I’m assuming you’re not a doctor which means every medical word of that article is taken on the authority of the author.
You keep saying this as if it were witty, or proves something, “is that a perspective” blah blah blah.
That may be, but you appeal to the opinion of the majority - how un-Nietzschean!
You should be called “Negativist”.
Negativist’s “lucid” description of Nietzsche’s perspectivism:
“One doesn’t discover truth, one’s perspective fucks itself until it’s impotence is transmuted into continuity.”
To me, you are no bridge to the Superman.
Like I said, it doesn’t matter to me what underlying condition Nietzsche had, but if someone asked me why he went insane, I would say syphilis. If I heard someone say Nietzsche went crazy because of “eye cancer” I would not think in a million years of trying to correct them.
It’s not that hard to understand, our intellect isn’t able to make subtle distinctions so it find identity where there is none. We aren’t able to understand processes, so we identify faulty cause and effect.
Some people like to take this further and posit “being” and “good an evil”.
Your brand of “reality” is simply your brand of “reality”.
I think that there is a Natural ethical, moral order. and it began with the fundamental essentials of survival of the very primitive Human.
stealing food for example. is the begining and awarness, the essence of right and wrong.
inotherwords it is the essence of survival that provokes, stimulates the realization of right and wrong. Naturally
Yes, it’s certainly wrong to be clubbed to death for stealing somebody’s mammut chops. And no, I do not mean that morally. Thank you for sharing your two cents.
[quote=“Sauwelios”]
you missed the point . the physical reaction to the action is not what is important. it is the awarness of the cause of the reaction to stealing , the want to survive. and therefore a primative begining to morality. that is whats important to understand.
[quote=“north”]
So morality is rooted in the will to survive. Yes, and thereby in immorality (selfishness). The positive, true form of the will to survive, however, (of the will not to die) is the will to power.
[quote=“Sauwelios”]
immorality-selfishness in this case, is rooted in the inability to survive , for what ever reason. both are fundamentaly the manifestation of the desperation to survive. eliminate desperation…
actually the positive true form of the will to survive is not power but to want to know , understand and develope , expand , grow.
power alone means nothing.
[quote=“north”]
Knowledge is power. And the will to flourish is the will to power (or, perhaps more fittingly, to might).
It seems to me now that more or less’ and Nihilistic’s criticisms were in so far warranted that the nihilism I considered “the truth” in this thread (and which Nietzsche considered the truth) was not complete nihilism. For according to complete nihilism, all my experiences and perceptions - including my sense of “self” - are only a hallucination; there is no shared universe in which there are multiple human (or any other kind of) beings, one of which may be more truthful (nihilistic) than the other. This is the view I’ve christened “solosomniism” (all there is is a dream) - even the “self” of solipsism is part of the dream.
What is having the hallucination? How can a nothingness have a hallucination?
The hallucination or “dream” is not had by anything. But at least there is something Nietzsche calls an “imagining Being” (vorstellenden Sein) that “puts forward” (vorstellt) these dream images.
Also, one should understand that “nothing” means “no thing”, “no being” (in the Parmenidean sense). As Nietzsche says, though it is necessary for imagination to posit a - being - subject and content, this does not mean that they must exist - that a Parmenidean being exists. We should certainly not fall in the grammatical trap by supposing that a “deed” presupposes a “doer”. Logic is itself part of the hallucination: there is no guarantee that existence (or the lack thereof) is logical.
Then what must exist, according to your logic, is imagination…not the content of imagination.
If content does not exist, is the imagination imagining the imagination?
You must eventually concede that objective reality exists, or your conclusions remain nonsensical.
Yep.
Nope, the imagination is (=) imagining the subject and the content.
It is not a question of conceding. Nietzsche begins the passage in which he expressed this idea as follows:
““I imagine”, therefore there is a Being: cogito, ergo est.”
This Being is the imagining Being, i.e., imagination.
Nietzsche called this “the fundamental certainty about Being”. The point is that, if nothing else, an imagining Being exists (though it is not a “thing”, not a Parmenidean Being).
