nihilism and absurdity...out in the world

[Moreno]

@iambiguous

Again and again and again and again and again: I don’t look for a solution. Instead, I look for an argument that might convince me there can be one.

An argument has limited power, often none, even a sound argument. We place the agency, often, in the argument. We say ‘that could convince me’ -me as the direct object in the sentence- the language positing capability in the argument. But arguments and the mind hearing the argument must enmesh in certain ways, the system as a whole leading to effects. You might have to experience differently or new ‘things’ to be convinced - which really is a poor word in the end. Is there something you can explore experientially, either through introspection or ‘out in the world’ and these explorations might lead to a new reception to arguments, new data, exceptions, real intimacy? (because intimacy is a fundamental issue here. Your position is not one designed to foster intimacy with oneself or the world) In fact to give most of the agency to the mind, not surprisingly, is much stronger, I think.

Otherwise what I quoted above can seem almost like a proud challenge…Nothing can change my mind.

We all know impervious minds and I am pretty sure at any given moment we are all impervious to some very sound, even creatively presented arguments. Perhaps later on the same argument hits home after we have experienced more of ourselves or more of the world or more of others.

The ant with its mandibles states: every argument I find I clip in two and cannot carry it home.
Something tentative between clipping in two and dropping is needed.
Something ongoing and exploratory experientially, not with the mind’s little mandibles and exoskeleton, which the damn thing has, let me tell you. Words just bounce off it most of the time.
Heading out as the same old ant with the same old mandible approach and style - wordy thinky wordy thinky - may and probably will just reinforce assumptions one is comfortable with without actually knowing the reasons why.

See, it cut in two like all the others.

Why I say it blocks intimacy…
because it is a metaposition that seems to be lived in. From the crow’s nest of a meta-position you view beliefs. I know, you have supported progressive causes. Why was that OK? Why are actions, which are concrete and with concrete effects, OK, but thoughts must be at a meta-position? Why the exception for the more potent phenomenon and caution with the ephemeral one? Who cares what you mull over but what you do has effects. And yet you allow yourself to vote and act.
but never allow yourself to be at home in what you believe, but rather viewing yourself (and everyone else) like the first anthorpologists viewed the primitives.

The odd thing is, in this way you are a Christian, and not tentatively. Instead of seeing sinful desires in yourself which one should try to control, you see sinful positions which you detach from. The devil has been removed from the story and the word sin is no longer used, but the bifurification of the self continues religiously.

You are hardly alone in this…most modern people who identify as rational - to distinguish themselves from others - do not know how much they inherited the architecture of their mind and even dreams - and presumption - of transcendence from the very beliefs they dislike. I find this in myself also.

Who is this roving ‘I’ that knows more than the self it inhabits?
Because now the meta-position is lived, so this little ‘I’ that says it is the right lifestyle could be just as subject to folly as the rest of itself it judges and fears. There is no evading an absolute stance, though you can do it at the meta level.

[iambiguous]

@Mo_

@iambiguous

Where however have ethicists made similar progress with respect to conflicting value judgments? Here “nihilism and absurdity” still prevail. And they do so in the form of “conflicting goods”.

What is your reason for thinking that value is any different from math, science, and logic? You mentioned that people’s views conflict… but that is no reason to think there is a difference, because AS A MATTER OF FACT, people’s views conflict in math, science, and logic. So, please: WHY DO YOU THINK THERE IS A DIFFERENCE?

There is, of course, no difference between them if you subscribe to, say, Volchok’s “stuff is stuff is stuff” theory.

But if I say, “America is involved militarily in Afghanistan”, it is different [for me] from saying “American should not be involved in Afghanistan militarily”.

The reason I suspect this is that the first assertion can be confirmed as either true or not true. But the second one invokes Barrett’s conflicting goods argument. Joe gives his reasons for wanting to be involved militarily there. Jean gives her reasons for not wanting to. And, if I understand you, Joe can be right objectively at the very same time that Jean is right objectively.

And I share this argument to the extent one invokes dasein. We see the war there from different perspectives rooted in the individual lives we have led and the manner in which we have come to find meaning in those lives.

And if one assumes there are immutable laws of physics then the differences people have regarding math and science will eventually be resolved by discovering what is in fact true. There are no conflicting goods here because there are no value judgments rooted in prejudice rooted in dasein.

[Unless, of course, volchok is right]

As for logic, the rules of language are applicable to everyone. If, for example, something is logically true for everyone [Bob either is or is not a bachelor] we don’t get into heated discussions over it. But how do we determine logically if Bob should be a bachelor?

