Nietzsche was wrong (pt. 2)

I’ve gotten a tad bored lately with political philosophers and there’s not much more Mill left for me to read. So I’ve started reading Mencken and, as a result, some of Nietzsche’s earlier works again (e.g., Human, All Too Human, Daybreak, The Gay Science, etc.).

My argument goes as follows: Nietzsche was wrong for the same reasons that Marx was wrong. He viewed the individual in the same way that Marx viewed society, professing a “planned economy of the self” (or so I say). Nietzsche would, no doubt, scoff at this argument for being too “English” and parsimonious in nature. But, alas, such is the nature of science, both social and physical.

Laissez-faire capitalists of Nietzsche’s time rightfully saw a corollary between Darwin’s theories and economies. But they wrongfully translated “survival of the fittest” to a literal understanding of economies; they thought economies were atomistic and constituted by individuals who competed as whole, rational, comporting agents.

Economists and libertarians no longer think this. They’ve been struggling to shed this image for quite some time. The poor aren’t poor because they are “unfit.” They also aren’t poor because they’re being “exploited,” as the Marxists would have you think. Rather, the poor are poor because they aren’t being exploited enough. Economies create competition between parts of individuals as much as individuals themselves. (Think of Dawkins’ Meme Theory.) Skills and abilities are efficiently capitalized upon in a free market. In today’s society, most people possess at least basic talents of mind or body that are valued in the market. Hayek called this the “spontaneous order.” It applied to markets as well as rain forests.

Marx looked through an egregiously materialistic lens. According to him, history is dialectical. Humans and surrounding material are mutually transforming one another through the connecting force of labor. If humans can – by definition of what it means to be human – manipulate their surroundings, they should be able to cut through the feedback process that leads to human arising. We should be able to jump out of the boat and steer it from the outside. (The logical fallacy is already apparent.)

This view of history is linear and quite unlike the biology of organisms as well as the laws of thermodynamics. The spontaneous order is – without getting too immersed in religious connotations – infinitely transcendental. Microcosms are not static, nor can they be transcended and then manipulated from the outside. Everything and everybody exists on the margin. Previous critics of human valuations (like Nietzsche) were right in pointing out the relativity of values, but were wrong in ignoring their relativity to the margin (that is, the way things currently stand if they were frozen into an observable snapshot).

We can consider the universe as “lazy.” Exertions exorbitantly beyond the margin are rarely necessary. Chaos inevitably disseminates into colder states.

Nietzsche had a view of the universe and of life that ran against this model; the world was expanding and violently overtaking at an exponential rate. Excellent persons embodied this will-to-power. He railed against English utilitarians for marginalizing the world.

The utilitarians would, in more elegant words, answer, “Yes, if that’s how you choose to put it.”

But my question for Nietzsche rides on his stated goal for humanity: to achieve the highest levels of human excellence (and continuing to transcend it via the superman). I don’t ask, “Why?” I ask, “How?”

The prescription to go above and beyond marginal “insipidity” seems prima facie merely an aesthetic suggestion. But Nietzsche heavily relied on a Schopenhauerian metaphysic of Will. Like Marx – who rejected ideals of justice, morality, and even utopia on the grounds that his metaphysic of dialectical materialism made communism an inevitability – Nietzsche thought greater and greater ascendancy above the margin was "natural. " Yet, unlike Marx, he didn’t think it a predetermined inevitability per se. For him, unnatural tendencies were the norm for slave-moralities and society as a whole. Christianity was a pristine example of unnatural morality.

But how “unnatural” was this?

Scholars immediately following Darwin saw moral institutions and herd behavior as not Darwinian proper in kind. Darwin and his followers at first thought that the law of natural selection ceased when humans huddled together into self-sustaining groups. But that’s a narrow understanding Darwin held of his very own theories. The selection process is not necessarily purely biological. Early human tribes evolved language and thereby created a highly conductive circuit of information exchange, dealing more with one another than outside threats. In a way, the first primary purpose of language was to help cavemen gossip. Reputation and social bodies became very important. It makes sense that they would; purifying the social structure of threats of betrayal, murder, incest, and theft was easier than doing away with external threats of disease, animal predation, and hunger. (Remember, nature is indolent.)

So the development of morality, cooperation, and even religion was a product of evolution – at least in the beginning epochs of the species.

