Yes this is very good, but I don’t want to go in that direction myself yet until there is continuation with the basic line of development that is occurring between Sauwelios’ and my thought.
… the Story of Lot, although “will-to-power” was not an angel involved.
I think you’re conflating herd and slave morality. A slave cannot be part of a social body of which masters are not also a part. Slave morality’s impotent anger is in the first place directed toward the masters, i.e., a part of the social body, and thereby to the social body itself as being a structure composed of such parts–an order of rank. Yes, insofar as the herd is the community of slaves within that order, the masters are the wolves who prey on it, etc.–a growth overgrowing it, or at the very least parasitizing it (compare BGE 258).
I disagree with the notion that the difference between the herd type and the master type consists in how you distinguish Hector. As Strauss and Lampert say:
[size=95]“[Nietzsche] could not have shown his freedom from the herd morality more tellingly than by mentioning in one breath Caesar and Alcibiades. Caesar could be said to have performed a great, historic function for Rome and to have dedicated himself to that function—to have been, as it were, a functionary of Roman history, but for Alcibiades Athens was no more than the pedestal, exchangeable if need be with Sparta or Persia, for his own glory or greatness. Nietzsche opposes men of such a nature to men of the opposite nature (aph. 199-200).” (Strauss, “Note on the Plan of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil”.)
“An opposition to modern morality on [Nietzsche’s] scale cannot be led merely by ‘men born to rule like Napoleon, Alcibiades and Caesar.’ Strauss defines the true leaders able to counteract the modern degradation of man by using a combination of Nietzsche’s terms from this aphorism [203]: ‘They must be philosophers, new philosophers, a new kind of philosophers and commanders, the philosophers of the future.’ In then saying, ‘Mere Caesars, however great, will not suffice,’ Strauss suggests that they will at least be like Caesar in the one way to which he has called attention, the way which distinguished Caesar from glory-seeking Alcibiades whom even Socrates could not tame: they will perform ‘a great historic function,’ not merely for Rome but for humanity; they will be, as it were, functionaries of human history. They will, as Nietzsche said, be those few with the highest responsibility who ‘have the whole history of humanity on their conscience’ (aph. 61).” (Lampert, Leo Strauss and Nietzsche, page 76.)[/size]
Now in BGE 258, Nietzsche says: “The essential thing about a good and healthy aristocracy is […] that it does not feel itself as a function (be it of the kingship, be it of the community), but as its meaning and highest justification,—that it therefore with a good conscience accepts the sacrifice of an immense number of people”. This may seem to contradict what Lampert and Strauss say about the highest men’s being “functionaries”. But this is not the case, for they are ultimately functionaries of their own kind only. There is an even higher type than the Alcibiadeses, an even greater thing than glory. I think this even higher type’s counterparts to Alcibiades and Caesar are Epicurus and Plato’s Socrates, respectively: Epicurus kept retired to his ivory tower, his garden, whereas Plato’s Socrates “went down”, entered the public sphere. But Socrates started trying to tame Alcibiades too late, when he had already corrupted him. As Alcibiades is to Socrates, so is Hector, perhaps, to Polydamas, about whom Wikipedia says:
[size=95]“Homer gives no foreshadowing of Polydamas’s final fate, nor is he mentioned in most of the later poems dealing with the aftermath of the war, leaving the reader to infer that he perished in the general slaughter after the fall of Troy to the Greek forces.” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polydamas_(mythology))[/size]
This suggests that Hector’s sense of honor destroyed any philosophers Troy may have had. It is, however, the philosopher kings who are the meaning and highest justification of humanity.
[size=95]“Peace, stability and preservation of the city are lower than justice [e.g., Hector’s], and the latter is lower than the most noble life of the philosopher. But this hierarchy of ends does not determine which of these ends takes priority and which must be sacrificed for the sake of the other in cases of conflict. There is no principle that can tell us in advance whether the higher or the lower ends in any given situation take priority. These decisions can only be made in concrete situations, and, needless to say, require wisdom if they are to be made in accordance with natural right. Strauss indicates that the lowest, being the most urgent, frequently takes precedence over the higher: [a Strauss quote follows]. In other words, justice may have to be sacrificed for the sake of public safety, and such sacrifices are also in accordance with the requirements of natural right. This is understandable in view of the fact that the lower is a necessary means to the highest. Without the preservation of the city, the life of the philosopher would be impossible.” (Drury, The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss, page 101.)[/size]
Great philosophers! Yes! Caesar with the soul of Christ become himself? 