Yes, we can note how, throughout history, men and women [and today same sex couples] have tended to enter into a relationship analogous to what we call “marriage”. But that does not entail that if Bob chooses not to he is being irrational or immoral.

Now, I suspect you will ignore these points by and large [again] and go back to questioning my technical understanding of the precise relationship between reason and objectivity here. Because that is what I often construe when you say things like, “I see no reason to respond to much of what you’ve written.”

Show me an argument rooted in an actual circumstantial context where it has been shown that someone is morally right to have done something—on par with being able to establish that, in fact, he did do it. When you do so I will change my conclusion.

@Mo_

Wake the fuck up.

One possible translation: “Agree the fuck with me”.

@Mo_

I gave you one in the very post that you’re responding to. Here it is again: Your dinner guest is in the process of removing your daughter’s eyes with a fork. That is something he ought not to do. That is something one very rarely ought to do, and absolutely never for the reason that he is doing it—namely, for an appetizer.

Again, we don’t think about these things in the same way. You seem to equate the objective fact of removing the eye with a fork with the subjective intent and motivation of the person doing so.

All the person need do is be able to rationalize it to his own satisfaction. And you hovering over him screaming, “but that’s not what you ought to do!”, may or may not dissuade him.

Same with convincing him that his behavior is making things worse for him

This is the world we live in sans God and this is the world you are ever intent on making go away by insisting, “you must think about these things like I do or you are wrong.”

That part I get.

@Mo_

Maybe his rationalization is that he just likes to do whatever he wants. But his wants in this case are irrational because there is no good reason for them.

Says you. That he gets some sort of psycho-sexual and/or deepseated emotional pleasure from doing what he does is embedded in the fact that when we do what we do we are never really able to make precise distinctions between the reasoning mind and the parts of the brain that twist cognition into emotional and psychological states that can vary significantly from dasein to dasein.

We are, after all, not Vulcans. And you notice Spock rarely gets around to discussing the issues like abortion or animal rights.

@Mo_

Now, about the definition of “rationalize”. To rationalize something is to act on behalf of reasons that are not outweighed by stronger reasons not to do the act.

Yes, as long as it is your own calulating mind we use to differentiate the stronger from the weaker reasons.

Right?

But how all of this relates to conflicting points of view that are both true objectively I can imagine only in relationship to daseins interacting in an essentially absurd world.

[von_Rivers]

@iambiguous

But if I say, “America is involved militarily in Afghanistan”, it is different [for me] from saying “American should not be involved in Afghanistan militarily”.

The reason I suspect this is that the first assertion can be confirmed as either true or not true. But the second one invokes Barrett’s conflicting goods argument.

1. There is no such thing as “Barrett’s conflicting goods argument”. I’m not saying it is a bad argument, I am saying it literally does not exist.
2. You continue to beg the question. I am asking you to specify what you think the difference between these claims is, such that one can be true, and the other a matter of “daseinblah.blah.blah”.

We can disagree whether the military is in Afghanistan. And we can disagree about whether they ought to be there. And there is nothing about either case that precludes the possibility of an answer, whether or not it is ready to hand. And there is nothing about either case that precludes the possibility of an answer whose truth does not depend on whatever your whim and fancy happens to be at that moment. In other words, you can be wrong about both cases.

As for logic, the rules of language are applicable to everyone. If, for example, something is logically true for everyone [Bob either is or is not a bachelor] we don’t get into heated discussions over it. But how do we determine logically if Bob should be a bachelor?

Yes, we can argue about whether to use a bivalent classical logic (a form of logic with only two truth values: True and False), or some kind of free or higher-order logic, which does not have bivalent truth values—to capture vagueness, and the like. And we can certainly get into a heated discussion about whether Bob is, or is not a bachelor whenever you want. I will argue that he is, you can argue that he isn’t. We’ll waste our lives and probably be talking about different Bobs, but so what----you can argue it until someone has a good reason for thinking what they do (e.g., like having met Bob’s wife). And we can argue whether Bob should leave his wife, as much as you want as well. Until someone has a good reason for thinking what they do (e.g., like having met Bob’s wife). FACTS FACTS FACTS, you know.

[fuse]

Mo_ooooooooooooooooooooooo,

chillout brah.

[fuse]

Oh god, pay no attention, I was a fair bit under the drink when I popped in here last night.

[von_Rivers]

don’t hate son

[iambiguous]

@Mo_

@iambiguous

But if I say, “America is involved militarily in Afghanistan”, it is different [for me] from saying “American should not be involved in Afghanistan militarily”.

The reason I suspect this is that the first assertion can be confirmed as either true or not true. But the second one invokes Barrett’s conflicting goods argument.