However, Nietzsche was quite correct in pointing out the sluggishness with which social mores evolve. If we agree that morality roughly equates with cooperation towards efficiency and expediency, as most utilitarians do, we’ll have to admit that the more intelligent members of a community surpass the efficiency of codified law. For instance, social solidarity was paramount to the hunter-gatherer tribe; these days, most of our threats are man-made. Homosexuality was a threat to the species then; now it’s just barely breaking through as acceptable – even though it hasn’t been an actual threat since the dawn of civilization. Dunbar’s Number explains the amount of individuals a person can work with socially, and it is staggeringly close to the number of people in a tribe. We still have gut reactions against incest, even if there is no chance of conception or psychological trauma. These are all throwbacks to more or less obsolete social norms.

Why does society not catch up more quickly with its greater members? Because the environment doesn’t warrant such a change. It isn’t as though morality is detrimental to the species in an evolutionary sense (yet). Sure, society could organize itself more efficiently, but only when pressured to. This is quite literally the law of the conservation of energy. Society is still resting on the margin. Why abolish social mores unless you absolutely have to?

We can interpret Nietzsche as saying that exceptional individuals are more efficient than the masses – that they are “beyond good and evil.” He often notes great persons as being highly adapted to their environment. However, we must remember that this environment, these days, is extremely social. Not only are we extrinsically instructed to have compassion for others abroad, we are also instructed intrinsically and instinctively to have compassion for more immediate scenes of suffering. Since Darwinians of his time thought the latter to be “unnatural,” so did Nietzsche. But that’s not the difficulty modern understandings of evolution give Nietzsche.

A superman as an efficient man is not enough. Rejecting Nietzsche’s and Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, we see threats spreading like liquid into the cracks, rather than accelerating into total violence. Greatness is more efficiently practiced on a shared level anymore. Talents need not be bound up tightly in a handful of individuals – they can be collectively practiced. Adaptation occurs in this landscape.

Now, Nietzsche professed radical individualism and that isn’t something we can ignore. But with a missing metaphysics, can his theories of morality survive in the normative sense? Some of his passages would allude to the impossibility of Nietzsche creating a positive ethics.

So one would think that all we can gain from Nietzsche is observance and description. In other words, all he has to offer is nihilism.

But Nietzsche made nihilism his mortal enemy; Christianity was but a particular manifestation of it. Was he right in doing so? I think he was.

Perhaps personal biases drive me to this conclusion, but I consider Marxism totally and unequivocally bankrupt. I see nothing of worth in it. Many of the past atrocities of the 20th and 19th centuries have been done in its very name, and most have been done on the same assumptions it maintains. If there’s anything Marxism has taught us, it is what not to believe in.

Nietzsche is different. I view him as pivotal to philosophy, as most philosophers do. I also consider him important in my own personal life and directly responsible for most of my beliefs today. While it may at first seem to illegitimate the concept, we need to look at the superman, again, in an aesthetic way. He is something to admire.

I think an existential Nietzsche makes more sense than a scientific Nietzsche. With the margin of living and nihilism encroaching upon us, a twinkle of sentiment explodes from within us to fight against these rather inevitable forces. The beautiful life somehow sounds better than the happy life. We would all pick being an unhappy human over a happy pig. Art isn’t valuable as it relates to market prices and forces of economy. It isn’t something we consciously do for its utilitarian ends, even if that might be the purpose it actually serves in the long run (which is arguable both ways). There’s much more to life than living on the margin. Schopenhauer mused over how humans can discover themselves with a contiguous model of causality and natural order, as well as see all of life and experience within our individual perceptions. We toggle between solipsism and empiricism with great ease. We don’t normally view our lives as nothing more than a path of least resistance. That world-view is meaningless to us.

Most people who read Nietzsche fancy themselves as the excellent persons he venerates, even if it’s quite untrue. Few think they are an obstacle to the coming of the superman, despite being just that. Nietzsche is inspirational more than anything else. He gives our lives meaning. He was an existentialist.

The Gay Science wasn’t an earlier work

Macro=Micro?

Nietzsche and economics?? Since when? You’re not saying that Nietzsche was a Laissez-faire capitalist, are you?

Possibility 1 - Humanity evolves into a new species with 48 chromosomes
Possibility 2 - Global paradigm shift

They’re really more of an indirect product of evolution. It is much more likely that things such as morality and religion were products of the collective consciousness in the populations that formed them.

