No difference among things can be identified by comparison if they have no thing in common for comparison. Is this illogical? Is this misguiding statement?
Some’thing’ that all (perceived) ‘things’ have in common, for any comparison to be made, is the perceiver.
It is illogical in that “differences among things” are not identified by points “in common”, but by uncommon points, ‘differences’.
A statement can only misguide someone that allows themselves to be guided by statements.
It’s just sloppy thinking…
*__-
you are correct. conceptual understanding of similarities presupposes common identity to begin with, but since each thing which exists is unique, common identity is an illusion. nothing has anything in common with anything else. therefore, you are correct that comparison and contrast are meaningless in theory.
difference is all that exists; as each thing is unique, therefore the measure of its “comparison or contrast” with another thing is the measure of the differences between them. difference itself is the fundamental ontological property upon which reality rests-- if this were not so, then the law of identity would be violated. if things are the same or comparable to each other, then A can be ~A, which is impossible.
however, language and thought equate one thing with another all the time, in terms of abstracted properties. this is tremendously helpful in thinking and in ordering our perception of the world. but we need to remember that this ordering is illusory, and the hierarchy we see reality through is a human creation. objectively there exists individual entities, unique and different from one another. A is A and cannot be otherwise. however, as limited beings we cannot perceive directly this ultimate differentiated reality, and so in terms of our need to understand, we categorize and group things we observe, create concepts out of concretes based on superficial and false similarities, and then abstract principles and laws from these conceptual operations.
this is necessary in the use of language (as language is ultimately symbolic and thus falsely-representational of a thing, and does not pick out the thing itself), and as language is necessary for any degree of intelligence, our human mode of thought and perceptual integration is very useful and essential to us, but is based in the end on false premises.
it doesnt mean that our view of the world is WRONG; certainly two cups seem alike in a property of cup-ness or similar with respect to color or location or size. this is TRUE from our perspective, but it is not OBJECTIVELY true. in reality itself there is no similarity or point of comparison between two cups. keeping this in mind is crutial to not allow our use of language to get out of control-- it keeps us pointed towards reality, and prevents us as much as possible from veering away.
- Unity is no thing if nothing is common among all.
- No relationship among things can be identified if no thing is common among them.
- No two things can be without similarity.
How can we account for 1, 2, & 3, if nothing is in common among things?
relations between ‘things’ seems (as we will see, this is false, but lets run with it first and see what happens) to presuppose a common identity. since no two things share a common identity because A cannot be ~A, relations could be seen as false. however, the relation itself exists, despite that the things thus related are dislike each other. a relation of differences exists. not a relation of similarities. for example, we see two cups as related via their property of cup-ness or “being a cup” and call this the being or reality of the cups, and that this is a point of reference and comparison between them.
however, this view is false. in reality itself, there are no commonalities or similarities at all between the two cups; how could there be, they are two different groupings of matter, existing in two different locations, and this matter and locations have no overlap from cup a to cup b. they are different in every respect. yet there still entails a relation between them: a relation of their differences. cup a is here, whereas cup b is here+x, where x is some set of x-y-z coordinate movements. this difference of position is an example of a relation of difference from one cup to the other-- and this difference in position itself IS the relation (i.e. the relation allows us to calculate the position of one cup by knowing the position of the other).
you are right, that ultimately no relation of similarities of type can exist between two things which are completely dislike. however, relations of difference always exist. “two things are different because…”, and this “because…” is what is related between the two; its just a description of how these two things are different rather than the same.
basically, unity is an illusion-- but the good thing is that unity is not necessary for some things to be related to each other, and in fact when you think about it, if there were unity, then relations themselves would be impossible, for how can one thing meaningfully relate to itself, to that which it is “united” in? only different entities can relate at all.
unity is a false concept, a byproduct of formal linguistic and logical expression.
Why do we identify a constant in every relation? in every relation which is identified?
We have the proportionality constant in every relationship.
How can we explain proportionality constants if no thing is in common?
I have a similar enquiry. Do two things, which are not part of one another in some way, have the ability to be aware of each other. And if so, how does this communication take place when they have no common parts to exchange and swap information about each other.
the north star has left the building…
there are no constants
-Imp
No constants?
What about the constants of change, speed of light, ratio of circumference to diameter …?
You can never identify that which you search for if no thing remains the same.
the things you mention are human measurements…
they are not constant…
no humans, no measurements…
-Imp
How can we make measurements without the scale to measure?
The scale of measure - ?
the scale of measure is a human invention and a human measurement as well…
no humans, no measurement…
-Imp
Is the scale of measurement a human invention?
Does “the use of scale of measurement” mean “the invention of scale of measurement”?
