Well, regarding neuroscience and cognitive psychology, his criticism seems to be that the abuse has become the conceptual scheme. Something on the scale of widespread category error is a pretty serious intrinsic problem with a conceptual scheme.
Certainly the monolithic structuring is not apparent so much these days, little more than the dogmatic anti-dogma of later Wittgenstein.
That’s a non sequitur. ‘Conceptual scheme’ doesn’t mean ‘widespread way of thinking’. A conceptual scheme is a set of interrelated ideas, and category mistakes arise when ideas are used in ways that are inconsistent with their positions in the set.
Science (for example) might claim that certain ideas are inadequate for dealing with the empirical facts and offer alternative ideas to replace them, but philosophy (of the sort in question) can only follow in science’s footsteps and elucidate the new ideas, their relations to the old, the risks of confusion, etc.
I didn’t think it did. A category mistake is not necessarily internal to a set. You might have a completely consistent scheme, but if it considers “political affiliation” to have spatial co-ordinates and a velocity, and as a result you end up importing misunderstandings from mechanics into your scheme, then that’s a category error. Similarly with confusions over brain activity and mental attributes.
If enough people make a mistake with a conceptual scheme, then that becomes the conceptual scheme. Same with people misusing words. Except that words are only meant to denote things, not model relationships as conceptual schemes are.
I disagree that science calls the shots and philosophy runs along afterwards explaining what the scientists meant. And so, I think, does Hacker:
“Our business is to tidy up linguistic or conceptual confusions rooted, among other places, in existing grammar. What we can do is clarify and disentangle conceptual confusions in the sciences…
… There are far too many philosophers who take their task to be to sing the Hallelujah Chorus to the sciences. It seems to me we should be serious, and one hopes helpful, conceptual critics of the sciences.”
philosophy is fundamentaly about truth , which implies the ability to reason clearly
and reason is based on the gathering of learned and observed knowledge
I wasn’t talking about inconsistent schemes. I said ‘[C]ategory mistakes arise when ideas are used in ways that are inconsistent with their positions in the set’. Only if you presuppose that conceptual schemes are a function of how their constituent concepts are used can you infer from what I said that I was talking about inconsistent schemes. But then you’d be presupposing the very point I’m denying.
To express my point in terms of your example, to attribute a velocity to a political affiliation is to use the concepts of velocity and political affiliation in ways that are inconsistent with their positions in our conceptual scheme.
I totally disagree with the analogy. Words are a matter of mere convention, but we can’t do just whatever we like with concepts. Otherwise I’d be sitting here conjuring up a square circle as I type.
That’s absolutely not what I said. I gave science as an example of something that, unlike philosophy, can give us reasons for changing our conceptual scheme. It doesn’t follow from this that philosophy has no role in clearing up conceptual confusions in the formulation or implementation of that scheme.
He’s referring to conceptual confusions that are revealed in how we think, write and speak. It doesn’t follow from this that he thinks there are problems with the schemes that we’re abusing.
I wasn’t talking about inconsistent schemes. I said ‘[C]ategory mistakes arise when ideas are used in ways that are inconsistent with their positions in the set’. Only if you presuppose that conceptual schemes are a function of how their constituent concepts are used can you infer from what I said that I was talking about inconsistent schemes. But then you’d be presupposing the very point I’m denying.
To express my point in terms of your example, to attribute a velocity to a political affiliation is to use the concepts of velocity and political affiliation in ways that are inconsistent with their positions in our conceptual scheme.
I totally disagree with the analogy. Words are a matter of mere convention, but we can’t do just whatever we like with concepts. Otherwise I’d be sitting here conjuring up square circles as I type.
That’s absolutely not what I said. I gave science as an example of something that, unlike philosophy, can give us reasons for changing our conceptual scheme. It doesn’t follow from this that philosophy has no role in clearing up conceptual confusions in the formulation or implementation of that scheme.
He’s referring to conceptual confusions that are revealed in how we think, write and speak. It doesn’t follow from this that he thinks there are problems with the schemes that we’re abusing.
So a conceptual scheme is the totality of a set of interrelated ideas? I would see the conceptual scheme of quantum physics to be different to that of relativism and different again to Newtonian mechanics. But even if that is case, it leaves his statement that “the philosophical problem, like all philosophical problems, is a confusion in the conceptual scheme” unaffected - these confusions are still tackled by ‘rethinking’, ‘engineering’, ‘reorder(ing)’, ‘redefin(ing)’ and ‘rearrang(ing)’, whether within the scheme or on the larger scale.