What about Pagan Rome?

Our inherited instincts leave only a disposition in our minds - one that we can go against.

What great members? The intellectuals? They are society’s filth. Haven’t you learned that yet? The common people can live in bliss, while you are pushed into a hole and unknowingly made to dig for them, because you aren’t fit for reproduction; then they’ll just take any of the precious jewels you dig up, and you’ll have allowed them to never have to earn such things themselves.

You’re getting close with the topic matter you’ve been compelled to let yourself get sucked into: evolutionary psychology; the blatant denial of reason and rationality throughout human history.
You’re quickly on the fast track to opening up a whole can of cognitive whoopass on yourself. Try looking into “sexual selection”, and maybe dabble in looking into a little “black magic”, and you’ll have a first class ticket to the void.

It came before Thus Spoke Zarathustra and Beyond Good and Evil. Many scholars consider this the dividing line between his earlier and later work.

Austrian economists like to say that the macro doesn’t exist. Ever hear Margaret Thatcher say, “Society doesn’t exist?”

Not at all. I’m saying that his proclivity to consider morality “unnatural” in a Darwinian sense has much to do with common thought of his time. Since I’m making “laissez-fare” argument against Marx, I also need to distance this argument from some common misconceptions of it that prevail even today.

Economics is the science of values. Like I said, the spontaneous order exists outside of biology and economies.

No, I mean how logically is this supposed to happen in light of the fact that the individual has been losing her premium in society and in life exponentially for the above stated economic reasons. I’m not asking methodologically how.

Again, evolution doesn’t just explain how wildebeests change over time; it explains how everything changes over time. The idea is that that “collective consciousness” is as much a dynamic system as anything else and it is as subject to the laws of selection. Calling anything a “direct product of evolution” is fallacious in itself.

An exception?

Who is the “we?” Another set of dispositions, right? The conflict of things will always eventually quiet down on the margin.

That was a rhetorical question for Nietzsche. Are you suggesting that great persons are not actually great?

I agree.

I disagree.

If civilization reverts back to a city-state structure similar to Ancient Greece, that will fix itself.

Still, its like saying “the development of ducks and beavers were the product of the planet Earth”. Okay, what’s your point? What are you implying?
You need to get on a narrower level. Just because “evolution” is a spooky word to some groups of people doesn’t mean using it asserts you any power - at least not when centered around intelligent discussion.

For individuals in small populations, if there are no members of the opposite sex present outside of the individual’s own family for extended periods of time, the individual will instinctively resort to reproduction with other family members.

“We” as in the human race. Our ability to defy disposition is permanently embedded at a very monumental margin. Why? Because any environment is chaotic, and we’ll always have to react to fluctuations.

Who? Martyrs and heroes? Shamans? Intellectuals? Define your terms

Imagine this: everybody already intuitively knows whatever it is you think you are “discovering”.

So you’re not into the current trajectory of things on the whole? I hear a lot of Nietzscheites proffer reactionary measures. Julius Evola is a classic example. Why is this? For one thing, it seems so presumptuous to call all of history a “mistake” or “unjust.” “If only we reverted back to such and such.”

I’m also not sure how what you said is supposed to follow from my point.

It’s conceited to think that we can “control” the same process that we are functions of. I was reacting to your statement about the “collective unconscious,” a concept popularly respected for its narrowness. You said that morality was indirectly derived from evolutionary processes. I’m retorting that those processes are a) inescapably ubiquitous, and b) at the heart of the is/ought problem. Saying that it’s natural to feel compassion for others doesn’t mean it’s right. But that doesn’t give one license to make up ethical dictates on the spot. Statements are judged rational by how closely they hug the margin. Sure, one might think eating lima beans is wrong, but my argument for them is based on the facts that they’re edible, (somewhat) tasty, nutritious, and not at all disease-ridden.

My argument is that these chaotic energies, don’t dissipate, but disseminate into smaller and smaller microcosms. The universe seems obsessed with fine-tuning itself.