That’s not what he told you. On September 3, he wrote in this very thread:
On KTS, the join date of the user called Magnus Anderson is 2014-08-27.
Are you sure he’s had that since at least 2014-09-03? And even so, what does that tell us?
The herd’s morality is slave morality conditioned by millenia and sublimated into its current form. There are no more masters. Consciousness and conscience are now too powerful. Everyone is ‘clever’ by which I mean that everyone has a richer inner life. Consciousness is no longer a mere membrane. There are some happy accidents, in that a master will on occasion arise among the herd, but even they are botched in some fundamental way. Nietzsche’s optimism is to say that despite all this, the ‘work’ done on mankind by morality, on all of us, will not go to waste. A new kind of master can arise, a clever master.
The quote I used earlier goes on to say
[size=95]“In those cases, however, where one considers leaders and bellwhethers indispensable, people today make one attempt after another to add together clever herd men by way of replacing commanders: alll parliamentary constitutions, for example, have this origin. Nevertheless, the appearance of one who commands unconditionally strikes these herd-animal Europeans as an immense comfort and salvation from a gradually intolerable pressure, as was last attested in a major way by the effect of Napoleon’s appearance. The history of Napoleon’s reception is almost the history of the highest happiness attained by this whole century in its most valuable human beings and moments.”[/size]
We are at the end of the moral period [cf. BGE 32], which means that what began as slave morality, i.e., purely reactionary in the face of an actual master morality, has become transformed, sublimated, over the centuries into herd morality. There is still resentment, but this too is sublimated. There are no more masters, but there is a need for them. Hence Nietzsche’s predictions for the catastrophes of the 20th century.
Right, a philosopher feels it his responsibility to give form to the marble, his beautiful stone. He loves his own image in the stone, and his task, the philosophical task, is to mold the stone in his image. His interests lie with the stone, but he doesn’t do what he does for the stone, in service of it. And here you have the difference between Alcibiades and Caesar, though Caesar falls short of being a philosopher for the reasons already mentioned in your quote. Alcibiades was a warrior, which means his dominating drive was towards glory, not as with Caesar, which was towards his beautiful stone.
But a master type is not necessarily a genuine philosopher, though a genuine philosopher is of necessity a master, because a master need not create his own value, which is what defines a philosopher. There is a difference, a distance, a gap in power, between seeking your own interests and not serving as mouthpiece for the herd’s virtues, and creating your own value and seeing the herd as your interest, your marble.
It’s the difference, the distance, and the gap in power between the free spirit and the genuine philosopher. A genuine philosopher is a free spirit, but a free spirit is not a genuine philosopher. They’re both, however, masters.
One thing I have to say–and it’s somewhat unrelated to the topic at hand, but relevant to difference in our interpretations of Nietzsche–is that another way to destroy philosophers is to preclude their emergence by rendering the soil upon which they can emerge barren. If will to power is not perspective, if perspective does not precede will to power, if will to power is not an experiment, an attempt and a temptation, and if it is instead a transperspectival truth, then Nietzsche is precluding the possibility of anyone overcoming him, of a new genuine philosopher, of anyone offering an interpretation of the world by means of another meaning for Being. If will to power is true in a mummified sense, then there can be no new horizon. There can only be laborers of behalf of Nietzsche’s philosophy.
[tab]A friendly suggestion: read Heidegger’s Towards the Definition of Philosophy. Nobody reads or uses it, and certainly nobody reads or uses it in connection to Nietzsche, but his understanding of being and how it relates to a horizon, and his take on the task of philosophy is identical to Nietzsche’s. Where they part ways is on their faith of what philosophy and a philosopher can do. Heidegger is a pessimist on this question.[/tab]
This doesn't really follow, because in an infinite regress there still may be limits to the regress, at the point of the infinitesimal. At that point, may be, the quanta of power can actually approach a different , uncertain state. Therefore, the metaphor could hold to it's absolute limit.
