There is an active and a passive self, a subjective and an objective self. As the philosopher G.E. Moore put it, the “self is always a center of a sphere”.
It seems that those who engage in political-social critique, even of the most conservative and traditionalist sort, are, at least to some extent, making assumptions about or projecting attitudes and/or assumptions about the self onto the public arena. These projections or assumptions about the political subject are, as such, very much part of the tradition of modern radical politics, and the very project of contemporary critique vis. “identity politics”, which is all about the construction of the self, self-identity.
An example of this are the assumptions about “the self”, particularly as it relates to questions of gender, ethnicity, sexuality, race, age, etc. all of which are implicated and/or affect the construct of the political subject, which I associate with the “passive self”. The passive self defines itself through things like sexuality and gender, things that it “is”, instead of defining itself through its actions, in terms of what it “does” and can “become”.
A similar assumption about the self, one that is implicit in much feminist, lesbian and queer critique, is one of fluidity, of flux or transitory/temporary, change. This is an model of the self as entirely passive to the flux it is thrown into, which is its existence, by which it is entirely shaped: an automaton, as you said, in a deterministic universe.
My point here is that the idea of the fluidity of the self has become increasingly central to political discourse and analysis for some time now, and one of the points I wish to focus on here is how such discourse becomes normative in conditioning us to view the self in its passive aspect. The active self, to the contrary, is viewed as something that we become, not as something that we are, and this active self becomes the basis of our conception of a new political subject.
The conception of the subject as always already being in the process of construction, of transformation, of becoming, however, is not in fact at all new. It is an assumption we can find in Aristotle’s Politics, for example. However, a question that immediately arises is where the self is located. If the subject, the self, is always already in the process of construction, transformation, etc., then where is it located, as a point of origin, and therefore as a foundation to its own action in the world? How does it resist the flux of nature? How does it remain in its essence, if it is always in the process of being shaped, of transforming? How does it maintain its autonomy if it is never complete?
These are questions that we are now forced to ask in relation to contemporary debates on the subject as being constructed in and through social relations.