Not so Schopenhauerian after all, then. I think the wording of 7 threw me.
Aha, I live and learn.
There an image forms of how a non-material phenomenon condenses into a physical form.
If ‘will’ here is replaced by charge and momentum, then this appears as a quantumphysical description of the way the subatomic becomes solid: by relation.
Will can not affect nerves, because a nerve does not exist on the same level as will. A nerve is not in itself a reality the way will is; like any physical thing it is a derivative of will. Observing how will (directly) affects nerves would be like computing a number on a display of a calculator with the electrical charges inside the calculators chip producing the appearance of the number.
In this sense a nerve, like any other object, could be seen as noumenon, in relation to will if we take that as (the primary) phenomenon.
Excellent post, so far.
A noumenon? Are you sure? Isn’t a noumenon supposed to be more fundamental than any phenomenon?
Noumenon, in the Kantian sense, is not considered ‘phenomenal.’ It is exactly this [edited intentionally]–
The ‘noumenal’ is the catalyst and reason for the “primary phenomena”, as Jakob put it. That primary phenomena being the manifestation, representation, or ‘projection’ of the noumenal chaos to our senses (in this case, driven by the ‘will’). The “secondary phenomena” would be perception and interpretation of the presented sense data. To Kant, we may only have knowledge of the phenomenal world which is affected, and driven, by the unknowable noumena.
In the classic, Platonic sense, I think that “noumenal” was used to describe the world of abstraction and form, posited as infinite and eternal. In this sense, the noumena is conceptual; whereas Kant used the term almost synonymously with the ‘thing-in-itself.’
To answer your question, I think the classical conception of ‘noumena’ is not more fundamental as it relies on phenomenal experience. Kant’s ‘noumena’, however, would be more fundamental (…in theory).
Actually, the two would seem almost synonymous in this context. Any “inner world” we might speculate about is likely derivative of an “inner will.”
No, I am not sure. I had something like this in mind:
With the notation that ‘in theory’ here means ‘not in reality’.
I use the word noumenon to mean a concept of a thing, or object.
A noumenon is a form, or a conception of a form, and a (or the) phenomenon, is a force.
Force is more fundamental than form, so there is no such thing as form prior to force. Noumena, concepts in general so also when they are exalted to metaphysical status, like Platos Idea and Kants thing-in-itself, are derived of phenomenal forms, which in turn are derived of the particular working of force/will. The question I am struggling with is whether these particular workings (willing to power) can be seen as the ‘inherent form’ of force.
This exact question was bouncing around my head during my entire drive to work this morning. My conclusion is admittedly simplistic, but I came to look at it like this–
That which exists necessarily exists to its full extent. That is, a ‘thing’ strives to survive, or persist, and does so with the best of its ability. Thus, to me, it seems that we are not only driven toward survival, but also dominion. We want what is useful for survival and quality of life, but never to be used. Therefore, our drive toward survival is more accurately a drive toward proficiency in survival. The only thing we desire more than life is control over how we live. So a person is faced with the decision of either capitulating to his environment (out of fear), or seeking dominion of that environment (power). However, such capitulation does not rob one of his desire for dominion, whereas that desire can easily overshadow any motive toward capitulation.
So, my conclusion is essentially that fear is powerful, but reactionary or defensive. Our desire for dominion is offensive, and continually driving us. Thus the ‘will to power’ (desire for dominion) is our primary, inherent drive.
So basically it is just another way of arguing “might makes right” or “survival of the the fittests”.
So that down on earth individal daseins come to approach it as points of view embedded in what they have been taught to will or to not to will.
But what…besides power itself…is it most reasonable to will?
Or does the will to power truly transcend good and evil? Is it even beyond philosophical discourse itself?
Also ask, what happens when the so-called will to power drives itself out of existence by overpowering and destroying those things necessary to foster its own life?
I was just reading the ‘nature of philosophy’ thread, with it’s Spinozean theme. I think what you describe here is precisely what Spinoza meant with Conatus: the effort of a thing or being to persist as itself.