The universe to have a limit, to be a zero sum, may be only metaphorically true, at the limit of the truth of that metaphors, the 'finite' dissolves into it's opposite boundary. At this point the metaphor is no longer applicable, since it's inclusive.
I cut you off here because what follows does not seem to follow, but seems like it could just as well have been a new paragraph.
When you say self-valuing is a term that means to “grasp” this why, do you mean it means to answer it or just to “grasp it in its whyness”, to use a horribly Heidegger-like phrase? What you go on to say implies that it specifically explicates this why, which is surely just a more lab-coated way of saying it explains it, that is, answers it. So how does the term self-valuing answer the question why there is being and not rather nothing? What is its answer?
“Auto-generative” is just a lab-coated way of saying it’s a self-cause. The notion of a self-cause, however, is absurd.
How is it “tied into the periphery values of other likewise [sic] beings”? What does this mean?
As for your “deep” (fundamental) contradiction etc., I think Nietzsche already covered that in his early, “artists’” metaphysics: the–primordial–will is the expression of the primordial one’s Being, the primordial one’s essential overfullness/overjoyedness: the primordial one suffers from its overjoyedness and therefore wills suffering/lack, that is, the world as we know it; more precisely, it wills this world, which is nothing but its own imaginary self-fragmentation, in order that the “individual beings” of which it consists yearn for joy/fullness, for the illusion of Being (eternity, divinity), and thereby transfigure Being. But this is no progressive phenomenon, but is always the case; the primordial one’s fundamental contradiction is its simultaneous joy and suffering.
And what would those elements be? Why should they together create a structure in a state of tension?
Can we really “look” at subatomic particles? Is not that by means of which we look, light, itself a subatomic “particle” (really neither a wave nor a particle)? And does not space solely consist of such subatomic “particles” (including of atomic and superatomic particles which in turn consist of such subatomic “particles”)? In fact, considering that a wave is only thinkable as consisting of particles, and whatever is neither a wave nor a particle not being thinkable at all, must not reality consist of nothing but hermetically touching particles? But then how can there be motion or change? It can only be because it is there always, with no particles pushing or pulling each other but just moving away in the direction in which others are moving away. But how can we relate to that?
[size=95]“Physicists cannot eradicate ‘action at a distance’ from their principles; nor can they eradicate a repellent force (or an attracting one). There is nothing for it: one is obliged to understand all motion, all ‘appearances,’ all ‘laws,’ only as symptoms of an inner event and to employ man as an analogy to this end. In the case of an animal, it is possible to trace all its drives to the will to power; likewise all the functions of organic life to this one source.” (Nietzsche, Will to Power 619, Kaufmann’s translation.)[/size]
Why cannot they?
A difference between what? A perturbation of what? “Topography”, like “space”, is an empty word.
No more than is your “pure, minimal difference”, your “potential localized in space to create a ‘bump’”; in fact, less so, because the will to power’s “insatiable frenzy” is our most fundamental experience.
This does not follow. It is the fundamental psychological or phenomenological notion, the most fundamental experience, the most fundamental feeling.
No, that is a naturalistic view, not a phenomenological one.
Yes, and this is where you are mistaken. For this is where you are a naturalist, not a phenomenologist. In other words, this is where you’re a labcoat, not a human being.
Anything can be analyzed in terms of lack, as a lack of lack is also a lack. But if we agree that absolute lack, total absence, would be nothingness, and that there is being and not rather nothing, then it follows that being has the character of surplus, an overflowing over the brims of nothingness. This overflowing is the will to power.
Here you imply that beings/selves consist of force as will to power.
I never said that it wasn’t specific. It is “willing for specific power or force-as-feeling-of-power”. In any case, I do not agree that value emerges as a consequence of a state of lack (see above). In fact, I think a “value” is simply the extrapolation from a specific force or combination of forces, and not something teleological.
