On Questioning Assumptions

Some people claim that all assumptions should be questioned, and even that the questioning of assumptions is at the heart of philosophy.

Probably, this is an assumption that needs questioning.

First of all, what is an assumption?

My online dictionary says the following (in the sense that is relevant here)

"The act of taking for granted: assumption of a false theory.
Something taken for granted or accepted as true without proof; a supposition: a valid assumption. "

Notice that according to this definition, an assumption might very well be true. It does not have to be false. And, also, although it might be taken as true without proof, that does not mean that the assumption may not be backed with good reasons which may, however, fall short of proof. In fact, I might have very good reasons for making an assumption.

For example, let’s just take a mundane case of that. Suppose I say, “I assume that Joe is going to the party.” If someone asks why I assume that, I need not be speechless. I might say, “Well, because this party is being given by Jane, and Joe likes parties given by Jane, and nearly always goes to them”. Of course, this is a trivial (non-philosophical) case. But when we do philosophy, it is usually a good thing to remind ourselves how a certain concept is usually used before we go esoteric.

So, an assumption may be made, but it may have very good reasons to back it up.

Now, is it true that all assumptions are wide open for questioning? Well, maybe open, but not “wide-open”. What I mean is that if you are going to question an assumption, shouldn’t you have some reason to question it. Descartes thought that everything could (and should) be doubted. And people who claim that all assumption should be questioned are, I think, the heirs of “Cartesian Doubt”. I mean suppose I, out of the blue question not merely whether the Earth has a particular shape (say) square, or round, or trapezoidal, but whether the Earth has any shape at all, because it is an [/i]assumption that the Earth has any shape at all, I might reply, “Well maybe it is an assumption. But it is not something for which I have no good reasons. After all, the Earth is an object in space, and all objects have some shape.” Now it is true that even my reason for thinking that Earth has some shape, namely that it is an object, is “an assumption”. But so what? Although, the person who makes assumptions does have the responsibility to back up his assumptions, doesn’t the questioner also have the responsibility to back up his questions? For instance, what makes the assumption-questioner think that Earth has no particular shape, and is not a physical object in space? If the questioner has not reasons for his doubts, then isn’t he like the child who, after each of his questions beginning with “why?” just asks, “why?” again? Why does the questioner not think that Earth is a physical object in space? Or is it that he is taking for granted, but without any good reason, that he can simply question, and has no responsibility for backing up his questions?

Questioning assumsions indivisually may be impractical due to an infinite regress. But can’t we make an assement about an arguments basic assumptions inclusive of those assumtions that suport it? Thus in this way we can question all an arguments assumptions and if they all come out “good enough” move along. The real point is that we don’t let any of them just sit there in the dark.

Maybe the maxim should be,
“It’s important to illuminate all assumptions.”

Afterall, questioning is pretty automatic once you’re aware of them. Is that a decent revision?

I did not say that no particular assumption can be questioned, provided we have some reason to question it. What I was saying is that empty or automatic questioning of assumptions is pointless. If you question, for instance, why I assume (which I do) that true propositions cannot imply false propositions, go right ahead, but please let me know what your objection is. When you question anything, the burden in on you to present your reasons for your objections.

Isn’t “burden” a very assumption laden term? It strongly hints of the adversarial legal process. And bereft of that reference, why should anyone have a burden in a disagreement?

You can call any assertion or belief an “assumption”. But that doesn’t mean that some assumptions are not more reasonable than others. It seems to me that if I were to remark that Washington D.C. is the capital of the United States, and you were to reply, “But that’s an assumption” suggesting that it might not be true, then I would be justified in asking you why you think that such a piece of common knowledge is questionable. And if you replied, “Well I have no reason, really, but I can question it, can’t I?” I think I would just reply, “Look, that Washington D.C. is the capital of the U.S. is known by everyone, Now I am not saying that it is certainly true, and that it is absolutely impossible that it should be questioned, but I have no idea what you have in mind. And I think it is up to you to tell me what it is you have in mind.” Don’t you think that is right?

Most likely, the reason for questioning assumptions is the desire to avoid error. If I ask why it is believed that the earth is round, then I probably have a desire to avoid believing “the earth is round” when it may not be the case that it is round.

Suppose I say that I assume the existence of leprechauns, and you wish to question that assumption. Do you need to give any more reason to question the assumption than your desire to avoid believing in leprechauns, when they may in fact not exist? (Or perhaps your desire to avoid my believing in them?)

You may be confusing an assuption with an axiom.