Paradoxically, in order to persist as oneself, it is necessary to accumulate and to add to oneself, and thereby change.
If one remains passive and ‘lets it be’ or ‘go with the flow’, one soon loses autonomy and becomes absorbed to be part of a greater whole.
Both ways, self-containment of a thing or being, ‘thingness’, can be seen as a fiction, but in the active, accumulating and dominating sense, the fiction is experienced as real, which in effect makes it more real than the truth which it ignores.
Tragedy.
No. More a way of explaining that mentality.
Is the ‘will’ taught? Desires can be recognized, and refined, through experience but I see that more as fodder for the ‘will’ than the ‘will’ itself.
That has been addressed – Fear. To persist we either assume an offensive or defensive position with respect to our environments. Offensive would be the pursuit of dominion (will to power), whereas defensive would be capitulation (fear).
Do you consider your inherent drives ‘good or evil’? This seems like an amoral discussion to me; for the time being at least. If the topic were beyond discourse, I doubt this thread would be near as interesting or controversial as it has become.
This is based on an assumption of individuality rather than synergy. Wouldn’t you think that part of the allure of dominion, or ‘power’, is an inherent interest in the well being of that which you use to survive?
A boss is well advised to treat his employees kindly, for instance, lest his lust for power rob him of his dominion.
Of course, this may not be applicable everywhere, but I think diversity keeps this balance for the most part. If everything is in competition (including subsystems, subcomponents, etc.) we form natural sort of checks & balances. Lesser consciousnesses do this through defense mechanisms, higher procreation rates, etc. We do this through the notion of ethics.
Sauwelios,
How unkind you are to my dear Fritz! I admit that the passage looks superficially like a conditional argument. (I.e., If nothing else were ‘given’…then the world is W-P). And of course, if you formulate the argument that way, it would be classically true–since the antecedent will always be preposterously false. Do you think that Nietzsche thinks that nothing else is ever given as real except “our world of desires and passions”? That sounds fairly idealistic, don’t you think?
What do you think is the purpose of this passage, according to Nietzsche? I would say, clearly, that it’s a creation of the world in his own image. (He straightforwardly admits this a few passages earlier, in BGE 9). If that’s the purpose of this passage, then why do violence to it by reconstructing it into the form of a syllogistic argument.
If you think the first premise is a tricky one to attribute to Nietzsche, I assure you the rest don’t get easier–not when they employ ideas like the causality of the will, the will itself, and powerful unities.
You should probably be wondering why Nietzsche wrote the passage, in the first place. He doesn’t need an argument that the world “viewed from inside” is will to power–his observations everywhere suffice for that.
I’m not sure I understand the point of your post.
Wow man, that is one hell of an analysis …and I’m being serious. How you picked up on that is beyond me, but you hit the nail right on the head. I admittedly love Spinoza, so much of his rationale seems very genuine, honest, and straight forward to me. When I came to find out that some of my favorites were also some of Nietzsche’s (Spinoza, Epicurus, etc.), I started finding similarities in ideas (though often confused by differences in rhetoric). What I came to realize from Spinoza, after many unsuccessful hours attempting to decipher Nietzsche’s will to power, is that we (and Nature, in general) are driven by necessity. And, in short, survival makes a necessity of assimilation. We must advance, or adapt, in order to persist – meaning we must continually seek to extend and solidify our dominion.
Dude… If only I had folks like you to talk philosophy with in person.
The will to power is basically just an explanation of the world, it is not an ideal in-itself.
What is “most reasonable to will”, for Nietzsche, is his normative ethics or noble ideal.
I wrote a paper on this if you want to read it:
iambiguous wrote:
But what…besides power itself…is it most reasonable to will?
To reduce the complexity of human interaction down to “either this or that” has always seemed unreasonable to me. There are simply too many ever convoluted variables to take into account in the labyrinthian interaction between nature and nurture.