That’s the point I was trying to make. Words can evolve, but schemes lose their potency as a map or model of reality.
Then we’re in agreement, no?
Among other places.
Hmm, I’m not sure. My position is this:
I could be wrong, but I take this to be the general tenor of Wittgenstein-influenced Oxford philosophy — the tradition of Ryle, Austin, Strawson and, apparently, Hacker (an alumnus of my alma mater, I’ve just discovered).
By contrast, your position seems to be this:
Am I putting words into your mouth? If not, what I’m not sure about is whether the disagreement between us is merely verbal — whether we just mean different things by ‘conceptual scheme’. If that’s the case, I can accept your list of ‘re-’ words after all. But then it leaves me wondering what can be your objection to analytic philosophy.
Taking a concrete example, the concept of ‘knowing something’ being an active mental process. One I’ve come across here, and one that wasn’t too far from the 18th century mind. Clearly, I know the rules of chess whether I’m thinking about them, playing a game, washing the dishes or sleeping; I know the currency of Japan whether or not I’m talking exchange rates. So, a disposition or capacity rather than an action; a category error. Very much Ryle/Austin.
I’d say that sort of category error is what leads to internal inconsistencies (and hence confusions) in conceptual schemes. The confusion comes to light by pointing out inconsistencies. If science makes theories to explain observations, as it should, and those theories use conceptual frameworks that aren’t consistent or justified, someone has to point it out. Whether it’s a scientific-minded philosopher or a philosophically-minded scientist, I don’t mind.
I don’t have much of an objection to analytical philosophy, besides its self-imposed limited scope. I’m certainly a lot closer to that than post-structuralist existentiophenomenology or neoclassicist aphorism. 
No problem.
Then my assessment of our disagreement was accurate, don’t you think? What you call ‘inconsistences in conceptual schemes’ or ‘conceptual frameworks that aren’t consistent’, I would call ‘uses of concepts that are inconsistent with their roles in conceptual schemes’. So for me, the concept of knowing something and the concept of active mental processes are both part of a single, internally coherent conceptual scheme; but to place knowing something in the category of active mental processes is to use the two concepts in ways that are inconsistent with their roles in the scheme.
I’m sure we just disagree about what ‘conceptual scheme’ means. You take a conceptual scheme to be a function of how concepts are used (or misused). I take a conceptual scheme to be a function of how concepts (successfully) fit together.
So in your original post, where you weren’t quoting, were you just paraphrasing? I took you to be asserting ('Philosophy isn’t a discovering … ').
Philosophy is about learning how to think properly and in a fashion to convince more than yourself is it not? If not what use is it?
It’s not about thought or knowledge per se, more about how we think and hence acquire valid knowledge.
Yes, sorry, I wasn’t clear - the difference comes from that difference in terminology.
I was assertively paraphrasing, in the interests of discussion 
But it’s not a million miles from what I like and find useful about philosophy.
So in your view what’s left after we’ve stripped away analysis (Hacker), armchair science (Sauwelios), and poetic writing (Vanitas)?
Once we strip away the superfluous all that remains is a truth, subjective as that is obviously. Who wants absolute truths that way lies the death of reason.
Sometimes it’s merely the question that counts not the conclusion, no?
How about a bit of wisdom?
Ever met anyone wise?
Is ‘wisdom’ any more or less subjective than ‘truth?’
What’s left isn’t necessarily “true”, but it is frank and honest – that, to me, constitutes some degree of wisdom inasmuch as it provides insight into the human condition (how we think & behave).
Much more subjective. Truth aims to reflect the state of things in our statements, wisdom is more about new ways to consider the state of things; “what to do” is never less subjective than “what is”.
Hello Humean,
— Something containing methodologies, observed results, analysis and/or explanatory hypotheses.
O- Methodologies reflect an approach to retrieve what is the case. As such it reflects a belief about facts, and not a fact itself. A book of facts that presents me a methodology, really only shows me the authors worked out beliefs about what is fact, and/or how he judges what is or isn’t the case.
A book that presents observed results, again, presents only someone’s or some group’s interpretations. The question comes “result of what?”. Sure, I can create an experiment, based on an overall analysis and explanatory hypothesis, but the results reveal only consistency or inconsistency with said hypothesis. But whether this consistency reveals a fact, or what is actually the case, what really and objectively is real, that is not part of the experiment. So I question whether a book of scientific “facts” deliver much by the way of facts, if the criteria is that stated above.