For instance your statement.

A true statment can’t imply a false one.

This seems to have little more function that to help define implication, truth and falisity in terms of one another. In other words its not a substantive claim.

There is no point to ‘questioning’ an axiom. In fact, it’s kinda impossible.

If your playing with geometry and axiom number one is:

Each line contains at least to points.

Then even uttering “What if a line only has one point?” would be to jump ship and leave the whole game. Of course you could contruct a system where such things are called lines, but it’s a different system.

So, thusly anything the assumtion and not an axiom is by definition worth questiong.

(And all swans are white. Geez I feel full of it tonight. In a way this whole argument is a perfect demenstration of Quine tho.)

I guess I don’t know what you mean by “questioning”. I mean, suggesting or implying that there is some question about the truth of some statement. So, if I stated that Washington D.C. was the capital of the United States, you might, of course, question it (it is one of the rights of man) but if I asked you why you questioned such a matter of common knowledge, how would you reply?

Questioning your belief that there are leprechauns is one thing. Questioning your belief that the Earth is round is another thing. But I would expect you to be prepared to say why you questioned either, although (and this is important) there would be no need for me to ask for your reasons for questioning the existence of leprechauns, but there certainly would be a need for me to ask why you were suggesting that the Earth is not round, and you had better give me a reason and not just tell me that any belief could be mistaken, which is not a reason.

How is that not a reason?

Because, “It is possible that you are mistaken” is not a reason for, “You are mistaken”. (If it is, then, “it is possible that you are right” is a reason for thinking that you are right.) Therefore, for every proposition we have equally good reasons for thinking that it is true and that it is false, if, it is possible that it is true, and it is possible that it is false, are (respectively) reasons for thinking the proposition IS true, or IS false. So for every contingent proposition, we always have one reason for thinking it is true, and another for thinking it is false.

So, if, for instance I tell you that I think Mary is at home, and you ask me why, I can say, “Two reasons. First I saw her walking through her doorway, And second, it is possible that she is at home”.

What causes any assumption to qualify as more reasonable than another?

How do you evaluate an idea to measure its reasonableness?

What is reasonableness itself?

In what community must an idea by common in order for it to be beyond question? What if I were to suggest that the real capital of the United States is Hollywood? The power of Hollywood dominates the United States and its influence touches the entire world. Or what if I said that New York is the real capital of the United States because of the extraordinary economic power that is centered there?

Reasonableness is, very briefly, conformity to the rules of logic, and respect for evidence.

I evaluate an idea or an argument, by considering its conformity to the rules of logic, and its respect for evidence.

One assumption is more reasonable than another if it is more likely to be true than the other. To determine that, you have to consider the evidence (if any) that there is for both.

But those are obvious answers. I wonder why you asked those questions.

If you suggested that Hollywood was the “real capital” of the United States, I would take that as a metaphorical way of saying that Hollywood was, in some ways, more influential in shaping the policies of this country than is the (governmental) capital of the United States which both of us know is, Washington, D.C. Most educated people know how to distinguish between the metaphorical and the literal. I would say similar things about the New York example, and also point out to you (if I had to do so) that by “capital” it was quite clear I mean the governmental capital, and not what you call the “economic capital”. And I would add that you were simply punning on the word “capital”.

But, again, I would suppose that these points were too obvious to have to be made.

Kennethamy,

You suggest that an assumption can be more reasonable than another if it is more likely to be true (through evidence). Please explain what is evidence? How much evidence is necessary for the establishment of the likelyhood of truth? From what perspective would we define truth?

JT

There is no general formula which is an answer to your question. It will depend on the issue. Of course, the term, “assumption” is not a clear one. Sometimes it means what is believed without evidence (at least in the context). But, sometimes, if you widen the context, you can then bring evidence to bear. If I say, “Mary is thinking that she will no longer date John”, you may retort, “You are assuming that Mary has been dating John already.” Well, that is true. “Mary is thinking that she will no longer date John” does assume that she has been dating John. Your retort, “You are assuming that Mary has been dating John” invites me to present evidence that Mary has been dating John. And I may be able to do so, or I may not. But we can easily imagine what evidence could be cited to show that the assumption that Mary was dating John was true. For instance, I might just ask Mary, whether she had been dating John. I don’t see what you think is the problem of finding evidence for assumptions.

Likelihood is, of course, a graded notion. It is a matter of degree. The more evidence the better. Each piece of evidence raises the liklihood of a proposition’s truth. In the simplest case, the observation of two white swans raises the liklihood of all swans being white more than does one white swan. And, naturally, three white swans are even better.

