That makes sense to me.
Nice answer. I wouldn’t take for granted a serious answer, though, if you felt like providing one. (My question was a response to this from you: ‘If it deals with (or raises) philosophical questions in a non-fiction way, it’s philosophy.’)
This is just incorrect. A very simple example of CBT would be treating a fear of spiders by bringing to the surface the unacknowledged belief that all spiders are deadly (that’s the cognitive bit). The falsity of the belief would then by revealed by testing it, e.g. by picking up a few spiders and seeing whether they killed you (that’s the behavioural bit). (The context is your claim that CBT already covers the ground potentially covered by ‘therapeutic philosophy’.)
I’m interested in this. Can you give me an example (fictitious will do)?
Yeah, and I like that. What I’m still trying to clear up (I think) is how this takes us beyond analysis. I think we’re getting there.
Philosophy gave birth to science, they are not really seperate, since science still relies heavily on philosophies and frameworks for interpretating evidence, even if science would like to divorce itself from philosophy it cannot, because concepts are needed to interpret the results of empircism.
The proof of Hume’s assertion would be empirical, in this case. He is, after all, telling you ‘what is the case’. Were you going to say that that makes him a scientist? I thought there was more to it than that…? Wasn’t I assuming the opposite…? I doubt Kuhn would be on board with the idea that science has “full libraries of well established objective facts and well confirmed theories”. And don’t they burn everything every so often…?
Don’t get the wrong impression. I’m content with what you said above. It is, after all, an example of what you think philosophy is. Weirdly, I can’t really refute your re-definition. I could provide examples of moral philosophers describing what is the case, but you’ll call it anthropology or sociology; or political philosophers describing what is the case, but you’ll call it political science; or phenomenologists describing what is the case, but you’ll call it cognitive science (or something like that); or metaphysicians doing what they do, but you’ll call it nonsense (would you?); would you call existentialists are sort of psychologist…? And when the scientists alter their methods internally, are they really a sort of philosopher? I could try to tell you that you, yourself, are describing ‘what is the case’ with your definition of what philosophers do, but you’ll tell me it’s just in the concept—or wait, what will you tell me…?
It makes one look like the other, to me. I have a tough time seeing the distinctions you want to, practically speaking, between the fact-collectors and the know-how’ers, and theoretically, between the two types of knowledge. I’m not averse to it, though. Insofar as I understand the difference, it makes philosophers look like the masters and commanders of lemming operatives. Plato-esque, a bit.
Interestingly (sort of), this looks like a response to my position. And if it were (which it isn’t), my response would be that the ‘definition of what philosophers do’ isn’t itself part of philosophy.
While I completely agree with this statement, I’m not sure about the context…
Those two individuals were specifically philosophers of science. That isn’t to say they are any less philosophical, but their expertise was specialized. In both cases I would assume that the philosophy was largely predicated upon an extensive understanding of scientific method [that is, science preceded philosophy]. However, I do not think that a universal quality of “Philosophers” in general. I think philosophers should have a solid grasp of logic, which translates almost directly to science; but actual scientific knowledge [knowing how ‘to do science’] is more specialized, in my opinion.
I would vehemently disagree. And I would point you to all the disagreements among philosophers, throughout the history of philosophy, about what philosophy is—as we’re having now. (But, I’m not familiar with your position).
That philosophers have disagreed throughout the history of philosophy about what philosophy is doesn’t entail that their disagreements have been part of philosophy. I dare say that all philosophers throughout history have had to evacuate their bowels from time to time, but it doesn’t follow that their bowel evacuations have been philosophy (or vice versa, at least not in all cases).
On second thoughts, I take back what I’ve said to some extent. I’d agree that the dispute about whether metaphysics describes mind-independent reality or describes our conceptual scheme might be part of philosophy. And I’d agree that the dispute about whether first-order ethics describes mind-independent reality or describes our attitudes might be part of philosophy. Where I’d disagree is on whether empirical or ‘metaphysical’ (in the pejorative sense) questions can be part of philosophy - I’d say that’s simply a matter of lexicology.
I’ve spoken to a therapist friend and it seems I was wrong in my idea of what CBT was. Live and learn. 