— A book of Northern European birds may well be beyond mathematical description but still contain many scientific facts and no philosophical ones. Mathematics is a root aim and tool of many, but not all, physical sciences.
O- Since ornithology can very well be taken by any amateur, I am not surprised that in this case mathematics would not be a requirement. Nevertheless, while mostly absent, it is not necessarily absent from the discipline, when in fact it is conducted as a dicipline and not so much for the excuse of looking at the pretty little birds. Books that, for example, study speciation of birds will use formulas. If the study is about the viability of an enviroment, I see math as an asset. If the book wants to give us the evolutionary roots of a species, with dates in which a species existed, then you are delving into physical characteristics of carbon based materials which require math for measurement. So math may well be included. Sure, it won’t be by the way of equations, but then again, Brian Green doesn’t pester his books with the mathematical equations which guide his statements, does he? But that doesn’t mean that what he says could have been known without a reliance on mathematical formulas- in the case of a possible book of ornithology= carbon dating.
As for philosophy. The study of birds may not have been possible without a little love for wisdom, so I would not say that an ornithology book is void of philosophy. It is implied. The difference is in the tendency of philosopher to tie the observed to something that is beyond observation. The ornithologist’s subject is tied to itself, for the most part. As I said above, certain subjects within the practice of ornithology reach beyond what is observed (instinct, learning, ecological systems and conservation for a short list).
— With the exception of the big bang, science really only deals with ordinary occasions.
O- Yeah, you’re right. But to those that believe that God is All in all, wouldn’t that make the experience of God equally as ordinary? Among believers , many will tell you that they have a personal relationship with God, yet their lives are very ordinary. many may glance upon the stars and see an ordinary night sky while to others it speaks of an eureka moment. This is because the difference between ordinary and extra-ordinary is a subjective valuation. Scientific discovery are extra-ordinary events. Scientists are affected disproportionately to the event. Take Newton. If the tale is true, then he had his moment of genius after being struck above the head with an apple falling from a tree.
— Religion is similar to science only insofar as it presupposes nothing and encourages enquiry.
O- But science presupposes a great deal. It encourages inquiry, yes, but also peer review.
— But one of the principal appeals of religion to many is its lack of doubt and its presentation of certainty.
O- Are we talking about Evolution?
— Science is similar to religion insofar as it develops dogmas and stifles debate. The idea is that that should be the exception too. As more people turn to the secular and away from religion, they seek certainty from science that they are missing elsewhere, unfortunately. And science becomes thereby an increasingly political tool.
O- Science is advanced on closed debates- meaning that many theories are based on other theories. Something that is proposed is based on others propositions because these other propositions cease to be discussed and are taken as “granted”. case in point is evolution whose explanatory power has made it an indispensable tool to advance scientific knowledge, though itself only a theory. People debate conclusions that can be drawn when evolution is implicitly accepted as fact. No one goes and questions the entire theoretical presuppositions upon which the suppositions debated rest. People can debate about whether change occured gradually or in jumps, but no one ever debates (except for creationists) the fact that is evolutionary theory, the fact of change over time.
— If the burning bush appeared and spoke to everyone who cared to look for it as reliably as Einstein’s measurements have been and may still be duplicated and interpreted, I would certainly see more value in the holistic appeal you’re making.
O- My appeal is only that observers whether of God or of the Grand scheme of things, succumb equally to the feeling of awe. No one is an uninterested observer and this is projected onto possible observations. The fact is that how a hypothesis is conceived affects the parameters of what is measured. The hypothesis is not disinterested and this is shown by the fact that a lot of scientists, say ecologists, hotly debate the interpretation of observations event though their books propose to present “facts”.
Observations require interpretation and these rely on hypotheses. These hypotheses are like philosopies in that they are not facts, but educated guesses. Philosophical books cannot present simple books of fact because they are hypothetical. Science can present books of facts only after you accept the hypothesis or philosophical-sister behind it. It is not an in-itself, it is not without prejudice and the “facts” are placed into question. And when they DO present facts, such as evolution, then they are objectionable in how zealous defences of it are based not on it’s factualness but in it’s utility (like it’s overall elegance and explanatory power).
— As a rough guideline, I would propose: debates about the contingent scientific facts belong to science;
O- But what about the historical development of hypotheses?
Gimme an example.