Could you give some examples where human invented the scales of measures?
you ask excellent questions. now we are getting at the heart of the issue.
the constant underlying a relation of differences (for all relations are relations of difference, except pure mathematical relations which presuppose a common construct of equal-value entities) is difference itself. this is a problem for logic, and for language. the positing of difference itself, without related entities and without a relation per se, is an answer to this problem of lack of commonality. its hard to understand, and ill admit my understanding is not perfect.
basically, youve got two cups. they are related with respect to their differences in size, position, color, type, matter content, etc. there is always a relation between cup a and cup b with regard to how properties of a differ from properties of b. yet these properties themselves, the types which are related between a and b (size/color/position etc) seem to be alike, they seem to be commonalities of identity. it seems that size, color, position, etc are the SAME as properties within each cup, and we would be tempted to claim that this sameness of type is the common identity which allows for the relation itself. however, this is wrong; unfortunately, its not that easy.
lets take color. cup a is blue, and cup b is red. each cup has a different color, but each cup has a color. doesnt this mean that each cup is related based on similarities then, because each cup is “color-ed” or possesses “color-ness”? no. the color of cup a, the essence of its color (not the actual color itself) is different from the color of cup b; even if they are both the same shade of red, this still entails. the color itself doesnt matter, it is the fact that the color exists in different forms. no two “reds” are the same, they cannot be, because red itself is not a “thing” it is a property of a thing, thus it is abstracted from the thing itself. lets say both cups are red, and that this redness is identical in wavelength and light-frequency, so that an advanced computer determines that the shades of red are identical… this doesnt change the fact that the “redness” from each cup stems from different photons, different EM fields. they SEEM to be the same to us, but they are not. this “sameness” of a certain type is really nothing more than the initial sameness we supposed existed between cup a and cup b with respect to “cup-ness”, which we have shown to be false. the redness itself (we are assuming it is a “thing” when it is not, but lets run with it, because we could use position or size instead of color, which would destroy the “not a ‘real’ thing” argument against colors) as redness of cup a and redness of cup b share a relation of type of color, but just as the two cups “shared” a relation of type of object (cup), it is illusory. it is appearance only. the wavelengths of the light, the photons creating the red color, are different. the same photon is not creating the redness of a and the redness of b. they are different, and appear the same only because of a coincidence of expression.
basically, to get back to it, the constant that you refer to which seems to exist in every relation (the “relation of the relation”) is not an identity, it itself is a further relation of two or more entities, and this relation is by definition differentiated as well. this is what it meant by “the difference of difference”, in that the difference in positions of cup a and cup b is the relation of one to another, but the fact that they both HAVE positions itself, while seeming a commonality, it only a further relation: the difference in position from cup a to cup b (we will call P to designate this difference in position) is related to Φ, where Φ is some other difference in positions of entities (b to a, or a-or-b to c, or c to d) which is ~P. P and Φ enter into a relation depending upon the ‘position’ of Φ relative to P (Φ here of course entails the relation of difference in position of various other entities or perspectives, or even from “b to a” rather than from “a to b”), yet this commonality of relation itself, while seeming to entail identity with respect to position or axis-coordination itself, is false as well, because P and Φ do not share any perspective with one another: every point on the axis or coordinate grid is different with relation to P than it is with relation to Φ. because of the lack of any common grounds or frame of reference between the two differences, even this commonality of ‘positional axis-perspectives’ is still representative of a fundamental difference. identity fails, even at the differentiated level.
i admit its hard to understand, and i likely did a terrible job explaining it. im not a professor, sorry. basically, two things are related by their differences in type or property; these types or properties then seem to create a commonality, a new underlying relation of sameness, but this is false, for one of two reasons: either 1) the type or property is an abstraction (a human conceptual construct) and not fundamentally ‘real’ and thus cannot relate to anything (color is like this, at the level of its color to us– talking about its fundamental physical nature doesnt solve this, it just reduces colro to 2) in the next section ->), or 2) the type or property is a real concrete aspect of the entity itself, and therefore the relation of this aspect from one entity to the other reduces to a relation of difference in the same way that the initial relation reduced to difference (position is like this).
relations of difference rest upon differences of types/properties, aspects of the entities. these aspects themselves, when real concrete things, relate to each other via difference as well, and since this underlying differential relation of aspects is the framework or grounds for the larger relation of entities themselves, this is kind of what is meant by “the difference of difference”… its not really whats meant by it, but its about the best i can explain it right now. you could also think about that “difference” as a fundamental aspect of everything, ends up being the final or absolute ‘relation’ or property of all things, but this is hard to explain because it is hard to conceptualize difference as existing on its own in some way, without things which are “different”… like i said, its hard to explain, but stick with my above explanation, and it might get a little clearer… then again, maybe not… :-"
the rock weighs 2.2 pounds
no, the rock weighs a kilogram
no, the rock is the rock and the human measurement invented by humans matters only to the humans…
rock on
-Imp
Are ‘all those which common to all’ not real?
in the sense that no thing is common to all, yes, they are not real. however we still think and act as if things share common properties all the time-- language and logic are based upon this assumption, and as i think i stated before, this isnt untrue, its just only true from a human perspective or perception, resultant from our limitations of sight/understanding and from our biological/psychological need for hierarchial categorization, conceptual abstraction and language.
commonality with respect to identity is ‘real’ in this sense, its just not objectively real.
Can two hydrogen atoms have the same activity (in reality)?
We have something called Quantitative Structure Activity Relationship (QSAR) in chemistry and molecular modeling.
im sure two hydrogen atoms, in identical environments, would behave in identical ways.
however, this doesnt mean that they are identical, it only means that their actions are. to my knowledge, one hydrogen atom is essentially a copy of any other hydrogen atom, their nature is the same. but they are still two different particles. likewise, this sameness is fleeting, for one particle could change in any instant and this sameness would vanish. it is ultimately an illusion, even on this level of reality… copies, even identical copies, are still different things.
i dont know what QSAR is.
“one hydrogen atom is essentially a copy of any other hydrogen atom, their nature is the same.”
“Things are different” ≠ “difference between things”
Are “make a difference” & “make different” the same?