There is no such thing as “Barrett’s conflicting goods argument”. I’m not saying it is a bad argument, I am saying it literally does not exist.

Yes it does. I have noted it here a number of times. You can insist his point is short of a proper argument, of course, but it is close enough for me. And this is Mundane Babble, after all.

@Mo_

You continue to beg the question. I am asking you to specify what you think the difference between these claims is, such that one can be true, and the other a matter of “daseinblah.blah.blah”.

This is how I do that:

I specify that American military involvement in Afghanistion either is or is not a fact.

Then I specify that, using a particular set of premises, reasonable people can claim the conflict is moral. Just as, using a different set of premises, reasonable people can claim the conflict is immoral. Why? Because they define good and bad in opposite ways. And there is no argument [I have come across] to resolve it. Not objectively. Unless, like you, you argue that [if I understand you] each person experiences the war in Afghanistan within the constellation of a particular set of factors—therefore each and everyone of them offers up an objective account. That I still don’t understand the implications of “out in the world”.

What I do then is go fishing for an argument that can denote whether the conflict is or is not moral in the same manner in which arguments can be made that the conflict does or does not exist.

You say:

@Mo_

We can disagree whether the military is in Afghanistan. And we can disagree about whether they ought to be there. And there is nothing about either case that precludes the possibility of an answer, whether or not it is ready to hand. And there is nothing about either case that precludes the possibility of an answer whose truth does not depend on whatever your whim and fancy happens to be at that moment. In other words, you can be wrong about both cases.

I’m not exactly sure what this means but, again, it seems like you are arguing that one can be wrong about the actual reality of the conflict in much the same way one can be wrong about the morality of it.

Well, maybe. But it seems like a peculiar way in which to describe the real world. How many people out there will claim U.S. military forces are not in Afghanistan?

As for logic, the rules of language are applicable to everyone. If, for example, something is logically true for everyone [Bob either is or is not a bachelor] we don’t get into heated discussions over it. But how do we determine logically if Bob should be a bachelor?

@Mo_

Yes, we can argue about whether to use a bivalent classical logic (a form of logic with only two truth values: True and False), or some kind of free or higher-order logic, which does not have bivalent truth values—to capture vagueness, and the like.

Is this meant to be ironic?

@Mo_

And we can certainly get into a heated discussion about whether Bob is, or is not a bachelor whenever you want. I will argue that he is, you can argue that he isn’t. We’ll waste our lives and probably be talking about different Bobs, but so what----you can argue it until someone has a good reason for thinking what they do (e.g., like having met Bob’s wife).

I don’t deny that arguments about the fact of a particular Bob’s marital status won’t crop up. Just that Bob is either a bachelor or he is not. We coincide the definition of bachelor in the dictionary with the facts on the ground. But in no dictionary will we come across a definition that includes whether it is or is not rational to choose bachelorhood.

@Mo_

And we can argue whether Bob should leave his wife, as much as you want as well. Until someone has a good reason for thinking what they do (e.g., like having met Bob’s wife). FACTS FACTS FACTS, you know.

No, my point is not whether Bob should leave his wife, but whether it can be determined if choosing to remain a bachelor is something a reasonable man would do.

This, in my own opinion, is rooted in dasein. How, reasonably, could it be otherwise?

[von_Rivers]

iambiguous,

You are doing it again… you are chopping up my paragraphs into one-liners, and responding to each line with something that was addressed in either the next line, or the next few lines. Please, respect the paragraph.

@iambiguous

I specify that American military involvement in Afghanistion either is or is not a fact.

Then I specify that, using a particular set of premises, reasonable people can claim the conflict is moral. Just as, using a different set of premises, reasonable people can claim the conflict is immoral. Why? Because they define good and bad in opposite ways.

Using a different set of premises, reasonable people can argue the American military is not physically in Afghanistan—and by defining key terms in different ways. But the fact remains that the truth about either kind of proposition is a matter of fact, not opinion. And you have not offered a single consideration for thinking them different. Here’s an example:

We can disagree about whether or not the American military is in Afghanistan. Here are a few ways:

1. The soldiers in Afghanistan could be American independents or mercenaries, not part of the American military.
2. Someone could think the American military is actually stationed in Pakistan.
3. Someone could dispute the borders.
4. Someone could argue that if the Americans have invaded, then what was formerly Afghanistan is no longer Afghanistan.
5. Someone could argue about media misinformation.

These are just a few ways that you can disagree about the proposition that the American military is in Afghanistan. Now, you can also disagree about whether they should be there.

