On the Inconceivability and Impossibility of Matter

Philosophy Forums Philosophy
1

On the Inconceivability and Impossibility of Matter

The denial that I make regarding the existence of the material world is a denial that I think results from the illogicalness of the conception of the material world that has been so far presented to myself. This essay is concerned with the illogicalness just mentioned, of the idea of a material world insofar as the arguments that I have seen so far seem illogical to myself. Two examples that are unrelated to the illogicalness of the material world but that should help illustrate the problem with an idea being illogical, can be seen in the examples of something being colored by colors, on the same part of that thing, such that, for example, it is both red and blue or some combination of colors and that something could be both square and circle, etc. Such illogicalness strikes our minds as being wholly absurd and such illogicalness is the extent to which I found the idea of a material world illogical. Notice in these cases of illogicalness just presented, that the absurdity of such claims is resultant from the utter impossibility of the ideas which are concluded from the inconceivability of such things. To state again, the impossibility of these is based upon their inconceivability. Perhaps, this idea of impossibility from inconceivability has been shaken in people’s minds by the conclusions of quantum physics, which state that a single particle, wholly the same, can be in two places simultaneously. This empirical discovery has made it such that inconceivability does not yield impossibility. As a result, our notions of inconceivability yielding impossibility have been rendered incorrect and the inference that inconceivability equals impossibility has been somewhat shaken. However, to a large extent, I think reason still thinks it reasonable that in most cases inconceivability yields impossibility. With this in mind, inconceivability is still seen as being likely to make something impossible. So, applying this idea to the truth or falsity that we should deem of a proposition is just a matter of concluding the likely falsity of a proposition based upon the propositions inconceivability because the inconceivability of a proposition just as surely leads to a conclusion of the probable falsity of a proposition just as surely as it does the impossibility because to say that a proposition is likely impossible is simply to say that it is likely false. With this understood, we can now discuss the inconceivability of the idea of matter and by doing this show that propositions regarding matter are likely fallacious based upon inconceivability. The refutation of matter will be complete if it is shown that matter is inconceivable as an idea.

So without further ado let us now turn to the exposition of what matter is claimed to be and to the showing of what it is that makes matter inconceivable. The conception of matter that I wish to show is inconceivable is the conception of matter which makes the claim of matter as it being something that occupies space and is senseless. That is matter requires space to put it in and requires that it be something that does not have sensations within it such as color, odor, taste, feeling, or hearing. Although it is asserted that it causes such thing through and interaction of the matter in ones body with the matter in the world, to state once again, matter does not have sensations within it but through an interaction of matter in one’s body and world creates sensations. The same can be said of ideas and emotions in that through an interaction of matter in the body and world these are caused as well. The causing of ideas and emotion by matter is not as commonly held as the idea that matter causes sensations. Also, it seems as though it will be sufficient to show that matter is inconceivable by focusing on sensations being caused by this matter. So, from here after the only claim regarding matter that will be attempted to be shown inconceivable is the claim that matter causes sensations because it seems that showing the contradiction in this will be sufficient for the point that matter is an inconceivable idea. To show the inconceivability of matter it is necessary to recall the claim that matter is senseless and has extension. That is, matter doesn’t have color, odor, or any of the other five senses but causes these sensations through body matter interacting with matter in the world. So, what is wrong with this claim? What is wrong with this is that this matter is said to be the causes of something while not being intelligible as an idea. To see this, take sometime out to think about whether you can imagine your conception of matter without giving the matter a color. I think that most people will say that they cannot and I must admit to a suspicion that anyone who says that they can is mistaken. It will be remembered that matter is senseless and imagining matter as having a color would be to imagine it having a sense. So you are not imagining matter if you give it color for this color doesn’t exist within the matter. I think it will be seen as quite evident that matter as an idea cannot be considered as not having a color because to do so would make it inconceivable. This is as though you insisted on there being unicorns but when you came to find what you were looking for it was just a horse. That is, your idea represents more than would actually be existent, in that there is a horn that cannot actually be found to exist. So what is the claim of matter but a claim just like this in that it asserts that matter has more than it does in that it has a horn. The claim of matter is a claim that insists upon imagining matter with color in the same sense that someone who imagined horse as though it were a unicorn would be misconceived in their claim that there were horses if they had to always imagine not the horse but the unicorn. To see this better, conceive of a man that hypothetically and for some odd reason cannot conceive of horses but only unicorns. However, this man insists that there are horses but he cannot imagine such a thing. The same can be said of matter because claims are made regarding an idea that cannot be imagined. So, what is the problem? If something cannot be thought why insist upon it? It is as though someone were to say that there were green and blue not greenish blue things. Or to say that there was a square circle not a square and a circle. But such things are inconceivable and because of this likely false. Likewise, imagine whether there is a thing that does not have color and it will be seen that it does have color, and it cannot be imagined that something doesn’t have color. In these cases of the inconceivability, we do not say that there are such things so why in the inconceivable idea of matter?