Nietzsche’s terms. He thought great people as both ultimate expressions of the universe’s will-to-power – which I argue is wrong – as well as people who live aesthetically beautiful lives – which I argue is the only thing ultimately worthy we can, and in effect do, get out of Nietzsche’s philosophy. This second argument is more compelling than saying, say, that Marxism is worthwhile since trendy but sadly uninformed individuals in college love wearing Che Guevara shirts and Mao hats. Nietzsche is far more powerful because he declares outright war against nihilism, which I think is what we should remember most about him.

a) They do?
b) Are the differences between intuitive and explicit knowledge necessarily coincidental? In other words, if such is the case as you posit, is explicating the intuitive a vapid activity? Most moral philosophers have attempted to do this very same thing; reconciling the intuitions with cerebral models of things is quite important for people concerned with detail, accuracy, progress, and humbleness of character.

I wasn’t talking about the collective unconsciousness, I was talking about the collective consciousness - there is a huge difference.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaos_theory

Triple post.

Triple post.

It’s still not a narrow category, nor one that eludes laws of dynamism. I also question the legitimacy of the concept’s power; is consciousness really collectivized in society?

Chaos theory certainly illustrates the sensitivity of the universe. This sensitivity took awhile to catch on in philosophical circles during the 19th cent. (Although David Hume seemed to have gotten it pretty early.) Objects were thought pretty cut and dry. Even paradoxes concerning cutting an apple into infinitely smaller pieces wasn’t that big of a deal. The universe was just mechanical and Newtonian. Then things like relativity, quantum mechanics, and other groundbreaking physical theories popped up. The world seemed a lot weirder as it got bigger or smaller in scope.

Chaos theory is just another instance of the “weirdness” science has to offer. It’s also a concept quite easy for sociology professors and postmodernists to latch on to and use to show that the natural sciences are subject to “paradigm shifts” and other such nonsense. See Thomas Kuhn.

All I’m saying is to put yourself in the universe’s shoes. Freeze time into a single snapshot. You have time to think. This is the margin. Observing the current state of all things, what will your next step be? You’ve only got so much matter and energy to work with. The rational option is to arrange things in the least exhausting manner (e.g., conservation of motion, etc.). So I can’t see how the will-to-power as a metaphysical concept holds water. It merely seems like a mawkish embellishment of the “survival of the fittest.”

Now put yourself back into a human perspective, but keep the margin frozen as is. Again, there’s time to think. How do you arrange your own personal resources? A utilitarian method certainly seems rational. But we’re finite creatures; furthermore, we’re imperfect creatures. We’re not all Spock. Utilitarianism confronts the calculation issue head on. But it also confronts the existential issue a little more subtly. And I think that this is where Nietzsche really got it right. (Note that Nietzsche reviled the “English hedonists” but still found more merit in their theories than the deontologists.)

Utilitarianism doesn’t explain art; it says it must serve some sort of utilitarian purpose within society’s structure, but this isn’t adequate for the experience or the creation of art. A Mona Lisa cold, rationality does not make. We have an instinct to defy the processes which comprise that very instinct. It’s a doomed but nonetheless valiant fight to wage.

But, like the Marxists, how are we supposed to wrench our resources out of the hands of processes that, by definition, can never relinquish them? Nietzsche anticipated this, at least tacitly. We often get images of great people being trouble, depressed, striving individuals, never satisfied with their own quite wonderful accomplishments. This is one of my favorite aphorisms by Nietzsche, and it sums this up well:

Now, to reiterate, I think the will-to-power is a bankrupt metaphysical concept. Why? Put yourself back in the universe’s situation. Are you going to play artist and twist the laws of physics to absurdities beyond the margin? Are you going to play God?

good article, dont know why i think that because i have no idea what you say. Yes N is affirmative of existence outside, beyond society, which is why we hippies all like him but miss his point. I heard that as a young man he saw a man on a hill slaying a beast in a thunderstorm. Supposedly thats when he got his special powers, the poetic vision of the dionysian will. No existence as such but at the cost of life.

I spent the last hour typing out a lengthy response, only for internet explorer to bring me back to the login screen once I submitted it.

Basically:

In recent decades, the concepts of a “collective unconsciousness” has been strongly associated with pseudo-science.
When most people hear the term “collective unconsciousness”, they think of conspiracy theorists, new-age pseudo-philosophers, homeless schizophrenics rambling about it on street corners, etc.
And honestly, these are all reasonable stereotypes. It seems that whenever I hear someone talking about the collective unconsciousness, 9 out of 10 times it is some crackpot rambling on about drivel.