In BOTH cases, you need to define key terms, (e.g., borders, who counts as “military”, whether an invaded territory still counts as part of the countries invaded land, etc, etc, etc). This is no different than in the moral case. AND BOTH CLAIMS ARE STILL MATTERS FOR OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT.

So. Please. If you think there is a difference between those two kinds of propositions: EXPLAIN WHAT YOU THINK IT IS.

that Bob is either a bachelor or he is not. We coincide the definition of bachelor in the dictionary with the facts on the ground. But in no dictionary will we come across a definition that includes whether it is or is not rational to choose bachelorhood.

This is exactly what goes on in morality. Deciding whether or not Ralph is a bachelor is the same as deciding whether or not he ought to be a bachelor. The latter question just involves more variables. In the former you gather facts about the past (i.e., whether he married), and in the latter you use facts to make projections about the future (i.e., whether he likes his wife, they get along, he can afford to marry, about what makes him happy, whether he likes company, etc, etc, etc)

[iambiguous]

@Mo_

iambiguous,

You are doing it again… you are chopping up my paragraphs into one-liners, and responding to each line with something that was addressed in either the next line, or the next few lines. Please, respect the paragraph.

I have absolutely no idea what this means. Help from others, perhaps?

@iambiguous

I specify that American military involvement in Afghanistion either is or is not a fact.

Then I specify that, using a particular set of premises, reasonable people can claim the conflict is moral. Just as, using a different set of premises, reasonable people can claim the conflict is immoral. Why? Because they define good and bad in opposite ways.

@Mo_

Using a different set of premises, reasonable people can argue the American military is not physically in Afghanistan—and by defining key terms in different ways. But the fact remains that the truth about either kind of proposition is a matter of fact, not opinion. And you have not offered a single consideration for thinking them different.

Let’s poll the families of those soldiers who died in Afghanistan and ask them 1] if the American military is present physically in Afghanistan and 2] if the American military ought to be present physically in Afghanistan.

What is the best argument one could come up regarding the second question? I don’t think there will be much debate regarding the first one.

@Mo_

Here’s an example:

We can disagree about whether or not the American military is in Afghanistan. Here are a few ways:

1. The soldiers in Afghanistan could be American independents or mercenaries, not part of the American military.
2. Someone could think the American military is actually stationed in Pakistan.
3. Someone could dispute the borders.
4. Someone could argue that if the Americans have invaded, then what was formerly Afghanistan is no longer Afghanistan.
5. Someone could argue about media misinformation.

Is there anyone else reading these words who finds them rather silly?

We can’t know anything with absolute certainty, of course, but the fact that the U.S. military is now stationed in Afghanistan comes about as close to being objectively true as we are ever likely to get.

But how close can we come to nailing down whether it ought to be?

Of course, if you define objective as reflecting each individaul soldier’s take on the experience – given that his or her experience will never be exactly the same as any other’s – we have literally tens of thousands of objective accounts.

@Mo_

So. Please. If you think there is a difference between those two kinds of propositions: EXPLAIN WHAT YOU THINK IT IS.

Over and again: I have. And, over and again, you can either come up with new ways to deconstruct it…or move on to others more willing to be enlightened.

I just don’t get your point. I can’t relate it to the world as I understand it. I can only acknowledge that how I understand it now is always subject to change.

@Mo_

Deciding whether or not Ralph is a bachelor is the same as deciding whether or not he ought to be a bachelor. The latter question just involves more variables.

A hell of a lot more. The fact of his bachelorhood comes down to this: Yes, he is a bachelor. No, he is not a bachelor.

Now, try to even imagine folks listing all the reasons they think men should get married or all the reasons they think men should not get married.

You can argue, “it’s still the same it just takes more”, but there will always seem to be men who think it is good to be married and men who think it is not good to get married. And these conflict existentially out in the real world. At least the one I know.

And by “men should get married” I’m not talking about whether they can afford to but whether men who choose not to can, objectively, be deemed irrational or immoral.

What you seem to be arguing is that they can be if we know all the factors we need to know in each individual’s case.

[von_Rivers]

@iambiguous

Let’s poll the families of those soldiers who died in Afghanistan and ask them 1] if the American military is present physically in Afghanistan and 2] if the American military ought to be present physically in Afghanistan.

What is the best argument one could come up regarding the second question? I don’t think there will be much debate regarding the first one.

Let’s poll the families of genocide victims and ask them 1) if genocide is morally wrong, and 2) if genocide ought to be morally wrong.

There won’t be any more debate about one question over the other. Nobody will be more sure about the former than they are the latter.

If you think there is a difference between either example… EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCE.

