philosophy of mind

Is there a causal explaination for intentions?

  • yes
  • no
0 voters

With all the problems that causality brings to philosophy of the mind, shouldn’t we begin to look at other options. Briefing: How can causality explain “I went to the kitchen because that is what I wanted to do.” It has trouble expressing intentions. Shouldn’t we begin to consider the possibility that human action can not be entirely explained causally? Causality of intentional brain states seems problematic. Rather shoukdnt we consider that some human actions can be explained Teleologically. This would be a significant help to the free-will problem as well.
Thoughts?

I think that you run into the wall of consciousness. With consciousness comes the apriori assumption that anything of mind is causal. That we may not perceive cause is understood, but lack of understanding the chain of causation in not proof of the lack of such. It is a case of locking up the conclusion in the definition, and because it takes into account that which is known, and posits the unknown, it finally comes down to opinion and not proof.

JT