In his “Restatement on Xenophon’s Hiero”, Leo Strauss assays “to explain the philosopher’s desire to communicate his thoughts”. In order to do so in a satisfying manner, he entertains “the assumption […] that the well-ordered soul is more akin to the eternal order, or to the eternal cause or causes of the whole, than is the chaotic soul”:
“[T]he souls of men reflect the eternal order in different degrees. A soul that is in good order or healthy reflects it to a higher degree than a soul that is chaotic or diseased. The philosopher who as such has had a glimpse of the eternal order is therefore particularly sensitive to the difference among human souls. In the first place, he alone knows what a healthy or well-ordered soul is. And secondly, precisely because he has had a glimpse of the eternal order, he cannot help being intensely pleased by the aspect of a healthy or well-ordered soul […]. Hence he cannot help being attached to men of well-ordered souls: he desires ‘to be together’ with such men all the time. […] Last but not least, he is highly sensitive to the promise of good or ill order, or of happiness or misery, which is held out by the souls of the young. Hence he cannot help desiring […] that those among the young whose souls are by nature fitted for it, acquire good order of their souls. But the good order of the soul is philosophizing.” (Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy?, page 121. The previous quotes are from page 122.)
Now in his new book (from March 16th), Lampert writes:
“Without the actions of a Socrates this thing of highest worth, human understanding of nature and human nature, could perish with his perishing. The hero of the Phaedo [Plato’s dialogue on Socrates’ last day] is a philosopher-ruler in action, acting on behalf of philosophy[.]” (Lampert, How Socrates Became Socrates, pp. 30-31.)
This “acting on behalf of philosophy” is what political philosophy, or more precisely philosophic politics, really is. But is it really wise? As Strauss again says, “the political action of the philosophers on behalf of philosophy has achieved full success. One sometimes wonders whether it has not been too successful.” (WIPP, page 127.) It has especially been too successful in leading, both directly and indirectly (through Judaism: Judaism as we know it was chiefly modelled on Plato’s Laws), to Christianity; and by leading, through modern philosophy (which in its inception was simply a reaction against the excesses of Christianity), to the imminent end of the Holocene… So shouldn’t philosophers refrain from taking action against such threats? Even if those actions should today consist in resetting mankind to its pre-Socratic conditions? Wouldn’t their actions make things even worse, again, in the long run?
“The [historical] recurrence or return does not necessarily require an external continuity between the cycles, or that some of phase 5 [the final and highest phase] be actually remembered, even vaguely, and be expressed in myth in phase 2 of the next cycle. Phase 5 may be completely forgotten or lost. But it will be rediscovered. What is necessary is the continuous existence of the two sources of men’s thought about the gods: the experiences of the soul and the phenomena of the heavens. […] Necessity, human nature, the experience of the soul, and the phenomena of the heavens give every cycle a definite beginning, direction, and end—which is philosophy [… and which] will be followed by an age of darkness, but an age of darkness that will be the beginning of new cycles and new movements that will end again (at least in some cases [i.e., if the cycle does not end prematurely, before phase 5]) in a philosophic phase.” (Mahdi, Alfarabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy, page 234.)
Shouldn’t Socrates, and later Machiavelli, have allowed philosophy to perish with their perishing? And shouldn’t I, in our times? Or should I now act precisely with a view to making philosophy (natural philosophy, science) perish…
[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ERJORQ1BbKY[/youtube] Filami, “Bioluminescence”