Ought-Is-Belief theory of knowledge, moral or otherwise

Philosophy Forums Philosophy
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The following is the sequel to this thread: http://ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=178858&hilit=justified+true+belief and I submit it to The Academy:

It is possible to blend Hume’s is-ought distinction (1) in Ethics with Plato’s justified-true-belief theory of knowledge.

Simply put, whatever sort of beliefs one is talking about, including moral beliefs, they must be ‘both’ justified by reasons (a justified belief OUGHT to be believed) ‘and’ correspondent to reality (a true belief IS true). Just because one has good reasons for one’s belief does not mean it is true. And even if one believes something that is true, one may have horrible reasons for believing it (bit of a tangent: Gettier was wrong in assuming falsehoods count towards justification) (Gettier is answered elsewhere (2)). All of this is true about any belief one holds, moral or otherwise. In order for one’s belief to be knowledge, it must satisfy those two conditions: 1: It must be backed by good reasons (justified/ought). 2: It must correspond to reality (true/is). These conditions are very different from each other. Both are required separately. So, satisfying both conditions is not Hume’s problem—it is when one condition takes the place of the other that one commits Hume’s is-ought fallacy, or its reverse (ought-is).

That said…

Hume obviously only drew this distinction when he was discussing moral knowledge, not any other kind of knowledge, and Plato grappled with Euthyphro’s (false) dilemma (it, skeptics, anti-realists and Gettier are all answered elsewhere (2)).

If one understands the blending and one is not a Christian, one may not be comfortable with it because one’s moral theory doesn’t correspond to, or describe, anything in reality, knowing of no always-good person who never has and never will violate one’s moral theory. That discomfort, though understandable, is not a valid reason to reject the is-ought distinction.

If one is a theist who still rejects Hume’s is-ought distinction because one thinks it means the Good cannot correspond to God, then one is misunderstanding what Hume really meant by his distinction, and there is still some work to do in communicating the blending properly. Even educated Christians like Dr. Richard Weikart and Dr. William Lane Craig share such a misunderstanding. Dr. Craig says:

(3)

and

(4)

It is unclear here whether or not Dr. Craig thinks the is-ought fallacy is a real fallacy. He seems to when he dismisses the idea that “because God is a certain way we ought to behave in certain ways” (ibid). But he seems not to when he asserts “our moral obligations and prohibitions arise as a result of God’s commands to us” (ibid). It is a tangent, but he also unnecessarily distinguishes between moral obligations and moral values. Anyway, to say “because this is God’s command, we ought to behave according to it” commits the is-ought fallacy.

There has been some discourse with Dr. Craig on this matter via Facebook (5), and via email with Dr. Weikart. Dr. Weikart’s most recent reply just restates his misunderstanding:

(via email)

Grounded in, yes. Justified by, no.

Reference List

  1. Ichthus77. (2011). Where I am at with Hume’s is-ought distinction. Retrieved from http://ichthus77.blogspot.com/2011/07/where-i-am-at-with-humes-is-ought.html

  2. Ichthus77. (2011). Answering Gettier. Retrieved from http://ichthus77.blogspot.com/2011/01/answering-gettier.html

  3. Reasonable Faith. (2012). Moral Argument for God. Retrieved from http://www.reasonablefaith.org/moral-argument-for-god#ixzz23vssuCM3

  4. Reasonable Faith. (2012). Does Theistic Ethics Derive an “Ought” from an “Is”? Retrieved from http://www.reasonablefaith.org/does-theistic-ethics-derive-an-ought-from-an-is#ixzz23vtucp00

  5. Ichthus77. (2012). Is-ought discussion with WLC. Retrieved from http://www.ichthus77.blogspot.com/2012/01/is-ought-discussion-with-wlc.html

Canonical link: A version of this post was originally posted here: http://www.ichthus77.blogspot.com/2012/05/humean-platonic-tripartite-ought-is.html

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You are saying that, in this system or theory, all idea-positions have to be justified by reason, and correspondent to reality.
In human history, and human reality, this is not the case.
There can be unjustified thought, and unjustifiable thought. Some views match, some don’t.

When we self-appoint ourselves as judges of reason, logic and realness, this is self appointing, it’s not appointed by the things we observe. The things we observe don’t show us themselves or teach us of themselves. They simply act according to their nature. Reason, logic, realness, these are entirely fabricated human paradigms designed by thoughts about things and thoughts about thoughts. These are also the product of sensation, which basically always feels real and is accepted, or reacted to. There is no natural ought. But we have developed names for almost everything, and the forms of ought have names. Just because they have names, does not mean they are real persons, though. The isness is so persuasive. It almost is unnatural not to accept the isness of the universe, or what appears to be what is. Although our minds start out rather neutral about this, our human nature and culture soon brings us into full compliance with isness. I classify isness with things that are almost always felt. The steady sensation seems tangible and is like a rock. We see it, we feel it, then we say that we know it, also being self-appointed to declare what is known and what is not known.