I don’t think I understand your final question about the “perspective” from which we would define “truth”. Why should there be more than one perspective. There are various theories of truth, which I think you are getting at. But the one that seems to do the job is the one that Aristotle expressed when he wrote that to say of what is that it is, or to say of what is not, that it is not, is to say what is true. That seems about right to me, although it clearly needs fleshing out.

Kenneth, I will ask again a question I asked on another thread. You say reasonableness is conformity to the rules of logic, so I ask the simple question, what reason do you have for accepting those rules of logic? By what standards do you judge that logic is the best standard for reasonableness? Again, “I dont know” is a fitting answer. I am not trying to disprove anything here. As a matter of fact I think we share similar world views. But your inconsideration of the alternatives makes your manner aproach that of an absolutist. And if theres 1 thing that gets me going, its absolutes.

It is not clear what it is you are asking when you ask, why be logical? It may be a question about motive. Why is it a good thing to be logical? And I suppose the answer is that being logical is more likely to attain truth than not. And truth is, to say the least, more useful than falsity. It is also true, I think, that it is not clear what the choice is. What would one have to do in order to be illogical. Go around committing fallacies all the time?

But you may not be asking a motive question. You may be asking a justification question. Something like show that logic is justified. Or, perhaps, what are the foundations of logic? Something of that sort. That is, show that our procedures of justification are, themselves, justified. Perhaps that would mean, use logic to justify logic?

If you ask by what standards do you judge that logic is the best standard for reasonableness, I guess I have to ask you, what is supposed to be the alternative to logic? It is not as if there are three or four standard of reasonableness out there. If there are, I don’t know what they are supposed to be.

As so often in philosophy, it is not the answer to a question we ought to be looking for, but, rather, we ought to examine the question itself. Since, if we don’t, we may find ourselves in the very situation that Kant describes when he wrote:

“To know what questions may be reasonably asked is already a great and necessary proof of sagacity and insight. For if a question is absurd in itself and calls for an answer where none is required, it not only brings shame on the propounder of the question, but may betray an incautious listener into absurd answers, thus presenting, as the ancients said, the ludicrous spectacle of one man milking a he-goat and the other holding a sieve underneath.”

I think that we ought to take what Kant says here very seriously and not just sluff it off.

I won’t answer “I don’t know” to your question, since what I don’t know is whether the question itself is a legitimate one. Perhaps it is up to you to make clear what you are asking. Consider the possibility, in other words, “that the question is absurd in itself, and calls for an answer where none is required”.

“that the question is absurd in itself, and calls for an answer where none is required”

I cannot accept this. This has cop-out written all over it. What the hell is absurd anyways? Who determines absurdity? LOGIC DOES. Anything illogical is absurd! So when I ask, why logic, you say, thats absurd. That mentality is no diffirent than a religious person completely convinced theres a God and Jesus is the way… They dont consider, dont desire to question, they just accept…

For reasonableness, I again bring up a person that considers the bible as the reason for all. If the bible said “Use logic” than this is a reason to accept logic. Prety much anything imaginable can be substituted in for logic… And diffirent forms of logic exist as well… For instance, Impenitent is convinced induction is illogical, so logic is just Deduction for him. I am convinced logic is a combination of induction and deduction. Others have diffirent ways im sure… So how do we determine which determinant of reasonableness is most reasonable?

Kennethamy,

I think that R t has a point. When we talk about assumptions, we must be very careful to explain that those assumptions (philosophically) only exist inside a construct. While they may refer to part or all of reality -vis a vis - an explanatory construct, they aren’t reality itself. We tend to forget that.

An example. In order to talk about assumptions, you made an apriori assumption that logic can or should explain the nature of nature. Show me your reasonable evidence for this first assumption. That’s what R t is concerned about, and what I was sort of suggesting in my first post.

It’s fun when we step into the soft stuff, isn’t it? :smiley:

JT

Kennethamy,

I think that R t has a point. When we talk about assumptions, we must be very careful to explain that those assumptions (philosophically) only exist inside a construct. While they may refer to part or all of reality -vis a vis - an explanatory construct, they aren’t reality itself. We tend to forget that.

An example. In order to talk about assumptions, you made an apriori assumption that logic can or should explain the nature of nature. Show me your reasonable evidence for this first assumption. That’s what R t is concerned about, and what I was sort of suggesting in my first post.

It’s fun when we step into the soft stuff, isn’t it? :smiley:

JT