But in evolutionary psychology, the collective unconsciousness is basically all of the cognitive mechanisms and psychological traits that the human species has gained through evolution. The difference between the “collective unconscious” and just the “unconscious” is simply that traits within the C.U. are shared between all members of the human species - versus just an individual.

Now, the “collective consciousness” (or called a Zeitgeist) consists of active phenomenon shared between individuals in an environment. For example, if one person starts cheering or clapping in a crowd of people, everyone else might start cheering or clapping as well.

The Collective Unconscious is sort of the “blueprint” for the psyche, where the Zeitgeist (collect. uncon.) consists of active demonstrations of the blueprint in action.

So a few posts earlier, I was basically just saying that religions and morality are formed through cultural factors (which in turn are just functions of environmental factors).
With evolutionary psychology, religion/morality are really just byproducts of evolution, and not direct results. For example, our DNA contains genetic instructions for the formation of a human eyeball, or instructions for an infant to instinctively identify a “mother”/“father” figure - but our DNA doesn’t contain any sort of psychological instructions for believing specifically in a religion.

Religion and morality are cultural phenomenon, not evolutionary phenomenon.

If you really want to view it through evolutionary psychology, religion and morality are much more likely the result of our DNA’s instructions for the mind when confronting the unknown, or for mitigating our conscious awareness of concerns.

I also typed a response to what you brought up about the will to power, but I’ll retype it later.

Is culture not an evolutionary phenomenon?

There is some evidence (albeit shaky) that spirituality is genetically linked, for example:
newscientist.com/article/dn7 … ation.html
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/God_gene

According to evolutionists, the entire universe is an evolutionary phenomenon including the religious arguments against it. :mrgreen:

And according to deists, the entire universe was created by a supreme being, who also created the arguments against himself :stuck_out_tongue:

Clink clink touche :banana-dance:

Mind you if any concept (either evolution or God) is stretched so broadly as to become some sort of universal acid dissolving all other arguments then it becomes unbeatable.
Philosophers refine your concepts!

As far as the thread goes I think the baron is making some good headwind - certainly will to power as a sort of universal motor also runs up against the problem of being way too wide a bat that hits every ball as outlined above.
I can’t see Nietzsche as wanting to propose any sort of alternative metaphysics - meta physics per sae is one of his major targets no matter what way you look at Nietzsche.

kp

Sure you could think of it that way. But saying “religion and morality are products of evolution” would also be like saying “renting housing is a product of evolution” or “watching television is a product of evolution”.
They are demonstrations of evolutionary psychological mechanisms in action, but not the product of evolution itself.

They could be called indirect products of evolution, but for what reason? That is what I guess I am asking. The connection being made between “religion/morality” and “evolution” is non sequitur.

If you painted a picture using paint made from berries and a paintbrush made from the fur of a horse, would you say that the painting is a product of the horse and the berries? Or wouldn’t we say that the painting is a product of whoever painted it - who catalyzed the elements of horse fur and berries.

And that articles just discusses a correlation between heredity and religiousness. Correlation does not mean causality.
The article specifies seperated twins in particular, who had similarities in their level of religiousness despite being seperated . Perhaps other similarities between the twins (such as physical appearance, intelligence, etc) may have disposed them to being more/less religious – and not necessarily a “god gene”.

I think the idea is that those very things are subject to evolutionary processes, as is everything else. Evolution is just a refinement of how laws of physics behave and interact over long periods of time – e.g., the evolution of the Earth’s core, the evolution of Seinfeld, etc.

You’re thinking of evolution as a paradigm. That’s why I like calling the application of evolutionary processes to all things the “spontaneous order” or the “natural emergence” instead of evolution. Most people think of “evolution” as this big long thing that happened before humans popped into the picture. But it’s still happening.

That means psychology is screwed if that’s always taken as an argument. A better argument is that that isn’t a convincing enough correlation.

That’s reaching. The idea is that some people are biologically predisposed to experiencing moments of what psychologists call “elevation.” One can look at ethics in three dimensions: an ethic of autonomy, an ethic of community, and an ethic of divinity. Our culture greatly emphasizes the ethic of autonomy. Others mix these three differently. The ethic of divinity has a lot to do with purity, pollution, disgust, and contamination. One can say that it takes great efforts in separating humans from their animal features. For instance, Hindu priests are instructed not to think of God while urinating, while food is still in their mouths, or while farting.