Goods are allot more tangible than gods, also. One hardly equates to the other, although we can place them together then at this point declare they are close, or that they equate to eachother, because logic is flexible and can effect appearance, which is one of the few things that we appear to have.

Some people bounce quickly between concepts and take up the task of consideration in such a way as they are almost in some sort of rush to get it all done. I feel that it is the minority which slowly examines and chooses thoughts. There are many many reasons why something can appear to be good. For example, if we believe that God is good, we can quickly assume that anything from God is good. There is a net of “reasons” behind all experiences because thoughts are made of thoughts. This means that many many types of things can appear to be reasonable, or effect one’s sense of reason. Reason itself is our best effort at sorting through ourself. This is typically a virtue, but then can be hated by some aswel. Because thought is made of more thought, morals for example are made of other morals, values are made of other values, and the fabric of appearant thought is more appearance. I am not absolutely saying that thoughts are made of other thoughts, but their other foundations are something which is outside of this description.

There are many forms of authority that are self appointing. They then create even more selves and appointments. Yes they feel that they ought to do this. I am not claiming that ought is a fallacy. I am trying to explain that our world isn’t consciously trying to portray itself to us. We are the ones which must do the work. We must create a moral code or a form of knowledge, otherwise the trees and the stones will not do it. Nature does not to me appear to support reason, justness, logic, or morality. If, due to the appearance of its great force, nature were to want morality, reason and logic, then these things would be flowing endlessly and so vastly, but as it currently seems, this is not the case.

So my point is that you are not seeking to describe nature in your post. Instead you are describing appearances and personas of super natures and meta natures.

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Thankyou for your reply, Dan~.

Is knowledge unnatural? Does a theory of knowledge describe something unnatural?

The suggestion that we do the work shows an agreement that, unless a (moral) theory corresponds to something in reality, the theory is merely constructed (unnatural). This is true of every theory. Very insightful :wink:

[insert how many ever words will get me to 100]

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I thought i had to do 500 words per reply.
But if not, I would quickly say that knowledge isn’t unnatural. Knowledge is our nature. But the world’s nature is not our own, if we can deduce that.

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Original posts are 500 minimum, replies 100 (I think). Anyway–how does your most recent reply relate to the OP?

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Hume didn’t leave much room for intuition in his thoughts on epistemology, which I think was a mistake. Divine Command theory clearly commits is is-ought fallacy, and commits it in a ‘fallacious way’. However, as with Hume’s critiques of causation and so on, he’s making the mistake of assuming that deductive thinking is the only good thinking.
What the is-ought fallacy really says is that there is a subjective and/or intuitive leap between any is → ought assertion. The implication is that this makes the assertion a mistake that we ought not place much credibility on, but I don’t think this is the case at all. Consider this example:

You shouldn’t rape women because they are capable of the same feelings of shame, horror, pain, and etc. that men are.

An example of the is/ought fallacy if there ever was one. There’s an unproven assumption of connection between creatures feeling pain and horror, and a duty not to inflict harm on them. But that doesn’t mean that the above is false. It just means it lacks the power to convince people who don’t share the intuition behind the unproven assumption. If you, too, believe that you shouldn’t harm creatures capable of feeling pain and horror, then the argument should be perfectly convincing assuming you agree with the premise.

  About the only context I can see for the is/ought fallacy when it involved such a universal assumption is that you wouldn't want to use it as an example of a deductive syllogism in Logic 201.

Remember- the is/ought fallacy doesn’t show that a conclusion is wrong. It doesn’t even show (contrary to popular opinion) that the premises don’t support the conclusion. It only shows that the relationship between the premises and the conclusion is not of a certain very specific type.

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Here’s a recent interesting discussion I was in, where Hume and Plato came up: https://www.facebook.com/ChristianApologeticsAlliance/posts/417291828331731?notif_t=feed_comment “Justin–To explain why (how we know) being loving is good (justified), we need to do epistemology. To explain WHAT this good “is”–what always loving being it describes–to what loving being the Good corresponds–we need to do ontology. We must do both epistemology (justification) and ontology (correspondence)–separately. Plato and Hume demand it.”

Uccisore–you’ve gone off on your own ramblings about your understanding of the is-ought…and about your opinion that (willed, or felt/intuited) empathy commits the is-ought fallacy…without ever addressing the original post. You want me to go into justifying the Golden Rule, I’m game, if it is in another thread. Still–no amount of justification will ever make it true. If it is true, it will be true because it corresponds to a being it describes.

Your verb tense off-ness has got me all confused when you say “when it involved”…in fact, the whole sentence it belongs to is wonky, if a sentence. context–don’t use it as an example? what? But maybe the final paragraph just restates what you were trying to say.

I agree with you that when we go from premise(s) to conclusion in a fallacious way, it doesn’t disprove the conclusion–however…because of the fallacy, the premises actually cannot support the conclusion. Justified beliefs do not make reality (oughts do not create ises). Correspondent beliefs may be entirely unjustified (ises do not create oughts). That’s why Plato demanded ‘both’ correspondence ‘and’ justification–separately.