Of course, if you define objective as reflecting each individaul soldier’s take on the experience – given that his or her experience will never be exactly the same as any other’s – we have literally tens of thousands of objective accounts.

No. ‘Objective’ = not a matter of opinion.
E.g., truths of maths are objective because they are not a matter of opinion, and you can get them wrong (despite what you think).
E.g., truths of science are objective because they are not a matter of opinion, and you can get them wrong (despite what you think).
E.g., truths of logic are objective because they are not a matter of opinion, and you can get them wrong (despite what you think).
E.g., truths of ETHICS are objective because they are not a matter of opinion, and you can get them wrong (despite what you think).

If you think there is a difference between these examples… EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCE.

You can argue, “it’s still the same it just takes more”, but there will always seem to be men who think it is good to be married and men who think it is not good to get married. And these conflict existentially out in the real world. At least the one I know.

It will be good for some men to get married, and bad for others. What is your point? These facts are objective, in the sense that you can be wrong about them (e.g., you can think it is better for you to get married, and realize that you were wrong to have thought that).

EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCE.

[iambiguous]

@Mo_

@iambiguous

Let’s poll the families of those soldiers who died in Afghanistan and ask them 1] if the American military is present physically in Afghanistan and 2] if the American military ought to be present physically in Afghanistan.

What is the best argument one could come up regarding the second question? I don’t think there will be much debate regarding the first one.

Let’s poll the families of genocide victims and ask them 1) if genocide is morally wrong, and 2) if genocide ought to be morally wrong.

Yes, and when you poll those who have rationalized commiting the genocide they will beg to differ. Then what?

That genocide occured can often be established objectively. Or, rather, it can be “established objectively” as I understand it. It is not just a matter of opinion that the Holocaust occured. Or the atrocities in Rwanda…or in Cambodia. And the overwhelming consensus [rooted in the evolution of human life interwining both nature and nurture] is to reject genocide as a morally correct approach to human interaction. But that does not make it necessarily so. How could it when human beings are fully capable of reducing morality down to, “what’s in it for me?” or to “self-gratification”?

@Mo_

There won’t be any more debate about one question over the other. Nobody will be more sure about the former than they are the latter.
If you think there is a difference between either example… EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCE.

Again, I have already explained how, in an essentially absurd and meaningless world, value judgments are, in my opinion, rooted in dasein. But each dasein does not get to say if the Killing Fields happened or not. The fact of it is only an issue for those who ignore the mountains of empirical evidence.

But the morality of it can only be rooted in any particular consensus any particular population derives. Taking into consideration the predispositions embedded in us by nature.

But with nurture…the sky is practically the limit.

Of course, if you define objective as reflecting each individaul soldier’s take on the experience – given that his or her experience will never be exactly the same as any other’s – we have literally tens of thousands of objective accounts.

@Mo_

No. ‘Objective’ = not a matter of opinion.
E.g., truths of maths are objective because they are not a matter of opinion, and you can get them wrong (despite what you think).
E.g., truths of science are objective because they are not a matter of opinion, and you can get them wrong (despite what you think).
E.g., truths of logic are objective because they are not a matter of opinion, and you can get them wrong (despite what you think).
E.g., truths of ETHICS are objective because they are not a matter of opinion, and you can get them wrong (despite what you think).

What this has to do with the point I raised is beyond me. It’s, well, very abstract.

If each individual soldier experiences the war in such a way that no one else can possibly have experienced it in exactly the same way, is he expressing an opinion about the war or not? And that is before the individual soldiers bring widely [and wildly] varying narratives about what is and is not moral into the war.

And what you think I think here may or may not be more distorted than what I think you think. But I would expect that given the nature of dasein.

You can argue, “it’s still the same it just takes more”, but there will always seem to be men who think it is good to be married and men who think it is not good to get married. And these conflict existentially out in the real world. At least the one I know.

@Mo_

It will be good for some men to get married, and bad for others. What is your point? These facts are objective, in the sense that you can be wrong about them (e.g., you can think it is better for you to get married, and realize that you were wrong to have thought that). EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCE.

My point is there are those who don’t take into consideration that some people will think abortion/incest/marriage etc is good while others will think they are not good. Instead, they will insist there is a way to know for certain if they ARE good or if they are NOT good.

You can think it is good to get married, then think it is bad. Or you can think it is bad to get married, meet someone, fall in love, get married and think it is good. Until the marriage falls apart and you think it is bad again. Then you meet someone else. Then you rationalize why marriage is actually good again. It’s all a matter of opinion rooted in particular worlds experienced by particular people in different ways.

But whether one is a bachelor is only rooted in opinion to the extent a married man tries to hide the objective truth from others.