We atheists see this as silly for obvious reasons. But an undeniable component of human nature is the dichotomy of disgust and elevation. Autonomy is certainly our main concern, but sociologists and psychologists are careful to point out that this emphasis isn’t totally beneficial. Anomie and depression are major effects of secular, Western nations.

Have you actually taken a look at the article? It’s bad

Schizophrenia, the “gene of Kings” – or as JRR Tolkien made reference to it, “Narsil”/“Andúril”
After countless generations of war and conflict, the genes of masochistic martyrs began to form.
When other people show them a mirror and they don’t see love, they break the mirror, and reassemble it.

Atheists’ real concern should be why they still feel like they need to stand under a banner — when the ironic and paradoxical fact is that their banner’s objective is the denouncing of banners in general.
Atheists are like the 21st amendment of the United States Constitution, having no other purpose other than to repeal the 18th ammendment.

Your intuition may be in the right place, but the geometry of your “-ism” is a contradiction of itself.

And also, you know little about the mechanics of evolution if you think a "genetic disposition to ‘religious elevation’ " would have time to form, let alone a reason for forming,

Biological disposition? You need to take another look at Chaos Theory.

Clearly you are more of a Schopenhauerean than a Nietzschean. Are you suggesting that we deliberately react to Nietzsche and instead side with his predecessor? The superman was explicitly meant in the exact opposite sense to what you suggest here. Nietzsche makes a distinction between art as admiration from afar and art as festival. Whilst Ancient Greek art was deliberately artificial, there was festival in it - just as in Plato’s philosophy. Now, art is nothing more than exaggeration, immitation and escapism (whether it is done today for money or expression). Schopenhauer’s reaction to art was in this latter escapist sense, in the degenerate bourgeois sense - not in the ancient sense where there was much strength in and amongst everyday life, always so close and intimate with conquest and unfettered human achievement.

This brings me to Marx. I think I am right in thinking you have read less of him than Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. He actually wrote very little about his legacy, Communism - he positioned himself as the untouchable theoretical initiator of real practical material models, without ever participating in the practice of them. The atrocities you mention were committed by those who were unable to lead the actual transition movement into Communism, and whose actions bear zero semblance to the practices of Marx’s Communism. For one, the state is supposed to “wither away” in order to reach Communism, so in what way does Statist action illustrate Communism?!

Marxism is about Socialism - even though he heavily criticised many Socialists - which is ACTUALLY simply the discussion, by the people, of how conditions can be changed to better suit the people. Socialism is another word, like Communism, that has been unrecognisably distorted by propaganda to mean almost the exact opposite of what it actually means. If you don’t think the practice of discussing these things is to be believed in, then you are either a smitten Capitalist or a vengeful and ambitious worker who wants to be a smitten Capitalist. Or simply ignorant.

Since Nietzsche advocated the free spirit, I do not see the relation between this and a “planned economy of the self”. Since Marx advocated the individual as a social and historical product who works best in social environments, the “self” is by no means a pivotal point in his philosophy, but a planned economy is (BUT NOT BY THE STATE!!) by socially related workers. There is no apparent logical fallacy in jumping “out of the boat to steer it from the outside”, this is just a bad analogy. At every step, we effect the outside world and it effects us - to the somewhat Buddhist extent that the distinction between the two is practically dissolved. History, like time, is traditionally looked at linearly - in order to quantify it. This “historical sense” is something that Nietzsche criticised, so whilst Marx is dependent on the linear modelling of life, Nietzsche is not. The practice of freezing the way things currently stand, as in an observable snapshot, is abstraction. This practice is infamously misleading, but without it we would not be able to consciously ascertain a path to lead. Another dichotomy melts away: between leading and misleading. Nietzsche did not rail against English Utilitarians for abstracting, he railed against them for ‘needing’ to see the world as already having been abstracted in certain ways - that it was ‘not man who did this’. Nietzsche’s sublimated will to power has the compulsion to abstract towards one’s own ends satisfied. Marx, with his historical sense, was very English in seeing history as having already been laid down, pre-interpretation. Only in this way could Communism be an inevitability. The Superman is not an inevitability, there is the threat of the perpetually uncreative Last Man.

There are significant differences between the two philosophers. It is not least wrong that Nietzsche was wrong for the same reasons that Marx was wrong.

It’s a shame that often when someone manages to say something intelligent, it kills the thread.