Where did I reduce all valuation to merely valuing the will to power? What I said was that the revaluation of values is basically simply the valuation of the will to power. This revaluation, however, is really a re-revaluation–or, perhaps more clearly, a trans-transvaluation. The original revaluation or transvaluation was basically simply the devaluation of the will to power and the valuation of its opposite, the will to nothingness and the will-lessness to power (which, as Deleuze says in his Nietzsche (not Nietzsche and Philosophy), are not the same thing: the will to nothingness can turn against the will-lessness to power in those who value the will, or strength of will, higher than will-lessness, or weakness of will (compare Will to Power 22)). So there are other possible values than the will to power, at least in the imagination…
I don’t see what there is to elaborate. My individual body includes my feet but not my socks; my socks are part of the cosmic/historical body but not of my individual body. Of course, there is no absolute difference between the two, and in Nietzsche’s artists’-metaphysics, my individual body would be a single imaginary fragment whereas the cosmic/historical body would be the primordial one itself, that is, the real totality underlying all imaginary fragments–or rather, Dionysus is the imaginary fragment that realizes it’s an imaginary fragment and it’s really the primordial one, an incarnation of the primordial one, whereas Ariadne is any number of imaginary fragments that do not (yet) realize this.
I still don’t understand. Do your epistemic and ontic selves correspond to Parodites’ ideal and real egos, respectively?
Well, that is not what is meant by the phrase “existence precedes essence”. It still seems to me, though, that you subscribe to that phrase, considering that you seem to analyze the essence or being–the self-valuing–into more fundamental elements which are not themselves self-valuings.
I disagree with your suspicion of infinitesimality. For if there would be infinitesimality, then each of us would be infinite compared to the smallest being. Also, it would make your whole naturalism arbitrary or in vain (you must stop at an arbitrary point or keep going forever).
All views are ultimately non-rational religious views, and this view is itself at the same time a non-rational religious view and a philosophical-rational view.
My “miracle of absolute overcoming” is an insight, and yes, that insight can and indeed cannot but be lost again. This insight is that everything, even gravity, even entropy, consists of wills like one’s own will to defy gravity or resist entropy. And in fact, the joy resulting from this Spinozan insight can only express itself in Faustian defiance and resistance.
It’s chapter 8 of Kaufmann’s Nietzsche. A few excerpts. In section I of the chapter, Kaufmann quotes Nietzsche exclaiming, “as if every passion did not contain in itself its own quantum of reason” (WP 387), and says: “The will to power is neither identical with reason nor opposed to it, but potentially rational.” And in section II, he says: “It is the very essence of the will to power to manifest itself in one way and then to sublimate its manifestations”; and: “Nietzsche expressly denied the peaceful self-identity of the basic cosmic force and considered strife a definite feature of the ‘Absolute.’/The will to power is, as it were, always at war with itself.”
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Being exists because it values itself.
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Nothing does not exist.
Self-valuings are not states of internal contradiction. The difference is rather between irreducible beings. Thus existence in the singular sense is a state of contradiction conflict and struggle, but it is not an entity. I disagree with Nietzsche’s artist-metaphysics – I reject the notion of ‘the Primordial One’.
Infinitesimals are indeed nonsensical. Infinitesimality precludes discreteness. Thus ‘affectance’ can certainly not be calculated in terms of infinitesimals. RM:AO is wholly nonsensical.
A self-valuing is a ‘finitesimal’. The discrete minimum of ‘entity’.
While you are wasting time here the moslems are making children. They will fuck you up just like that, that is concrete will to power.
Stop trolling.
Stop eating shit. Thanx muchos!
Numbers of people count less than the quality of those people, and count less than the power or “will to power” of the societies of those people.
Islam will to power is virulent, yes. But also brutal, unsophisticated and intellectually void. It is why they have no technology or wealth to speak of except for what they have been given in trade or taken from other, better societies.
In contrast, the will to power behind western capitalism is greater than that of any other society in history.
I’m just saying that whites are eliminating themselves through trash culture where women work like slaves in order to buy children idiotic toys and pay kindergarden where they can meet only idiots, instead of buying them weapons and training them for war. Now made so meek they even fight against war and can not afford more than one child!
What is left from ancient Greece? Only books that nobody can understand!
That “question” is only a misuse of language and a misunderstanding of logic, a sign of inadequately developed thinking. There is no “why not rather nothing (at all)”, the entire concept of “nothing at all” is absolutely irrational and impossible. To even use such a concept as a guiding standard for examining being, will, consciousness, physics, is only indicating that person hasn’t even developed critical thinking adequate to philosophy. They are instead, in essence, still floundering in their own confusion of improper and ungrounded ideas and impulses which they experience as “their self”.