2

tl;dr

but i did read the subject

impossible? perhaps

why can’t I conceive of something that fundamentally does not exist in the same domain as myself?

assuming that my ability to conceive is not too imposed upon me by the world in which i exist, defining it as such is not that difficult

3

So you’re argument is that if it cannot be personally sensed, it doesn’t really exist?

So radio waves do not exist? They certainly have no color and except for extremes, cannot be personally felt. They are said to cause what we see as color and sensations.

And what about energy? Energy has no color. It doesn’t even have form. It is said to cause all things. But because you cannot directly sense it, it doesn’t really exist?

A computer program? It has no color, form, smell (although I have to admit that some seem to stink).

There are probably quite a list of things that cannot be directly seen or felt and thus require tools so as to convert one type of feature to another so that things can be seen and measured, much like a magnifying glass so as to see what was beyond the natural eye.

The mind functions by using concepts in the form of pictures and words, various sensation oriented constructs with which it can then apply logic and reasoning. It is like converting one language to another, or simplifying or reducing an equation so that it is easier to work with and further build upon.

It isn’t human conceivability that determines existence, but rather affect. If it affects something, it exists. If it affects nothing, it doesn’t exist. Man names things by the affect they have. Whether you can conceive of it is entirely another matter. You perceive and conceive the affect, not the entity that caused it. And if that entity produced any affect at all, then obviously it exists, seen or not.

Physical matter is called “matter” because its affect is that “it matters”.

4

OP makes no sense, every conclusions seems to be grabbed out of thin air.

5

Come now, Drusuz.

Rackedrick isn’t now the clearest of writers but what’s clear to me is he’s trying.

When Saint says

You’re pre-supposing there are “things” to be seen. Sounds like Rack believes in what we’re seeing, in terms of sense data, but he doesn’t believe that there’s anything there making us see it.

Say this to a scientist and see how they sigh and roll their eyes. They spend their lives mining data about matter, anti-matter, dark matter, atomic matter, etc, and never do they question whether the genuine stuff exists, the stuff triggering a cascade of ever-convoluted (but damned repeatable) empirical data.

They know, and we all live as if, things exist. Matter can bash into us, or our balls, and that would be bad. By respecting matter as a priori, we can control and contain all sorts of shit (including shit) and that’s probably a good thing.

We do our best to see something, but we are not “seeing” the object (if it exists) in its purest form. We are converting the “object” into intelligible sense data, data which tells us perhaps more about ourselves than about the “object’s” true essence.

Grass is not green, but in fact an organism that rejects and wholly spurns green spectrum light from it’s makeup, and we attribute to it that which it is most vehemently not. I think Rackedrick is irritated by this disconnection, puzzled by its game, and he wouldn’t be first.

Indeed, Drusuz, in regard to matter,

What of this base substance that affects but never appears, can’t appear, to us? Either merely WE can’t conceive it, OR it’s just plain inconceivable. That’s the discussion. Thales to Aristotle to Des Cartes to Chomsky to…Rackedrick.

Could it just be a vast hologram (keep in mind photons are not considered matter) in the mind of some very scared and desperate God? Are we not what we think we are? Is space and time an illusion, is change an illusion? We can’t by definition ever know it directly. Is there room enough in holy Existence for both substance and me? It seems one of us HAS to go. (Granted it’ll probably be me, in the end, although as of now I’m holding my own.)

Saintly stated:

Not according to Rack. It “it” affects something, the affect exists. We can name the affect, but whereof the affecting “it” has attributes beyond its paltry human-sensed affect, thereof we must remain stymied. And maybe a little suspicious.

One can and will call Matter a well-developed character or characters in a story dubbed Science. In some ways the story remains a novel…and it’s a philosopher’s job is to point that out.

Because I Love Philosophy, I invite rackedrick to take another stab at it. Avoid long dense paragraphs. And hopefully an ornery, anal-retentive science geek will happen along and we can watch him twitch and sigh and be all aloof and dismissive before he goes to cry in his pillow and wonders: “Dreams of a Nobel Prize! Indeed, what was I thinking? I’m a grunt in a coat who gazes at the navel’s navel’s navel of mother nature in the interest of military and pharmaceuticals! I don’t know if there’s matter and I don’t care! It doesn’t MATTER!” (FADE SCENE as dork in white lab coat falls asleep wnkin to noam chomsky, who in his fantasy, has the body of Linda Carter c.1978.)