a lot like a zen buddhist, & his ‘temporal reality’ was closer to what in zen would be called ‘now’ or ‘the moment’, beyond which all perception is mere description.
I would agree with both assertions, not that I have ground to assert.
I find Kant to be often sketchy in his definition fixing for his temporal realities. Wittgenstein less, but still in the act of fixing statically.
Kant attempted to complete to conclusion, Wittgenstein never did. Both seem rather fragmentary in their logic, and I am confused by their stations within the philosophical realm. They both seem to be very “incomplete”.
Whether Kant or Wittgenstein, both attempt to find an explanation of our tendency toward reification -ie- to objectify abstraction. Both understand and point out the inherent difficulties of attempting to ‘fix’ the flux of a processual universe. That mind attends to ‘persistent particularness’ (things) is obvious and unavoidable. To hold the concept of our seeing and knowing as both processual and conditional is the issue, and a difficult practice of understanding. Don’t worry about being confused. None of us do very well in this department…
If I can’t understand the rudiments of this sort of philosophy, I may have to opt for the the full frontal labotomy based on being unworthy and aspiring to mediocrity with a foundation of subpar intelligence.
For Kant Time or Temporality is a structure of the mind necessary for us to experience anything. Wittgenstein isn’t concerned so much with experience as logical meaning, when discussing the possibility of a book on language itself he says:
One might argue that Kant’s philosophy is an answer to Wittgenstein’s question, though I think that Wittgenstein would reject that answer. He goes on to say:
I’ll leave you to wonder as quite what he’s driving at here. I hope that this has been of some help…
No No! You’ve already had the lobotomy. We all have. The question is whether we can gain control over our projections and apprehend reality as it is. Seeing duality and oneness at the same time isn’t easy, and few can hold both for more than a few seconds. (well, at least I can’t)
For Kant time is a necessary condition of experience, a structure of the mind which in part allows us to make sense of the world in the way that we do.
For Wittgenstein time is a common property among all known propositions, an apparently necessary (though not a priori, like Time is for Kant) condition of a proposition’s making sense.
The former is concerned with experience, the latter is concerned with language.