Off the top of my head, I can’t really. Or at least, the examples I could come up with would be sufficiently irrational that philosophical treatment would probably not stand a chance - if a category error survives being pointed out, it’s probably a psychotic problem.
A fair point. I’ve been thinking in any case whether ‘wisdom’ such as it is is more an internal good to philosophy than an external deliverable.
Additional to analysis, though, there are many books (of WILDLY varying quality) that take information from wildly different sources like psychology, sociology, mathematics, physics and take a look at examining ‘the good life’, for example, or epistemology. Classical philosophy studies, but synthetic rather than analytic.
It doesn’t make him a scientist, as he only proposed the hypothesis. But it doesn’t make it true simply because he proposed it.
I think Kuhn would agree that science does have a lot of established facts and confirmed theories - as I recall, he gives optics as a prime example. And says that once science has got to a certain stage, such facts are no longer ‘science’ but technology, engineering, production. No paradigm shift is going to change the prescription of your glasses or the hardness of your screwdriver head.
I think all good philosophy threads should have the occasional trumpet of the Reflexive Argument Horn. The distinction is artificial in the sense that the people who collect the facts are often those who spend a lot of time thinking about what to do with the facts, and the people who decide how studies are structured are often tempted by the details and specifics. Many economists are investors too.
Science less so than law or politics, I think; for a start, there is the ‘Two Worlds’ culture that keeps a lot of scientists away from arts and humanities, and there is a considerable investment in apparatus and time necessary for most modern scientific studies. Two hundred years ago, of course, the boundaries were as blurry for natural philosophy as for political or economic philosophy.
Popper was more famous in his lifetime as a political philosopher. And most of ‘how to do science’ is epistemology, rather than any scientific training; the scientific method is applicable irrespective of the science studied, and highly abstracted from the laboratory world of titrations and bunsen burners.
I’m not sure of your point. He is still recognized as a philosopher of science [if not the philosopher of science]. His knowledge of science is what made his philosophy so profound.
I don’t understand what this means. ‘How to do science’ is predicated upon epistemological presumptions, but does that necessarily translate to an actual ability ‘to do science’? One can focus on understanding how/what we know, and how we obtain that knowledge, without being able to apply that understanding in a ‘scientific’ way. In other words, ‘doing science’ involves a learned methodology that does not necessarily accompany a general epistemological understanding.
Agreed, but knowledge of/about/regarding philosophy doesn’t imply any understanding of the Socratic method, for instance, any more than it does the scientific method. Those are ways to apply your understanding, but entail specific methodology in that application. Also, the scientific method has been amended since its conception; no?
Just to jump in here to unwelcomely address only the title rather than the article to which it was obviously meant to refer, philosophy is like trying on different clothes.
You clarify and strip off when you deconstruct an argument and you obscure/mask/redress when you put together a new one.
This is just another analogy like her crossword one - just serves to prettify a new challenge for philosophers to unravel at their pleasure. The simple analogy is akin to seducing the thinker, by making a solution seem attainable, into grateful muddlement amidst tangled layers that inevitably hide the fallible assumption that underlies all… so that then they may either ravage or decide to politely leave be.
(Supposing truth to be a woman - what?)
No, it wasn’t, really. His knowledge of science wasn’t exceptional, he wasn’t a scientist and didn’t claim any acute understanding of scientific theories. His whole beef was epistemological, that of verification/falsification. That’s my point. His peers were Carnap, Russell and Wittgenstein, not Bohr, Einstein or Oppenheimer.
Absolutely not. That’s why philosophers cover the epistemological requirements, and scientists (and applied mathematicians/statisticians) work out the practicalities of delivering them.
Popper never ‘did science’, neither did Kuhn. They read and thought a lot about how it should be done, in very general abstract terms, but they didn’t design experiments or develop scientific hypotheses - they looked into the terms by which experiments and hypotheses could be judged, evaluated, described, understood.
I’d say ignorance of the Socratic method is a lack of knowledge about philosophy, wouldn’t you? And yes, insofar as there is “the scientific method”, it’s been amended - it is not a law, but the name we give the standard protocols that scientists hold their work to.
