A paper I wrote a few months ago. Enjoy!
In the larger since Aristotle defines virtue as that which allows something to do it’s function well, and that which is the good state of something. He means by this, that the virtue of something is to achieve its end; virtue is goal directed. For example the virtue of an eye would to produce good sight, and the eye would itself be good if it does this. The virtue of a house builder would be to build sturdy houses that provide adequate coverage from the elements. Aristotle tells us that the function of a lyre player is to play the lyre, and the function of an artist is to create art, and that man is no exception when it comes to this. Man also has a function just as the lyre player and the artist have one.
In Book I Chapter 13, Aristotle also claims that the function of man must be peculiar to him. So the function cannot be found in the nutritive part of the soul since all living things share growth, nor can it be found in perception because most animals share this part of the soul with man. Therefore, according to Aristotle, the function of man must be found in the rational part of the soul, since that is what is peculiar to man. Which means the function of man is an activity in accordance with a “rational-principleâ€, “and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of theseâ€.(1098a, 14) So in the case of the good man his function “turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtueâ€.(1098a, 16)
Aristotle contends that man has two type of virtue, moral and intellectual. Moral virtue is developed through action, and is learned by habit. He claims that moral virtue is not natural because “nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its natureâ€(1103a, 20). Since man is capable of being both moral and immoral it is not possible for moral virtue to be natural because that would mean man could go against what is natural by being immoral. So moral virtue must then be something that is learned, which makes it an activity rather than an internal state. Aristotle claims that like a lyre-player who learns by playing, man learns morality by acting moral. If a man is taught by his society to act courageously, and he practices acting courageously, then the man is said to be courageous. We acquire a virtue by acting a certain way. If a man acts cowardly in the face of danger, and he does this often and forms a habit, then this man is said to be cowardly. If the man acts rashly in the face of danger, then he is said to be rash. We learn how to act from our society and legislator; therefore it is imperative that man be raised in a just society for virtue to be obtained. For Aristotle it is not only required that man act in a certain way, but it is also required that he do it for the right reasons. He claims that it is possible for a man to do “something in accordance with the laws of grammarâ€, but not be a grammarian or grammatical.(1105b, 23). The person could act in accordance with grammar by chance or because he’s simply following the directions of another, which would mean he might know nothing about grammar, and thus couldn’t be called a grammarian. The same is true with the virtuous man. Acting in accordance with the virtue alone doesn’t make him virtuous, because he could do it by chance or because someone instructed him to do so. The man is virtuous when he acts virtuously for the right reasons. He himself must choose the action for it’s own sake, he must have knowledge that this action is good, and he must do it consistently. Then and only then could he be said to be virtuous.
Once Aristotle has set out how virtue is obtained, it is possible for him to tell us exactly what virtue is. Aristotle claims that moral virtue is a mean between two extremes. Aristotle reasons that virtue is what “makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well.â€(1106a, 24). In physical activity, the man who exercises too much or too little is unhealthy, while the man who has a balanced program remains healthy. In art, it is said that adding anything to it, or taking anything away from it cannot improve a perfect painting. The goodness of the painting lies in a median between two extremes. Excess and defect destroys the art, just as a man who eats too much or too little is in bad health. If a man eats what is proportional too him, then health is preserved. Likewise the same goes for virtue. What makes a human good and able to do his own work well is a mean between two extremes. Hence virtue for man is acting at a mean. For example if a man acts overly courageous and faces undue danger he becomes rash, and puts himself in danger. However if he acts in a defective manor by running from danger, he is said to be cowardly, and is scorned. If the man acts at a mean, however, he neither puts himself in undue danger, nor is he scorned, but rather he is praised for being courageous. Courage rather than cowardice and rashness, is what makes a man excellent.
Aristotle also tells us that the mean between two extremes is relative to the person. A large man may eat 4 pounds of food to maintain his health, and the 4 pounds is the mean between the extreme. While a slender man may require 2 pounds of food to maintain his health , while if he ate 4 pounds of food it would make him unhealthy and would be excess. So virtue as with food is relative to the person, and the right action at the right time is different for everyone. There is no one prescribed action that is right for everyone at any given time, what the right action is depends on the individual person and the individual circumstance.
For Aristotle, Happiness is the chief good of man because it alone is something man desires for its own sake. Aristotle argues against many common notions of what happiness is, to find the true definition of happiness. Many people claim that pleasure is human happiness, but Aristotle denies this as being a life suited for the beasts. Another popular notion of happiness is that it is obtained through status and honor, but Aristotle denies this claiming that happiness cannot possibly depend on other people. He also claims that virtue is not happiness because someone could be inactive all their life or sleeping while maintaining virtue, and it is absurd to say that a sleeping man is happy. Aristotle claims that all these popular ideas of happiness are defective, and he posits in their place a definition whereby happiness is reserved for an active man when he is accordance with virtue. He claims this because virtuous actions are by nature pleasant, so the life of virtuous activity is pleasant in itself.
Aristotle’s account of virtue and happiness hinges on a teleological understanding of nature and humanity. The very starting definition of virtue that he gives us thoroughly saturates the rest of his arguments with teleology. If we are not willing to lend this to him, then his arguments seem to lose their severity. Even if we allow that natural objects have a purpose, an eye’s purpose is to see, it doesn’t necessarily follow that humans are similar. Perhaps the rational-principle that Aristotle said is so integral to the human function absolves humans of the teleological bind through choice. Or we could take an existentialist view of human purpose, and understand it to be something that is not set for us, but created by us through valuations. In which case virtue loses it’s teleological force. While Aristotle’s idea of how moral virtue is obtained is not violated by a non-teleological understand of human nature, his definition of virtue is. Aristotle’s idea that virtue is a mean between two extremes depends on him contending that virtue is what makes a man do his work well. Meaning virtue is what satisfies Aristotle’s teleological constraint on the nature of man, by best affirming man’s natural function. If we don’t accept man’s telos, then Aristotle’s link between virtue and happiness fades. As man no longer has a specific function, and is free to find good in what he wants. Furthermore Aristotle consistently reasons from physical and artistic principles to moral principles. Such reasoning is dubious at best because there is no reason to believe that physical principles should extend to moral principles. Excess and defect in virtue are part of life, if we get rid of them and only act according to a mean, then we get rid of part of the human experience. Instead of them destroying us, like eating too much or too little destroys health, they enhance life by allowing us to experience a broad spectrum of emotions and feelings. Aristotle seems to seek to make life mundane and uninteresting when he binds us to the mean. He tells us that since man’s function is concerned with the rational-principle, so is happiness. He also tells us that the most rational people will be the happiest, the most rational people being adult Greek males. According to Aristotle women are too passionate to be rational, children don’t have the experience necessary, and non-Greek barbarians are too brutish. So true happiness, being a function of virtue and rationality according to Aristotle is reserved to Greek males. Again we see a denial of passions and pleasures, and a triumph of stone rationality. Weather the Greek adult male is alone capable of rationality doesn’t matter, what does matter is that Aristotle reserves happiness for them alone based on this capacity. Surely the hardships of adulthood weigh heavily upon the happiness of an individual. Children being immune to these hardships seem to possess a level of carefree joy that the most rational person cannot obtain.
Aristotle’s account of virtue and happiness is rooted in a teleological methodology, whereby the function of man is rationality. The happiness of man the actualization of the perfection of this function. If we don’t lend this teleology to Aristotle, then it becomes possible to argue that rationality is not preferable to passion and pleasure in all cases.