And this is always embedded in historical and cultural norms. And these are in turn embedded in contingency chance and change.
Where, for example, is the “will to power” manifested in human communities that resist unbridled competition?
To wit:
[b]Jules Henry quoted in Michael Novak’s, The Experience of Nothingness:
Boris had trouble reducing 12/16 to the lowest terms, and could only get as far as 6/8. The teacher asked him quietly if that was as far as he could reduce it. She suggested he ‘think’. Much heaving up and down and waving of hands by the other children, all frantic to correct him. Boris pretty unhappy, probably mentally paralyzed. The teacher quiet, patient, ignores the others and concentrates with look and voice on Boris. After a minute or two she turns to the the class and says, ‘Well, who can tell Boris what the number is?’ A forest of hands appears, and the teacher calls on Peggy. Peggy says that four may be divided into the numerator and the denominator.
Henry remarks:
Boris’s failure made it possible for Peggy to succeed; his misery is the occasion for her rejoicing. This is a standard condition of the contemporary American elementary school. To a Zuni, Hopi or Dakota Indian, Peggy’s performance would seem cruel beyond belief, for competition, the wringing of success from somebody’s failure, is a form of torture foreign to those non-competitive cultures.[/b]
iambiguous wrote:
Or does the will to power truly transcend good and evil? Is it even beyond philosophical discourse itself?]
I agree, the limbic brain functions beyond good and evil. But it is always in contact with so-called “higher brain functions” that can shape and mold the naked ape into any number of conflicting social aggregates. You can have cultures that range from the Amish community to the thugs that make up most gangbanger communities. And all social configurations inbetween.
In my view, the “will to power” is just an intellectual reconfiguration of the role testosterone plays in making this a violent world. But this is by no means the way it has to be.
I was with you until you said this. If that were the case, then all communities would degenerate into gangs and social darwinism; but clearly many human communities have not done so. That our world is now doing so speaks more to the way that humans have become separated from their true natures since communities of the past were able to live and sustain themselves holistically and cooperatively for many millennia.
The thing is that according to Platonism, the Forms are the only true beings. I understand your use of the term “noumenon” now: you basically invert Platonism. But why still call such fictions “noumena”, then? Because this is inaccurate, Nietzsche calls them “phenomena”.
It seems that Nietzsche goes beyond description to prescription. He elevates Will [as did Scopenhauer] over all else and creates a “normative ethic” and a “noble ideal” predicated on the assumptions he makes about it. But there are other assumptions made by other philosophers about the role Reason plays both in tackling Will and in bringing it over to Virtue.
Actually, I tend to agree more with Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. But Will is just one component in the interaction between nature and nurture—manifested as it is in conflicting ways regarding actual flesh and blood human communities over the centuries.
I don’t think the will to power can ever actually be tamed, true. But I don’t think it can ever actually be named either.
We have yet to ground the premises of subsyllogism I:
Sub-syllogism I
a. Thinking is merely a relations of our drives to each other.
b. All elements of consciousness other than thinking, if any, are also only drives or relations of drives to each other.
- Nothing else is “given” as real except our world of desires and passions, and we cannot get down, or up, to any other “reality” besides the reality of our drives.
I think these premises are meant to be grounded psychologically. Self-reflection can tell us whether they are true. So if one is dishonest toward oneself, as most people are, one will not agree with them. But this does not satisfy me. Should we just accept such dishonesty? Or can we ask such people difficult questions?
Nobody has yet addressed the irony in the will to power doctrine. It is an idea invented by a human being, and in putting the idea in practice, the use of power itself ends up destroying the instruments, particularly when that will to power becomes equated with might makes right. There is also a paradox inherent in such manifestation because ultimately it makes the most powerful the weakest in evolutionary terms. The fittest survive in a dog eat dog, human against human, human against nature world where any will can become a whim of iron and do anything it likes to the point that no one survives; hence, humans go down as the most successful failures ever of all who have lived on earth.