Ha! Shame. It reminds me of my attempts (long since abandoned) to explain why grammar is important. Any fictitious examples I could produce of mistakes that would cause big problems in people’s lives were so far-fetched that no-one would be likely to make them, and any real examples I could produce didn’t have very serious consequences.
I don’t get how a synthesis of non-philosophical studies amounts to a philosophical study. Is that what you’re proposing?
I’m well aware that pre-twentieth century ‘philosophy’ was at least as concerned with psychological questions as conceptual ones. But psychological questions have been taken on by an empirical science … psychology. What psychological questions are there that a) aren’t the domain of psychology, b) aren’t conceptual, and c) can be answered other than by guesswork? The same goes for sociology, physics, etc.
I see what you’re getting at now. However, I’ve got to disagree. While you are right about his epistemological ‘beef’, that was not the limit of his philosophy; though it did serve as a primary theme. His understanding of scientific theory was exceptional, in my opinion. I don’t think he ever needed to claim an acute understanding – it was implied by the scope of his analytics. His peers don’t necessarily dictate the subject matter, or focus, of his work.
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This seems agreeable enough, but still doesn’t necessarily imply any knowledge of ‘how to do science’. Seems more like understanding ‘why we do science’. The ‘how to do’ is dictated by scientists, though it may have been refined through specialized philosophy.
I can’t really say whether or not he actually ‘did science’, but I’d contend that he delved a bit deeper [in particular cases] than general, abstract terms.
About philosophy, yes. Actual philosophical understanding, not necessarily [especially in cases where the information wasn’t available]. Confucius was likely not aware of the Socratic method.
True, but my point is that the standard is dynamic in nature. Philosophy of science, in particular, would require an in-depth understanding of scientific methodology in order to be, and remain, relevant.
I know the question wasn’t addressed to me, but it got me thinking. Hows-a-bout something like this–
A question is ‘philosophical’ when posed in the interest of understanding, or ‘truth’ [used as synonymous with ‘reality’], of a matter pertaining to ‘knowledge’ and the conditions thereof [behavioral or otherwise].
Doesn’t that make all cognitive matters ‘philosophical’? I’m not saying that’s an inaccurate use of the word, but it kind of diminishes its usefulness.
Heh, indeed, it’s the sort of creative thinking that I don’t know how to force. 
There’s the well-known importance of capitals in “would you please help Uncle Jack off his horse?” I guess, or abstractions from various newspaper headline blunders as inspirational material.
That’s what I’m proposing, yes. You make a philosophical point (about How One Should Live A Good Life, say), backing it up with quotes from literature, psychology studies, sociology or political theory… or even philosophy. Epistemology and psychology share some common grounds, as do ethics and sociology (for some ethical standpoints, at least).
Not necessarily. A majority of simple cognitive matters are easily presumable based on what is given.
2+2=4 is presumable based on the predetermined values. “Does 2 plus 2 equal 4?” is not necessarily a philosophical question, for instance, because it is not an inquiry into/about ‘knowledge’ or the conditions thereof; it is an inquiry of ‘knowledge’ [what ‘knowledge’ dictates]. In other words, what we ‘know’ and how we use it is already accepted, the question is essentially asking if 2+2=4 is logically consistent based on what is given. A ‘philosophical’ question, on the other hand, must take into account what is given, then inquire from there – like “why does 2 plus 2 equal 4?”. We ‘know’ 2+2=4, but how/why?
Most people simply accept that they “breathe air”, so asking “what do we breath?” is an inquiry of knowledge – what does the given [“breathing”] imply to us? Air. An inquiry into/about that ‘knowledge’, like “is air all we can possibly breathe?”, forces an examination of what is given - both “air” and “breathing”.
On one hand we question what follows from ‘knowledge’, and on the other we question the specificity, accuracy, or content of ‘knowledge’. The latter, to me, seems ‘philosophical’, where the former is just pragmatic.
…I wrote way to much in this explanation. I hope that makes some kind of sense.
In my experience its more about arm waving and ego stroking and proving you’ve read more about x than anyone else but such is the nature of such fields. 