Joy comes after, it is secondary. “Suffering” is the more universal, fundamental state. No pleasure is possible without that broader sensate system in place which is frustrated and-or capable of being frustrated, which means destabilized and brought toward self-ruin.
The fundament of the deepest joy of being is itself, Phenomenologically speaking, the joy of self-existing and of feeling oneself as a sensationality enduring through time. But even this fundament is predicated on the existence of that “self”, that sustaining continuity of sensate self-organization. Remove any being’s senses, their singular perspective/“will” of identity-ness or just mess with their memory enough and you make that “joy of being” absolutely impossible.
You talk about joy and feeling as if it can exist without complex organisms capable of producing those states inside themselves as a consequence of their particular kinds of organizations of sensation, perception and responsiveness. That is a mistake. No anthropomorphism is needed to justify ontology or the human-like consciousness’s absolute primacy and power in that ontology. One “wills lack into the world” precisely because will is lack, it is the positive manifestation of systems in dynamic self-contradiction and irreconcilability; not, as you seem to think, because one is somehow “more fundamentally overjoyed”.
Joy-fullness must be earned, created, won. It is a process of overcoming (which Nietzsche in fact knew), and it is never given.
. . .
In terms of “periphery values”, the idea in VO is that all self-valuings radiate their values outward around themselves and produce valences, much like an atom; these valences also interact and form up to the common understanding and ground that we humans experience and measure as “physical-objective reality”.
It is because different things/elements are separate in space and “time” and composed differently than each other. The rocks in a pile are aggregated together by gravity but do not continue to merge closer and closer until they become “one rock”, until they lose their discreetness. This is the case with all entities. This is what it means to “be an entity”.
In rejecting the thesis I laid out here above you would be saying that entities all converge absolutely and become perfectly homogenous. That is not the case, and not only our reason but our experiences confirms this.
Take any structure of any scope, any “entity” and you can analyze it in terms of its constituent parts, “elements”, that are more or less irreducible. If increased/changed force or conditions are applied then they may reduce further, in which case that entity in question ceases to exist qua that entity- it failed to self-value itself qua this kind of structure-organization which it is.
In the kind of view you espouse, taken to its logical end, entities as such wouldn’t even be possible to exist. “Balanced tension” as uncollapsible self-irreducibility is a given for any kind of structure/entity-ness to occur.
That “inner event” Nietzsche mentions is not taken to mean an unstoppable irreducible “given” state. Seeing will to power as this inner event is not the end, it is just the beginning. N’s concept does not give cause to stop examining further, “deeper”, but rather exactly the opposite.
As I said above, if they could, then no entities, no “beings” would be possible.
To ask why a specific entity cannot collapse its inward difference further would require examining that entity itself. This would reduce through biology and chemistry to particle physics and logic. Ultimately it reduces to, again as I said, “difference itself”, the fact that local displacements in space (and remember, “space” just means those “mutual values” of whatever entities and scopes of entities happen to occupy that particular region) are possible at all. We know they are possible because they exist and because to posit the impossibility of their existing generates a contradiction, namely that no difference would be possible and this no existence would be possible.
However we conceptualize sub particle physics it relies upon this basic logical distinction of “pure differences”, pure in a relative sense because we can either posit an absolute ground lower limit or we can posit endless regress into always-lower levels and either way this relative “pure difference” appears.
I’m not here to lay out 100% knowledge of the physical sciences and sub-physical laws of reality, and it doesn’t matter how you conceive these, maybe more as irreducible atoms, particles, as quanta, fundamental field-forces, or as endlessly regressing tiers of existence/causality. Space exists regardless and is composed of beings, it is not “just empty”. In VO those beings are smaller and smaller orders of self-valuings whose nearby agreements on common “value” creates a fabric of mutuality and relative non-changing on which is them eventually built up all larger and more enduring beings and the “space” between them. You can think about that fundament however you want, provided you admit that this space actually exists, which it does, and that it is not absolutely uniform-homogenous, which it isn’t. It has a “topography” anyway, even if you only see local variations across space as “on” it rather than as an integral part of it.