So yes, logically, an objective reality exists: if nothing else, it is the imagining Being. But it can never be an object of thought: for that would mean to imagine imagination, and imagination is pure flux, untrammeled; whereas only “things” can be objects of imagination. A “thing” is an absolutely durable, indivisible unity (or unit). Projecting such imaginary things on imagination itself does nothing to make the latter conceivable; if anything, it obfuscates its inconceivability.
Last year I wrote a translation and purport to the passage in question. I will reproduce it here:
"Fundamental certainty.–
[this is the title of the passage]
“I imagine”, therefore there is a Being: cogito, ergo est.–
[I have to explain this.
- “I imagine” is ich stelle vor in German, literally “I put forward”.
- “A Being” is ein Sein in German: so “Being” here means something that is; not an entity (as in “a human being”): that would be ein Wesen.
- Cogito, ergo est is Latin and means “I think, therefore there is something”, or “I think, therefore it is.” It is a correction of Descartes’ cogito, ergo sum, “I think, therefore I am.” The explanation follows.]
That I am this imagining Being, that imagining is an activity of the ego, is no longer certain: just as little is everything that I imagine.–
[So it is not necessarily the “I” which is putting these images forward, into the mind; both the “I” (the subject) and the objects or content of consciousness may be imaginary.]
The only Being that we know is the imagining Being. When we accurately describe it, then it must contain the predicates of Being. (When we regard imagination itself as an object of imagination, however, is it not tinctured, falsified, made indefinite?–)
[When we think about this imagining Being, we regard it as a “thing”; but this “thing” is only an image of the imagining Being; we can never see it as it is, as “seeing” is itself imagining, and it is not we, but the imagining Being which imagines (puts these images into our mind, into our consciousness).]
Characteristic of imagination is change, not motion: passing away and coming to be, and in Imagining anything persistent is lacking.
[Change, not motion, because existence as a whole is changing, and existence as a whole has nothing to move in. That imagination is changing is a fact of experience.]
On the other hand, it posits two persisting things, it believes in the persistence of 1. an ego, 2. a content; this belief in persistence, in substance, i.e. in the remaining identical thereof with itself, is a contradiction with the imagination process itself.
[As the imagination process is a process of change.]
(Even when I, like here, talk completely generally of imagination, I make a persisting thing out of it.)
[As I said above: when we think about this imagining Being, we regard it as a “thing”, that is, as something which remains identical with itself.]
Inherently clear, however, is that imagination is nothing resting, nothing identical-with-itself, unchangeable: the Being therefore, which alone is guaranteed to us, is changing, not-identical-with-itself, has correlations (conditions, Thinking must have a content, in order to be Thinking).–
[These conditions are the belief in the two persisting things mentioned above: 1. an ego, 2. a content.]
This is the fundamental certainty about Being. But Imagining postulates precisely the opposite of Being!
[Namely, persisting, substantial things.]
But that does not mean that it is true!
exist.]
But maybe this postulation of the opposite is only a condition of the existence of this kind of Being, of the imagining kind! That is to say: Thinking would be impossible, if it did not fundamentally mistake the essence of esse [esse means “Being” in Latin]: it must postulate substance and that which is identical, because a cognition of the completely fluent is impossible, it must poetically ascribe properties to Being in order to exist. There need not be a subject or an object for imagination to be possible, but imagination must believe in both. In short: that which Thinking [Thought] conceives and must conceive as the real, may be the antithesis of Being!
[You may have noticed that Nietzsche more or less uses thinking and imagination as synonyms. This is because in Latin, cogitare means both “to think” and “to imagine”. Even the English word “to think” means “to cause to appear to oneself” (it’s the causative form of the Old English thyncan, which meant “to seem”). So what Nietzsche says is that “I think” does not mean that “I” cause something to appear to myself, but that the imagining Being causes it to appear to “me” (and also causes the idea of “me” to appear).]
P.S.: I have sometimes capitalised words in order to emphasise that they are nouns. Also, das Vorstellen may be translated both as “imagination” and as “Imagining”; I have sometimes chosen the one and sometimes the other. If we compare the word “creation”, it is obvious that this is synonymous with “creating” if the process is meant, but not if the result of that process, the “product”, is meant (thus we can speak of “God’s creation of the Creation in six days”). In the above, by “imagination” I always mean the process.