Pure difference is absolutely, logically maximally individual and even so, I propose it is itself not actually indivisible but only relatively so; that its own inward differentiation is simply beyond the scope of our instruments to measure, yet nonetheless exists. My ideas here are an appeal to individual essence and organization down to the logically maximally different and to the actually endless regression of these difference-causalities and “forces”. Your idea is that there is one fundament that is not individual but rather universal, “will”, a feeling-impulse of force-expansion. Why does that fundamental “one thing” have this ceaseless “expansion-drive”? You say, “because it does, because that is what it is” and leave it at that-a non-answer. Rather my answer to “why this expansion-drive of the will?” is to say that this expansion-impulse or force is the result of a state inwardly differenced and in tension thus compelled, like water running downhill or air shifting from high into low pressure, to generate “forces” (changes that radiate outward and inward of itself) as a result of that tension, not even to mention as a result of what other changes are accepted into it and act upon it from the outside, which are we haven’t even started to explore yet.
My ontology is deeper, more comprehensive and more logically founded than your. To me, yours is like a parent who says “because it just does” to their child’s question, you don’t care to ask from where the will to power-expansion comes.
Feelings are never “fundamental”, that is the whole point you are confused about. A feeling is the result of a certain kind of sensate possibility given into reflexive, metonymic responsiveness by virtue of that larger system in which that particular quality of response is even possible.
“Valuing” in VO does not imply “feelings”. The capacity to respond is the basic ontic element latent to any entity in an ontological sense and this capacity only occurs because that particular entity/event in question has a specific nature and inward structure that is “porous” enough so as to allow itself to be changed-expended as a result of incoming stimuli.
Naturalism, so called (I don’t mean empiricism) is the basis of reason. My view is natural and naturalizing, as is all rationality and non-mystical thinking.
“Phenomenology” is the attempt to combine psychology with ontology, to derive the ontology of man/consciousness in terms of his psychological reality and to derive that psychology from the further ontology of the universe, of material existence.
You mistake where I talk about natural reason for the “naturalism” of empiricism, of the natural sciences. That is a large error on your part.
Your “will to power” is not yet even an overflow and surplus, because it is only a reactionism and consequence of those “more fundamental” lacks.
In fact the kind of will to power you idealize, the kind you think you are talking about when you talk about the fundemts of existence or psychology is only found much further up the chain of being, and only truly realized in human-like consciousness that not only overflows itself in fact but actually overflows this overflowing, as the understanding and ideal, higher-order overflowing of itself given the extremely disordered, confused, inwardly differenced and contradicting natures and senses-impulses it holds in itself.
Your looking at man in terms of the ground. Instead you should be looking at the ground in terms of man, or at least and most essentially, man in terms of himself- “consciousness in terms of consciousness”. What does it mean to “be a consciousness”? More than the WtP ideology is able to explain and account for.
That is your interpretation, because you still see every instance of “physical change” as changes in quanta of power only. However that’s not at all what I was talking about.
By saying that all change is “willing to power”, appeal to the quantum of feeling in “power-increase” you are claiming that all specific events are actually general, universal events, merely differing instances in place and intensity of the exact same thing. That is absurd.
To understand a thing you must examine it specifically, not merely declare it to be “a willing-feeling for more power” and call it a day.
Value isn’t teleological, except in beings like us whose architecture becomes subtle, self-responsive and inwardly differenced enough – rational enough – to comprehend and respond to conditions before they actually exist; as “ideas”. That is why I say that being is grammatical. In most beings, simpler beings this capacity to respond to the not-yet-existent is collapsed and flat, therefore those beings are merely reacting to immediate circumstance and stimuli. Only when capacity for thought develops can being become “teleological”.
What I meant was that the project of “revaluation” has more to do with than just “where/how is there more or less power?”.
Yes, because l this “naturalistic” sense is the very root, indeed the only root, of reason.
Only the complete abandonment of mystical, illogical, pathological-emotional, and vague thinking can be called reason. Note this does not banish these other forms from our existence, it only banishes them from our reason.
Good, now you’re starting to do some real thinking. I like this. The next step of course is to delve in like manner into the nature of consciousness/desire in order to unearth the actual living nature and reality of these as that on which the distinction between Dionysus and Ariadne rests. That would require, however, a much more precise and extensive conceptual language than the WtP alone has to offer, rather via N or Deleuze.
The epistemic is what grasps itself and lives as an enduring entity out of this “self-knowledge”, is basically this self-knowledges extended as far as possible. The ontic is what is already there and exists independently of that other process, including our memory and basic instincts/drives. The epistemic self emerges out of the wider ontic nature by virtue of capacities in structure and realized in environment to engender that kind of “self-knowing” entity-process; however, the only substance this epistemic self is able to work upon are either the immediate sensory stimuli or that other ontic self itself. The epistemic self therefore works to disorder, tear apart and reorder the contents of experience of the ontic and it does this in one of two ways: it either does so in terms of a process given by the “accidental” patterns handed down to us by natural selection, namely our already existing impulses like pleasure, pain, fear, jealousy, frustration, or instead it imposes its own nature upon these contents, the nature of self-responsive organization, secondary and “grammatical” being, objective being, namely reason, which is its own nature. The former process produces more ingrained pathological responses and absences, lacks of rational space- “gaps” - in feeling and behavior, while the latter produces what we call our ideas.
Ideal and real are confusing terms at first, are somewhat arbitrary names and you can disregard them if needed, use whatever terms you like.
The problem with will is that willing arises out of the ontic (psychological, instinctual-drive based) sphere as those inherited patterns of “feeling” which nature has given us; the epistemic sphere exists in opposition to all that, is by it’s very nature an entirely and radically different kind of being. Thinkers like Nietzsche, or Spinoza and Kierkegaard too, create their thought as precisely the activity of this epistemic sphere attempting to synthesize and reconstitute the contents of the ontic sphere; the “will to power” is basically just an attempt to draw the ontic nature firmly into the epistemic-thinking nature, a noble act to be sure, an attempt at a true psychology- but only just that, it is a particularly well-developed idea as attempt to reorganize the self in terms of reason (of truth, of reality) however, because Nietzsche lacked this basic understanding of the inward and causal dual division and irreconcilability of consciousness, its production of consciousness into two separate and quite different kinds of entities as well as the principles acting within and between them, what he achieved instead of a comprehensive knowledge of consciousness, self and reality is a kind of maximally ontological epistemology, by introducing the idea of the will to power as a lowest common denominator between these two spheres.
The idea can be attacked, yes. It can be defended too, by pointing out that any finite, specific emergence within the infinite continuum is despite that wider infinite itself wholly finite and limited to that scope in which it appeared; this its powers of action, sensation and response would apply in a likewise finite and limited manner and that being would be subject to thresholds of possible experience beyond which it could not venture into the wider infinity of larger or smaller scales of beings.
We might call those thresholds whatever stopping points our own senses cannot proceed beyond or our own made instruments cannot measure beyond. “Particles” or “quanta”, or “forces”, or whatever.
The whole “existence vs. essence” thing common in philosophy is just misguided, idiotic nonsense, by the way. An example of inadequate thinking, like how a child might parse things up were he given to metaphysical speculation.
What? All views are ultimately non-rational and religious? Are you fucking serious?
I’ll give you a chance to explain yourself. Let’s hope there is only some kind of language barrier or personal use of terminology causing you to say something so blatantly retarded.
So far for you, anyway. There are other ways the “religious” insight you see can express- as love, as hatred, as apathy, as hunger, as nobility. Religion like what N’s idea of the WtP has become produces many different kinds of temperaments and types.
In contrast, truth produces only one kind and “type”. Indeed, singularity appears only at the end of the long process of understanding.
…Completely irrational response.
- The question was one of why it exists. “It values itself” is not an answer. It has to exist before it can value itself.
- “Nothing does not exist”? - Amazing revelation.
- Infinitesimals are indeed completely sensible, else calculus wouldn’t work at all.
- You have certainly found nothing about RM:AO that is invalid or “nonsensical”, nor are you currently capable.
MM must have been talking about you;
The WtP exists for a reason. If you are going to promote it, you would do yourself a favor to learn of it.
Human anarchy - Humanarchy.
Humans struggling against the few.
Well, it happens that only few are better than the majority, but you can make a slave rebellion or a Buddhist herd-rebellion anytime!